Filed 11/10/26 Lipson v. Motel 6 Ridgecrest CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JONATHAN LIPSON,
F088550
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-20-103026)
v.
MOTEL 6 RIDGECREST et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.
Pulskamp, Judge.
Law Offices of Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza, Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza and Mark Richard
Berns for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reed Smith and Kathryn M. Bayes for Defendants and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff and appellant Jonathan Lipson appeals from a judgment entered in favor
of defendant and respondent G6 Hospitality LLC (G6) after the trial court granted G6’s
motion for summary judgment.
We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Complaint
On December 29, 2020, Lipson filed a complaint for damages against G6 and
other named defendants alleging he was injured “as a result of bedbug bites during his
stay” at Motel 6 Ridgecrest (subject hotel) located at 535 S China Lake Boulevard in
Ridgecrest (subject hotel property). Lipson alleges that G6 “is the parent corporation that
owns, operates, manages, and does business as the Motel 6, located at 1473 Holiday Ln.,
Fairfield ….”
Other named defendants include the subject hotel, Travelodge by Wyndham
Ridgecrest, Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Wyndham Destinations, Inc., Mark Doe,
and Does 1 through 20. In the body of his complaint, Lipson identified Super 8 by
Wyndham Selma/Fresno as another defendant. And, on September 19, 2023, Lipson
filed an amendment to his complaint to substitute K.T.M.A. Inc., as DOE 1.
The following facts are alleged in Lipson’s complaint: “Cimex lectularius, more
commonly known as ‘bed bugs,’ are ‘small, flat, parasitic insects that feed solely on the
blood of people and animals while they sleep”; and bedbug infestation has been
“spreading rapidly to parts of the United States.’ ” According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, “ ‘some people may have no reaction [to bedbug bites] and will
not develop bite marks or any other visible signs of being bitten,’ ” whereas other people
“ ‘may be allergic to the bed bugs and can react adversely to the bites.’ ” “ ‘These
2.
allergic symptoms can include enlarged bite marks, painful swellings at the bite site, and,
on rare occasions, anaphylaxis.’ ”
Lipson checked into room 131 at the subject hotel on January 3, 2019, and
checked out the following morning. During his breakfast, Lipson “began to experience
an intense itching sensation all over his body.” Later that morning, he went for a walk
with friends, but “by 1:00 p.m., [he] was unable to walk any further with them, as the
itching sensation worsened and became painful when rubbing against his clothes.” The
next day, Lipson discovered bumps “all over his body, including on his face,” and
reported the incident to management at the subject hotel. The manager, identified as
“Mark Doe” (some capitalization omitted), apologized, offered Lipson a free room, and
“told [Lipson] that he would spray the mattress himself.” Lipson suggested a
professional be hired to address the problem and requested Mark Doe send him a report
on their efforts, but Lipson never heard from Mark Doe.
On or about January 10, 2019, Lipson sought treatment at an urgent care facility
and “was informed that the insect bites appeared to be bed bug bites and was prescribed
medication.” Lipson sought further medical attention after his urgent care visit. Lipson
was physically and emotionally scarred from the bedbug bites and has “difficulty
sleeping through the night as a result of the incident.” He “wakes up in the middle of the
night thinking that bugs are crawling on him when there are none.” Lipson never
observed bedbugs at his own residence and never received bedbug bites at his residence.
“As a result of the incident, [Lipson] incurred various expenses, including medical
costs, the cost of the [subject] hotel room, the replacement cost of [his] luggage and
clothing, along with other belongings exposed to the infestation …, and other costs.”
According to Lipson, the subject hotel “has a prior and/or ongoing history of
bedbug infestations” and related customer complaints. He alleges the defendants knew of
the problem, willfully ignored the problem, willfully or negligently failed to advise him
of the problem, and “deliberately and recklessly chose not to inspect or otherwise ensure
3.
that [his] room was free of” bedbugs. Lipson alleges the defendants instituted (or
ratified) routine and shoddy housekeeping practices that permitted the bedbug infestation
to continue.
Lipson alleges causes of action against all defendants for battery, negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent concealment, and public nuisance.
II. G6’s Motion for Summary Judgment
On March 27, 2024, G6 and the subject hotel filed a joint motion for summary
judgment seeking judgment in favor of G6 on the grounds that (1) “G6 did not own,
control, operate, or manage, the Property where the alleged incident occurred”; and
(2) “G6 did not have control over the business operations of its franchisee, Defendant
K.T.M.A.[] Inc.[,] with respect to operating the Property, and as such are not liable for
any negligent actions of K.T.M.A.[] Inc.” Lipson opposed the motion and filed
evidentiary objections to evidence proffered by G6. Thereafter, G6 and the subject hotel
filed their reply in support of the motion for summary judgment and requested the trial
court take judicial notice of specified documents.
On June 27, 2024, the trial court heard G6’s motion for summary judgment. The
trial court granted G6’s request to judicially notice three deeds of trust related to the
subject hotel property and a May 22, 2024 minute order of the court entered in
connection with a discovery motion brought by G6 (the May 22 discovery order). In the
May 22 discovery order, the court “deem[ed] admitted the matters at issue in [G6’s]
requests for admission.” Pursuant to the parties’ respective requests and subject to limits
discussed in People v. Harbolt (1997) 61 Cal.App.4th 123, 126–127, 1 the court also took
1 “Evidence Code sections 452 and 453 permit the trial court to ‘take judicial notice of the
existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along with the truth of the results reached—
in the documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments—but cannot take judicial
notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings,
affidavits, testimony, or statements of fact.’ ” (People v. Harbolt, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 126–127.)
4.
judicial notice of G6’s requests for admission and G6 and the subject hotel’s joint answer
and affirmative defenses. The court overruled Lipson’s evidentiary objections.
The trial court determined the evidence submitted in connection with the motion
“demonstrates that G6 … neither owns, manages or controls the [subject hotel]
property …, nor does it manage the day-to-day operations of K.T.M.A. LLC, [sic]
franchisee and the current owner of the [subject hotel] property.” The court granted the
motion as to G6 but denied the motion as to the subject hotel. 2
On July 3, 2024, the trial court entered its “Order Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Defendants G6 … and [the subject hotel]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Some
capitalization omitted.) In the order, the court granted judgment in favor of G6.
III. Notice of Appeal
On August 26, 2024, Lipson timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“Appellate courts determine de novo whether an issue of material fact exists and
whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[Citation.] Upon review, the appellate court applies the same three-step analysis as the
trial court. [Citation.] This requires the court to (1) identify the issues framed by the
pleadings, (2) determine whether the moving party has established facts justifying
judgment in its favor, and (3) determine whether the nonmoving party has demonstrated a
triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] In conducting its review, the appellate court
must, ‘view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party.’ [Citation.]
Under the three-step analysis, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing there
2 Although the motion was brought by both G6 and the subject hotel, the notice of motion
appears to indicate that summary judgment or summary adjudication was sought only as to G6.
In any event, the appeal does not raise any issue concerning the trial court’s denial of the motion
as to the subject hotel.
5.
is no genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[Citation.] Typically, to meet this burden, a defendant moving for summary judgment
can either negate an element of the cause of action or demonstrate a complete defense to
plaintiff’s claim. [Citation.] Only if the defendant meets its initial burden does the
burden shift to the plaintiff to show a triable issue exists.” (Jones v. Awad (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1206–1207.)
II. Lipson’s Contentions on Appeal
On appeal, Lipson contends G6 did not meet its burden on summary judgment.
Lipson further contends the court erred by “consider[ing] inadmissible evidence,
accept[ing] deemed admissions as dispositive, and disregard[ing] triable issues
concerning G6’s retained control over its franchise.” Lipson contends triable issues of
material fact remain.
III. G6’s Evidence in Support of its Summary Judgment Motion
A. Declaration of Rhonda Payne
Rhonda Payne submitted a declaration in support of G6’s motion for summary
judgment. In her declaration, Payne averred as follows: Payne is the director of
franchise administration for G6. As a result of her job duties, she is “familiar with the
ordinary and customary method and matter [sic] of preparation and maintenance of G6’s
business records”; has “come to know the policies, practices, and procedures of G6 as a
hospitality provider under the brand name Motel 6”; and has “full access to the records of
G6, including the imaging repository.” “In the ordinary course of its business, G6
maintains of [sic] properties it has sold and properties which are owned, controlled,
operated, and managed by Franchisees utilizing the Motel 6 brand.”
Payne averred that the records she referred to or relied upon in her declaration “are
the business records of G6 … taken or made in the regular or ordinary course of business,
at or near the time of the act, condition or event to which they relate, by persons
employed by G6, and/or its predecessors and/or agents, who had a business duty to
6.
accurately and completely take, make and maintain such records and documents. These
documents are trustworthy based on the source of information and method of preparation,
and all copies attached as exhibits are true copies of the records as they are kept by G6.”
Payne stated she reviewed G6’s records relating to the subject hotel property, “its
sale, and its ownership by a Motel 6 franchisee.” She also “reviewed G6’s records
relating to the [subject hotel property] and any bed bug issues that existed at the time G6
owned the [subject hotel property] in 2015.”
Payne averred the subject hotel property “was originally obtained on May 5, 1975
by Motel 6” and attached a grant deed dated September 25, 1975 (the 1975 Grant Deed)
that stated, “Quadrant Development Company, a general partnership [¶] hereby grant(s)
to [¶] Motel ‘6’, Inc., a Delaware corporation [¶] the following real property in the [¶]
County of Kern, State of California: [¶] as more particularly described on the description
attached hereto and made a part hereof marked Exhibit ‘B’.” (Some capitalization
omitted.) Said Exhibit B contains a legal description of the subject hotel property but
does not identify the property by its common street address. 3 Payne went on to state, “In
the intervening years, the Motel 6 brand became owned by G6.”
Payne declared, “On or about September 10, 2015, G6 sold the [subject hotel
property] to Ridgecrest Hotel LLC, a Motel 6 franchisee,” and attached a September 14,
2015 grant deed (the 2015 Grant Deed) to her declaration. The 2015 Grant Deed reads,
in part: “G6 …, a Delaware limited liability company, Grantor, grants, with permitted
title exceptions described in Exhibit ‘B’ attached hereto for all purposes, to [¶] Ridgecrest
Hotel LLC, a California limited liability company, Grantee, the real property located in
City of Ridgecrest, County of Kern and State of California, having a physical address of
3 Exhibit B to the 1975 Grant Deed reads: “Parcel 3 in the unincorporated area of the
County of Kern, State of California, as shown on Parcel Map No. 1773 filed May 9, 1974 in
Book 10 Page 36 of Parcel Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of Kern County,” and
excepts therefrom a partial interest in “oil, gas, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances in or
under said land” and certain surface rights previously quitclaimed from the land.
7.
535 S China Lake Blvd., Ridgecrest, California 93555, [i.e., the subject hotel property],
and described as follows: [¶] See attached Exhibit A, incorporated by reference to this
document.” (Boldface, underlining, & some capitalization omitted.) Exhibit A to the
2015 Grant Deed contains a legal description matching that of Exhibit B to the 1975
Grant Deed. Payne averred that, as of the date of the 2015 Grant Deed, “G6 no longer
had ownership or control of the [subject hotel property].”
Next, Payne averred, “On or about July 28, 2017, the [subject hotel property] was
sold by Ridgecrest Hotel LLC to K.T.M.A.[] Inc.” Payne attached a July 28, 2017 grant
deed (the 2017 Grant Deed) to her declaration, which states in part: “Ridgecrest Hotel
LLC, a California Limited Liability Company [¶] hereby Grant(s) to: [¶] K.T.M.A. Inc., a
California Corporation [¶] the real property in the City of Ridgecrest, County of Kern,
State of California, described as: [¶] Legal Description Attached Hereto as Exhibit ‘A’
and Made a Part Hereof[.] [¶] Also Known as: 535 South China Lake Boulevard,
Ridgecrest, CA 93555 [i.e., the subject hotel property].” (Boldface & some capitalization
omitted.) Exhibit “A” to the 2017 Grant Deed matches the legal descriptions contained
in each of the 1975 and 2015 Grant Deeds.
As previously alluded to, the trial court took judicial notice of the 1975 Grant
Deed, the 2015 Grant Deed, and the 2017 Grant Deed.
According to Payne, “K.T.M.A.[] Inc., became a franchisee of the Motel 6 Brand”
on or about July 28, 2017, the date of the 2017 Grant Deed “pursuant to a franchise
agreement and a transfer agreement by and between Ridgecrest Hotel LLC, K.T.M.A.[]
Inc., and G6.” She attached a document titled “Transfer Agreement and Consent” (some
capitalization omitted) and excerpts of a document titled “Motel 6 Franchise Agreement
[¶] by and between [¶] G6 Hospitality Franchising LLC [¶] Franchisor [¶] and [¶]
K.T.M.A. Inc. [¶] Franchisee [¶] Ridgecrest, California.” (Boldface, underlining, &
some capitalization omitted.)
8.
Payne stated, “Pursuant to the franchise agreement, K.T.M.A. Inc., owned,
operated, controlled, and managed the [subject hotel property] while utilizing the Motel 6
brand as a franchisee”; “[a]t no point in time did G6 own, control, operate, or manage the
[subject hotel property]”; “[a]t no point in time did G6 control K.T.M.A. Inc.’s hiring,
directing, supervising, disciplining, or discharging of K.T.M.A. Inc.’s employees”; and
“[a]t no point in time did G6 have control over the day-to-day operations of the [subject
hotel property] or day-to-day aspects of K.T.M.A. Inc.’s employees.”
Finally, Payne averred, “A review of Terminix records related to the [subject hotel
property] from 2015 indicate that there were no bed bug issues, or other pest issues, with
Room 131 [i.e., the room Lipson stayed in].” Payne attached to her declaration a
purported copy of a 2015 Terminix report for the [subject hotel property].
We address Lipson’s objections to Payne’s declaration post.
B. The Terminix Report
The purported 2015 Terminix Report contains six columns and 30 rows of data in
each column. The columns are denominated as follows: “Incident ID,” “Property ID,”
“Incident Log Date,” “Positive Infestation,” “Negative Infestation,” and “Status.” There
is no declaration from an employee of Terminix explaining the report. Consequently, the
data contained in the report cannot be interpreted without speculating as to its meaning. 4
Below the “Incident ID” heading are 30 rows, each with different five-digit
numbers. Below the “Property ID” heading are 30 rows referencing the number “244.”
These columns are likely internal record keeping numbers used by Terminix to identify
service incidents and the property to which the report relates. Even if true, there is no
admissible evidence demonstrating that the number 244 corresponds with the subject
hotel property. Similar uncertainties exist with regard to the columns denominated
4 In addition, there is no indication on the purported 2015 Terminix report that it originated
from Terminix.
9.
“Positive Infestation” and “Negative Infestation.” 5 Finally, below the “Incident Log
Date” heading are 30 rows with dates ranging from January 3, 2014, to September 7,
2015. Even if these correspond to the dates Terminix provided inspection or pest control
services to the subject hotel, the subject incident was alleged to have occurred in
January 2019, more than three years later.
The aforementioned evidence does not demonstrate that there was no bedbug
infestation in Lipson’s room in 2019. However, G6 argues the evidence was merely
intended to show that “in 2015 when G6 … last had ownership of the [subject hotel
property], there were no issues with bedbugs at the [subject hotel property].” Whether
there were bedbugs at the subject hotel in 2015 is not an issue in the case. Consequently,
we will not consider the Terminix Report in assessing whether G6 met its burden on
summary judgment.
C. Deemed Admissions
The trial court took judicial notice of its May 22 discovery order in which the
court “deem[ed] admitted the matters at issue in [G6’s] requests for admission.”
As a result of the May 22 discovery order, Lipson was deemed to have admitted
that “K.T.M.A. Inc[.] is a Motel 6 Franchisee” and “any relationship between [G6] and
… K.T.M.A. Inc[.] is that of a Franchisor and Franchisee.”
Lipson was also deemed to have admitted that the 2015 Grant Deed reflects “that
G6 deeded the PROPERTY to Ridgecrest Hotel LLC on or about September 10, 2015”;
the 2017 Grant Deed reflects “that Ridgecrest Hotel LLC deeded the PROPERTY to
5 Below the “Positive Infestation” heading are 13 rows that each contain a single three-
digit number, which are likely intended to correspond to hotel room numbers—but there is no
evidence admitted confirming that is the case. Below the “Negative Infestation” heading are
eight rows that contain one or more three-digit numbers, which likely correspond to hotel room
numbers—but again, there is no evidence admitted confirming that is the correct interpretation.
Notably, none of the three-digit numbers displayed under “Positive Infestation” and “Negative
Infestation” are the same three-digit number as Lipson’s room, which was alleged to be
room 131.
10.
K.T.M.A. Inc., on or about May 18, 2017”; and that “there is no Grant Deed recorded or
otherwise in the public record that shows G6 … owned the Property after September 14,
2015.” The term “PROPERTY” was defined to “refer[] to the Motel 6 located at 535 S.
China Lake Blvd, Ridgecrest, CA 93555, [i.e., the subject hotel property,] as alleged in
[Lipson]’s Complaint.”
Lipson was further deemed to have admitted “that as of January 2019, G6 … did
not own the PROPERTY,” “did not control the PROPERTY,” and “did not manage the
PROPERTY.” Similarly, Lipson was deemed to have admitted “that G6 … did not
manage the DAY TO DAY operations of the PROPERTY” and “did not manage the
DAY TO DAY operations of [K.T.M.A. Inc.]” The term “DAY TO DAY” was defined
to “refer[] to the standard day to day operations in the management of the PROPERTY,
including but not limited to, guest check in, guest check out, cleaning, maintenance,
responding to complaints made by guests, and scheduling or providing for the
extermination of pests.”
Finally, Lipson was deemed to have admitted that he “amended [his complaint] to
add K.T.M.A. Inc.[,] to the lawsuit because [Lipson] knew that K.T.M.A. Inc.[,] was the
Franchisee owner of the PROPERTY at the time of the alleged INCIDENT”; and that
Lipson has “no evidence that supports the argument that G6 … and K.T.M.A. [Inc.,] have
any other relationship than a Franchisor-Franchisee relationship.”
IV. Analysis of G6’s Evidence
A. Payne’s Declaration
On appeal, Lipson states that G6’s alleged “ownership and control” of the subject
hotel property was placed “squarely at issue” in the complaint. Lipson contends G6’s
summary judgment motion “relied almost exclusively on the declaration of Rhonda
Payne, a G6 administrator, and on recorded deeds showing a 2015 and 2017 transfer of
the [subject hotel] property,” and “[n]either piece of evidence foreclosed liability.”
11.
Lipson contends Payne’s declaration that G6 “did not own, operate or control” the
subject hotel property was insufficient because Payne did not establish she had personal
knowledge of the day-to-day operations of the subject hotel. He further contends the
various grant deeds in evidence show only a change in legal title but do not establish “the
absence of control, management, or franchisor responsibility, the very theories pled in the
Complaint.”
To the extent Lipson is relying on a theory of franchisor responsibility, that theory
depends on the franchisor exerting some level of relevant control over the franchisee’s
operations or the plaintiff having been led by the franchisor to reasonably believe that the
franchisor exercised such control. (Pereda v. Atos Jiu Jitsu LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
759, 770 (Pereda).) “[A] franchisor is liable for the conduct of the franchisee only if the
franchisor actually exercises control—or is reasonably believed to exercise control—over
the ‘ “means and manner” ’of the franchisee’s operation that caused the plaintiff’s alleged
injury.” (Id. at p. 770.)
In some situations, “ ‘a franchisee may be deemed to be an agent of the
franchisor.’ [Citation.] Where, for instance, a business labeled as a ‘franchisor’
nevertheless retains ‘the right of complete or substantial control over the franchisee’ or is
reasonably perceived as having that right, then the business labeled as the ‘franchisee’
may be deemed to be the actual or ostensible agent of the ‘franchisor.’ ” (Pereda, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 769.) In a bona fide franchisor relationship, “the franchisor by
definition controls the franchisee’s use of the franchisor’s trademark and business plan.”
(Ibid.) “[A] finding of actual or ostensible agency based on that type of control alone
would effectively render franchisees the agents of franchisors in every case, thereby
‘disrupt[ing]’ and ‘turn[ing] … “on its head” ’ one of the key aspects of the franchise
business format—the ability of the franchisor to share its goodwill with its franchisees
without assuming all responsibility for how they operate their otherwise independent
businesses.” (Ibid., first bracketed insertion added.)
12.
“To avoid having the doctrine of ostensible agency swallow up this carefully
balanced principle, courts have limited what can give rise to a reasonable belief that a
franchisor is controlling the portion of the franchisee’s operation that caused the
plaintiff’s alleged injury. It is not enough to show that the franchisor and franchisee have
‘some relationship.’ [Citation.] It is not enough to show that the franchisor has allowed
the franchisee to use its trade name and good will [citations], or, relatedly, that the
franchisor’s name appears on some of the materials used by the franchisee [citations].”
(Pereda, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) The Pereda court gave the following
examples: “[I]n a case alleging fraud, it is reasonable for a plaintiff to believe that the
franchisee is the ostensible agent of the franchisor when the franchisor’s affirmative
‘advertising campaign’ to the public conveyed that it ‘ “stood behind” ’ all of its
franchisees. [Citation.] And in a case alleging violations of an administrative statute, it
is reasonable for a plaintiff to believe that the licensee is the ostensible agent of the
licensor when the licensor was supervising the licensee’s operations closely enough to
know that the licensee was violating the statute and did nothing to stop those violations.”
(Ibid.)
Here, Lipson has not alleged anywhere in his complaint or asserted anywhere in
his brief on appeal that he believed the operator of the subject hotel was acting as an
ostensible agent of G6. 6 “Ostensible authority is authority that the principal, either
intentionally or by lack of ordinary care, causes or allows a third party to believe the
agent possesses.” (Taylor v. Roseville Toyota, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 994, 1005.)
“Ostensible agency cannot be established by the representations or conduct of the
6 Lipson does include a general allegation in his complaint that reads: “Defendants, and
each of them, including without limitation those Defendants herein sued as DOES[,] were acting
in concert or participating with each other, or were joint participants and collaborators in the acts
complained of, and were the agents or employees of others in doing the acts complained of
herein, each and all of them acting within the course and scope of said agency and/or
employment by others, each and all of them acting in concert with the other and all together.”
13.
purported agent; the statements or acts of the principal must be such as to cause the belief
the agency exists.” (J.L. v. Children’s Institute Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388, 404.)
Lipson has not alleged he was led to believe an agency relationship existed between G6
and any defendant in this matter by any intentional or careless act of G6. Moreover,
Lipson did not argue ostensible agency at the trial court level and submitted no evidence
to support such an argument.
Lipson’s complaint alleges all defendants “deliberately and recklessly chose not to
inspect or otherwise ensure” his room was free of bedbugs; “failed to eradicate such
infestations”; “deliberately chose not to notify, or otherwise failed to notify” him of the
infestation; failed to “place adequate safeguards to protect clients from an ongoing
bedbug exposure”; failed to make a change in management; “authorized or ratified
housekeeping staff … to either not change bed skirts on a regular basis or to not inspect
and ensure that bed skirts are free” from infestation—all of which demonstrate Lipson
was relying on the theory that defendants (including G6) had operational control over the
subject hotel.
Lipson presented the following issue for review: “Did the trial court improperly
resolve factual disputes in [G6’s] favor and disregard evidence suggesting that G6 … in
fact retained operational control over its franchisee, thereby presenting a triable issue of
fact precluding summary judgment?” He has cited to Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 489 for the proposition that “franchisor liability turns on retained
control, not just ownership.” He argues, “The very existence of franchise branding,
coupled with G6’s admitted status as franchisor, supports an inference of control that
must be viewed in [Lipson’s] favor.”
Thus, to the extent Lipson has relied on an agency theory of liability, that theory
has always been that G6 owned, operated, managed, or otherwise controlled the subject
hotel or its franchisee’s activities in running the subject hotel.
14.
As stated by our Supreme Court, “A franchisor … becomes potentially liable for
actions of the franchisee’s employees, only if it has retained or assumed a general right of
control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and
relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees.
Any other guiding principle would disrupt the franchise relationship.” (Patterson v.
Domino’s Pizza, LLC, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 497–498, fn. omitted.)
We agree with Lipson’s argument that Payne’s declaration failed to show that she
had personal knowledge with regard to G6’s management and control of the subject hotel
and property. 7 However, to the extent Payne’s declaration is insufficient to demonstrate
such lack of management and control, as discussed below, Lipson’s deemed admissions
fill the gap.
B. Deemed Admissions
“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely
response, the following rules apply: [¶] … [¶] … The requesting party may move for an
order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the
requests be deemed admitted ….” (§ 2033.280, subd. (b).) 8 Although a party may avoid
the consequence of having matters deemed admitted if the trial court finds that the party
has served “a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial
7 Among other things, Payne did not state when she became employed by G6, did not aver
that she was employed by G6 at the time of the subject incident, did not state when she became
the director of franchise administration for G6, or whether her duties as such would have given
her sufficient knowledge to determine whether G6 had any role in managing or controlling the
subject hotel property.
8 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
15.
compliance with Section 2033.220” (§ 2033.280, subd. (c)), 9 Lipson has not presented
any evidence that the trial court found he served compliant, proposed responses to G6’s
requests for admissions, and the May 22 discovery order demonstrates the court never
made such a finding.
“Matters that are admitted or deemed admitted through [requests for admissions]
discovery devices are conclusively established in the litigation and are not subject to
being contested through contradictory evidence.” (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 762, 775; § 2033.410, subd. (a) [“Any matter admitted in response to a
request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission
in the pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that
admission under Section 2033.300.”].) “[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by
judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the
truth of all matters contained therein.” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973,
979.) Thus, the May 22 discovery order conclusively established in the litigation all
matters that G6 requested Lipson admit, and Lipson cannot contest the admissions with
contradictory evidence. (See St. Mary v. Superior Court, at p. 775.) 10
9 Among other things, section 2033.220 requires that “[e]ach answer in a response to
requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably
available to the responding party permits.” (§ 2033.220, subd. (a).) Said statute further requires
that a party “[a]dmit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true” (id., subd. (b)(1)),
“[d]eny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue” (id., subd. (b)(2)), and
“[s]pecify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding
party lacks sufficient information or knowledge” (id., subd. (b)(3)).
10 In Wilcox v. Birtwhistle, our Supreme Court determined that “a party may withdraw or
amend admissions deemed admitted for failure to respond upon a showing of ‘mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect’ and no substantial prejudice pursuant to subdivision (m)” of
former section 2033. (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 977.) Subdivision (m) of
former section 2033 has been continued without substantive change in section 2033.300.
However, Lipson does not contend that he sought relief under section 2033.300 to avoid the
May 22 discovery order or that the trial court denied such relief in error or otherwise.
16.
Lipson contends, “[R]equests for admission … may narrow issues for trial, they
cannot relieve the moving party of its initial burden under … section 437c,” the summary
judgment statute. Lipson cites to Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
850 and Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83 to
support his contention. Neither citation stands for the principle asserted.
In fact, section 437c expressly provides that a summary judgment motion “shall be
supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions,
and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.” (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1), italics
added; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855 [acknowledging
§ 437c authorizes the use of admissions and, specifically, acknowledging that admissions
to the effect that a plaintiff has discovered nothing may be used to demonstrate a party
does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence].)
In People v. $2,709 United States Currency (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1278, a
defendant “was found in possession of cocaine and $2,709 in cash.” (Id. at p. 1281.) The
People brought civil proceedings to have the cash forfeited under statutes authorizing
forfeiture of assets connected to drug trafficking.11 (People, at p. 1281.) The People
served the defendant “with requests for admissions regarding the ownership and use of
the cash.” (Ibid.) When the defendant did not timely respond, the People successfully
moved to have the requests deemed admitted under section 2033.280. (People, at
p. 1281.) The People then “moved for summary judgment … on the ground that the
deemed admissions conclusively established [the d]efendant lacked standing to contest
the forfeiture, that the cash was used to facilitate her drug crimes and that the cash was
proceeds of those crimes.” (Ibid.) The court granted the motion after determining “the
deemed admissions conclusively established the People’s entitlement to the property.”
(Ibid.)
11 See Health and Safety Code sections 11488.4, subdivision (a) and 11470, subdivision (f).
17.
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed. (People v. $2,709 United States Currency,
supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286.) In addressing the defendant’s contention that “the
cash at issue was her tax refund, not drug money,” the court wrote, “[The d]efendant
never answered the request for admissions and has never asserted that her failure to
answer was the ‘result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.’ (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2033.280, subd. (a)(2).) The court’s order deeming the requested admissions to be
admitted is therefore conclusive and may not be ‘contested through contradictory
evidence.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1287–1288; see also Miller v. Marina Mercy Hospital (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 765, 770–771 [affirming summary judgment based on deemed
admissions].)
There is no merit to Lipson’s contention that deemed admissions cannot satisfy a
moving party’s burden on summary judgment.
C. G6’s Showing on Summary Judgment
G6 demonstrated, by virtue of the 2015 Grant Deed, that G6 divested itself of
ownership of the subject hotel property in 2015. G6 further demonstrated, by virtue of
deemed admissions, that G6 did not own the subject hotel or property after September 14,
2015, or at the time of the subject incident.
G6 showed, by virtue of deemed admissions, that G6 did not manage or control
the subject hotel or property and did not manage the day-to-day operations of the subject
hotel or property or the day-to-day operations of its franchisee, K.T.M.A. Inc., the owner
of the subject hotel property, as of January 2019.
G6 also demonstrated, by virtue of a deemed admission, that there is no
relationship between G6 and K.T.M.A. Inc., other than that of franchisor and franchisee,
and that Lipson has no evidence to the contrary.
Finally, G6 demonstrated that Lipson amended his complaint to add K.T.M.A.
Inc., to the lawsuit because he knew K.T.M.A. Inc., was the franchisee of G6 and owner
of the subject hotel at the time of the subject incident.
18.
The allegations against the defendants are: they “deliberately and recklessly chose
not to inspect or otherwise ensure that [Lipson’s] room was free of [bedbugs]” and
“willfully disregard[ed] knowledge of [a] prior bedbug infestation”; they “failed to
eradicate” the infestation in the room before renting it to Lipson; they failed to notify
Lipson of the presence of bedbugs in his room; “[m]anagement did not place adequate
safeguards to protect clients” from bedbugs; they “ratified housekeeping staff” not
regularly changing bed skirts and inspecting for bedbugs; and management did not
sufficiently train their employees or institute policies and procedures to protect against
bedbug exposure and ratified their employees’ alleged shoddy practices. To the extent
the above allegations are lodged against G6 (as opposed to other defendants), 12 Lipson’s
claims against G6 are all premised on the contention that G6 had some role in owning,
managing, or controlling the subject hotel. The deemed admissions demonstrate there is
no merit to the contention.
V. Lipson Did Not Demonstrate that Triable Issues of Material Fact Remained
with Respect to His Claims Against G6
In opposing G6’s summary judgment motion, Lipson relied solely on his
contention that certain evidence G6 relied upon was inadmissible and that G6 did not
meet its burden on summary judgment. Lipson filed evidentiary objections to Payne’s
declaration and the Terminix Report but did not offer any evidence in opposition to G6’s
motion, except for seeking judicial notice of G6’s answer to the complaint and the
affirmative defenses stated therein.
Lipson objected to the following statements in Payne’s declaration: (1) “After
September 2015, G6 no longer had ownership or control of the property”; (2) “Pursuant
to the franchise agreement, K.T.M.A. [Inc.,] owned, operated, controlled and managed
12 Lipson’s complaint does not distinguish between the alleged acts of any of the
defendants.
19.
the Property”; (3) “At no point did G6 own, control, operate or manage the Property”;
(4) “At no point [in] time did G6 control K.T.M.A. Inc[.]’s hiring, directing, supervising,
disciplining, or discharging K.T.M.A.[ Inc.]’s employees”; (5) “At no point in time did
G6 have control of the day-to-day operations of the Property”; and (6) “A review of
Terminix records related to the Property from 2015 indicate[s] that there were no bed bug
issues, or other pest issues, with Room 131.”
Lipson objected to the first five statements detailed above on grounds that Payne
lacked personal knowledge of the information stated. As previously discussed, however,
G6 adequately demonstrated through grant deeds judicially noticed by the trial court and
deemed admissions that G6 did not own, control, operate, or manage the subject hotel
and/or subject hotel property. Similarly, G6 adequately demonstrated, through deemed
admissions, that it did not have day-to-day control over subject hotel and/or subject hotel
property, or its franchisee, K.T.M.A. Inc. Consequently, even if the trial court had
sustained each of those objections, other admissible evidence submitted by G6 stood for
the same propositions stated by Payne and objected to by Lipson. And, with regard to the
Terminix Report, we have previously stated our intent not to rely on it.
“[I]t is well settled that on appeal following summary judgment the trial court’s
reasoning is irrelevant, and the matter is reviewed on appeal de novo. [Citations.] We
exercise our independent judgment as to the legal effect of the undisputed facts [citation]
and must affirm on any ground supported by the record.” (Jimenez v. County of Los
Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140.) “No judgment shall be set aside … in any
cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection
of evidence, … unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
20.
VI. Issue Raised for the First Time at Oral Argument
At oral argument, during his final rebuttal, Lipson’s counsel argued that the trial
court should not have relied on the deemed admissions because they were only submitted
as part of G6’s reply in support of its summary judgment motion and Lipson did not have
an opportunity to respond to that evidence. 13 This argument was not made on appeal at
any point prior to oral argument. 14 “ ‘[C]ontentions raised for the first time at oral
argument are disfavored and may be rejected solely on the ground of their
untimeliness.’ ” (Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 426,
448, fn. 12.) Notwithstanding, we solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on the
13 In support of this contention, Lipson’s counsel referenced Jay v. Mahaffey (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 1522, wherein the court wrote: “ ‘[T]he inclusion of additional evidentiary
matter with the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case …’ and if permitted, the
other party should be given the opportunity to respond.” (Id, at pp. 1537–1538.)
14 Nor is there anything in the record on appeal that demonstrates that Lipson objected to
the trial court’s consideration of the deemed admissions.
21.
issues raised by Lipson’s counsel’s rebuttal argument 15 and now consider those
arguments. 16
VII. Supplemental Arguments
In his supplemental brief, Lipson reiterates the argument he first made at oral
argument—i.e., that he did not have the opportunity to respond to the deemed admissions
in response to G6 and the subject hotel’s summary judgment motion. In response, G6
states that once it served Lipson with its reply, Lipson was on notice that the trial court
was being asked to consider the deemed admissions in ruling on the summary judgment
motion, and that Lipson’s counsel never objected to the trial court considering the
15 On July 20, 2026, we issued an order vacating the July 14, 2026 submission of the appeal
and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issues raised on rebuttal by Lipson’s
counsel. The order read in relevant part: “Lipson is hereby directed to file a supplemental letter
brief for the following purposes only: (1) to demonstrate that the May 22 discovery order does
not bar Lipson from disputing the deemed admissions in the summary judgment proceeding,
even though the May 22 discovery order was entered after the summary judgment motion was
filed, including without limitation whether the discovery order constitutes new evidence under
the rules governing summary judgment; (2) to argue that the deemed admissions, together with
other evidence in support of G6’s summary judgment motion, do not entitle G6 to summary
judgment—however, we request that Lipson not repeat arguments previously raised by him on
appeal unless those arguments also relate to the deemed admissions; (3) to make an offer of
proof of additional evidence, if any, that Lipson would file in opposition to the motion; (4) to
explain why any such additional evidence is relevant for purposes of opposing G6’s summary
judgment motion and what it would show; and (5) to explain why the evidence and any
inferences Lipson contends should be drawn therefrom are not precluded by the deemed
admissions. [¶] Thereafter, G6 may file a supplemental letter brief to respond to Lipson’s
supplemental letter brief.”
16 G6 has objected to this court’s solicitation of a proffer of evidence that Lipson would file
in opposition to the motion. However, section 437c, subdivision (m)(2) provides in relevant
part: “Before a reviewing court affirms an order granting summary judgment … on a ground not
relied upon by the trial court, the reviewing court shall afford the parties an opportunity to
present their views on the issue by submitting supplemental briefs. The supplemental briefs may
include an argument that additional evidence relating to that ground exists, but the party has not
had an adequate opportunity to present the evidence or to conduct discovery on the issue.”
Because there is an argument (albeit, untimely made) that the trial court should not have relied
on the deemed admissions, we believe the aforementioned provision authorizes the action taken
by this court to solicit supplemental briefing and a proffer of evidence from Lipson. The
objection is overruled.
22.
deemed admissions, notwithstanding the fact that Lipson received notice of the new
evidence when it received G6’s reply, and that Lipson was represented by counsel at the
hearing on the motion. G6 cites to Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co.
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, wherein the court, faced with a similar situation, wrote: “The
record confirms that [the] plaintiffs had notice of the additional material when they
received [the respondent]’s reply papers and ample opportunity to ask the trial court for
permission to submit responsive evidence or to file a sur-reply. By failing to take such
action, or to even object to the court’s consideration of the evidence, [the] plaintiffs
forfeited any claim of a due process violation.” (Id. at p. 449.) There is merit to G6’s
contention.
Notwithstanding, as a result of our supplemental briefing order, Lipson has now
had notice and an opportunity to meet that evidence. Therefore, we consider Lipson’s
remaining arguments below.
Lipson argues that he could have sought relief from the May 22 discovery order
under section 2033.300, subdivisions (a) and (b) and may have been able to withdraw the
deemed admissions pursuant to that statute. 17 Section 2033.300 authorizes a party to
“withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on
leave of court granted after notice to all parties.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The court may permit
withdrawal or amendment … only if it determines that the admission was the result of
mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the
admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that party’s action or
defense on the merits.” (Id., subd. (b).)
While it is true that a party may seek relief from deemed admissions upon a
showing of “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect” (§ 2033.300, subd. (b)), Lipson
17 Lipson reiterated his argument that “[r]equests for admission cannot substitute for the
moving party’s affirmative evidentiary showing under section 437c,” an argument we have
rejected in part IV.B. of this opinion, ante.
23.
does not explain why he never sought such relief prior to the trial court issuing its order
granting G6’s summary judgment motion. The May 22 discovery order was entered on
May 22, 2024, but the order granting G6’s summary judgment motion was not entered
until July 3, 2024. Although “delay alone without a showing of substantial prejudice
cannot justify the denial of a motion under [section 2033.300]” (New Albertsons, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1421), given that G6 has had to expend
substantial resources in defending against Lipson’s appeal, G6 has been substantially
prejudiced by Lipson’s failure to seek relief from the deemed admissions during the six-
week period between the May 22 discovery order and the order granting G6’s summary
judgment motion.
Lipson’s argument that there was “mistake, inadvertence, and/or excusable
neglect” is premised solely on the declaration of his attorney, Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza,
wherein Janfaza states in relevant part: “I was unaware that [a motion that requests for
admissions be deemed admitted] was in fact filed and that the motion was granted. … I
was not present at the hearing because I was unaware that a hearing was set, and failed to
place the matter on my calendar and/or file any opposition.” The excuse falls flat
because the record on appeal demonstrates that attorney Shelan Toma appeared at the
hearing of said motion on behalf of Lipson and could have objected to the trial court’s
consideration of the deemed admissions at that time.
Lipson concedes the requests for admission “potentially foreclose[] a duty
argument based on operational control.” Lipson continues: “However, operational
control is not the only basis for a franchisor’s duty to a hotel guest. A franchisor with
actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition—independent of any right to
control day-to-day operations—may still owe a duty to warn or act, particularly where the
franchisor’s own systems … generated or received the relevant information.” G6
correctly observes that Lipson has failed to provide any legal authority in support of the
argument and argues that Lipson forfeited the argument by failing to raise it earlier. We
24.
agree with G6 on both points and will not consider the argument. (See W.S. v. S.T.
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 149, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief
are deemed waived or abandoned.”]; Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [“failure to provide legal authorities to support arguments
forfeits contentions of error”].)
Lipson also contends the admission that “Lipson has no evidence of any
relationship between G6 and K.T.M.A other than franchisor-franchisee” does not
“foreclose reliance on the terms of that franchise relationship itself. Evidence that the
franchise agreement between G6 and K.T.M.A. [Inc.] granted G6 retained rights to
inspect, audit, or enforce brand standards, including pest-control standards, describes the
content of the admitted franchisor-franchisee relationship; it is not evidence of a different
relationship .…” Lipson’s argument appears to be based solely on speculation. He does
not state that such evidence exists, does not quote from any such evidence or attach it to
his supplemental brief (despite having attached other evidence [i.e., a declaration] to his
supplemental brief), and states that he “would have sought to submit testimony and/or
documentary evidence concerning G6’s contractual rights and obligations under the
franchise agreement.” That Lipson has no evidence in this regard is further revealed by
Janfaza’s declaration in which he states that Lipson “would have … sought evidence
concerning G6’s contractual rights under the franchise agreement, including any retained
rights to inspect, monitor, audit, enforce brand standards, or otherwise exercise quality-
control authority at the property.” (Italics added.)
Lipson also contends he would have “included the complete Terminix incident
log” and “would have sought … room-specific and stay-specific pest-control, inspection,
maintenance, and related records concerning the room occupied by [Lipson] and the dates
of his stay.” Lipson argues that this would “bear[] directly on whether G6 had actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition” of which he complains. Similarly,
Lipson contends that communications between G6 and K.T.M.A. Inc. or the subject hotel
25.
“concerning the .…pest history would show, most directly, what G6 knew and when.”
(Boldface omitted.) These arguments do not aid Lipson. Lipson fails to demonstrate
how a more complete Terminix report would demonstrate G6’s actual or constructive
knowledge of the alleged pest infestation. Moreover, G6’s alleged knowledge of the
issue is insufficient to impose a duty on G6 with regard to the condition. (See Davidson
v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 208 [mere knowledge of danger imposes no
duty to warn a potential victim]; Williams v. Southern California Gas Co. (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 591, 602 [“Standing alone, knowledge of a dangerous condition does
not impose a duty” to warn or take action].)
Finally, Lipson states that “Requests Nos. 6 through 10 admit only that G6 did not
own, control, or manage the [subject hotel] [p]roperty, and did not manage the day-to-day
operations of the [p]roperty or the Franchisee. They do not admit, and by their terms
cannot be read to admit, that G6 lacked knowledge of the [p]roperty’s pest history, or that
G6 had no independent means of acquiring such knowledge .…” As noted in the
preceding paragraph, knowledge alone is insufficient to impose a duty on a party.
(Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 208; Williams v. Southern
California Gas Co., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 602.)
VIII. Summary
In summary, we conclude that Lipson did, in fact, forfeit any objection to the trial
court considering the deemed admissions in ruling on G6’s summary judgment motion by
failing to object to the trial court’s consideration of the evidence and by failing to request
an opportunity to file a sur-reply. (See Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
Co., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.) For reasons discussed above, the evidence
submitted to the court in support of G6’s motion for summary judgment demonstrated
that no triable issues of material fact exist and that G6 is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. We also conclude that Lipson has failed to proffer any arguable basis for relief
from the deemed admissions under section 2033.300 and has failed to demonstrate that
26.
additional evidence exists to overcome the evidence in support of G6’s motion for
summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. G6 Hospitality LLC is entitled to its costs on appeal.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
GUERRA, J.
27.