Filed 8/3/26 Lipa v. Rodriguez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
CRYSTAL THOMAS LIPA, B345965
Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23SMRO00440)
v.
JAVIER RODRIGUEZ,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David W. Swift, Judge. Affirmed.
Javier Rodriguez, in pro per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
******
Javier Rodriguez appeals the trial court’s renewal of a
domestic violence restraining order, contending that the court
erred in treating his stipulation to entry of the initial restraining
order as a finding of abuse, and that insufficient evidence
supports renewal. Because his arguments lack merit, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Initial Domestic Violence Restraining Order
Rodriguez and Crystal Lipa dated on and off for four years
between 2016 and 2020. Between 2020 and mid-2023, Rodriguez
repeatedly came onto Lipa’s property, followed Lipa and her
children to family events, showed up at her children’s schools,
followed Lipa on errands, and sent her repeated emails. In
September 2023, Rodriguez showed up at a Starbucks where Lipa
had been, and tried to forcefully take away her car keys. In
October 2023, he came to the porch of her residence (after hiding
behind trees or cars) and refused to leave; once Lipa refused his
entreaties to have sex, he blocked her driveway, preventing her
from leaving.
In the fall of 2023, Lipa filed a request for a restraining
order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, §
6200 et seq.).1 The trial court entered a temporary restraining
order on November 1, 2023, ordering that Rodriguez stay 100
1 Rodriguez did not include Lipa’s application in the record
on appeal. Although this makes it more difficult to evaluate his
arguments, the other portions of the record he does include are
sufficient for us to consider his arguments on appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
yards away from Lipa and her four children (one of whom is an
adult).
When the parties appeared, with counsel, at the April 8,
2024 hearing on Lipa’s request, Lipa’s counsel reported that the
parties “agree[d] to a one-year restraining order” on the same
terms and conditions as the temporary restraining order.
Rodriguez’s attorney added that, despite the parties’ agreement,
Rodriguez “is not making any admission of any sort.” The court
accepted the parties’ stipulation and entered a restraining order
after hearing that protected Lipa (as a “[f]ormer [r]omantic
[p]artner”) as well as her four children; ordered Rodriguez not to
“[h]arass, . . . stalk, . . . or disturb the peace” of Lipa or her
children, to stay 100 yards away from them, and not to contact
them. The order was set to expire on November 30, 2024.
II. Renewal Request
On October 9, 2024, Lipa filed a request to renew the
restraining order for an additional five years. In support of the
request, Lipa stated that Rodriguez (1) sent Lipa’s father $29
with the message, “For Thanks to your SUNSHINE [which is the
nickname Lipa’s father uses for Lipa] Im getting full custody,”
followed by a heart emoji; and (2) on at least four occasions
“appeared” while Lipa or her children were out and about in
public in the Westwood/UCLA area. Lipa stated that the
message to her father “intimidate[d]” her and that Rodriguez’s
constant appearances caused her to be “anxious” and “visibly
shaken.”
Rodriguez opposed the renewal, and submitted an 11-page
document listing the “reasons [he] d[id] not agree with [her]
request” for renewal. Among those reasons are that he never
admitted to the truth of the allegations underlying the initial
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restraining order, that many of the instances Lipa now reported
had occurred prior to the issuance of the initial restraining order,
and that Lipa did not otherwise prove that she had a “reasonable
apprehension of future abuse.”
The court conducted a hearing on November 25, 2024.
After swearing in both Lipa and Rodriguez, Lipa reaffirmed her
prior statements, while Rodriguez explained that he had a “great
relationship” with Lipa’s father (and hence did not mean to
intimidate Lipa) and that he also lived in the Westwood/UCLA
area, making serendipitous encounters unavoidable. Rodriguez
declined to discuss the October 2023 incident that precipitated
the original restraining order due to a pending criminal matter.
The court granted a five-year renewal.2 The court framed
the “question” as “whether [Lipa] has a reasonable apprehension
of abuse.” The court declined to find that Rodriguez had
“violated” the original restraining order by encountering Lipa
because “both of [them] frequent Westwood” and because there
was “no proof that it was a willful violation,” but found that
Rodriguez’s message to Lipa’s father was “much closer to a
violation, if not a violation.” The court nevertheless ruled that
Lipa had established a reasonable apprehension of abuse because
she had “put forth some pretty persuasive evidence that the
incident in [October] 2023 was serious” as well as the message to
her father; because Lipa showed that her encounters with
Rodriguez had disturbed her “peace of mind”; and because the
“fact that [Lipa and Rodriguez] go to the same neighborhoods”
means that she “needs a restraining order for her protection.”
2 Rodriguez did not include a copy of the renewed order in
the record on appeal. We are nonetheless able to discern its
terms from the court’s oral ruling.
4
When Rodriguez told the court that he did not think that this
renewal hearing would “rehash” prior events, the court explained
that it “need[ed] some background on what happened” “to decide
if [Lipa’s] apprehension is credible,” and reminded Rodriguez that
“there’s been a finding of domestic abuse back in 2023” because
he “stipulated to that.”
III. Appeal
Rodriguez filed this appeal.3
DISCUSSION
A domestic violence restraining order “may be renewed,
upon the request of a party . . . for five or more years” if the party
to be protected “entertains a reasonable apprehension” that
“‘abuse will occur at some time in the future if the protective
order is allowed to expire.’” (§ 6345, subd. (a); Michael M. v.
Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 179, quoting Ritchie v.
Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288.) The party seeking
renewal need not show that the initial restraining order was
violated, or that “it is more likely than not that abuse will occur if
the protective order is not renewed.” (Michael M., at p. 179.)
And the party need not show a reasonable apprehension of
physical abuse; any type of statutorily defined abuse will suffice,
including “harassing or disturbing the peace” of the party. (Ibid.;
3 Rodriguez’s notice of appeal purports to appeal the
“[j]udgment after court trial” and lists the date of February 18,
2025—which is the date that the trial court denied Rodriguez’s
motion for reconsideration. Although a motion for
reconsideration is not itself appealable, we can and do elect to
construe Rodriguez’s notice of appeal as appealing the earlier
renewal order to which the reconsideration motion was solely
directed and which was appropriately filed. (Hughey v. City of
Hayward (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 206, 210.)
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§ 6203, subd. (a).) In evaluating whether the party seeking
renewal has established a reasonable apprehension of future
abuse, a trial court is to consider (1) “the evidence and findings
on which the initial [restraining order] was based”; (2) “‘any
significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events
justifying the initial protective order’”; and (3) “‘the seriousness
and degree of risk’” as well as “‘the burdens the protective order
imposes on the restrained person.’” (Michael M., at p. 180,
quoting Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333.) We
review a trial court’s decision to renew a restraining order for an
abuse of discretion, but review de novo whether the court applied
the correct legal standard. (Michael M., at pp. 178-179.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in renewing the
restraining order in this case. The court properly considered the
facts underlying the initial restraining order, noting that Lipa
had “put forth some pretty persuasive evidence” that Rodriguez’s
conduct precipitating that order was “serious.” The court’s
observation that the parties continued to encounter each other in
the Westwood/UCLA area—while not constituting a violation of
the initial order—nevertheless showed that circumstances had
not changed and that the risk to Lipa of further harassment if
the order was not renewed was serious and the burdens on
Rodriguez were minimal because Rodriguez would only need to
not talk to her or “walk away” from the area where he encounters
Lipa; the court was also careful to delineate that the order would
not preclude Rodriguez from going about his business (at work or
at school) in the area.
Rodriguez raises what boil down to two challenges to the
renewal order.
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First, he argues that the trial court considered a legally
improper factor—which invalidates its ruling—because the court
noted a prior “finding of domestic abuse” attendant to the initial
restraining order, when, in fact, Rodriguez merely stipulated to
the entry of that order while purporting to “not mak[e] an[]
admission of any sort.” (Italics added.) We reject this argument
for several reasons. For starters, the trial court’s comment about
the prior finding was made in response to Rodriguez’s
questions—and was not part of its initial ruling, which rested on
Lipa’s “pretty persuasive evidence” of the conduct underlying the
initial restraining order. (Italics added.) As noted above, the law
makes the “evidence and findings” on which the initial order was
based undeniably relevant to the question of whether to renew
that order. More to the point, the fact that Rodriguez stipulated
to the entry of a domestic violence restraining order rather than
Lipa proving she was entitled to such an order is irrelevant: In
either event, the court has to find prior abuse before it can issue
such an order. (C.C. v. D.V. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 101, 110 [“By
stipulating to the issuance of a one-year [restraining order after
hearing], the parties effectively agreed [that the party to be
restrained] had committed an act of domestic violence and—
having accepted their stipulation and issued the [order]—the
court necessarily found likewise.”]; accord, People v. Voit (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364 [noting that a plea of no contest in a
criminal case has the same effect as a guilty plea, despite it
resting on the admission of the defendant].) Accepting
Rodriguez’s argument would mean that no restraining order
resting on a stipulation could be renewed; that would provide a
blueprint for precluding renewals, which would contravene the
intent of permitting them in the discretion of the trial courts.
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Second, Rodriguez argues that the court’s finding of
reasonable apprehension of future abuse is unsupported by the
record. For the reasons explained above, we disagree.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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