Filed 6/26/26 Liu v. Fang CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
HONGQING LIU, B347287
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23LBCV02113)
v.
ZHONG FANG et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael P. Vicencia, Judge. Affirmed.
Zhong Fang (aka Johnson Fang), in pro. per, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Hu Min (aka Michelle Hu), in pro. per, for Defendant and
Appellant.
The Liu Law Firm, Long Z. Liu and Hanson Hsu for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
________________________________
In a lawsuit concerning a dispute over the purchase of
real property, defendants Zhong Fang (aka Johnson Fang), Hu Min
(aka Michelle Hu), California Investment Regional Center, LLC and
Los Angeles City Plaza LP moved to set aside a default judgment
and underlying entry of default obtained against them by plaintiff
Hongqing Liu. Defendants contended that service of the summons
and complaint and service of the first amended complaint were
improper and they had no actual notice of the suit. Liu opposed
the motion, supported by declarations and proofs of proper service.
The trial court denied defendants’ motion. Because the decision
was within the court’s discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
We glean the factual and procedural background of this case
from a sparse appellate record that contains only an entry of default
and default judgment, defendants’ motion to vacate (supported
by Fang’s declaration concerning lack of service), Liu’s opposition
to the motion (supported by proofs and declarations of service),
and the trial court’s denial of the motion. The record contains
no complaint, proposed answer, or evidence (as opposed to
arguments) describing the parties’ relationships or transactions.
A. Lawsuit
Liu contends he wanted to invest in real property in the
Los Angeles area. Fang was an owner and principal of California
Investment Regional Center, LLC and Los Angeles City Plaza
LP, in which entities Hu, Fang’s ex-wife, also had an ownership
interest. Liu contends he paid Fang or one of the entities $700,000
in exchange for an interest in real property. When Fang failed to
convey the interest or return the money, Liu sued him, Hu, and the
entities for fraud and breach of contract.
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Fang does not dispute that Liu paid him $700,000 but argues
$500,000 of it was an at-risk equity investment for the purpose of
obtaining permanent resident status (green cards) for Liu and his
family.1 He argues the investment made Liu his partner, not his
creditor.
On September 9, 2024, the trial court entered a default
judgment against defendants in the amount of $846,735.
B. Motion to Vacate
1. Defendants’ Motion
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473,
subdivision (b) and 473.5,2 defendants moved to vacate what
they called the “default,”3 arguing service was improper and no
defendant had notice of the lawsuit because none of the defendants
lived at the addresses of service. Defendants argued that Liu
served the summons and complaint at 1125 First Street in Arcadia,
and served the request for entry of default at 1125 South First
Street, neither of which was any defendant’s address. Defendants
admitted, however, that Hu lived at 1125 South First Avenue in
Arcadia. Defendants represented that their proposed answer to
1 The United States makes visas available to qualified
immigrants who invest in new commercial, job-creating enterprises
for at least two years. (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5).) To be eligible for a
green card under this “EB-5” program, a participating immigrant
must maintain the investment for the requisite amount of time.
(8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d).)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3 We will assume that by “default,” defendants meant the
default judgment and underlying entry of default.
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the complaint accompanied the motion, but the record contains no
such answer.
Defendants supported the motion with Fang’s declaration
that he did not live at any of the aforementioned addresses but Hu
lived at 1125 South First Avenue.
2. Liu’s Opposition
Liu opposed defendants’ motion with proofs of service and
declarations showing: (1) The summons and original complaint
were served on California Investment Regional Center on
February 27, 2024, by personal delivery to Ming Qi, its authorized
agent, at an address in Long Beach; (2) the documents were served
on Los Angeles City Plaza and Fang on February 29, 2024, by
personal delivery to Fang as an individual and as Los Angeles City
Plaza’s authorized agent, at 1125 South First Avenue, Arcadia; and
(3) an amended summons and amended complaint were served on
Hu, California Investment Regional Center and Los Angeles City
Plaza (via Fang, the entities’ agent for service of process) on June
25, 2024, by personal delivery to a woman residing at 1125 First
Street in Arcadia who represented that she was Hu’s daughter and
that both Hu and Fang lived at the address.
3. Ruling and Appeal
On April 10, 2025, after a hearing, the court denied
defendants’ motion.
All defendants appealed from this order.
On March 4, 2026, we dismissed the appeal of California
Investment Regional Center and Los Angeles City Plaza pursuant
to California Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(1) because they failed to
file an opening appellate brief.
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DISCUSSION
Section 473, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that
“[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party
or [his or her] legal representative from a judgment, dismissal,
order, or other proceeding taken against [him or her] through
[his or her] mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,”
provided relief is sought “within a reasonable time, in no case
exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or
proceeding was taken.” In addition to authorizing discretionary
relief, section 473, subdivision (b) mandates that a court vacate a
default, default judgment, or dismissal resulting from attorney
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” where the
culpable attorney timely files a sworn affidavit attesting to his or
her error.
Because this case does not involve attorney error, the only
relief available would be discretionary relief under section 473,
subdivision (b). The party seeking such relief bears the burden
of proof in establishing a proper ground for relief. (Hopkins &
Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.) Because the
trial court’s order does not state which of section 473’s discretionary
grounds it relied upon, and defendants have provided no reporter’s
transcript of the proceedings, we presume the order “was based
on any rationale supported by the record.” (State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610.)
We review a trial court ruling on a motion for relief from
default for abuse of discretion. (Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v.
Philadelphia Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894,
907.)
Defendants advance only one principal argument in support
of their challenge, but it fails to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying them relief. Defendants contend
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the proofs of service show that the documents were served at
an outdated address belonging only to Hu. Citing no evidence,
defendants argue that from June 2022 through September 2024,
Fang resided outside the United States. They claim he thus could
not have been served either personally or by proper substitute
service.4
This argument does not assist Fang because no evidence in
the record supports that he lived outside the country during the
pertinent period. Fang offers to produce such evidence now, but
it is too late; the time to do so was when he moved to vacate the
default judgment. Nor does the argument assist Hu, but on the
contrary demonstrates she is not entitled to relief because she was
served with at least the amended summons and complaint at her
residence.
In any event, Liu’s evidence refutes defendants’ claim. Liu’s
process server declared that on February 29, 2024, he personally
served Fang with the summons and complaint in Arcadia. Deciding
which of two countervailing narratives to credit is quintessentially
a matter of the trial court’s discretion which we may not second
guess. (Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 583, 597.)
Defendants also seek affirmative remedies, including that
we stay ancillary proceedings, refer the matter to mediation or
schedule a jury trial, all of which we reject because we affirm the
trial court’s order.
4 Defendants do not contend on appeal, as they did below,
that a meaningful distinction exits among the three different
address designations for Hu’s residence in Arcadia.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
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