Filed 9/1/26 L.G. v. Superior Court CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
L.G.,
F091812
Petitioner,
(Super. Ct. No. 25CEJ300061-1)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO OPINION
COUNTY,
Respondent;
FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT*
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Kimberly J.
Nystrom-Geist, Judge.
Kaelee Geller, Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.
Douglas T. Sloan, County Counsel, and Lisa R. Flores, Deputy County Counsel,
for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
Petitioner L.G. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.452)1 from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review
hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e))2 terminating his reunification services
and setting a section 366.26 hearing for October 7, 2026, as to his one-year-old daughter,
Baby Girl W. (the child). In his petition, father contends insufficient evidence supports
the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided. He also asks us to
review findings and orders from the dispositional hearing in October 2025. We deny the
petition.
FACTS
Initial Removal
In April 2025, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department)
received a suspected child abuse report that the child was left without provision for
support as a safe surrender baby by her mother, C.W. (mother). The child was taken into
protective custody from the hospital shortly after her birth. The department filed an
original petition alleging the child was described by section 300, subdivision (g). The
petition alleged mother safely surrendered the child pursuant to Health and Safety Code
section 1255.7 at a local hospital. The identity of the child’s father was listed as
unknown in the petition.
At the initial detention hearing held on April 11, 2025, the juvenile court ordered
the child detained from mother’s custody, and a combined jurisdiction and disposition
1 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise noted.
2
hearing was set for May 12, 2025. Mother contacted the department to exercise her right
to claim custody of the child on April 21, 2025. She had surrendered custody of the child
due to threats from the father of her two-year-old child, A.M. Father was not in
communication with mother. Mother reported father left a few days prior to the child’s
birth and wanted nothing to do with the child. The department attempted to assess
mother’s living situation, but mother would not respond to the social worker’s attempts to
visit her home. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued due to the
department’s contact with mother.
The social worker made first contact with father by phone on May 13, 2025.
Father indicated he was trying to locate the child since the day she was born. Mother did
not answer his phone calls after he arrived at the hospital to see the child. He did not
learn of the child’s removal until he received a letter from the department. Father
believed he was the biological father of the child, and he wanted the child in his care.
Father reported having his own apartment and baby supplies for the child.
The department filed an amended petition, which provided the full names of
mother and father. Father was identified as an alleged father. The allegations involved
mother’s unstable housing and refusal to allow the department to assess the suitability of
her home. The petition further alleged mother had a history of exposing her children to
domestic violence.
On May 28, 2025, mother and father were both present and appointed counsel at a
second detention hearing. On that same date, father submitted a Statement Regarding
Parentage (form JV-505) requesting genetic testing to determine whether he was the
biological father of the child. The juvenile court ordered father to participate in a
paternity test. The child was ordered detained from mother, and the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing was reset to July 9, 2025. A second amended petition was filed to
update the child’s last name.
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Jurisdiction and Disposition
The department’s jurisdiction and disposition report, dated July 2, 2025,
recommended that the allegations in the second amended petition be found true. It was
also recommended that father be elevated to the status of a biological father based upon
the results of the genetic testing. Family reunification services were recommended for
father and mother. Father’s reunification services were to include parenting classes and
any recommended treatment from a mental health assessment.
The report stated father had no criminal convictions in the State of California or
child welfare history. Father requested placement of the child, but the department
recommended father’s request be denied due to the lack of a relationship or participation
in visitation. A social worker had also been unable to assess his home in Sacramento
County. The department’s assessment concluded that father needed to demonstrate his
ability to meet the child’s needs for stability and safety before obtaining placement.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on July 9, 2025, father was present
and represented by counsel. The juvenile court found the allegations in the second
amended petition to be true, and disposition was continued for further compliance with
the Indian Child Welfare Act. Supervised visitation was ordered between father and the
child to be a minimum of once per week for a minimum of two hours per visit. The
department was also provided with discretion to advance visitation to unsupervised.
On July 15, 2025, father’s counsel filed a “Kelsey Motion” requesting elevation to
presumed father status. The motion argued that father was prevented from taking the
child into his home by the actions of mother, and he requested to be assessed for
placement as a presumed father of the child.
In an addendum report, dated August 22, 2025, the department provided updates
on the parents’ circumstances. On August 13, 2025, the social worker contacted father by
phone. Father explained that he was recently laid off from his employment, and he was
currently searching for a job. Father was living with his cousin, and he had a room to
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share with the child. He reported having a “huge support system” to help assist with the
child. The social worker notified father of the need to assess his living situation, and he
reported that he was ready to care for the child.
The following week, the social worker inquired about scheduling a time to assess
father’s current residence. Father explained that he “bounces” around homes, and he
wanted his aunt’s home to be assessed. The paternal great-aunt had just moved into the
home, but he agreed to discuss her availability for an assessment. A virtual assessment of
the paternal great-aunt’s home was scheduled for August 26, 2025.
The social worker supervised two in-person visits between father and the child on
August 8, 2025 and August 13, 2025. Father engaged with the child during the visits, and
there were no concerns noted. He fed the child and consoled her when she began to cry.
On August 27, 2025, father was present for the continued disposition hearing. The
department was ordered to hold a child and family team meeting to address father’s
visitation progression. The disposition hearing and father’s “Kelsey Motion” were
continued to October 8, 2025.
The department submitted a second addendum report on October 8, 2025. Father
began his parenting program on September 18, 2025, and he completed three sessions at
the time of the report. The virtual home assessment of the paternal-great aunt’s home
was completed on August 26, 2025. There were no visible safety concerns in the home.
Father stated he would have a crib in his bedroom, and he provided photos of baby
supplies for the child. He provided the names of several family members that would be
able to provide childcare while he was at work.
Supervised virtual visits took place between the child and father on
August 22, 2025 and September 5, 2025 due to father’s inability to obtain transportation.
Father cancelled scheduled visits on August 29, 2025 and September 16, 2025. On
September 17, 2025, father requested to change his visitation dates due to a potential
5
conflict with his new employment schedule. A September 22, 2025 visit was cancelled
because father was receiving treatment for breathing difficulties.
At the continued disposition hearing held on October 8, 2025, mother and father
were both present and represented by counsel. The juvenile court granted father’s
“Kelsey Motion,” and he was elevated to presumed father status. Both parents lodged an
objection to the department’s recommendation without presenting any evidence.
The juvenile court ordered the child removed from mother’s custody, and it found
there was clear and convincing evidence that placement with father would be detrimental
to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. Family
reunification services were ordered for both parents. Father was ordered to participate in
parenting classes and a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment. The
court authorized the use of electronic means for visitation, but the department was to
prioritize face to face contact between the child and father. Transportation for visits was
to be facilitated by the department. Mother and father were advised of their appellate
rights. A six-month review hearing was set for April 8, 2026.
Six-Month Review Period
In its report for the six-month review hearing, dated March 26, 2026, the
department recommended family reunification services be terminated for mother and
father. The child was placed with his older sibling, A.M., in the home of a maternal aunt.
The child, at 11-months of age, was developing in an age-appropriate manner without any
medical concerns.
Father completed his parenting program on December 18, 2025. The progress
report from class facilitators stated that father engaged in discussion and had a positive
attitude. The social worker was unable to refer father for a mental health assessment due
to his out-of-county residence. A list of mental health services providers in the area of
Sacramento County was obtained by the social worker.
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On August 27, 2025, the social worker advised father that he was ordered to
complete a mental health assessment. Father was given the option to request a mental
health assessment as a walk-in through his medical insurance or use a service provider
from the social worker’s list. Father indicated he was getting his medical insurance
“ ‘figured out,’ ” but he believed that he had coverage. The social worker told father to
check on his medical insurance to complete the mental health assessment as a walk-in. In
October 2025, father was reminded to verify his medical insurance to complete his
mental health assessment.
In January 2026, father had to move unexpectedly, and he was unsure where he
would be staying in the future. On February 26, 2026, father informed the social worker
that he was residing in Napa County. The social worker reiterated his need to complete a
mental health assessment, and father was advised that a search for service providers in
the area would be conducted. On March 19, 2026, the social worker provided father with
a local mental health service provider’s contact information to schedule a mental health
assessment.
At the beginning of the review period, father was participating in virtual visits. On
October 2, 2025, the care provider stated she was willing to supervise in-person visits
with father if he was able to travel to Fresno. She also expressed a willingness to
transport the child to father when she travelled near him to visit family members. Father
was in agreement with the care provider’s suggestions, and he intended to reach out for
the next scheduled visit.
On October 24, 2025, father told the social worker that he was attending virtual
visits because he did not have time to visit in person. He claimed his work schedule of
Saturday through Thursday from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. prevented him from attending
visits. The social worker advised father of the importance of visiting with the child in
person due to her young age, and she indicated that visits could be scheduled on his days
off. Father then identified transportation as another barrier to visiting in person.
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Assistance with train fares was offered as a solution by the social worker, and father
stated he would keep the social worker updated when he was able to schedule an
in-person visit.
On November 25, 2025, the child’s care provider expressed concerns that the child
was not able to engage with father during virtual visits due to her age. In
December 2025, the care provider reported father was questioning her about the child’s
schedule, and he complained that the child was too tired to visit with him. The social
worker was informed that the care provider no longer wished to act as a third-party
supervisor for father’s visits.
On January 14, 2026, the social worker inquired about father’s work schedule and
transportation issues. Father acknowledged that transportation was a barrier to in-person
visits, and he was currently seeking new employment. Father was in agreement with
virtual visits, but he felt the care provider’s busy schedule prevented his visits from being
productive. The social worker explained that the department could assist with
transportation for an in-person visit by purchasing a train ticket. However, father claimed
he was unable to get a ride to the train station because his support system only did things
for him if they were getting something in return. The following week, father reported he
was unable to attend the visit because he had to move unexpectedly. Father agreed to
update the social worker when he was able to come to Fresno.
In February 2026, the social worker followed up with father about visitation. He
stated that he had been waiting for a phone call from the social worker, but the social
worker responded that he agreed to provide an update on his availability. Father
explained that he was living in Napa County with his mother. He agreed to attend an in-
person visit with transportation assistance on March 4, 2026. The social worker
supervised the visit with father after providing him with a train ticket. The child began
crying at the start of the visit. Father tried to soothe the child, but she continued to cry
throughout the visit. He attempted to show her toys, provide her snacks, and hold her,
8
but he was unable to console her for the duration of the visit. The child stopped crying
once the visit came to an end.
On March 13, 2026 and March 18, 2026, the social worker supervised additional
in-person visits between the child and father. The child cried throughout the visits
despite father and paternal grandmother’s efforts to soothe her. Father rocked the child
until she fell asleep after the paternal grandmother and a family friend left the visitation
room during the March 18, 2026 visit.
The social worker’s report stated father had not shown any commitment or
willingness to maintain consistency with in-person visitation. The department
emphasized his inability to console the child during in-person visits, and his prognosis for
reunification was described as poor. The department’s assessment concluded that father
had been unable to progress in visits to demonstrate his ability to care for the child.
At the initial six-month review hearing, a contested hearing was set for May 20,
2026 at father’s request. Father and mother were present for the contested six-month
review hearing. The contested hearing started with testimony from father. Father
testified that his mental health assessment was delayed due to his relocation to another
county. He was still in the process of obtaining a mental health assessment in Napa
County.
Delays in transportation by train or bus would occasionally disrupt his ability to
visit the child. Father’s medical condition prevented him from attending visits as well.
Father had participated in approximately eight to 10 in-person visits with the child. He
also utilized virtual visits to interact with the child. Father testified that the child cried
every visit, and he rocked her to sleep to console her. A paternal great-aunt was identified
as a potential third-party supervisor by father, but she was not approved by the
department. His request to have visits occur closer to his home was also denied.
The assigned family reunification social worker testified that she had worked on
the case since April 2025. She acknowledged that part of the reason the child was not
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placed with father was due to concerns about him being a first-time father. The social
worker responded in the affirmative when asked if father was “pretty consistent” with his
virtual visits. She was not aware of any department policy that expressed a preference for
in-person visits over virtual visits.
An assessment of father’s current residence had not been completed due to a lack
of progression in visitation. A difference of opinion between father and the care provider
resulted in her no longer serving as a third-party supervisor. No other individuals had
been assessed to provide third-party supervision after the care provider’s decision.
The social worker further testified that virtual visits did not provide the same
connection as in-person visits. During visits with father, the child was calm for
approximately five minutes, and she spent the majority of the visit crying despite father’s
efforts to soothe her. According to the social worker, father attended nine in-person visits
since October 2025. The department provided train tickets for father to visit the child in
person. The social worker testified that father would have been provided train tickets
weekly if he requested to travel to Fresno for visits on a weekly basis.
The contested hearing continued with closing arguments from the parties. Counsel
for the department argued the department had shown by clear and convincing evidence
that reasonable services were provided to the parents. Counsel for the child joined in the
department’s argument. Father’s counsel argued that there were significant delays in
father’s visits progressing, which may have contributed to the child’s “consolability” at
visits. His counsel requested a finding that “reasonable services have not been provided
and that father was improperly denied placement.”
After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court continued the hearing
for a ruling on June 11, 2026. In its ruling, the court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the department had provided reasonable services to overcome the problems
leading to the continued removal of the child. The court reasoned as follows:
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“the [d]epartment has documented its efforts to provide visitation
services to [father]. And [father] kept some of those visitation
appointments, primarily preferring, it appears, to visit virtually.
There were times that he said transportation was an issue, but the
[d]epartment provided transportation vouchers for tickets for him to
travel from his locations to Fresno County. He also at one point told
the [d]epartment he didn’t have time to visit. [¶] The primary issue
with [father]’s visits are a lack of commitment to developing an
in-person relationship with this very small person who is barely
one year old. A one-year-old cannot develop a bond effectively with
a parent who is just calling in from time to time. And a higher level
of personal face-to-face interaction was needed. And as the
[d]epartment documents, [father] has spent very little time with the
child to build that relationship, despite the [d]epartment’s best
efforts.”
The juvenile court found that return of the child to the parents would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child, and both parents family reunification services
were terminated. A section 366.26 hearing was scheduled for October 7, 2026.
DISCUSSION
Challenge to the October 8, 2025 Disposition Order
Father contends the juvenile court erred by denying his request for placement and
ordering family reunification services at the October 8, 2025 disposition hearing.
However, the present extraordinary writ petition was filed on July 22, 2026, from the
order terminating his family reunification services on June 11, 2026. To the extent father
now seeks to challenge the October 2025 disposition order, the challenge is untimely.
Father never filed a notice of appeal to contest the order, and we cannot now revisit them
in this extraordinary writ proceeding from the June 2026 order setting a section 366.26
hearing. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.)
Appeals in dependency case appeals are governed by section 395, which provides
in relevant part: “A judgment in a proceeding under [s]ection 300 may be appealed in the
same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an
order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a); In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1234
(A.A.).) Under section 395, the disposition order in a dependency proceeding is the
11
appealable judgment, and all subsequent orders are directly appealable as postjudgment
orders. (A.A., at p 1234.) In an appeal from a disposition order, the appellant may
challenge the jurisdiction findings underlying the disposition order declaring the child a
dependent, and any other findings or orders made before or at the time of disposition. (In
re B.P. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 886, 890.)
But an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order “ ‘ “is final and binding
and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” [Citation.] This
“waiver [or forfeiture] rule” holds “that an appellate court in a dependency proceeding
may not inquire into the merits of a prior final appealable order,” even when the issues
raised involve important constitutional and statutory rights.’ ” (A.A., supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.) “[This] rule serves vital policy considerations of promoting
finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and
preventing late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier
orders.” (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355; accord, Dwayne P. v. Superior
Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 259.)
Father cites to In re Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355 (Serenity S.), where the
appellate court excused compliance with the writ requirement to challenge the previous
order terminating family reunification services. In that case, the parent was not present
when the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing, and the only notice provided to
the parent failed to mention the writ requirement and was sent one month after the
hearing. (Id. at p. 371.) Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the father could
seek review of the juvenile court’s detriment finding on appeal of the orders terminating
his parental rights. (Ibid.)
In the present case, the October 8, 2025, dispositional order included the juvenile
court’s rulings denying father placement and ordering family reunification services. The
order was not accompanied by a simultaneous order setting the section 366.26 hearing
and was therefore immediately appealable. (Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41
12
Cal.App.4th 1391, 1394.) Father was present at the time of the disposition hearing, and
he was advised of his appellate rights. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that
father has made a sufficient showing of good cause warranting review on the merits of
the dispositional hearing findings and orders.
Since father did not timely appeal from the October 8, 2025 dispositional order,
the order is now final. (See rule 8.104(a).) Thus, we are “accordingly without
jurisdiction to consider [his] current challenge by means of [his] writ petition.” (Wanda
B. v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) Since we lack jurisdiction to
consider father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s rulings in the October 8, 2025
dispositional order, any claims involving the previous detriment finding and order of
family reunification services fail.
Reasonable Services
Father also contends the juvenile court’s finding that the department provided him
with reasonable services is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, father
argues that the court disregarded father’s commute time for visits, medical condition, and
indigency when it determined that father failed to prioritize visits with the child.
A. Legal Principles
“Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings.
[Citations.] At the dispositional hearing, the [juvenile] court is required to order the
[department] to provide child welfare services to the child and his or her parents.
(§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Services ‘may include provision of a full array of social and health
services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse of children.’ (§ 300.2.)
Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family.” (In re
M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (M.F.).)
At each review hearing, “if the child is not returned to his or her parent, the
juvenile court is required to determine whether ‘reasonable services that were designed to
13
aid the parent … in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the
continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent’ … (§§ 366.21,
subds. (e)(8) & (f)(1)(A), 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) The ‘adequacy of reunification plans and
the reasonableness of the [department’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances
of each case.’ [Citation.] To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or
provided to the parent, ‘the record should show that the supervising [department]
identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to
remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course
of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where
compliance proved difficult .…’ ” (M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13–14.)
At the six-month review hearing, “the juvenile court may not set a section 366.26
hearing unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were
offered or provided to the parent.” (M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Reunification
services are a benefit, and there is no constitutional “ ‘ “entitlement” ’ ” to child welfare
services. (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242, citing In re Joshua M.
(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 476.) Furthermore, the resources available to the court are
not unlimited. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 566.)
B. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all reasonable
and legitimate inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘If there is any substantial
evidence to support the findings of a juvenile court, a reviewing court is without power to
weigh or evaluate the findings.’ ” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361–
1362.)
C. Analysis
Father complains that the department denied his request to hold visits closer to his
residences in Sacramento County and Napa County. He asserts that the juvenile court
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failed to acknowledge the barriers that prevented him from visiting in person when it
concluded that he failed to prioritize visits with the child.
In support of his argument, he continues to rely on the case of Serenity S., supra,
55 Cal.App.5th 355. The father there, who was not living with his 18-month-old child
before the dependency began, was unable to visit with his child in person because of the
distance between the foster placement and his home, and the social services department
arranged an online video visit. (Id. at pp. 359, 361–362.) He was also unable to take
custody of the child at the outset of the dependency because he lacked adequate housing,
but the department did nothing to help him obtain a stable residence. (Id. at p. 376.)
Thus, the juvenile court found a due process violation where the “state detained
and removed the child based only on allegations against mother and the court found
giving father custody would be detrimental based on problems arising from his poverty.”
(Serenity S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 355 at p. 359.) Specifically, the father there could not
regain custody of his child because of his “economic situation .… He lacked adequate
housing and also lacked transportation.” (Id. at p. 376.) The appellate court concluded
the father was not given an adequate opportunity to reunite with the child before his
parental rights were terminated; although he visited with her in person only six times, the
record showed he missed visits because the distance and his work schedule made
visitation difficult, and the agency did not assist his efforts to supplement the in-person
visits with video meetings. (Id. at p. 377.)
Father’s reliance on Serenity S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 355 is misplaced. There
the juvenile court was not considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
of reasonable services. Instead, the appellate court was concerned with the juvenile court
basing its detriment finding on father’s poverty. Here, father’s limited transportation and
changes in employment may have impacted his ability to visit with the child in person,
but not by phone or video. The department provided father virtual visits when he had
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issues with transportation, medical problems, or conflicts with his employment
scheduled.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered supervised visits to occur
between father and the child, and electronic means were an authorized form of visitation.
The department was ordered to prioritize face to face contact between the child and
father, and transportation was to be facilitated by the department. At the start of the
review period, father elected to participate in virtual visits because he did not believe his
employment gave him sufficient time to travel to Fresno. The care provider was initially
willing to act as a third-party supervisor or bring the child closer to his home, but a
conflict with father resulted in her withdrawal as a third-party supervisor option for visits.
In January 2026, the social worker attempted to provide father with a train ticket
to attend in-person visits. However, he cancelled the in-person visit because he had to
move unexpectedly. In-person visits resumed in March 2026 between father and the
child after the department provided train tickets. The social worker testified that the child
cried for the majority of the visits. There were approximately nine in-person visits
attended by father according to the social worker’s testimony.
A review of the record discloses that the greatest impediment to an early
reunification was father. Father cited multiple excuses for his failure to attend an
in-person visit with the child for the first five months of the reunification period. The
department offered to accommodate father by providing assistance with transportation
and scheduling visits on his off days.
The adequacy of a reunification plan and of the department’s efforts is judged
according to the circumstances of each case. The effort must be made to provide suitable
services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success. The record
should show that the department identified the problems leading to the loss of custody,
offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with
the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the
16
parents when compliance proved difficult. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 996, 1010–1011.) The record here so demonstrates.
Father was regularly offered the opportunity to attend in-person visits with the
child throughout the reunification period. He simply chose not to take sufficient
advantage of those opportunities. Reunification services are voluntary and the social
services department is not required to force them on unwilling parents. (In re Ronell A.
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365.) Father’s failure to attend in-person visits for the
majority of the reunification period is a primary cause of his inability to develop a
relationship with the child. “The reality is that childhood is brief; it does not wait while a
parent rehabilitates himself or herself. The nurturing required must be given by someone,
at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it.” (In re Debra M.
(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in
In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 234.)
While father now complains that the department did not arrange in-person visits
sooner, the visits provided were reasonable under the circumstances and the department
made a good faith effort to assist father when compliance proved difficult. (In re Misako
R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [“In almost all cases it will be true that more services
could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect”
but the standard is “whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”].)
Consequently, we conclude substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
that reasonable services were provided. (Id. at p. 545.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is dismissed. This court’s opinion is final
forthwith as to this court pursuant to rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).
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