Filed 8/25/26 Legacy Partners Tenancy Cases CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LEGACY PARTNERS B349432
TENANCY CASES.
(Los Angeles County
NORMA CASTANEDA et al., Super. Ct. No. 23STCV01307
Plaintiffs and JCCP No. 5290)
Respondents,
v.
LEGACY PARTNERS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
[And 33 other related cases.*]
* Bryant et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct.
Alameda County, No. 23CV032950); Chapman et al. v. Legacy
Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, No. CGC-
23-606910); Freitas et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super.
Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV417282); Hernandez et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Alameda County, No.
23CV035108); Hollenbeck et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al.
(Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV417400); Joshi et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. San Mateo County, No.
23-CIV-02863); Popov et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super.
Ct. San Mateo County, No. 23-CIV-02160); Sharma et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No.
23CV418369); Shi et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct.
Santa Clara County, No. 23CV416202); Soto et al. v. Legacy
Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No.
23CV416120); and Ta et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super.
Ct. San Mateo County, No. 23-CIV-02512) (Northern California
Tenants).
Aguirre et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, No. 23STCV02560); Akroush et al. v. Legacy Partners,
Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV07795); Argarin et
al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Orange County, No.
30-2023-01319947-CU-BT-NJC); Aronson et al. v. Legacy
Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV14142);
Bachman et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, No. 23STCV09026); Bell et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et
al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV09732); Blackwell et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No.
23STCV10895); Cann et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super.
Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV14483); Cardenas et al. v. Legacy
Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV06202);
Cole et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
No. 23STCV06106); Cook et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al.
(Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV11309); Goodwin et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No.
23STCV03297); Gregory et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al.
(Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV06107); Hamilton et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No.
23STCV09766); Ludwig et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al.
(Super. Ct. Orange County, No. 30-2023-01320256-CU-BT-NJC);
Mansourian et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, No. 23STCV10248); Ortiz et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc.,
2
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Samantha P. Jessner, Judge. Dismissed.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Craig J. Mariam, John P.
Cogger and Stephanie L. Cobau for Defendant and Appellant.
Brod Law Firm and Gregory J. Brod for Plaintiffs and
Respondents Northern California Tenants.
Litigation Advocacy Group and Glenn A. Murphy for
Plaintiffs and Respondents Southern California Tenants.
******
Legacy Partners, Inc. (Legacy), a property manager for
numerous apartment complexes throughout California, is the
defendant in 34 lawsuits brought by 453 individuals (collectively,
tenants) pursuant to the Investigative Consumer Reporting
Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code, §§ 1786–1786.60).1 Legacy
filed a petition for coordination, which was granted.
Two years later, Legacy moved for class certification,
seeking to require the tenant-plaintiffs to proceed in one of two
et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV09174); Peirson et al. v.
Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No.
23STCV10492); Perez et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super.
Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV05888); Reynaga et al. v. Legacy
Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV12297);
Tabe et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
No. 23STCV15406); and Warrior et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et
al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV12541) (Southern
California Tenants).
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Civil Code.
3
subclasses depending on which application service the individual
tenants used to apply for an apartment. Tenants opposed the
motion for class certification, asserting Legacy failed to identify
an ascertainable class and class certification would prejudice
tenants, depriving them of the minimum statutory damages set
forth in section 1786.50, subdivision (a)(1), among other things.
The trial court denied Legacy’s motion.
Legacy purports to appeal from the trial court’s order
denying its motion for class certification. Legacy argues the
order is appealable under the “death knell” doctrine. (Citing,
inter alia, In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761
(Baycol) [death knell doctrine “comes into play for class claims
only when an order ‘is tantamount to a dismissal of the action as
to all members of the class other than plaintiff’”].) However, we
find the death knell doctrine inapplicable in this case because the
order is not tantamount to a dismissal of any tenant’s claim.
Instead, the claims at issue will proceed in the context of the
coordinated proceeding. Because the death knell doctrine is
inapplicable, and Legacy raises no alternative ground for appeal
under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, we dismiss the
appeal as we lack jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
I. ICRAA
A. Purpose
ICRAA states that an investigative consumer reporting
agency may provide an investigative consumer report to a person
other than the subject of the report under limited circumstances,
including where the person “[i]ntends to use the information in
connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit ….” (§ 1786.12,
subd. (d)(5).) ICRAA defines an “investigative consumer report”
4
as one “in which information on a consumer’s character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained
through any means.” (§ 1786.2, subd. (c).)
ICRAA is “intended to promote disclosure and accuracy in
background checks, especially in the rental, employment, and
insurance contexts.” (First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026,
1034.) It was “enacted to ensure that consumer reporting
agencies ‘exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness,
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.’”
(Id. at p. 1032, quoting §§ 1785.1, subd. (c), 1786, subd. (b).) It
“requires the person procuring the report (or causing it to be
made) … to ‘certify to the investigative consumer reporting
agency’ … that it provided the consumer a ‘clear and conspicuous
disclosure in writing’ … that includes the act’s disclosure
requirements, and that the consumer gave a written
authorization for the report’s procurement.” (Id. at p. 1033,
citations omitted.) Those who use such reports are required to
notify the consumer of the report in a timely fashion, identify the
reporting agency, provide a means to easily request and receive a
copy of the report, and send a copy of the report when requested
within three days. (§ 1786.16, subds. (a)(3) & (b)(1).)
B. Enforcement
ICRAA includes a provision making an investigative
consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to
comply with the statute “liable to the consumer who is the subject
of the report.” (§ 1786.50, subd. (a).)
“As originally enacted in 1975, ICRAA … provided that any
agency or user of information that ‘fail[ed] to comply with any
requirement’ under its provisions was liable to the consumer for
‘[a]ny actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of
5
the failure or, except in the case of class actions, three hundred
dollars ($300), whichever sum is greater.’” (Parsonage v. Wal-
Mart Associates, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 399, 414
(Parsonage).) In 1998, the Legislature amended ICRAA, partly in
response to “concerns that ‘[t]he existing penalty of $300 for false
information contained in a report [wa]s not a sufficient incentive
to ensure accuracy.’” (Ibid.) The penalty was raised from $300 to
$1,000, then to $2,500. (Ibid.)
In 2001, the Legislature again amended ICRAA to
incorporate provisions addressing identity theft, among other
things. (Parsonage, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 415.) In
addition, “the Legislature also again sought to ‘increase penalties
for violations’ and raised the sum available as an alternative to
actual damages from $2,500 to $10,000, where it currently
stands.” (Ibid.) However, the statute makes an exception in
cases where the consumers proceed as a class action, disallowing
the statutory penalty in such cases.
The provision currently reads, in part: “An investigative
consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to
comply with any requirement under this title with respect to an
investigative consumer report is liable to the consumer who is the
subject of the report in an amount equal to the sum of all the
following: [¶] (1) Any actual damages sustained by the consumer
as a result of the failure or, except in the case of class actions, ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever sum is greater.”
(§ 1786.50, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
6
Thus, had Legacy successfully forced the tenants to proceed
as a class, each individual tenant would have been ineligible for
the $10,000 statutory penalty.2
II. Procedural history
In 2023, 453 California consumers who applied to Legacy
for residential apartment homes filed 34 separate lawsuits
seeking to enforce their rights under ICRAA for Legacy’s alleged
violations of the statute. Each tenant requested ICRAA’s $10,000
statutory damage award.
Legacy filed a petition for coordination on May 30, 2023,
which was granted on October 17, 2023.
On April 11, 2025, Legacy filed its motion for class
certification, seeking to require the tenants to proceed against
Legacy in one of two subclasses, depending on which application
service the tenants used to apply for an apartment. Legacy did
not identify any putative plaintiffs other than the 453 tenants
who had already chosen to sue, nor did Legacy identify
individuals suitable to serve as class representatives.
Tenants opposed the motion, arguing it was “‘designed to
prevent [them] from seeking minimum statutory damages’
available under ICRAA.” The court requested additional briefing,
and the matter was heard on July 25, 2025.
On July 31, 2025, the court filed a ruling adopting its
written tentative decision denying Legacy’s motion for class
certification as its final order. The court noted, “ICRAA
‘expressly precludes the recovery of the statutory $10,000 amount
in class actions.’” (Quoting Bernuy v. Bridge Property
2 As the trial court and the Legislature noted, it would be
very difficult for most ICRAA plaintiffs to prove actual damages.
7
Management Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1190.) The court
noted tenants argued “[i]f this case were certified as a class
action[], … they would be limited to recovery of their actual
damages, regardless of whether their actual damages are less
than $10,000.”
The court cited Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014)
59 Cal.4th 1, 34 (Duran), for the proposition that “[t]he class
action procedural device may not be used to abridge a party’s
substantive rights.’” After addressing Legacy’s arguments, the
court noted it agreed with Legacy to a certain extent: “It would
certainly be more efficient for all involved, the Court and the
parties, to resolve [tenants’] claims, and the claims of the
[tenants] in the 33 other cases, in one class proceeding if
possible.” However, the court also noted, “Certification of a class
would … abridge their right to a statutory award of $10,000, in
violation of Duran.” The court declined to allow Legacy “to
impose on [tenants] a method of prosecuting their claims that
they do not agree with.” (Citing Pinnacle Holdings, Inc. v. Simon
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1437 [plaintiff could not “impose” on
defendants the “responsibility” of representing a class of other
defendants].) The court further noted it was “not clear how a
class plaintiff could adequately represent a class, for example, if
she did not want to represent the class or otherwise proceed on a
class basis in the first place.”
The court concluded, “Because certification of a class would
abridge [tenants’] substantive right (assuming they prevail on the
merits of their claims) to ICRAA’s statutory award of $10,000, the
Court denies Legacy’s motion for class certification.”
Legacy filed its notice of appeal from the order on
August 28, 2025.
8
DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal is required as the order at issue is not
appealable
“The one final judgment rule is ‘a fundamental principle of
appellate practice’ [citation], recognized and enforced in this state
since the 19th century [citation].” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 756.) Thus, courts are “reluctant to depart from its principles
and endorse broad exceptions.” (Id. at p. 757.)
One such exception is the “death knell” doctrine. (Baycol,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 757.) Under the death knell doctrine, the
denial of a request for class certification may be an appealable
order. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 699 (Daar).)
The Daar court explained “[i]n determining whether there has
been a final judgment, sometimes a difficult question, we have
long adhered to the rule ‘that the question, as affecting the right
of appeal, is not what the form of the order or judgment may be,
but what is its legal effect.” (Id. at pp. 698–699.) In Daar, the
legal effect of the order denying class certification was
“tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the
class other than plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 699.) Because the order
“demolished the action as a class action,” the Daar court
concluded “the order in the case at bench is in legal effect a final
judgment from which an appeal lies.” (Ibid.)
“The gist of the death knell doctrine is that the denial of
class action certification is the death knell of the action itself, i.e.,
that without a class, there will not be an action or actions.”
(Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552.)
The matter before us is not appropriate for application of
the death knell doctrine. Separate individual actions against
9
Legacy have been filed and pursued. There is no indication in the
record that the denial of Legacy’s motion for class certification is
the death knell for the coordinated actions before the trial court.
“‘[E]xceptions to the one final judgment rule should not be
allowed unless clearly mandated.’” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 757.) The exception carved out in Daar was due to its impact,
as it “effectively rang the death knell for the class claims.” (Ibid.)
“In cases decided since Daar,” the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeal “have emphasized that orders that only limit the scope of
a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly
tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal
under the death knell doctrine; only an order that entirely
terminates class claims is appealable.” (Id. at pp. 757–758.)
Nothing in the trial court’s order terminates any tenant’s
claim. Nor does it prevent any tenant not named as a party in
the coordinated proceeding from bringing his or her own lawsuit
against Legacy. In sum, “[n]othing in this record suggests that
the trial court’s order has sounded a death knell.” (Shelley v. City
of Los Angeles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 692, 696.)
Because the death knell doctrine is inapplicable, and
Legacy has failed to provide any other basis for appeal, we lack
jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.
II. Neither party sought an extraordinary writ
Neither party has asked that we exercise our power to treat
this purported appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ, nor
has either party argued the matter meets the criteria to be
treated as a petition for extraordinary writ. (See Olson v. Cory
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 400–401; H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of
San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1367.)
10
However, we note that to the extent the matter could be
treated as a petition for extraordinary writ, it would be denied.
An order denying class certification is generally reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326–327.) Under this standard, a trial
court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless it reflects “““a clear
case of abuse”’” resulting in a miscarriage of justice. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331; see Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) “‘“[A] disposition that results in an
error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion.”’” (Orozco v. WPV
San Jose, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 375, 401.)
The deferential abuse of discretion standard does not apply
“if the trial court has evaluated class certification using improper
criteria or an incorrect legal analysis.” (Jaimez v. Daiohs USA,
Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1297.)
Legacy’s argument that the trial court failed to follow the
correct legal analysis in denying its motion for class certification
is incorrect. Legacy argues California courts follow a three-part
test when evaluating motions for class certification under Code of
Civil Procedure section 382. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.
Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) Legacy identifies
the three-part test as: “‘“(1) predominant common questions of
law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses
typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can
adequately represent the class.”’” (Ibid.)
Preliminarily, we note Legacy has failed to meet this three-
part test, as it has failed to identify any class representative and
failed to explain how such representative could adequately
represent a class when the representative “did not want to
11
represent the class or otherwise proceed on a class basis in the
first place.”
Further, Legacy presents only part of the trial court’s
required analysis in deciding whether class certification is
appropriate. In addition to showing the existence of an
ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class and a well-defined
community of interest, the party advocating class certification
must show “substantial benefits from certification that render
proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1021.)
“[B]ecause group action also has the potential to create injustice,
trial courts are required to ‘“carefully weigh respective benefits
and burdens and to allow maintenance of the class action only
where substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the
courts.”’” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.)
In its careful analysis of the respective benefits and
burdens of class certification, the trial court gave great weight to
the tenants’ rights to ICRAA’s statutory award of $10,000.
Legacy has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that the tenants’ entitlement to the statutory award,
established as an incentive to enforce ICRAA requirements,
weighed heavily against class certification.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Tenants are awarded their costs
on appeal.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.
12