Filed 10/16/26 Lee v. Wong CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
GYURI LEE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174879
v. (San Mateo County
MANKIT WONG, Super. Ct. No. 24FAM02038)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
On January 12, 2026, this court notified the parties we were
considering dismissing this appeal for lack of an appealable order. After
hearing from the parties, we deferred any decision on appealability, but today
we dismiss the appeal on that basis, as explained more fully below.
Mr. Wong met Ms. Lee when he responded to her advertisement on a
website in 2015 and began what Lee delicately refers to as a “business
relationship” involving companionship and sex. In October 2024, Lee filed a
petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Wong,
obtaining a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) that she
1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
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had served on him. When Wong filed a response to Lee’s request for a DVRO,
he asserted their relationship had never been a “ ‘[d]ating relationship’ ” as
that term is defined in Family Code section 6210 (section 6210), and that Lee
accordingly did not have standing to obtain a DVRO against him. Theirs was
not a “frequent, intimate association[] primarily characterized by the
expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial
considerations,” Wong maintained. (§ 6210, italics added.)
The superior court found otherwise, at the close of an unusual hearing
that resulted in the order Wong here appeals. On July 15, 2025, the parties
and their counsel appeared before a commissioner for a hearing at which they
argued, solely on the basis of the parties’ previously filed declarations and
exhibits, over whether the parties’ relationship met the standard set forth in
section 6210. At the end of the hearing, the court concluded the relationship
did meet the statutory standard, and it announced that the court “does have
jurisdiction to hear the matter” and would “set [it] for long cause starting
October 31, 2025.” Then, addressing the DVTRO it had issued the previous
October, the court expressed the view that order was already in place
“through October 31st, which is the date of the evidentiary hearing,” but in
case that recollection was faulty the court expressly extended the DVTRO
until October 31, 2025.
On July 23, 2025, the court issued a written order memorializing the
results of the July 15 hearing. The July 23 order set the October 31 hearing
date, extended the DVTRO until that date, and recorded that, at the July 15
hearing, the court had found Lee “had standing to proceed to trial” on
October 31. The July 23 order does not mention a factual finding as to
whether the parties had been in a “dating relationship.”
2
Wong filed a notice of appeal, which was timely in light of the date on
which he was served with the minute order from the July 15 hearing. Wong
then filed a Civil Case Information Statement including copies of that minute
order and the July 23 written order. In the Civil Case Information
Statement, Wong explained his intention in appealing, calling this an
“[a]ppeal under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 904.1[, subdivision ](a) from
[an] order finding [a] ‘dating relationship’ under Fam[ily] Code [section] 6210;
failure to appeal would waive [the] argument,” such that he could not raise it
in later contesting the DVRO, Wong wrote.
We disagree with Wong about the appealability (and likely effect) of the
July orders. He correctly points out that “[w]here, as here, the minute order
indicates a written order will be filed, ‘only the written order is the effective
order.’ ” (Quoting In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170.)
Thus, we focus, as does Wong’s appellate briefing, on the July 23 written
order.
Wong asserts the July 23 order is appealable under Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) (section 904.1(a)(6)) as an order
“granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an
injunction.” While we do not doubt that section 904.1(a)(6) authorizes the
appeal of a DVRO or DVTRO (In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 1115, 1124–1126 (A.M. & R.Y.), the provision does not apply in
this case because this is not an order granting or dissolving, or refusing to
grant or dissolve, a DVRO or DVTRO. The July 23 order merely extends in
effect a previously issued DVTRO until a long cause hearing can be held to
determine whether a DVRO should issue.
Wong’s appealability arguments focus on the DVTRO, but he cites no
authority equating mere extension of the term of an existing injunction with
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the decision originally to grant such an injunction. The cases he cites involve
orders that straight-forwardly deny a DVTRO (A.M. & R.Y., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 331)
or a preliminary injunction in a trade secrets matter (Courtesy Temporary
Service, Inc. v. Camacho (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1281).2 None of these
cases suggests that an order merely extending the term of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction is directly appealable. And none
supports Wong’s assertion that the court “lacked jurisdiction to continue the
restraining order” in effect without making a finding that the parties were in
a dating relationship. Wong is effectively asking us to review the original
DVTRO, since it was in issuing that order that the trial court made its initial
assessment of the evidence for a dating relationship. Wong could have
appealed the DVTRO when it was first granted (A.M. & R.Y., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 1124–1126), but he did not, and an appellate court may not
review an order from which appeal could previously have been taken. (In re
Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119, citing Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 906.) We see nothing in the language of section 904.1(a)(6)—which speaks
of “granting” an injunction not of extending one—that authorizes this appeal.
And we are not eager to embrace a construction of the statutory language
that would convert routine scheduling orders into opportunities for a new
appeal.
2 Wong’s February 2, 2026 letter brief addressing appealability cites one more
case, which is even further afield. In re Marriage of Nicholas (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1455, 1576 addresses whether a superior court can amend a sealing
order previously entered. Likening sealing orders to “temporary restraining orders
or preliminary injunctions,” the court comments that these “are appealable” (ibid.,
citing section 904.1(a)(6)), but it otherwise has no bearing on this case.
4
Wong also makes no effort to explain how the mere extension of an
existing DVTRO could be considered an order that dissolves, or refuses to
dissolve, an injunction. We will not make that argument for him, especially
here because the contested issue at the July 15 hearing was framed
differently: whether Lee “had standing to proceed to trial” on the DVRO. The
topic of whether to continue in effect the DVTRO came up only fleetingly, in
the context of scheduling and without opposition, after the court had
concluded its primary business. We thus see no basis, under section
904.1(a)(6) or the case law, for holding that the July 23 order was appealable
for having continued a DVTRO in effect.
We are not moved by Wong’s concern that by failing to appeal the July
23 order he would waive the right subsequently to argue he did not have a
“dating relationship” with Lee. There is a good chance that the superior
court, when it holds its long cause hearing on the DVRO, will allow (or has
allowed) the parties to introduce witness testimony about the nature of the
parties’ relationship, and that the superior court will decide (or has decided)
the “dating relationship” issue anew based on a full record.3 But regardless
of how the superior court approaches its decision on whether to issue a
DVRO, we cannot review in this proceeding the July 23 order that permitted
3 We note that the trial court advised the parties on July 15, immediately
after making its ruling on standing, that they “are welcome to file additional
evidence [they] would like [t]he Court to consider at time of hearing.” And we
expect the hearing to provide the parties an opportunity to offer live testimony as
well. (Cf. Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1355–1358.)
We do not rely on the declaration of Lee’s attorney, found at pages 19–20 of
Respondent’s Brief on appeal. Indeed, we grant Appellant’s Motion to Strike the
Declaration of Robert G. Waligore and Portions of Respondent’s Brief, to the extent
that motion addresses this attorney’s declaration. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 396, 405; Cal. Rules Ct., rule 8.204(d).) Appellant’s motion is otherwise
denied as unnecessary.
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Lee to proceed to trial on the DVRO. The single judgment rule (or “one final
judgment rule”) prevents that. (See Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992)
3 Cal.App.4th 640, 645 [“The one final judgment rule is based on the theory
. . . that optimal appellate review is achieved by allowing appeals only after
the entire action is resolved in the trial court”]; Plaza Tulare v. Tradewell
Stores, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 522, 524 [“Under [Code Civ. Proc., §] 904.1,
the codification of the “final judgment rule,” an appeal may not be taken from
. . . an interlocutory judgment except as provided therein”]; Rivera v. Hillard
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 964, 975 [as an exception to “single judgment rule,” a
DVRO is appealable pursuant to section 904.1(a)(6)].) Thus, the trial court’s
factual finding as to whether the parties’ relationship met the standard of
section 6210, like its conclusion that Lee has standing to proceed to trial, will
be amenable to appellate review only when that trial concludes. (Art Movers,
at p. 645; Code Civ. Proc., § 906 [on appeal from a final judgment, we “may
review . . . any intermediate ruling . . . which substantially affects the rights
of a party”].)
In sum, because the July 23 order allowing the case to proceed is an
interlocutory order that is not appealable under section 904.1(a)(6), and
Wong has cited no other authority allowing him to appeal the order, the order
and its underlying factual findings may be reviewed on appeal only if, and
when, a DVRO is finally entered and properly appealed.
DISPOSITION
The appeal before this court is dismissed for lack of an appealable
order. Costs on appeal are awarded to Lee. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)
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TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
PETROU, J.
Lee v. Wong (A174879)
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