Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Lindemann v. Sacee, LLC CA2/3

Filed 11/20/26 Lindemann v. Sacee, LLC CA2/3
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/20/26 Lindemann v. Sacee, LLC CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

BLAKE LINDEMANN, B342635

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21VECV01653)
v.

SACEE, LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Valerie Salkin, Judge. Affirmed.
Lindemann Law Firm, Blake J. Lindemann and Donna R.
Dishbak, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Yoka | Smith, Christopher E. Faenza, Christine C. De
Metruis; Chuck & Tsoong and Stephen C. Chuck, for Defendant
and Respondent.
_________________________
This appeal arises from a boundary dispute between
neighbors. Plaintiff Blake Lindemann sued defendant Sacee,
LLC (Sacee), asserting causes of action for equitable easement,
declaratory relief, quiet title, trespass, and nuisance. The trial
court granted summary adjudication in Sacee’s favor on the
equitable easement, declaratory relief, and quiet title causes of
action, finding plaintiff had waived and released any claim to an
easement over Sacee’s property in a 2016 settlement agreement
resolving earlier litigation with Sacee’s predecessor in interest,
and that plaintiff could not, in any event, establish that his
encroachment was “innocent” as required to obtain equitable
relief. The parties tried the remaining causes of action for
trespass and nuisance to a jury, which returned a verdict in
Sacee’s favor on both claims.
Plaintiff appeals the judgment on all causes of action. With
respect to the summarily adjudicated claims, he contends Sacee
made a binding judicial admission in its verified answer that the
settlement agreement did not apply to it, and the evidence raised
a triable issue of fact as to whether he was an innocent
trespasser entitled to equitable relief. As for the jury’s verdict on
the remaining claims, plaintiff argues the trial court engaged in
prejudicial misconduct by repeatedly suggesting that plaintiff
needed expert testimony to prove his boundary claims, the court
improperly limited the evidence and jury instructions bearing on
trespass, and the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
None of the contentions has merit. We affirm.

2
BACKGROUND
A. Summary Adjudication of the Equitable Easement,
Declaratory Relief, and Quiet Title Causes of Action
We draw the following undisputed facts from the summary
adjudication evidence. (See Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1518–1519 (Scalf); see also D’Amico v.
Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)
In February 2014, plaintiff purchased the residential
property located at 4040 Madelia Avenue, Sherman Oaks (the
Lindemann Property). Before making the purchase, plaintiff had
viewed the property and learned from the property’s leasing
manager that an area where plaintiff had parked in fact belonged
to the neighboring property at 4030 Madelia Avenue (the Sacee
Property). Plaintiff did not obtain a land survey to determine the
boundary line. He nonetheless purchased the Lindemann
Property with “expectations” that he could use the land belonging
to the Sacee Property to complete a “circle drive” for his property.
Six months after purchasing his property, plaintiff sued the
then-owner of the Sacee Property—Doubleleaf Investments, LLC
(Doubleleaf)—asserting causes of action for equitable and
prescriptive easement, quiet title, trespass, and declaratory and
injunctive relief, based on his claimed right to use a portion of the
Sacee Property to complete a circular driveway.1

1 Plaintiff admitted in his response to Sacee’s separate
statement of undisputed facts that the claim for equitable
easement asserted in the Doubleleaf action concerned the “same
location” on the Sacee Property as the equitable easement claim
asserted in the current lawsuit against Sacee.

3
In October 2016, plaintiff settled his lawsuit against
Doubleleaf. The parties’ written settlement agreement states, in
relevant part: “Lindemann warrants and represents that he has
no interest or claim in Doubleleaf’s property located at 4030
Madelia Avenue, Sherman Oaks, California [the Sacee
Property]), including but not limited to a prescriptive easement
or equitable easement in [the Sacee Property].” It further
provides that it “shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the Parties and their heirs, personal representatives, executors,
administrators, successors, assigns, and transferees” and that
“the respective rights and obligations of the Parties hereto will
not be assigned without written consent by each of the other
Parties.”
In January 2019, Sacee purchased the Sacee Property from
Doubleleaf in a bankruptcy sale, taking title by grant deed.
In December 2021, plaintiff filed a verified complaint
against Sacee for equitable easement, declaratory relief, quiet
title, trespass, and nuisance. The pleading referred to the
Doubleleaf action, including a “survey . . . prepared by a licensed
surveyor commissioned by Doubleleaf” and the parties’ release of
all “claims against one another” in the settlement agreement.2

2 Specifically, Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges:
“Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement after protracted
litigation in this Court in a case styled Lindemann v. Doubleleaf
Investments, LLC, case No. LC102004. In that case, a survey was
prepared by a licensed surveyor commissioned by Doubleleaf
Investments, LLC. One term of the confidential settlement was
that that the parties released claims against one another. In
communications between the principal of Defendant Sacee, and

4
The complaint alleged Sacee had taken the position that neither
the survey nor the settlement agreement applied to it (see fn. 2,
ante), and Sacee had begun construction work “to build a six feet
concrete wall” in “violation of the survey” that threatened to
cause “flooding” due to its location “in a flood plain.” Based on
this conduct, the complaint alleged an “easement” over the
disputed portion of the Sacee Property had “been created as
matter of equity” in favor of plaintiff “from the date [Sacee]
purchased the [Sacee Property] through present date.” In
addition to an equitable easement, the complaint prayed for a
declaratory judgment and to quiet title to the alleged easement
area.
Sacee filed a verified answer with the following response to
the allegations regarding the Doubleleaf action: “Defendant
lacks sufficient information or belie[f] as to the truth of the
allegations in Paragraph 9 and on that basis denies the
allegations of Paragraph 9, except that Defendant admits that
any survey or settlement referred to that is not reflected in
Defendant’s title does not apply to Defendant.” (See fn. 2, ante.)
Sacee moved for summary adjudication of the equitable
easement and derivative declaratory relief and quiet title causes
of action on two independent grounds. First, it argued plaintiff
had “waived and released all equitable easement claims” over
Sacee’s property in settling the action against Doubleleaf.
Second, Sacee maintained plaintiff could not establish the
innocence element of his equitable easement claim because he

Plaintiff, Sacee has taken the position that the survey and the
settlement agreement do not apply to Sacee.”

5
had admitted in deposition testimony that he knew the disputed
driveway area belonged to the Sacee Property.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, among other things,
Sacee’s verified answer contained a binding judicial admission
that the settlement agreement did not apply to Sacee; that the
settlement agreement was never assigned to Sacee with
plaintiff’s written consent; and that his innocence was a triable
issue of fact.
The trial court granted the motion. With respect to the
settlement agreement, the court found plaintiff’s express
warranty that he had “no interest or claim” to an equitable
easement over the Sacee Property, coupled with Sacee’s
undisputed status as Doubleleaf’s transferee by grant deed, was
“facially sufficient to show that Plaintiff expressly waived and
released his right to assert an equitable easement.” (Boldface
and underlining omitted.) The court rejected plaintiff’s judicial
admission argument, reasoning Sacee’s answer used only
“general language” to deny that it was bound by an agreement
not recorded in the property’s title, while it said “nothing [about]
whether such a settlement would be binding on Plaintiff.”
As for innocence, the court determined plaintiff could not,
as a matter of law, establish this element of his equitable
easement claim, because his deposition testimony proved beyond
dispute that he was aware the alleged easement area belonged to
the Sacee Property before plaintiff purchased the neighboring lot.
Moreover, the court reasoned plaintiff “cannot be an ‘innocent’
trespasser” based on conduct that occurred after he executed the
settlement agreement, because plaintiff “expressly disclaimed
any interest in the [Sacee Property] and exchanged a mutual

6
release of all equitable easement claims” over the alleged
easement area in the Doubleleaf action.
B. Trial and Verdict on the Trespass and Nuisance
Causes of Action
The parties tried the remaining causes of action for
trespass and nuisance to a jury. Plaintiff, an attorney,
represented himself and testified in narrative form. With respect
to his nuisance claim, plaintiff testified the wall construction
generated persistent noise and debris affecting his property,
describing “an absolute mess of dirt piles, planks, construction
debris, [and] dust.” As for the finished wall, he testified it
created “claustrophobia,” adding that its configuration prevented
him from using his garage or driveway for more than one vehicle,
forcing household members to park on the street, which plaintiff
tied to recent home invasions. On his trespass claim, plaintiff
offered his personal “observations” that Sacee built the wall “over
the boundary” separating the two parcels, and that fence posts
embedded in the wall were likewise “on [plaintiff’s] side of the
property.”
Sacee presented percipient testimony from its principal,
who testified the construction proceeded under plans and permits
obtained through his surveyor, and the work crew put up tarps to
block dust, as required by the city. Sacee also offered expert
testimony from a licensed land surveyor, who testified that both
the wall and the fence posts were located entirely within Sacee’s
property, several inches clear of the boundary line.
The jury returned a verdict for Sacee on both causes of
action. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

7
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary
Adjudication of the Equitable Easement, Declaratory
Relief, and Quiet Title Causes of Action
A motion for summary adjudication may be granted as to
one or more causes of action if there is no triable issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment on the cause of
action as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1),
(o)(1); see Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 480.)
“ ‘ “A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if
not separately pleaded, cannot be established . . . .” ’ [Citations.]
Once the moving party defendant meets its burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact
exists.” (Scalf, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518; Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) On appeal, we exercise our
“ ‘independent judgment, deciding whether undisputed facts have
been established that negate the opposing party’s claim or state a
complete defense.’ ” (Scalf, at p. 1519.)
The trial court granted summary adjudication of the
equitable easement claim and derivative declaratory relief and
quiet title claims on two independent grounds—first, plaintiff
affirmatively waived any claim to an equitable easement over the
Sacee Property in the settlement agreement with Doubleleaf; and
second, plaintiff could not establish he was an innocent
trespasser because he indisputably knew the alleged easement
area belonged to the Sacee Property. While we conclude both
grounds are independently sufficient to support summary
adjudication of the claims, we focus on the latter ground—

8
plaintiff’s inability to prove his innocent trespass, which overlaps,
in any event, with plaintiff’s knowing waiver of any claim to the
easement area.
Because “equitable easements give [a] trespasser ‘what is,
in effect, the right of eminent domain by permitting him to
occupy property owned by another,’ ” and such “a right is in
tension with the general constitutional prohibition against the
taking of private property,” “courts approach the issuance of
equitable easements with ‘[a]n abundance of caution.’ ” (Shoen v.
Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 21.) To establish an
equitable easement over a landowner’s property, the trespasser
claiming the right to the easement must prove “(1) her trespass
was ‘ “innocent” ’ rather than ‘ “willful or negligent,” ’ (2) the
public or the property owner will not be ‘ “ ‘irreparabl[y]
injur[ed]’ ” ’ by the easement, and (3) the hardship to the
trespasser from having to cease the trespass is ‘ “ ‘greatly
disproportionate to the hardship caused [the owner] by the
continuance of the encroachment.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 19.) While all
three elements are necessary, the innocence factor is “the most
important.” (Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P. (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1020, 1028 (Hansen); accord, Ranch at the Falls LLC
v. O’Neal (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 155, 184; Hirshfield v. Schwartz
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 769 [encroaching party’s innocence is
“paramount”].) “If the [encroaching] party is willful, deliberate,
or even negligent in his or her trespass,” a court must “enjoin the
encroachment.” (Hirshfield, at p. 769, italics added.)
In moving for summary adjudication, Sacee demonstrated
that plaintiff had notice that the alleged easement area belonged
to the Sacee Property. At his deposition, plaintiff admitted that
when he came to view the Lindemann Property in 2014 before

9
purchasing it, the property’s leasing manager advised him that
the alleged easement area belonged to the neighboring lot.
Plaintiff testified:
“So anyway, when I came -- when I came to the
property in 2014 to look at this and think it’s a
short sale, I want to buy it, I came into this
driveway thinking that this is part [of the
Lindemann Property]. And Jay [the leasing
manager] said to me where I parked . . . was
technically not on my side . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I
didn’t know where exactly the boundary line
was. I just knew that what I’ve already testified
to, which is that certainly part of where I was
parking was on the land of 4030 [the Sacee
Property].”
Although this admitted exchange necessarily put plaintiff on
notice that the alleged easement area might belong to the Sacee
Property, plaintiff also admitted at his deposition that he did not
commission a survey of the Lindemann Property before
purchasing it. Sacee contends this evidence was sufficient to
demonstrate that plaintiff would be unable to establish the
innocence element of his equitable easement claim. We agree.
Hansen is instructive. The reviewing court in Hansen
reversed a judgment granting an equitable easement, concluding
the Hansens’ encroachment was “negligent as a matter of law,”
notwithstanding the lower court’s finding that it was
unintentional. (Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1027,
1029.) The evidence showed the Hansens “knew there was a lot
line issue at least by early/mid-2011” in the area where they had
been farming and that a “ ‘lot line adjustment needed to

10
happen,’ ” but they “did not know ‘the specifics’ of the issue.” (Id.
at p. 1029.) The reviewing court acknowledged this evidence,
when viewed in the light favorable to the judgment, “support[ed]
the trial court’s finding [that] the Hansens did not knowingly and
intentionally plant the pistachio trees” on their neighbor’s land in
2012, but concluded “it was undoubtedly negligent to plant trees
on the land without first learning the location of a known,
unspecified lot line issue.” (Id. at pp. 1029–1030, third italics
added.) While “growers do not have a general duty to survey or
otherwise confirm boundaries before planting,” the reviewing
court explained that once a party has reason to doubt the
boundary “it is negligent” to trespass—even if unintentionally—
before resolving the doubt.3 (Id. at p. 1030.) Because the
Hansens’ failure to confirm the boundary despite notice of the
discrepancy precluded a finding of innocence, as a matter of law,
the reviewing court reversed the judgment granting an equitable
easement. (Id. at pp. 1027, 1030.)
Plaintiff contends he offered sufficient evidence to raise a
triable issue of fact regarding his innocent trespass,
notwithstanding his admission that he was on notice of the

3 The Hansen court explained: “[I]f the Hansens had no
reason to doubt they owned all of what they thought was [their]
parcel, it likely would not have been negligent to rely on factors
like the purported lack of objection from [their neighbor]—or
visual cues like the irrigation ditch. But by early to mid-2011,
the Hansens did have reason to doubt their prior assumptions
were wrong. Nonetheless, they planted the pistachio trees in the
area after becoming aware that there was a lot line issue
concerning the border between their parcel and [their
neighbor’s].” (Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030.)

11
disputed boundary issue. He points to the following statement
from his declaration as evidence of his “innocent belief” that he
could use the alleged easement area: “As pled in the complaint,
the use of the disputed area at the time of the purchase of [the
Lindemann Property] was based on an innocent belief that this
use was within [the Lindemann Property]’s property rights. . . .
[T]his innocent belief as to right of use continued long after the
purchase based on aerial photographic images, discussion with
neighbors, custom and practice, actual use of the disputed area,
and other factors to be discussed at trial.”
The trial court did not err in finding plaintiff’s declaration
insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. As explained in
Hansen, plaintiff could not have had an innocent belief that he
had a right to use the disputed area because he was on notice
from his conversation with the property’s leasing manager that at
least part of the area might belong to the Sacee Property, and
plaintiff did not commission a survey to resolve the known
boundary issue before purchasing the Lindemann Property. (See
Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1027, 1029–1030.) Nor was
his claimed reliance on “aerial photographic images, discussion
with neighbors, custom and practice, [or] actual use of the
disputed area” sufficient. While it might “not have been
negligent to rely on factors like the purported lack of objection . . .
or visual cues” if plaintiff had “no reason to doubt” his right to
use the disputed area (id. at p. 1030), plaintiff admitted he did
have reason to doubt this supposed innocent belief, as he was told
he could not park in that area because it belonged to the Sacee
Property.
Although not specifically raised in his opposition to the
summary adjudication motion, on appeal, plaintiff argues he “can

12
be innocent” because he “innocently believed” he was “using the
land in accordance with a survey.” In support of the contention
he points to a text exchange he had with Sacee’s principal
(apparently during the wall’s construction) where plaintiff
referred to “a survey done by [Sacee’s] predecessor who [plaintiff]
settled with” in asserting the construction encroached on the
Lindemann Property. There are at least two problems with this
contention.
First, the text messages plainly reveal that plaintiff—just
like the trespassing growers in Hansen—was aware of the
disputed boundary issue, so he could not claim that any
encroachment onto the Sacee Property was innocent, even if his
mistaken reading of the survey made it unintentional.4 (See
Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1029–1030.) Moreover, the
text messages also prove that plaintiff knew he had been
encroaching on the Sacee Property, even on his own reading of the
survey, as he suggested to Sacee’s principal in the exchange that
“I think we can come to some agreement on allowing you to build
on my property near the waste baskets subject to us getting a
little a space near where I park my car through the line as

4 Plaintiff’s reliance on Romero v. Shih (2024) 15 Cal.5th 680
is misplaced. Unlike in Hansen, the claim in Romero concerned
an implied easement—not an equitable easement as plaintiff
alleged here. An implied easement arises where a common owner
conveys a portion of the property, the owner’s preexisting use of
the land was so obvious and permanent that the parties must
have intended it to continue, and the resulting easement is
reasonably necessary to the dominant estate. (Id. at p. 694.)
Nothing in that test requires proof that the party claiming the
easement acted innocently.

13
reflected on my survey.” (Italics added.) In view of this text
exchange, plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, credibly claim he
innocently believed the alleged easement area where he parked
his car was not part of the Sacee Property.
Second, plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, credibly claim
he innocently believed he had a right to an equitable easement
over the disputed area because he expressly waived that right
when he settled his equitable easement claim against Doubleleaf.
The trial court made exactly this point in its order granting
summary adjudication, and plaintiff fails to offer any rebuttal to
it. As the court explained:
“Plaintiff cannot be an ‘innocent’ trespasser
based on acts, occurrences, and omissions that
occurred after Plaintiff already executed the
Settlement with Doubleleaf wherein he
expressly disclaimed any interest in the Sacee
Property and exchanged a mutual release of all
equitable easement claims over the exact same
area alleged in the Doubleleaf Case. [¶] Clearly,
Plaintiff knew that he had disclaimed any
equitable easement over the Sacee Property by
the time Defendant purchased the Sacee
Property from Doubleleaf. Any conduct by
Plaintiff after the Settlement was executed
which could have gone toward creating an
equitable easement was therefore willful, as
Plaintiff engaged in such conduct with clear
knowledge that he had already disclaimed any
easement. Plaintiff cannot be an innocent

14
trespasser and cannot claim an equitable
easement as a matter of law.” (Italics added.)
We agree with the trial court’s assessment, which is
entirely consistent with Hansen. (See Hansen, supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1029–1030.) Plaintiff’s failure to address this
part of the court’s innocence analysis speaks for itself. The trial
court did not err in summarily adjudicating the equitable
easement and derivative declaratory relief and quiet title claims.5
B. Plaintiff Fails to Establish Grounds to Set Aside the
Jury’s Verdict on the Trespass and Nuisance Claims
Plaintiff challenges the verdict both for trial court error
and for insufficiency of the evidence. We address the claimed
errors first.
An appellant bears the burden of showing “error and
prejudice during the trial before an appellate court may reverse
the judgment.” (Loeb v. Kimmerle (1932) 215 Cal. 143, 160;
accord, F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) “In order to
demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 (WFG).) Rather
than “scour the record unguided,” we may decide the appellant
has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by
accurate record citations. (Ibid.) “Similarly, we may disregard

5 Because plaintiff’s inability to establish the innocent
trespass element of his equitable easement claim is
independently sufficient to support summary adjudication, we
need not address his contentions about Sacee’s answer to
Paragraph 9 of the complaint.

15
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority.” (Id. at pp. 894–895.)
1. The Trial Court’s Statements About the Need
for Expert Testimony
Plaintiff contends the trial court “repeatedly made
prejudicial statements to the jury indicating that [plaintiff] was
required to hire his own expert witness,” citing statements made
over the course of trial, including the court’s remarks that
“[s]ome of this is going to call for expert testimony,” that plaintiff
would “need an expert” to interpret a survey, and that plaintiff
would “need somebody as an expert to testify” about certain
technical matters. Although he does not address the context of
any statement individually, plaintiff contends the statements—
viewed cumulatively—created “the false impression” with the
jury that his case was legally deficient because he had not
retained his own surveying expert. He maintains this
contravened controlling Supreme Court precedent in “agreed
boundary cases” holding that “property owners may testify
regarding boundary matters based on their personal
observations.” (See Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51
Cal.2d 702 (Ernie).)
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate error, let alone prejudice. As
Sacee rightly points out, although plaintiff contends the court
contravened controlling authority, he “provides no context for any
of the statements, and indeed fails to identify the specific
evidence each statement refers to.” As we have said, it is
plaintiff’s burden as appellant to demonstrate error affirmatively
through reasoned argument tied to the record. (See WFG, supra,
51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.) Having failed to identify the specific
evidence at issue or to explain how the court’s statements—in

16
context—departed from controlling authority, he has not satisfied
that burden. (See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1294 [“ ‘Where a point
is merely asserted by appellant’s counsel without any argument
of or authority for the proposition, it is deemed to be without
foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ”].)
In any event, while it is not our duty to “act as counsel for
appellant” (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th
922, 963), we have nonetheless independently reviewed the
challenged statements in context and confirmed they reflect
ordinary, defensible evidentiary rulings rather than improper
commentary on the merits of plaintiff’s case. For example, most
of the rulings sustained objections that a lay witness’s testimony
required technical expertise, such as interpreting bearings and
coordinate notations on a survey or opining on Building Code
height-compliance calculations. These subjects were “sufficiently
beyond common experience” that the trial court reasonably
determined “the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of
fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see Knutson v. Foster (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1097 [“Testimony of an expert witness is
required when the subject matter ‘is sufficiently beyond common
experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of
fact.’ ”].) The court made some of the other statements in the
context of sustaining objections that plaintiff’s questions assumed
facts not in evidence or lacked foundation, because plaintiff’s
questions concerned a partial survey that was not admitted into
evidence and that the witness had never reviewed. As for
plaintiff’s percipient testimony, the record shows the court
reasonably exercised its discretion in allowing plaintiff to point to
features on documents and to testify to his belief about the value

17
of his property and observations about the location of
improvements, while sustaining objections when plaintiff sought
to interpret technical notations on a partial survey for which no
foundation had been laid.6 Finally, two of the challenged
statements could not possibly have influenced the jury’s
assessment of plaintiff’s case, because the court made one of them
outside the jury’s presence and it made the other after the jury
had already returned its verdict.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Ernie is misplaced. As Sacee
correctly emphasizes, Ernie sets out the elements of the agreed-
boundary doctrine in a quiet title action, which require a showing
that there is “uncertainty as to the true boundary line, an
agreement between the coterminous owners fixing the line, and
acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period equal
to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that
substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position.”
(Ernie, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 707.) As the trial of this action
plainly demonstrates, there was no agreement between the
owners fixing the disputed boundary line, nor acceptance and
acquiescence in the line so fixed for any period.

6 When plaintiff explained he could bridge the expertise gap
by presenting the deposition testimony of the Doubleleaf expert
who had prepared the survey in connection with the earlier
litigation, the court rejected the suggestion on hearsay grounds,
but added that “[t]here’s nothing stopping you from asking
[Sacee’s] experts . . . about the survey.” Plaintiff reserved the
right to call the Doubleleaf surveyor, but never did. He did,
however, cross examine Sacee’s surveying expert at length about
the partial Doubleleaf survey during the defense case.

18
Plaintiff’s reliance on Evidence Code section 813, Hansford
v. Lassar (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 364, and Red Mountain, LLC v.
Fallbrook Public Utility Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 333 is
similarly misplaced, because the trial court did not preclude him
from testifying to matters within his personal knowledge, such as
his personal beliefs about the location of the boundary line, his
belief that the wall trespassed on his property, and his belief
about the diminution in his property’s value. Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate prejudicial error.
2. The Jury Instructions
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by declining to
instruct the jury on Los Angeles Municipal Code hillside setback
requirements and by limiting the evidence the jury could consider
on the trespass claim to the location of the retaining wall. Sacee
responds that plaintiff has failed to meet his appellate burden, as
he does not provide a copy of the proposed jury instructions, nor
does he identify evidence in the record that would have supported
giving the instructions. We agree with Sacee. “In order to
demonstrate error,” plaintiff must offer a “cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (WFG,
supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894, italics added.) He failed to do so
here.
For its part, Sacee directs our attention to a reported
hearing where the trial court considered three special
instructions that plaintiff proposed. The transcript does not
disclose the text of the proposed instructions; although the trial
court does refer to “a code section” and “setback requirements” in

19
its discussion with counsel.7 In any event, the transcript shows
the court agreed to give one of the instructions, while declining
the other two on the ground that there was insufficient evidence
for the jury to make a finding on whatever issues the instructions
concerned. Critically, plaintiff did not attempt to identify
evidence supporting the declined instructions in response to the
court’s ruling. Instead, the transcript shows the court decided to
instruct the jury as follows, and plaintiff agreed to the
instruction: “You may consider whether Sacee did or did not
construct a wall within one or more surveys. If you determine
Sacee’s wall encroaches on property, you may consider if that’s a
nuisance or trespass both or neither.”
We agree with Sacee that plaintiff has not carried his
burden on this issue. To establish instructional error, an
appellant must identify the specific instruction proposed and

7 Plaintiff argues Los Angeles Municipal Code sections 12.21,
subdivision (C)(10), and 12.08 required a three-foot setback for
concrete structures in a hillside area, but he does not cite any
instance where he asked the court to instruct on these particular
code sections. In any event, our review of the municipal code
confirms the setback requirements apply only to a “Building or
Structure” (L.A. Mun. Code, § 12.21, subd. (C)(10); see also id.,
§ 12.08, subd. (C)(2) [regulating side yard requirements for a
“building or structure”]), as distinguished from perimeter walls or
fences, for which there are height restrictions. (See, e.g., id.,
§ 12.22, subd. (C)(20)(f) [regulating “Fences and Walls”].) This is
consistent with the only evidence that plaintiff cites on this issue,
in which Sacee’s survey expert testified that “the City of Los
Angeles has code for side yard walls that allow side yard walls to
be up to eight feet high, and then additionally you can go to [a]
zoning administrator . . . and get a wall height determination and
walls can actually exceed the eight foot maximum height.”

20
refused, demonstrate that substantial evidence supported it, and
show resulting prejudice. (See Soule v. General Motors Corp.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572.) Plaintiff’s briefing does not reproduce
the text of the instructions he contends were wrongly refused and
does not otherwise explain why there was sufficient evidence for
the court to give the instructions. On this record, we cannot
conclude the trial court erred.8
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, plaintiff argues the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. He relies exclusively on a snippet of
testimony by Sacee’s land-survey expert who, plaintiff contends,
“acknowledged that the boundary fence poles were ‘bent over’ into
[plaintiff’s] property,” thus providing “uncontroverted evidence
establishing trespass as a matter of law.”9 The argument
mischaracterizes the expert’s testimony and, in any event, fails to
satisfy plaintiff’s appellate burden under our substantial
evidence standard of review.
“ ‘The rule is well established that a reviewing court must
presume that the record contains evidence to support every
finding of fact, and an appellant who contends that some
particular finding is not supported is required to set forth in his

8 Because we conclude plaintiff has not established error,
there is no need to address his contention that 11-1 and 10-2
verdicts in Sacee’s favor, or a post-verdict question by one of the
jurors, establishes prejudice.
9 Plaintiff does not advance a separate argument with
respect to the nuisance claim. Instead, he argues the jury’s
verdict on this cause of action was “necessarily tainted by its
improper rejection of the trespass evidence.”

21
brief a summary of the material evidence upon that issue.
Unless this is done, the error assigned is deemed to be waived.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887 (Marriage of
Fink).) Thus, “ ‘[i]t is incumbent upon appellants to state fully,
with transcript references, the evidence which is claimed to be
insufficient to support the findings.’ ” (Ibid.)
We begin with the survey expert’s testimony. To support
his contention that the evidence compelled a different verdict on
his trespass and nuisance claims, plaintiff plucks two words—
“ ‘bent over’ ”—from a brief excerpt of the expert’s cross-
examination testimony. The full exchange reveals the expert’s
testimony was materially different from what plaintiff
characterizes as “uncontroverted evidence” of trespass:
“Q. DID YOU TAKE MEASUREMENTS
BETWEEN THE POSTS AND THE WALL
FROM THE TOP OF THEM?
“A. NO. I COULD SEE THAT THE
POSTS WERE EMBEDDED INTO THE BASE
OF THE WALL. AND SO THEN BY
MEASURING – BY KNOWING WHAT THE
MEASUREMENT WAS TO THE FACE OF THE
WALL, IF YOU KNOW THAT THE POST IS
RIGHT AT THE FACE OF THE WALL AND
YOU KNOW WHERE THE FACE OF THE
WALL IS, THEN YOU KNOW WHAT THE
POST IS.
“Q. MY QUESTION, THOUGH, IS: DID
YOU TAKE A MEASUREMENT TO THE TOP
OF THE POST TO THE WALL?

22
“A. NO, I DID NOT MEASURE AT THE
VERY TOP OF THE POST. THE POSTS DO
APPEAR TO BE BENT OVER IN A FASHION.
“Q. SO YOU DIDN’T TAKE A
MEASUREMENT AS TO WHETHER THEY
WERE BENT OVER INTO [PLAINTIFF’S]
PROPERTY? YES OR NO?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ASKED AND
ANSWERED.
“THE COURT: OVERRULED. ARE YOU
ASKING ABOUT THE AIR SPACE?
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: CORRECT.
“A. NO. I CAN SEE THAT THEY’RE
BENT OVER.
“BY [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:
“Q. OKAY. THANK YOU.”
Contrary to plaintiff’s characterization, the expert did not
testify that the posts were bent over “into [plaintiff’s] property.”
Instead, when asked whether he took measurements “as to
whether [the posts] were bent over into [plaintiff’s] property,” the
expert responded in the negative—“no,” while acknowledging
again that the posts appeared to be “bent over.” This is not the
affirmative admission that plaintiff suggests.
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues it is “semantic
gamesmanship” to focus on the expert’s verbatim testimony. He
insists that “[p]osts whose bases are on [Sacee’s] property near
the property line [and] that are ‘bent over’ . . . , will inevitably
cross into [the] neighbor’s airspace if bent sufficiently.” (Italics
added.) And, he adds that Sacee “points to no evidence that the

23
bent portions of the posts did not cross the boundary.” There are
at least two related problems with this argument.
First, as plaintiff’s argument concedes, the expert’s
acknowledgement that the posts appeared to be bent over suffices
to prove that they crossed into plaintiff’s “airspace” only if there
is evidence that the posts were “bent sufficiently.” Critically, it
was plaintiff’s burden—as the party asserting the claims—to
prove every element of his trespass and nuisance causes of action,
yet plaintiff fails to identify evidence in the record that would
have compelled a finding that the posts were “bent sufficiently” to
encroach on his property. (See Sukoff v. Lemkin (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 740, 744 [in a civil action, “ ‘the plaintiff has the
burden of proving every essential element of the cause of
action’ ”].) Second, and relatedly, because plaintiff had the
burden of proof at trial, he cannot satisfy his burden on appeal
merely by asserting Sacee failed to prove “the posts did not cross
the boundary.” (See Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare
County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 965–966
(Valero).)10 Instead, plaintiff must show that the evidence he

10 As the Valero court explained, where, as here, a judgment
rests on the fact finder’s determination that the appellant failed
to satisfy his burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court
is not necessarily “whether there is substantial evidence in the
record” to support a finding, but rather “ ‘whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’ ”
(Valero, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965–966); accord, Roesch v.
De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570–571 (Roesch); Caron v.
Andrew (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 402, 409.) Reviewing courts have
consistently recognized “it is almost impossible” for the party who
had the burden of proof “to prevail on appeal by arguing the
evidence compels a judgment in his favor.” (Bookout v. State of

24
relies upon was (1) “ ‘ “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2)
“of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding” ’ ” in
his favor. (Id., at p. 966, italics added; Roesch, supra, 24 Cal.2d
at p. 571; Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) Plaintiff’s reliance on a snippet of
testimony denying that any measurement of the top of the fence
posts was taken fails to satisfy this “almost impossible” burden.
(Bookout, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486.)
Plaintiff’s argument fails for another reason. As discussed,
a party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a particular finding must summarize all the relevant evidence,
both favorable and unfavorable, and, “[u]nless this is done, the
error assigned is deemed to be waived.” (Marriage of Fink, supra,
25 Cal.3d at p. 887; see also Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738.) By exclusively relying on the snippet
of testimony we have discussed, plaintiff ignores all the other
evidence presented on his trespass and nuisance claims.
Although it “is neither practical nor appropriate for us to comb
the record on [plaintiff’s] behalf” (Marriage of Fink, at p. 886),
Sacee has summarized (with citations to the record) some of the
relevant evidence that plainly supports the jury’s verdict.

California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1478, 1486 (Bookout).) This is because, “unless the [jury] makes
specific findings of fact in favor of the losing plaintiff,” a
reviewing court must “presume the [the jury] found the plaintiff’s
evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the
burden of proof.” (Ibid.) The “judgment is presumed to be correct
on appeal, and we indulge all intendments and presumptions in
favor of its correctness.” (Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn.
v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769–770.)

25
Sacee’s principal testified that, before the wall construction
began, he retained a licensed land surveyor to survey his
property and establish the boundary lines. Sacee built the wall
according to the survey—first erecting a fence with posts six
inches inside Sacee’s property line, then placing a string next to
the fence on Sacee’s side of it to mark where the workers should
dig the trench for the wall’s footing, and finally building the wall
inside that line. After Sacee completed construction, the city
conducted a final walkthrough to confirm the work complied with
the approved plans.
Sacee’s surveying expert testified that he conducted a
comprehensive survey of the surrounding neighborhood to
confirm that the city’s surveying monuments and the private
survey monuments were consistent with one another, then
calculated between those monuments to establish the property
lines. He also visited both properties, took photographs and
measurements, and produced a survey depicting the boundary
lines. Based on that work, the expert concluded Sacee’s wall was
eight inches clear of the property line near the street and slightly
more than four inches clear further along, and that the entire
wall was within Sacee’s property with no encroachment onto
plaintiff’s property. He also measured the diameter of the two
fence posts, observed their bases were embedded in the wall
itself, and concluded—contrary to plaintiff’s contention—the
posts also were clear of the property line and located on Sacee’s
property.
This evidence, which plaintiff fails to address, plainly
supports the jury’s verdict that Sacee neither trespassed, nor
caused a nuisance on plaintiff’s property.

26
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant Sacee, LLC is
entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

KARNOW, J.*

* Retired Judge of the San Francisco County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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