Filed 8/12/26 Lockett v. Allen CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
JESSICA LOCKETT, B346277
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 25TRRO00076)
JUSTIN ALLEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gia G. Bosley, Judge. Affirmed.
Reel Fathers Rights and Nakisha Sandy for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jessica Lockett, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Justin Allen appeals from a five-year restraining order
issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.) (DVPA).1 Because substantial evidence supported
the trial court’s factual findings, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing the restraining order. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Lockett Confronts Allen’s Fiancée During a Custody
Exchange, and Allen Brandishes a Firearm
Allen and Jessica Lockett met in 2015 when they were
serving in the United States Navy. They dated for a short time,
but ended their relationship in July 2016, shortly after the birth
of their daughter, Z.
On November 3, 2024 Lockett, along with her boyfriend
Seven Mason and her mother, traveled from Los Angeles, where
Lockett lived, to San Diego, where Allen lived with his fiancée.
Lockett went to pick up Z., who was seven years old at the time.
The custody exchange did not go well. When Lockett and
Mason arrived at Allen’s home at 8:30 p.m., Lockett rang the
doorbell, and Allen’s fiancée answered the door. Lockett and
Allen’s fiancée began to argue and shout at each other.
1 Statutory references are to the Family Code.
2
Hearing the argument, Allen came downstairs to the front
door, told Z. to go upstairs, and refused to let her leave with
Lockett. According to Lockett’s testimony, which the trial court
found credible, Allen “pulled a gun, cocked a gun, and waved a
gun” and said he would kill Lockett and her family. Allen said
that his fiancée would beat up Lockett and that Mason would not
be able to stop her.2
According to Mason, who also testified at trial, Allen came
downstairs with a weapon concealed in his “rear waistband.”
Mason saw Allen brandish and cock the gun at him, Lockett, and
Lockett’s mother. Mason moved between Allen and Lockett and
challenged Allen to a fight; Lockett said she felt safe because
Mason was protecting her. Lockett and her companions went
back to her car, and Lockett called the police.
The police arrived, detained Allen, viewed video recordings
from a neighbor’s doorbell camera, and released Allen. The
officers asked Allen whether he had a firearm and searched the
house, but they did not find a firearm or arrest him. Allen denied
that any of the events described by Lockett occurred and said
that he never had a firearm during the incident. He explained he
keeps all of his weapons in a safe and “away from the children.”
Allen did not let Z. leave with Lockett. He said he did not
give Lockett custody of Z. at that time because Lockett “was
2 Lockett testified about two other incidents of domestic
violence, both in 2019, one where Allen slammed her head
against a shower door in front of Z. and another where Allen
threw Lockett’s belongings out of her house and drove away with
Z. The court found Lockett’s testimony about these prior
incidents of domestic violence credible. Allen denied these
incidents occurred.
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acting in a very violent and aggressive manner” and Allen did not
“feel safe just handing [Z.] over while [Lockett] and her boyfriend
were outside [the] door acting erratic.”
The trial court viewed 12 videos taken from the neighbor’s
doorbell camera that show much (though not all) of the incident.
The videos show that Lockett was agitated and aggressive from
the beginning of the confrontation and that Mason played a
major role in escalating the conflict by threatening Allen and his
fiancée and trying to fight him. The videos confirm Allen went
upstairs, returned downstairs, and stood at the open front door
behind his fiancée. At one point Mason said to Allen, “I been
waiting to beat that ass” and “I been waiting to beat you up.”
The videos also show Lockett trying to hit Allen’s fiancée and
yelling, “Let her go!” and “Give me my daughter!” The videos
show Mason swinging his arms back and forth, threatening Allen
and his fiancée, stating he likes to fight, and challenging Allen to
a fight. One of the videos shows Allen making a movement that
could have been him revealing a gun in his waistband. Mason’s
behavior appears to change at that point, and he yells several
times, “That’s what I thought.” The videos, however, do not show
Allen waving or cocking a gun.
B. The Trial Court Grants Lockett’s Request for a
Domestic Violence Restraining Order and Issues
a Statement of Decision
The court found that Lockett’s testimony was credible and
that Lockett met her burden to show by a preponderance of the
evidence past abuse by Allen. The court stated: Lockett’s
“testimony was that [Allen] brandished a gun on or about
November 3, 2024 [and] racked the gun. The court looked at the
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video, I think it was the fourth video, I saw [Allen] come down
the stairs and reach in his waistband. You can’t see the item that
was pulled out, but . . . what I saw on the video was consistent
with the testimony by [Lockett]. . . . I do agree that [Lockett’s]
behavior was not appropriate under the circumstances. I would
characterize her behavior as aggressive toward [Allen’s fiancée].
However, [Allen] became a more dominant aggressor in pulling
out a gun in a situation where the parties were arguing regarding
custody.”
The trial court issued a five-year restraining order. The
court also ordered Allen to have monitored visitation with Z. and
allowed him and Lockett to communicate in a parenting
application to discuss scheduling visitation. The court also
ordered Allen to enroll in and complete a domestic violence
treatment program and at least 12 parenting classes. The court
stated: “My understanding is that there is a case in San Diego.
Any further request regarding custody should be filed in that
court. Any further request to modify or to rebut the presumption
under [section] 3044 should be directed to the family law court in
San Diego.”
Allen filed a request for a statement of decision, listing
20 issues he wanted the court to address. The court issued a
written statement of decision, summarizing the evidence and
stating its findings.
In its statement of decision the court again stated it found
credible Lockett’s testimony that Allen walked down the stairs
inside his home and that, as “he descended the stairs, he pulled a
gun from inside his waistband and cocked it.” The court also
found Allen’s testimony was not credible. The court stated that it
had watched the surveillance videos from the neighbor’s doorbell
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camera and that they showed Lockett “arguing aggressively” with
Allen’s fiancée. The court stated that Allen “was seen descending
the staircase while reaching into his waistband as if grabbing an
object. Because of the movements of individuals within the
frame, further movements of [Allen’s] hands were blocked from
the camera’s view. The movements that were captured were
consistent with [Lockett’s] testimony that [Allen] was reaching
for a gun.” The court found the videos showed that Lockett was
the “original aggressor” and that her “tone and demeanor were
aggressive and threatening toward” Allen’s fiancée. The court
found, however, that Allen “was the more dominant aggressor”
and that his “actions in retrieving and cocking the firearm during
the argument would not constitute self[-]defense or defense of
others” and was “excessive.” Allen timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The DVPA authorizes the trial court to issue a restraining
order “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual
abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in
the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these
persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.”
(§ 6220; see J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 640-641.)
“Under the DVPA, a court may issue a protective order “‘to
restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of
domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the
persons involved,” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse.”’” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
106, 115; see J.H., at p. 641 [under section 6300, subd. (a),
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“[c]ourts may issue a restraining order to achieve [the DVPA’s]
purpose upon ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse’”].)
Section 6211 defines “domestic violence” as “abuse
perpetrated against,” among others, a former cohabitant, a
person with whom the respondent had a dating relationship, or a
person with whom the respondent has had a child. (§ 6211,
subds. (b), (c), (d); see Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
1166, 1175.) “Abuse” within the meaning of the DVPA includes
“behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Section 6320,
subdivision (a), in turn, authorizes the court to enjoin “‘molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting,
battering, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting, either
directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, [and] coming within a
specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.’”
Abuse under the DVPA includes not only physical abuse or
injury, but also ‘“[a]nnoying and harassing’” conduct. (In re
Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 536;
see K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981 [abuse includes
conduct that “‘“destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other
party”’”]; N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 602 [abuse
includes conduct that “disturb[s] the peace of the protected
party”].)
The party seeking the domestic violence restraining order
has the burden of demonstrating past abuse by a preponderance
of the evidence. (§ 6300, subd. (a); Hatley v. Southard (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 579, 592.) We review an order issuing a
restraining order under the DVPA for abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933; In re
Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) “‘To
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the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s
factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of
review.’” (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
Findings, and the Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Issuing the Restraining Order
Allen does not argue threatening the mother of one’s child
with a firearm does not qualify as abuse under the DVPA. (See
In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 228
[by pointing a gun at his wife and threatening to kill her, the
husband committed domestic abuse by placing his wife “‘in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury’”].)
Instead, Allen claims it never happened.
In particular, Allen argues substantial evidence did not
support the trial court’s ruling because the collection of video
recordings from the doorbell camera, which according to Allen is
“the most reliable evidence of what occurred on November 3,
2024,” “flatly contradicts” Lockett’s testimony because it does not
show Allen “draw, display, point, or brandish a firearm.” Allen
asserts: “Every piece of objective evidence contradicts the court’s
central finding. When the entire objective evidentiary record
points in one direction and only uncorroborated testimony points
the other way, substantial evidence cannot sustain the finding.”
Allen misunderstands the substantial evidence standard of
review and the evidence in this case.
In reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial
evidence, “‘“we examine the entire record to determine whether
there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.]
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We must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.
[Citation.] We do not determine credibility or reweigh the
evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence supports the
judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would
support a contrary finding.”’” (In re Marriage of M.P. & M.C.
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1106-1107; accord, Parris J. v.
Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 116; see M.S. v. A.S.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1144 [“The inquiry is whether
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, not whether a
contrary finding might have been made.”].) “‘The testimony of
one witness, even that of a party, may constitute substantial
evidence.’” (In re Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369,
380.)
Lockett testified Allen brandished a gun, cocked it, and
threatened to kill Lockett, her mother, and Mason. The court
believed her. That was enough. (See In re Marriage of Mix
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614 [“‘The testimony of a witness, even the
party himself, may be sufficient.’”]; Major v. Western Home Ins.
Co. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1208 [“[t]he testimony of a
single credible witness—even if a party to the action—may
constitute “substantial evidence”]; see also Estate of Wardani
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 870, 885 [“under substantial evidence
review, appellate courts defer to a trial court’s credibility
determinations”]; DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 371, 382 [“[i]n exercising substantial evidence
review, an appellate court does not evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses but defers to the trier of fact”].) Indeed, in “many
domestic violence cases . . . the sole evidence of abuse will be the
survivor’s own testimony which, standing alone, can be sufficient
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to establish a fact.” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. supra,
65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119.)
Mason testified Allen came downstairs with a gun in his
waistband and brandished it. The court believed him. That, too,
was enough. (See People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72,
86 [“although not required,” corroborating testimony may
constitute substantial evidence]; Major v. Western Home Ins. Co.,
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208 [same].)
It is true, as Allen suggests, a witness’s testimony may not
constitute substantial evidence if that testimony is “physically
impossible or inherently improbable.” (DeNike v. Mathew
Enterprise, Inc., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 381; see People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 281.) And as Allen repeatedly
points out, none of the individual videos shows him waving or
pointing a gun. But one of the videos shows Allen making a
movement (and Mason reacting to the movement) that, as the
trial court found, was consistent with Allen displaying a weapon
in his waistband. And, because the 12 videos did not capture
every moment of the encounter, they did not make the testimony
of Lockett and Mason that they saw a gun physically impossible
or, given that one of the videos shows Allen making a motion
consistent with brandishing a gun, inherently improbable. (See
Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1548, 1562 [“‘[i]t is the exclusive function of the trial court to
weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts and determine the
credibility of witnesses’”].)
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C. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Grant Lockett’s
Request for a Restraining Order
Allen argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) to issue a restraining order because he and Lockett
had a custody case in San Diego County Superior Court and that
under section 3422 the court in San Diego had “‘exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction over the determination’” of which parent
had custody of Z. Allen argues that the trial court in Los Angeles
County “had no authority to displace San Diego’s exclusive
jurisdiction through its emergency powers” and that the court in
Los Angeles County “could act—if at all—only within the narrow
confines of . . . section 3424’s temporary emergency jurisdiction: a
tool available ‘only to protect the child’ and only on a temporary
basis.”
The premise of Allen’s argument is flawed. The UCCJEA
“ensures that only one state has jurisdiction to make child
custody decisions at any time.” (In re Kayla W. (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 99, 107.) It is “a carefully crafted statutory
scheme—enacted not just by California but also by 48 other
states (excluding only Massachusetts)—to determine the
appropriate forum for child custody proceedings and avoid
conflicting state child custody orders.” (In re L.C. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 728, 735, fn. omitted.) “‘The UCCJEA is designed
to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between states and relitigation of
custody decisions, promote cooperation between states, and
facilitate enforcement of another state’s custody decrees.’”
(A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 517; accord,
L.C., at p. 738-739; see In re Ari S. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1125,
1130 [the UCCJEA “provides a framework to address custody
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issues across states”]; In re Marriage of Kent (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 487, 493 [the “UCCJEA determines the proper
jurisdictional situs as between interested states for litigation of
child custody determinations”].) The UCCJEA “is the exclusive
method to decide the proper forum to adjudicate issues involving
a child subject to a sister-state custody order.” (Kayla W., at
p. 105.)
There are no custody orders from other states at issue in
this appeal. The record suggests there was some kind of divorce
proceeding in Michigan that affected custody of Z., but there is no
evidence of what the court in Michigan ordered. And Allen is not
arguing the trial court’s orders conflicted with any orders by a
Michigan court; he is arguing the trial court’s orders had the
potential to conflict with the proceedings in a court in another
California county. The UCCJEA addresses conflicting interstate,
not intrastate or intercounty, custody orders.
Citing Grahm v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
1193 and N.S. v. D.M. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1040, Allen asserts
the “UCCJEA cannot be circumvented through parallel filings in
a different county.” Grahm, however, involved a custody order by
a New York court. (Grahm, at p. 1195.) N.S., which the court
described as a “complex custody proceeding,” involved a custody
order by a court in Illinois, as well as proceedings in Santa Clara
County and San Diego County. (N.S., at pp. 1045-1046.) The
issue of whether custody should be adjudicated in Santa Clara
County or San Diego County, however, was decided on a motion
to change venue, not under the UCCJEA. (See id. at p. 1046.)
Allen argues “section 3424, subdivision (d) does not merely
authorize court-to-court communication when another custody
proceeding is pending—it mandates it.” But again, section 3424
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applies to communication between courts in different states, not
different counties. Section 3424, subdivision (d), provides:
“A court of this state that has been asked to make a child custody
determination under this section, upon being informed that a
child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child
custody determination has been made by, a court of a state
having jurisdiction under Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, shall
immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this
state which is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 3421 to
3423, inclusive, upon being informed that a child custody
proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody
determination has been made by, a court of another state under a
statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate
with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the
safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the
duration of the temporary order.” (Italics added.) Section 3424
says nothing about communications between courts hearing child
custody proceedings in different parts of the same state.
Finally, even if there were a UCCJEA provision that
applied to child custody proceedings in different counties, as
opposed to different states, Allen did not argue the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on Lockett’s request for a domestic
violence restraining order or ask the court to transfer Lockett’s
request to San Diego County Superior Court. Unlike the parent
in N.S. v. D.M., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 1040, Allen did not make a
motion to transfer venue from Los Angeles County to San Diego
County. (See id. at p. 1046.) In his response to Lockett’s request
for a restraining order Allen accused Lockett of “attempting to
usurp” the San Diego court’s authority, and in his posttrial
request for a statement of decision Allen asked the court to state
13
the “[f]actual and legal basis for the court’s determination”
Lockett’s request for a restraining order was a “legitimate filing[ ]
to prevent acts of domestic violence or abuse against herself, as
opposed to a ruse to gain an advantage in an ongoing custody
dispute in San Diego filed by [Allen] immediately after [his] filing
of a request to modify child custody and visitation . . . .” But he
did not argue the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on
Lockett’s request, under the UCCJEA or otherwise, or ask the
court to transfer Lockett’s request for a restraining order to the
pending case in San Diego County.
DISPOSITION
The domestic violence restraining order is affirmed.
Lockett is to recover her costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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