Filed 8/11/26 Linson v. Chesney CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
PATRICIA LINSON, B342104
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22VECV00301)
v.
KENNETH ARNOLD CHESNEY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of C. Randall Plentzas, Randy Plentzas; Law
Office of Ronda Baldwin-Kennedy and Ronda Baldwin-Kennedy
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Theodora Oringher, Gregory M. Hatton, and Alice M.
Hodsden for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Someone impersonating musician and defendant Kenneth
Arnold Chesney convinced plaintiff Patricia Linson to lend him
(the impersonator) and another defendant, who is not a party to
this appeal, over $300,000. When the impersonator and the other
defendant failed to repay the loan, Linson sued Chesney and the
other defendant.
Linson alleged, among other things, that Chesney likely
knew third parties were impersonating him to steal money from
others and that he owed her a duty to warn and protect her
against such scams. Linson also alleged that an unknown
employee of Chesney may have aided and abetted the
impersonator by leaking confidential information about
Chesney’s music business to the impersonator, which the
impersonator used to convince Linson that he was Chesney. As a
result, Linson claimed Chesney was also liable for her loss under
vicarious liability and negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention theories. The trial court sustained without leave to
amend Chesney’s demurrer as to all of Linson’s causes of action
against Chesney, and dismissed him from the lawsuit.
Linson appeals, arguing the trial court erred in finding
Chesney did not owe her a duty to warn or protect her against
the impersonator’s scam. We conclude the court correctly found
Chesney owed Linson no such duty. Because Linson has not
otherwise shown the court erred in dismissing any of her claims
against Chesney, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In February 2021, someone impersonating Chesney
contacted Linson. The impersonator told Linson that he was
experiencing financial difficulties and needed her to forward him
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several hundred thousand dollars. The impersonator claimed
that he needed the money to appear at a country music awards
show, repair damaged instruments, create new music videos, and
help finance other aspects of his music business. According to
Linson, the impersonator was able to convince her that he was
Chesney by revealing details about future tours and releases that
were not yet public and that only someone closely connected to
Chesney’s music business would know.
In April 2021, Linson agreed to loan the impersonator more
than $300,000, which the impersonator claimed he would repay
within several months. The impersonator asked Linson to send
the money to Nayri Apelian, who the impersonator claimed was
Chesney’s “partner.” In total, Linson sent $310,000 to Apelian.
Neither the impersonator nor Apelian repaid any of the money.
In June 2024, Linson filed her operative second amended
complaint against Chesney, Apelian, and a John Doe defendant
because she never discovered the impersonator’s identity. Linson
asserted 10 causes of action against Chesney: fraud; civil
conspiracy; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; promissory estoppel; unjust enrichment; vicarious
liability; inadequate warning; negligence; negligent hiring,
supervision, or retention; and punitive damages.
Linson’s inadequate warning and negligence causes of
action are based on allegations that Chesney was aware that
third parties were impersonating him and using confidential
information about his music business to steal money from his
fans. According to Linson, Chesney owed her a duty to warn and
protect her against such scams, including by posting warnings
about such scams on his website and social media accounts. Had
he posted such warnings, Linson claims she would have realized
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the impersonator was not Chesney and she would not have
agreed to loan the impersonator and Apelian money.
Linson’s vicarious liability and negligent supervision,
hiring, or retention causes of action are based on allegations that
an unknown employee of Chesney was the impersonator or
leaked confidential information about Chesney’s music business
to the impersonator that was used to convince Linson that the
impersonator was Chesney. According to Linson, Chesney should
be held liable for failing to prevent the unknown employee from
using confidential information about his music business to help
facilitate the underlying scam.
Chesney demurred to Linson’s second amended complaint.
Among other things, Chesney argued that Linson failed to plead
facts showing that he owed her a duty to warn or protect her
against third parties using his identity to scam his fans out of
money. Chesney also argued that Linson failed to plead any facts
showing that it was foreseeable that an unknown employee of his
would use information about his music business to defraud
Linson or aid and abet a third party in defrauding Linson.
The trial court sustained Chesney’s demurrer without leave
to amend. Relevant here, the court found that Chesney owed
Linson no duty to warn or protect her against third-party scams.
As for Linson’s claims based on allegations that Chesney was
liable for his employee’s negligence or intentional misconduct in
helping to facilitate the underlying scam, the court found that
Linson failed to plead facts that would support a finding that
such conduct by one of Chesney’s employees was foreseeable.
In addition, the court found that Linson failed to plead any facts
that would support a finding that Chesney shared a special
relationship with his fans such that “they had a right to expect
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protection from Chesney as a result of the rising [third-party]
scams” or that he had a special relationship with the
impersonator and Apelian such that he was able to control their
conduct.
The court also rejected Linson’s request for leave to amend
to allege additional facts that would support a finding that
“Chesney knew of the fraud being committed in his name and
that he failed to prevent it.” The court explained, “[w]hen
pressed, counsel did not have any actual facts he intended to add
that would establish that [the impersonator] or Apelian actually
were employed by Chesney, that Chesney had actual knowledge
of this particular scam, or that Chesney had any ability to control
the activities of the scammers; rather counsel argued that
because these types of celebrity scams are on the upswing,
Chesney could have placed warnings on his website to alert fans
to possible scams. These factual allegations are insufficient to
rise to the level of imposing a duty to warn or control on Chesney
over the fraudulent actions of third parties. While these scams
are indeed unfortunate, to require every famous person to include
disclosures on their social media pages that unknown individuals
might be impersonating them (and face liability for those scams if
they do not), stretches the concept of duty beyond what is
supported by common sense and sound public policy.”
The trial court dismissed Linson’s action against Chesney
with prejudice. Linson appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review
We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a
demurrer to determine whether the operative complaint alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ivanoff v. Bank of
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America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) We assume the
truth of all properly pled factual allegations and matters that are
judicially noticeable, and liberally construe the complaint’s
allegations with a view toward substantial justice. (Ibid.;
Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th
26, 43, fn. 7.)
If the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the plaintiff can amend her complaint to cure the defect.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If the defect can be
cured, the trial court has abused its discretion, and we reverse.
(Ibid.) If the defect cannot be cured, the trial court has not
abused its discretion, and we affirm. (Ibid.) The plaintiff bears
the burden of showing there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect can be cured. (Ibid.) The plaintiff can make that showing
for the first time on appeal. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 711.)
2. Duty to warn or protect against third-party
misconduct
Linson contends the trial court erred when it dismissed her
claims against Chesney because she adequately pled facts to
support a finding that he owed her a duty to warn or protect
against scams that he knew were perpetrated by third-party
impersonators. As we explain, this argument lacks merit.
“[N]ot every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care.”
(Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213 (Brown).)
The law typically “imposes a general duty of care on a defendant
only when it is the defendant who has ‘ “created a risk” ’ of harm
to the plaintiff, including when ‘ “the defendant is responsible for
making the plaintiff’s position worse.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 214.) One
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generally owes no duty “ ‘ “to control the conduct of another, nor
to warn those endangered by such conduct.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Whether a
duty exists is a question of law for courts to decide. (Id. at
p. 213.)
Linson acknowledges that no authority imposes a duty on
celebrities to protect others from scams perpetrated entirely by
third parties, even when celebrities are aware that third parties
have used the celebrities’ identities to steal money from others.
Nevertheless, Linson urges us to create such a duty here. For the
reasons expressed below, we decline to do so.
In Brown, the California Supreme Court established a two-
step inquiry for courts to use when deciding whether to impose
upon a defendant a “legal duty to take action to protect [a]
plaintiff from injuries caused by a third party.” (Brown, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) First, courts “must determine whether
there exists a special relationship between the parties or some
other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to
protect. Second, if so, [courts] must consult the factors described
in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108] to determine
whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that
duty.” (Ibid.)
Linson does not allege any facts, or cite any authority, that
would support a finding that celebrities share a special
relationship with their fans, such as a fiduciary relationship (see
Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 753,
764 (Harding)), or a special relationship with their
impersonators, such as one that would entitle celebrities to
control their impersonators’ conduct (see Brown, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 216). Indeed, Linson concedes that “whether or
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not there is a special relationship between Chesney and any of
the parties involved [in this case] is admittedly tenuous at best.”
Instead, Linson argues that “some other set of
circumstances” exists to warrant imposing upon celebrities a duty
to warn their fans and the public about scams perpetrated by
third-party impersonators. (See Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 209.) Specifically, Linson argues that third-party scams
centered around celebrity impersonations have become so
prevalent that they should be considered an “epidemic,” and the
only way to curb this epidemic is to create a new duty requiring
celebrities who are aware of such scams to protect their fans by
posting warnings on their websites and social media accounts.
To support this argument, Linson relies on anecdotes of
celebrities and companies warning the public about third-party
scams or enacting measures to protect the public from third-party
misconduct. For instance, Linson claims that other famous
musicians have placed warnings on their websites and social
media accounts notifying fans that third parties were
impersonating those celebrities in attempts to steal money from
their fans. Linson also cites and discusses news articles detailing
the rise of scams perpetrated by people impersonating celebrities,
government officials, and business people.
Linson cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that
required the celebrities in the anecdotes and news articles that
she relies on to enact prophylactic measures to protect the public
from third-party misconduct. Nor does Linson cite any authority
that supports the proposition that because some celebrities have
voluntarily undertaken measures to protect the public from third-
party impersonators, that all celebrities who are aware of such
scams must undertake similar measures.
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Linson attempts to analogize the facts of this case to a line
of decisions that have held that landlords owe a duty to protect
their tenants and patrons from third-party criminal conduct
occurring on their land. (See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza
Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674–680 [listing cases].)
Linson’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. It is well settled
that landlords and businesses share special relationships with
their tenants, patrons, and invited guests that may support a
duty to protect against foreseeable risks, including those caused
by third parties. (See Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior
Ct. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 620.) As we already explained, Linson
alleges no facts, and cites no authority, to support a finding that
celebrities share special relationships with their fans to support
imposing a duty on celebrities that would require them to protect
their fans from third-party misconduct.
In the absence of any authority supporting the creation of a
new legal duty that would require celebrities to warn and protect
their fans against third-party imposter scams, we decline to
create such a duty here. (See Harding, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at
p. 764.) While we do not doubt that financial scams are becoming
more sophisticated and prevalent as technological developments
make it easier for people to impersonate others, the trial court
aptly observed that it would “stretch[] the concept of duty beyond
what is supported by common sense and sound public policy” to
require celebrities to post warnings about third-party scams on
their websites and social media accounts lest they face liability
for such scams.
Finally, Linson contends that she alleged sufficient facts to
support a theory that Chesney negligently contributed to her
injuries by maintaining a website and social media account
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through which he engages with fans and sells products.
Linson argues that because the impersonator was able to use
information that he allegedly learned from Chesney’s social
media account and website to convince Linson that he was really
Chesney, and because Linson relied on Chesney’s website and
social media account to convince herself that the impersonator
was really Chesney, Chesney increased the risk that Linson
would be harmed by the impersonator’s scam by maintaining his
website and social media account. (See Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 214.) In essence, Linson rephrases her argument that we
impose a duty on celebrities requiring them to protect their fans
from third parties who use information about the celebrities to
defraud fans. For the same reasons discussed above, we reject
this argument.
3. Employer liability
Linson next contends the trial court erred when it
dismissed her claims for vicarious liability and negligent
supervision, which are based on a theory that an unknown
employee of Chesney likely leaked to the impersonator
confidential information about Chesney’s music business, which
the impersonator used to convince Linson that he was Chesney.
Linson has not shown the court erred in dismissing these claims.
We presume a challenged order or judgment is correct.
(Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771,
799.) To overcome this presumption, the appellant must provide
reasoned argument and legal authority to support his
contentions. (Ibid.) An appellant generally waives any issues
that she does not adequately brief. (Behr v. Redmond (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 517, 538.)
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Here, Linson asserts that she adequately pled her vicarious
liability and negligent supervision claims. Even if she failed to
adequately plead these claims, Linson contends, the court should
have granted her leave to amend her complaint because she could
have unearthed more facts relevant to those claims through
discovery.
Linson does not, however, discuss the elements of either
claim or cite any authority that explains how a plaintiff can
prevail on either claim. Indeed, while Linson generally discusses
the factual allegations relevant to these claims, she does not
explain how those allegations would satisfy any of the elements
of a vicarious liability or negligent supervision claim. Nor does
she explain how any facts she could learn through discovery
would satisfy the elements of either claim.
It is not our role “to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) By failing to provide reasoned
argument with citations to pertinent legal authority, Linson has
failed to show that the court erred in dismissing her claims for
vicarious liability and negligent supervision.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Chesney shall recover his costs
on appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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