Filed 10/27/26 Lo v. CM Holdings USA CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
KUANG HSUN LO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G066040
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01395202)
CM HOLDINGS USA, INC.,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.
Lachowicz Park, Sang Hyun Park and Jinni Kang for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Jeong and Likens and C. Yong Jeong for Defendant and
Respondent.
Kuang Hsun Lo appeals from the judgment in favor of CM
Holdings USA, Inc. (CM Holdings), issued after the trial court granted CM
Holdings’ demurrer dismissing the claims against it without leave to amend.
Lo’s allegations against CM Holdings are premised on his claim CM Holdings
is subject to successor liability under section 200.3 of the Labor Code.1
Section 200.3 establishes a “successor to a judgment debtor” is “liable for any
wages, damages, and penalties owed to any of the judgment debtor’s former
workforce pursuant to a final judgment, after the time to appeal therefrom
has expired and for which no appeal therefrom is pending.” (§ 200.3, sub. (a).)
Here there was no judgment debtor or final judgment upon which to premise
successor liability. Nevertheless, Lo contends he should be able to litigate the
successorship claim against CM Holdings concurrently with the liability of
the other defendants. We disagree and find the claims against CM Holdings
were premature and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The operative first amended complaint2 alleged multiple
violations of the Labor Code against CM Holdings, as well as other
defendants who are not parties to this appeal. While the allegations
frequently did not distinguish between the different defendants, Lo alleged
he was employed as an in-office salesperson by the defendants from June 15,
2023 through January 12, 2024. Lo alleged he was misclassified as an exempt
employee and during the time of his employment was not paid an amount
equal to or greater than minimum wage. Lo further alleged his work
conditions were so intolerable that he was forced to leave and constructively
discharged. The defendants did not pay Lo his wages due and a check he did
receive bounced.
1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless
otherwise specified.
2 The trial court granted a demurrer directed to the initial
complaint and permitted Lo an opportunity to amend.
2
The allegations specific to CM Holdings indicated, “In April 2024,
CM [Holdings] took over the business operated and owned by [defendant
Summit Design] and [defendant B.T.S. Solar Design] using substantially the
same facilities, managing agent, and the same workforce offering the same
service of providing solar panel installation. CM [Holdings] is thus liable for
wages, damages, and penalties [the other defendants] owe to [Lo] pursuant to
a final judgment that will be awarded in the instant matter as a successor
under [section] 200.3.” The operative complaint further alleged CM Holdings
“assumed liability of the debts of [defendant Summit Design] and [defendant
B.T.S. Solar Design] during the merger of the entities into CM [Holdings]
which works as a mere continuation of [defendant Summit Design] and
[defendant B.T.S. Solar Design].” Lo alleged this merger was “entered into
fraudulently to escape liability for the debts.”
CM Holdings, along with the other defendants, filed a demurrer
to the operative complaint. CM Holdings argued the operative complaint
failed to state any claim against CM Holdings because, as Lo alleged and
admitted, CM Holdings did not take over the other defendants’ business until
April 2024, which was after Lo’s constructive discharge. CM Holdings further
argued Lo did not allege and could not allege facts sufficient to meet the
conditions of successor liability under Labor Code section 200.3. In response,
Lo argued section 200.3 allowed the claims to proceed against CM Holdings
as a successor to the employer.
The trial court granted the demurrer based on its conclusion
section 200.3 was limited to successors of judgment debtors after the issuance
of a final judgment and, because there was neither a judgment debtor nor a
final judgment, the operative complaint failed to state a claim against CM
Holdings. Because Lo had previously been given an opportunity to cure the
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defects as to CM Holdings, the demurrer was sustained without leave to
amend.3 The court entered judgment in favor of CM Holdings.
DISCUSSION
Lo argues we should reverse because section 200.3 permits
litigating CM Holdings’ liability as a successor concurrently with liability
even though there is no judgment debtor and no final judgment. Lo bases his
arguments on his claims regarding the plain language of section 200.3, the
broader statutory context, the legislative history, as well as other concerns
over the statute of limitations and due process protections to the alleged
successor.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a demurrer,
“we review the operative complaint ‘de novo to determine whether the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal
theory or to determine whether the trial court erroneously sustained the
demurrer as a matter of law.’” (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.) Consequently, “we accept the truth of material
facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact
or law.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th
339, 346.) “We independently construe statutory law, as its interpretation is a
question of law on which we are not bound by the trial court’s analysis.” (City
of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 861, 870.)
3 Lo does not argue the trial court should have permitted him
another opportunity to amend.
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II.
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 200.3 REQUIRES A FINAL JUDGMENT
ISSUED AGAINST A JUDGMENT DEBTOR
Section 200.3 provides, “[a] successor to a judgment debtor shall
be liable for any wages, damages, and penalties owed to any of the judgment
debtor’s former workforce pursuant to a final judgment, after the time to
appeal therefrom has expired and for which no appeal therefrom is pending.”
(§ 200.3, subd. (a).) The section sets forth criteria for determining
successorship, including: “(1) Uses substantially the same facilities or
substantially the same workforce to offer substantially the same services as
the judgment debtor.… [¶](2) Has substantially the same owners or
managers that control the labor relations as the judgment debtor. [¶](3)
Employs as a managing agent any person who directly controlled the wages,
hours, or working conditions of the affected workforce of the judgment
debtor.… [¶](4) Operates a business in the same industry and the business
has an owner, partner, officer, or director who is an immediate family
member of any owner, partner, officer, or director of the judgment debtor.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1)–(4).) Section 200.3 “shall not be construed to limit other
means of establishing successor liability for wages, damages, and penalties.”
(Id., subd. (b).)
Lo’s position appears largely to read out of section 200.3 the
requirements of both a judgment debtor and a final judgment. Lo contends he
should be permitted to litigate whether the other defendants violated the
Labor Code concurrently with his litigation of the issue of whether CM
Holdings is a successor. Lo argues his interpretation is consistent with the
plain language of the statute because “pursuant to a final judgment” and
“successor to a judgment debtor,” should be read to establish the “condition
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upon which to attach liability to a successor” but “not [to] limit when a
lawsuit can be initiated against the successor.” To his reading, these
provisions establish when liability exists, but do not impose a “sequential”
requirement that a final judgment must be entered before a lawsuit is filed.
“‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate the law’s purpose.’” (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14.) In doing so, courts look first to the “‘“the
statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.”’” (Turrieta
v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 687 (Turrieta).) We do not, however,
“‘“consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the entire
substance of the statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes’” and
“‘construe the words in question in context.”’” (Ibid.) “‘“If the statutory
language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls[,]”’” but if “‘“the
language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look
to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history.”’” (Ibid.) When construing a statute, “‘“[c]ourts should give
meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a
construction making any word surplusage.”’” (Briggs v. Eden Council for
Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 (Briggs); see also People v.
Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 301 [“Yet if reasonably possible we must
construe this legislation so as to harmonize its provisions and give force and
effect to every phrase thereof”].)
Even accepting Lo’s reading of the statute, if liability had not yet
attached, then there was no claim under section 200.3 precisely because the
elements of the claim had not accrued and there was no possibility of
successor liability at the time the action was filed. “Pursuant to a final
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judgment” is not a future aspirational statement, but a description of the
conditions the statute contemplates existing in order to impose liability. To
decide the issue before that time would risk asking the trial court to issue a
“‘purely advisory opinion based on hypothetical facts or speculative future
events.’” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 1175, 1186.) Under the circumstances, it would be both
inconsistent with the requirements of section 200.3 and a tax on judicial and
party resources to attempt to litigate successorship without knowing whether
there will ever be a judgment or judgment debtor for it to succeed.
Accordingly, we do not find this to be a reading consistent with the plain
language of section 200.3. This point is reinforced by consideration of Lo’s
other arguments.
Lo also argues similar statutory provisions in the Labor Code
support his position. Lo cites section 1434 which provides a “successor
employer is liable for any wages, damages, and penalties its predecessor
employer owes to any of the predecessor employer’s former workforce if the
successor employer meets” certain enumerated criteria. (§ 1434.) Section
1434 applies to property service workers and is part of a series of registration
and other requirements applicable to janitorial services. (See § 1434.) Section
1434 does not include reference to a “judgment debtor” or the necessity of a
final judgment for a successor employer to be liable. Lo does not contend his
position fell under section 1434, however he argues by analogy we should
construe section 200.3 to be consistent with section 1434.
We consider the language of section 1434 as part of our obligation
to “‘“look to the entire substance of the statutes in order to determine their
scope and purposes”’” and “‘“construe the words in question in context.”’”
(Turrieta, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 687.) However, section 1434 only highlights
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the principle, “[w]here different words or phrases are used in the same
connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the Legislature
intended a different meaning.” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1117.) In other
words, “[i]t is presumed changes in wording and phraseology were
deliberately made [citation] and that different meanings were intended when
different words were used.” (Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046,
1059.) If the Legislature used “successor employer” in section 1434 and then
“successor to a judgment debtor” in section 200.3, we presume the Legislature
made an intentional distinction between the two sections and that they do
not mean the same thing.
Moreover, we find the inclusion of “judgment debtor” to be of
significance given its technical legal meaning. “[T]echnical words and
phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in law, … are to be construed according to such peculiar and
appropriate meaning or definition.” (Civ. Code, § 13.) Indeed, it is a
“venerable principle that when a word or phrase appearing in a statute ‘has a
well-established legal meaning, it will be given that meaning in construing
the statute.’” (Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335, 351.)
“Judgment debtor,” while not defined within the statute, has a well-
established legal meaning to be understood as a “person against whom a
money judgment has been entered but not yet satisfied.” (Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024) p. 1008, col. 1.) This technical meaning further underscores
the necessity of a judgment before section 200.3 is applicable.
Section 200.3 became effective on January 1, 2021, and as Lo
points out, was coordinated with amendments to the Corporations Code
wherein the Legislature imposed disclosure requirements. For example,
Corporations Code section 1502 requires every corporation to file a
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“statement indicating whether any officer or any director has an outstanding
final judgment issued by … a court of law, for which no appeal therefrom is
pending, for the violation of any wage order or provision of the Labor Code.”
(Corp. Code, § 1502, subd. (a)(10); see also Corp. Code, §§ 2117, subd. (a)(8),
17702.09, subd. (a)(8)(A), (B), (C).) Each of these disclosure requirements is
limited to the disclosure of an outstanding final judgment from which no
appeal is pending. (Corp. Code, §§ 1502, subd. (a)(10), 2117, subd. (a)(8),
17702.09, subd. (a)(8)(A), (B), (C).) We view the fact that the Legislature
repeatedly chose to limit these requirements to circumstances where a final
judgment had been issued, reinforces the necessity of interpreting section
200.3 similarly. Consequently, the broader statutory context does not support
Lo’s reading.
Lo argues the legislative history and purpose of section 200.3, as
well as public policy, compels us to accept his reading of the statute. Lo
contends the purpose of section 200.3 was to expand worker protections.
Section 200.3 does in fact expand remedies for workers, even without
adopting Lo’s interpretation. However, we only “‘“look to extrinsic aids,
including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history”’” if
“‘“the language supports more than one reasonable construction.”’” (Turrieta,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 687.) Here the statute is unambiguous, so we do not
consult the legislative history or purpose of the statute.4
4 Nevertheless, as the trial court found, the legislative history is
consistent with the discussion above and our interpretation of the plain
language of the statute. For example, the legislature history, relied upon by
Lo, indicated “[e]xisting law provides that a successor employer of property
services workers is liable for any wages, damages, and penalties its
predecessor employer owes” and the new bill “would provide that a successor
to any judgment debtor shall be liable for any wages, damages, and penalties
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Finally, we consider Lo’s argument that if an employee is not
permitted to pursue concurrent litigation, the statute of limitations may run
during the pendency of litigation against the employer and due process
concerns may be implicated by holding a successor accountable for a
judgment they were not permitted to dispute on the merits. Even if credited,
considering the unambiguous statutory language, neither argument permits
us to rewrite the statute. (See Camarena v. State Personnel Bd. (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 698, 702 [“[I]n construing a statute, we ‘cannot create exceptions,
contravene plain meaning, insert what is omitted, omit what is inserted, or
rewrite the statute’”].) Additionally, Lo did not raise his due process
argument before the trial court and cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal. (See Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 982, 997 [“‘As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court
cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal’”].)
Accordingly, we interpret section 200.3 as it is written, and the
plain language of section 200.3 requires a judgment debtor and final
judgment before successor liability can be found. Because neither are present
here, the claim against CM Holdings, based solely on successor liability
owed to any of the judgment debtor’s former workforce pursuant to a final
judgment.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig. to Assem. Bill No. 3075 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess., italics added.) The Legislature’s recitation of the existing law did not
include reference to a judgment debtor or final judgment, but the description
of what the new bill, section 200.3, would accomplish included both
requirements. Had the Legislature intended to make the same rule
applicable to all employers, it could have done so by adopting the same
language. Again, we interpret the choice of different language to be
intentional and to indicate the Legislature intended a different rule to apply.
(Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1117.)
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under section 200.3, was premature and the trial court was correct to grant
CM Holding’s demurrer.
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of CM Holdings based on the trial court’s
order granting the demurrer is affirmed. CM Holdings shall recover its costs
on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
MACAULEY, J.
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