Filed 10/29/26 Lazo v. Sun Gir CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
NYDIA DEL SOCORRO LAZO, B343372
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV10863)
v.
SUN GIR INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Caskey & Holzman, N. Cory Barari, Daniel M. Holzman
and Marshall A. Caskey for Plaintiff and Appellant.
McMillion & Hirtensteiner, Sylvia Havens and Evelina M.
Serafini for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Nydia Del Socorro Lazo was a dedicated cashier who
worked at the same fast food restaurant location for 34 years
with no prior disciplinary record. Her former employer, Sun Gir
Incorporated (SGI) fired her based on three allegedly mishandled
transactions. Lazo sued alleging age discrimination and various
wage and hour claims arising from alleged meal and rest break
violations. The trial court granted summary judgment for SGI on
all causes of action.
SGI’s firing of Lazo based on three allegedly mishandled
transactions, presumably out of thousands, may seem
unwarranted. But to proceed to trial Lazo’s burden on summary
judgment was to adduce evidence the firing was motivated by age
discrimination, and we conclude she has not met her burden of
raising a triable issue of fact on that claim. We determine,
however, that Lazo raised a triable issue of fact regarding her
wage and hour claims for meal and rest break violations, failure
to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay unpaid
wages, failure to produce wage records, and unfair or unlawful
business practices. Accordingly, we reverse the summary
judgment, affirm summary adjudication as to the age
discrimination claim and reverse summary adjudication as to
Lazo’s remaining claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Lazo, the
party opposing summary judgment. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 844-845 (Aguilar).)
2
A. Lazo’s Employment With and Termination By SGI
Lazo began working at a Carl’s Jr. restaurant (Store 7400)
in Canoga Park in 1989, when she was 42 years old. Lazo
remained working at this location for over 34 years. In 2000, SGI
acquired this franchise location and continued to employ the
existing workers, including Lazo. Until her termination at the
age of 76, Lazo “had never been written up, reprimanded, or
disciplined for any work-related issues over the course of her 34-
year career” at Carl’s Jr.
During the last four years of her employment with SGI,
Lazo was employed as a “crew member” on the overnight or
“graveyard” shift from 12:00 a.m. to 8 a.m. Her duties included
“work[ing] the counter and drive-thru window, tak[ing] customer
orders, operat[ing] the cash register and process[ing] payment,
distribut[ing] food to customers, and clean[ing] the restaurant.”
Lazo did not handle food or do any food preparation as a cashier,
and she did not “have the training or expertise” to work as a cook,
including cooking food and maintaining the kitchen. The cooks
Lazo worked with “did not handle the register or customer
transactions.” In her time working at Carl’s Jr., Lazo had
previously worked as a shift leader for a period of four years, but
she was “demoted” from this position about 10 years before the
time she was fired.
During Lazo’s overnight shifts, “there would be only two
people scheduled to work”: Lazo and a cook. Lazo “was not able
to take and did not take 10-minute rest breaks free of work or 30-
minute meal breaks free of work, because [she] always needed to
be available when a customer came through the drive-thru and
there was no one to cover for [her]. The cook did not take breaks
3
for the same reason. The cook did not cover for [Lazo] and could
not, because he/she has a different job, does not know how to use
the register, and cannot take orders while cooking at the same
time. [Lazo] was not free to leave the restaurant during the
graveyard shift and [she] always had to be available at a
moment’s notice, even if there were gaps in time between orders.
When customers were not at the drive-thru window and [Lazo]
was not handling cash or orders, [she] would be busy cleaning the
restaurant.”
Lazo’s managers created these work schedules and were
aware that Lazo was “the only non-cook employee helping
customers during the graveyard shift,” and that she was
“working more than 5 hours without a break.” There was
“sometimes” or “usually” a “lull” during the overnight shift “when
there are no cars coming through” that could “last anywhere from
30 minutes to an hour.” Lazo’s managers assigned her to clean
the restaurant overnight and she would clean during lulls in
customers. Lazo was not told she could not take meal and rest
breaks, nor did she report to SGI that she was unable to take her
breaks. Lazo testified that she did not “punch out” for meal
breaks during the “last years” of her employment.
In January 2023, SGI commissioned an independent loss
prevention audit of certain restaurants, including the one where
Lazo worked, “in an effort to resolve or limit loss of inventory due
to factors such as employee theft and cashier error. An audit
addresses transactions which appear to involve questionable or
unusual activity and include inspection for evidence of cash
shortages, improper discounts, refunds, voids, receipts not
matching what was delivered and similar mishandling, all of
which would be indications of potential theft.” “The auditor
4
checked activity such as excessive refunds, voids, and discounts,
and reviewed accounting records, videotapes and sales tickets,
looking for indications of suspicious activity. The auditor
reviewed all cash transactions, going back at least two weeks.”
The auditor did not focus on any particular employee and did not
know employee names but rather focused on potentially
questionable transactions, especially cash transactions. “Once
evidence of suspicious activity was found, the auditor would
complete his/her notes, save a picture of the suspect, and send
his/her findings to the appropriate management personnel.” SGI
conducted these audits of its restaurants on a monthly basis.
As relevant here, one “pattern of suspicious activity was
the use of voiding (X-ing out) one or more items of an order, even
though the item(s) was actually sold and delivered.” However,
voiding or X-ing out items could also simply reflect that the order
was canceled. Giving away food for free was against SGI policy,
warranting “immediate termination,” and the record of
transactions needed to “reflect exactly what was given to the
customer and what the customer paid.”
The 2023 audit “produced evidence that led [SGI] to believe
that at least ten [] employees mishandled at least
21 transactions,” including Lazo. The auditor reviewed video
footage of Lazo’s mishandled transactions. SGI subsequently
terminated seven of these employees, including Lazo, while the
other three “chose to voluntarily quit in lieu of being terminated
after they were confronted with the evidence of their misconduct.”
At that time, the employees who resigned were 19, 20, and 39
years old, and the terminated employees were ages 22, 22, 24, 39,
50, 50, and 76 (Lazo).
5
On March 24, 2023, Lazo was suspended without pay
pending an investigation with a notice that she had violated
company policies because “[m]anipulation of register transactions
appear to reflect cash theft.” Lazo disputed the allegations of
theft. Lazo was terminated for theft on March 29. Her
termination notice reflected the following three theft incidents:
On 2/9/2023, at 1:34 a.m., Order #340492 was taken
as a cash transaction. A large drink was served that
was not on the ticket. A bag of food was handed to
[the] customer that was also not on the ticket. The
ticket was thrown in the trash. At 1:39 a.m., [Lazo]
opened the register, took cash then walked away. It
was discovered that a fake ticket was created, and
the customer was still charged the full amount for the
items given.
On 2/12/2023, at 2:55 a.m., Order #340898 was taken
as a cash transaction. A drink was served which was
Xed-out on ticket. The register was then open and
closed. Cash was left on the countertop. A large bag
of food was given to the customer.
On 2/19/2023, at 2:08 a.m., Order #341724 was taken
as a cash transaction for 6-7 spicy chicken
sandwiches which were Xed-out of the system. The
cash register was used to charge only 1 spicy chicken
sandwich at a total of $1.08. The register was then
open and closed again.
6
Management did not tell Lazo that she was being
terminated because of her age. During her employment, Lazo
only recalled one “inappropriate comment[] . . . concerning her
age” 14 years before her termination, when a manager told Lazo
she was “ ‘already old.’ ”
After Lazo’s termination, she learned SGI “had hired 2 new
employees approximately 1 month before [her] employment
ended and who were women . . . 19-20 years old.” SGI filled
Lazo’s former overnight shift with three existing employees:
Kimberly, Ariel, and Blanca. Kimberly was born in 2002 and
hired by SGI in February 2023; Ariel was born in 2004 and hired
in December 2022; Blanca was born in 2003 and hired in March
2023.
Between September 2022 and July 2023, SGI hired
approximately 24 new employees at Store 7400 for various
positions, including cashier. Birthdates were available for most,
but not all, of these employees. No new hires during this period
for whom birthdates were available were over 40 years old.
According to SGI’s general manager, following Lazo’s
termination, “most” applicants for the cashier position were
between 40 and 60 years old.
On April 3, 2023, Lazo’s counsel requested Lazo’s
“personnel file” from SGI, including “pay stubs, wage stubs and
time records,” and “[a]ny and all other records that relate to [her]
compensation, [and] time scheduled or worked.” In “spreadsheet
format,” SGI provided Lazo with a “computer-generated record”
of her wage statements and paystubs reflecting her
“compensation, [and] time scheduled or worked.” As relevant
here, the spreadsheet documented the date of each paycheck, as
7
well as regular and overtime hours, gross pay, and net pay for
each paycheck.
B. Legal Proceedings
In May 2023, Lazo sued SGI, alleging causes of action for
age discrimination (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)); failure to
provide meal and rest breaks (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7, 512, subd. (a));
failure to provide accurate wage statements (Lab. Code, § 226,
subd. (a)); failure to pay unpaid wages at discharge (Lab. Code,
§§ 201, 202); failure to produce personnel and wage records (Lab.
Code, §§ 226, subd. (c), 1198.5); and unfair or unlawful business
practices under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200 et seq.). Lazo requested damages, including
punitive damages, and injunctive relief. SGI denied the
allegations in the complaint.
In July 2024, SGI moved for summary judgment, or
summary adjudication in the alternative, on all Lazo’s causes of
action. As relevant here, SGI argued Lazo’s age discrimination
claim failed because it terminated her for a “legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason,” i.e., the three thefts uncovered by the loss
prevention audit. SGI further argued Lazo could not establish
pretext by showing only that “a younger employee replaced her.”
As to Lazo’s meal break claim, SGI argued Lazo received a
“reasonable opportunity to take compliant breaks” pursuant to
SGI’s meal and rest break policy, Lazo was “told she was
supposed to take her breaks,” and Lazo could take breaks during
“long lulls” overnight or by asking the other employee to “cover.”
SGI further argued it did not knowingly or intentionally fail to
provide accurate wage statements or to pay unpaid wages, and
that there was no predicate act of unfair business practices.
8
Finally, as to the personnel and wage records claim, SGI argued
it produced Lazo’s complete file within nine days of her request, it
provided a “computer-generated record” of Lazo’s wages, and any
missing documents, including new hire documents and
performance reviews, were not available.
Lazo opposed summary judgment. Lazo argued SGI’s
motion violated Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision
(b)(1),1 and rule 3.1350(d)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court,
because it “combin[ed] multiple facts and arguments into one
‘undisputed material fact’ and then cit[ed] to a large group of
evidence, without any clarification as to which evidence supports
which facts/arguments.” Lazo also argued summary judgment
was improper under section 437c, subdivision (h), because four
days before her opposition was due, SGI had produced discovery
of certain “email chains evidencing some of the discussions
between [SGI’s] decisionmakers prior to [Lazo’s] termination,”
but had “incriminatingly redacted” certain portions of the emails
on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Lazo asserted “the[se]
redacted portions will reveal . . . discussions of Lazo’s age.” Lazo
separately filed motions to compel further discovery and to
receive unredacted copies of these emails. Lazo’s counsel also
filed a declaration attesting that SGI’s assertion of attorney-
client privilege was “prejudicing [Lazo’s] ability to present all
‘facts essential to justify opposition’ ” to the motion for summary
judgment.
As to age discrimination, Lazo argued her termination for
theft was pretextual because SGI had changed its allegations of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
9
wrongdoing regarding the February 9, 2023 theft incident. Lazo
also asserted pretext because SGI “treated younger employees in
the audit more favorably” and she was replaced by three new
hires under 22 years old.
As to the wage and hour claims, Lazo identified evidence
that she and the cook on her shift “worked through breaks, could
not leave the restaurant, and could not cover for one another,”
and that “the gaps between customers . . . do not qualify as
breaks, since [she] could be called upon at any moment.” Lazo
also argued SGI’s knowledge that Lazo and the cook were not
taking meal and rest breaks established willful violations of the
related statutory claims for unpaid wages, inaccurate wage
statements, and the UCL violation.
As to the failure to produce personnel and wage records,
Lazo argued SGI did not provide her with “signed payroll reports
and paystubs.”
Following Lazo’s summary judgment opposition, on July 23,
2024, SGI moved for leave to file a first amended answer
including three additional affirmative defenses. SGI argued that
“a class action settlement [was] reached in a different case” (the
Monroe action) “which became effective on or after May 30, 2024.”
The Monroe settlement addressed wage and hour claims on
behalf of all persons employed by SGI from January 18, 2014
through December 21, 2022, and SGI asserted Lazo was a
member of this class and did not opt out of the settlement. Based
on this settlement, SGI’s proposed amended answer pleaded
defenses of settlement and release, claim or issue preclusion, and
accord and satisfaction, which would apply to Lazo’s wage and
hour claims falling under the class period.
10
Lazo opposed, arguing she would be prejudiced by the
amended answer. Lazo asserted SGI “deliberately did not
disclose any defenses or facts relating to the settlement
throughout this case, undoubtedly so that [Lazo] would not be
put on notice to object to, opt out of, or learn of relevant facts and
witnesses in the class actions.” According to Lazo, the Monroe
class action had “been pending since 2018 and 2021 and a
settlement was reached on or around December 15, 2021 . . . .
Between December 15, 2021 and March 21, 2024, the class
settlement was pending . . . with an unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the class settlement being filed as early
as February 27, 2023.”
After a hearing, the trial court granted SGI leave to amend
its answer in October 2024. A transcript of the hearing
proceedings is not included in the appellate record.
In December 2024, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of SGI. On the age discrimination claim, the
court determined SGI met its initial burden to show Lazo “was
not performing competently in her position and that the adverse
employment action was due to a non-discriminatory motive.” The
court determined Lazo had not met her burden of demonstrating
a triable issue of fact that these reasons were pretextual and that
SGI acted with discriminatory animus because she did not
“present admissible evidence that [SGI] favored younger
employees or that age was a factor in her termination.”
As to the meal and rest breaks claim, the court concluded
SGI “presented facts negating that it had knowledge that [Lazo]
was not taking proper breaks or that [SGI] was undermining its
meal and rest break policies.” The court ruled that Lazo had not
established a triable issue because she did not present “any
11
evidence that [SGI] impeded or discouraged her from taking meal
and rest breaks in compliance with [SGI’s] policies,” Lazo did “not
assert that she was required to clean during her breaks,” and
“there is no duty for employers to prevent employees from
undertaking voluntary work during meal periods.” The court
granted summary judgment on the related wage and hour claims
and UCL claim, concluding that SGI met its burden to show it did
not violate the Labor Code meal and rest break requirements and
was not obligated to pay meal and rest break penalties.
Finally, as to the personnel and wage records claim, the
court observed SGI “asserts that it timely produced [Lazo’s]
complete file when requested, and that it otherwise does not
possess the items” Lazo identified as missing. The court
determined Lazo did not “provide any statutory authority
suggesting that the wage statements provided were inadequate;
nor does she present facts showing that she was injured by
[SGI’s] alleged failure to provide signed payroll reports and
paystubs.” The court further denied Lazo’s motions to compel
further discovery responses as moot.
Lazo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Lazo first challenges the trial court’s grant of leave to file
an amended answer. Lazo next argues the court erred by
granting summary judgment because she demonstrated triable
issues of material fact regarding her causes of action. Lazo
further argues the court should not have granted summary
judgment given her pending discovery motions and because SGI’s
12
separate statement did not conform to the statutory
requirements.2
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Granting
SGI’s Motion To Amend Its Answer
Lazo argues the court erred by permitting SGI to file an
amended answer pleading defenses based on the Monroe class
action settlement.
Section 473 permits amendments to pleadings in the
furtherance of justice, subject to the trial court’s discretion.
(§ 473, subd. (a).) “Ordinarily, courts should ‘exercise liberality’
in permitting amendments at any stage of the proceeding.
[Citations.] In particular, liberality should be displayed in
allowing amendments to answers, for a defendant denied leave to
amend is permanently deprived of a defense.” (Hulsey v. Koehler
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1159; accord, Morgan v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530 [“it
is a rare case in which ‘a court will be justified in refusing a party
leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his
case’ ”].) “It is well established that leave to amend . . . is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and ‘ “ ‘[t]he
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent
a clear showing of abuse.’ ” ’ ” (Garcia v. Roberts (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 900, 909; accord, Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 488 (Hong Sang Market).) “ ‘[A]bsent
a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, the rule of great
2 Lazo’s opening brief also argued the trial court erred by
awarding costs to SGI, but she abandoned this argument in her
reply brief.
13
liberality in allowing amendment of pleadings will prevail.’ ”
(Hong Sang Market, at p. 488.)
Lazo contends that SGI failed to disclose the Monroe class
action during discovery to prevent her from objecting to or opting
out of the settlement. While Lazo did request discovery
regarding any other civil employment actions filed against SGI
within the past 10 years, including class action lawsuits, SGI
objected to this discovery request as overly broad, and Lazo did
not challenge these objections or move to compel discovery
responses on this issue.
Lazo further argues that permitting the additional defenses
in the amended answer caused her prejudice through “ ‘legal
gamesmanship’ ” and by costing her “resources spent on
litigation, the []ability to timely address defenses during
discovery, risk evaluation before trial, and probable delay.”
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting SGI leave to file the amended answer. Here, SGI
requested leave to amend approximately seven weeks after the
Monroe settlement was finalized and enforceable. SGI’s new
defenses seeking to apply the Monroe settlement against Lazo
presented only legal issues and did not require any additional
discovery in this case beyond the fact of the settlement. (See
Hong Sang Market, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 487-488 [trial
court did not abuse discretion by allowing defendant to amend
answer with a res judicata defense; although plaintiff asserted
defendant’s “extreme lack of diligence” and prejudice from
“address[ing] a new and complex defense ‘without the benefit of
either research or pretrial discovery,’ ” plaintiff was not
“prejudiced by any delay” because “[t]he issue was purely legal in
nature,” it was “unclear what, if any, discovery [plaintiff] might
14
have conducted that would bear upon a res judicata defense,” and
plaintiff had “opportunity to respond to the res judicata
defense”].)
Lazo relies on Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage
Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686 (Green), but that case is
distinguishable. There, the defendant mortgage broker moved to
amend its answer with a new affirmative defense sounding in
negligence. (Id. at p. 691.) The court denied leave to amend, and
the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the “amendment would
have both contradicted the mortgage broker’s previous verified
pleading” which asserted its diligence “and required further
discovery, requiring the [plaintiffs] to substantially redo their
trial strategy.” (Id. at p. 693.) The court further observed the
defendant’s decision to delay its negligence defense was
“obviously deliberate and strategic, not a mere product of
inadvertence.” (Id. at p. 693, fn. 3.)
Even if, as Lazo avers, SGI employed “deliberate and
strategic” timing by disclosing the Monroe action after the
binding settlement, Lazo did not suffer prejudice akin to the
plaintiffs in Green. (Green, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 693,
fn. 3.) Unlike Green, SGI’s new defenses did not raise any new
factual issues or require further factual discovery but simply
presented a new legal issue: whether a portion of Lazo’s wage and
hour claims may be precluded by the class action settlement.
And while Lazo argues SGI’s timing compromised her use of
litigation resources and her trial strategy, Lazo does not argue
that she could not respond to SGI’s newly pleaded defenses on
their merits. (Cf. Mac v. Minassian (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 510,
519 [“ ‘ “California courts have ‘a policy of great liberality in
allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to
15
dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the
authorization does not prejudice the substantial rights of
others.’ ” ’ ”].)
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Adjudication
on Lazo’s Age Discrimination Claim
1. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
Summary judgment or summary adjudication are
appropriate “if all the papers submitted show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c); see
id., subd. (f) [summary adjudication].) A defendant moving for
summary judgment or summary adjudication “ ‘bears the burden
of showing the court that the plaintiff “has not established, and
cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case.” ’ ”
(Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th
264, 274 (Lyle).) The moving party “bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of
any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of
production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then
subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima
facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) A triable issue of material
fact exists “ ‘if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable
trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard
of proof.’ ” (Doe v. Salesian Society (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 474,
478; see Padron v. Osoy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 677, 689.)
“ ‘On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary
judgment [or summary adjudication], we examine the record de
16
novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment [or summary adjudication] and
resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ”
(Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 274.) “To analyze the issues, ‘we
follow the traditional three-step analysis. “We first identify the
issues framed by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to
which the motion must respond. Secondly, we determine
whether the moving party has established facts which negate the
opponents’ claim and justify a judgment in the movant’s favor.
Finally, if the summary judgment [or summary adjudication]
motion prima facie justifies a judgment, we determine whether
the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material
factual issue.” ’ ” (Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201,
213; accord, Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 967, 975.)
2. Fair Employment and Housing Act
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
forbids age discrimination in employment. (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subd. (a).) “Any employee making a claim of age discrimination
ultimately bears the burden of proving that the challenged
adverse employment action was based on the employee’s age.”
(Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116;
accord, Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997)
57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 (Hersant).)
For claims of discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence, “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting
test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying
claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a
theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
17
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354. (Guz).) The employee plaintiff has
the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination (ibid.) by “present[ing] evidence that the plaintiff
(1) is over the age of 40; (2) suffered an adverse employment
action; (3) was performing satisfactorily at the time of the
adverse action; and (4) suffered the adverse action under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination, i.e., evidence that the plaintiff was replaced by
someone significantly younger than the plaintiff.” (Sandell v.
Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 321; accord,
Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003). If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, “a presumption of discrimination
arises.” (Guz, at p. 355.)
The burden then “shifts to the employer to rebut the
presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to
‘raise[] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the
[employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355-
356.) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of
discrimination disappears. [Citations.] The plaintiff must then
have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons
as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of
discriminatory motive.” (Id. at p. 356.)
This burden-shifting framework is “ ‘ “slightly modifie[d]” ’ ”
when a defendant employer moves for summary judgment or
summary adjudication. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 143, 160 (Wills); accord, Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc.
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097 (Kelly).) If the employer’s
motion “relies in whole or in part on a showing of
nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, the employer
18
satisfies its burden as moving party if it presents evidence of
such nondiscriminatory reasons that would permit a trier of fact
to find, more likely than not, that they were the basis for the
termination.” (Kelly, at pp. 1097-1098; accord, Husman v. Toyota
Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1182 (Husman);
Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986,
1005 (Scotch).) “To defeat the motion, the employee then must
adduce or point to evidence raising a triable issue, that would
permit a trier of fact to find by a preponderance that intentional
discrimination occurred.” (Kelly, at p. 1098; accord, Scotch, at
p. 1005.) The employee may do so by offering “substantial
evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the
employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of
the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the
employer engaged in intentional discrimination.” (Hersant,
supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005; accord, Horn v. Cushman &
Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 806-807
(Horn).)
However, “[i]t is not enough for the employee simply to
raise triable issues of fact concerning whether the employer’s
reasons for taking the adverse action were sound. What the
employee has brought is not an action for general unfairness but
for age discrimination.” (Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1005; accord, Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 [“ ‘ “The
[employee] cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was
wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” ’ ”].) Rather,
the employee’s “ ‘ “[c]ircumstantial evidence of ‘ “pretense” must
19
be “specific” and “substantial” in order to create a triable issue
with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate’
on an improper basis.” ’ ” (Husman, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1182; accord, Morgan v. Regents of University of California
(2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.) “[S]ummary judgment [or
summary adjudication] for the employer may [] be appropriate
where, given the strength of the employer’s showing of innocent
reasons, any countervailing circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory motive, even if it may technically constitute a
prima facie case [of discrimination], is too weak to raise a
rational inference that discrimination occurred.” (Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 362.)
3. SGI Met Its Burden To Show It Terminated Lazo for
a Nondiscriminatory Reason, and Lazo Did Not
Demonstrate a Triable Issue of Fact That Her
Termination Was Motivated by Age Discrimination
Lazo concedes that SGI offered a nondiscriminatory reason
for her termination: that she mishandled transactions. We agree
that SGI met its initial burden to show it terminated Lazo for a
nondiscriminatory reason. SGI introduced evidence that an
independent loss prevention auditor determined Lazo and nine
other employees mishandled cash register transactions against
company policy under circumstances suggesting theft. Three of
these employees chose to voluntarily resign, while the six others
(including Lazo) disputed the accusations and were terminated.
Lazo argues she met her burden to show that SGI’s
justification for her termination was “a pretext to disguise illegal
[age] discrimination.” She first argues that SGI advanced
“shifting” and “factually baseless” reasons for her termination.
20
Lazo broadly asserts that SGI’s proffered reason for her firing
was pretext for age discrimination. She argues SGI did not have
a reasonable belief that she was stealing because she had no
record of wrongdoing during her previous years of employment,
and SGI did not properly investigate the circumstances
surrounding the alleged theft. Lazo also asserts that SGI
management dismissed objections from other employees about
her termination based on her lack of previous misconduct. As
stated, however, it is not enough to show the employer’s proffered
reason for termination was wrong or mistaken. (See Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 358; Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160;
Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) Consistent with
FEHA, an “ ‘employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a
bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at
all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason. . . .
“While an employer’s judgment or course of action may seem poor
or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question is . . . whether
the given reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination.” ’ ”
(Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344.)
Indeed, Lazo’s burden is to demonstrate the firing was motivated
by an unlawful purpose.
Lazo also argues that SGI’s justification was pretextual
because it changed its characterization of Lazo’s February 9,
2023 transaction from giving away a bag of food and a drink to
overcharging for a side order of jalapeños. “[E]vidence of pretext
requires ‘ “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions . . . that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation], and
hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for the [asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons.’ ” ’ ” (Martin v. Trustees of California
21
State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 163 (Martin).) But
here, SGI consistently maintained that Lazo was fired because
the audit revealed she “mishandl[ed]” transactions, indicating
“potential theft.” (See Reeves v. MV Transportation, Inc. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 666, 680 [plaintiff did not establish triable issue
regarding employer’s alleged age discrimination by identifying
“slight[]” “inconsistencies in defendant’s position” which were
“not the kind of ‘ “fundamentally different justifications” ’ . . . for
an employment decision that created triable issues”]; accord, Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 364 [same, where employer first stated
employee’s termination was “to reduce costs” and later because of
a “ ‘downturn in [] workload’ ”]; Horn, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 813, 815 [affirming summary judgment on age discrimination
claim where employer’s reasons for terminating plaintiff “contain
the same central theme”].) Although there may be differences
between giving away SGI’s product (food and drink) and
mischarging for a different product (jalapeños), Lazo does not
argue that SGI changed its characterization of the other two
alleged mishandled transactions, which separately served to
justify her termination.3 For these reasons, a reasonable
factfinder could not infer from SGI’s different description of the
February 9, 2023 transaction that SGI did not fire Lazo for
mishandling transactions.
Even if we accept Lazo’s assertion that SGI’s theft
accusations lacked a factual basis, “an inference of intentional
discrimination cannot be drawn solely from evidence, if any, that
3 Lazo’s declaration submitted in opposition to summary
judgment conceded that she had no recollection of and could not
explain the February 19, 2023 allegation that she gave a
customer six or seven sandwiches but only charged for one.
22
the company lied about its reasons [for termination]. . . . Proof
that the employer’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence
may ‘considerably assist’ a circumstantial case of discrimination,
because it suggests the employer had cause to hide its true
reasons. [Citation.] Still, there must be evidence supporting a
rational inference that intentional discrimination, on grounds
prohibited by the statute, was the true cause of the employer’s
actions.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.) Lazo contends
she introduced such evidence showing SGI’s discriminatory
motive behind her termination. She argues: “while it was
pursuing its pretextual termination of Lazo, SGI was replacing
Lazo with 18-to-21-year-old employees, solely hiring young
employees in its restaurant, favoring other younger employees in
its audit while removing other aging employees, and later lying
about its knowledge of Lazo’s age and other dubious details
during depositions.” We determine Lazo’s circumstantial
evidence of age discrimination does not create a triable issue of
fact in light of SGI’s “strong contrary showing” of a
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. (Guz, at p. 367.)
Lazo argues that “fifty percent of the employees who lost
their jobs as a result of SGI’s audit were over 40 years old or
about to be 40 years old.” “ ‘ “ ‘[T]o create an inference of
intentional discrimination, statistics must demonstrate a
significant disparity and must eliminate nondiscriminatory
reasons for the apparent disparity.’ ” ’ ” (Martin, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 168; accord, Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1009.) Here, SGI produced evidence
that an independent auditor reviewed transactions without
access to employee information, and that all employees who were
flagged by the audit resigned after being confronted with the
23
audit or were terminated. Lazo did not introduce any evidence
indicating that SGI only audited older employees or that it
terminated older employees while retaining younger employees
whose transactions were flagged by the audit. Thus, Lazo does
not point to evidence that intentional age discrimination
motivated the disparity she identifies.
Lazo further argues that “SGI treated other younger
employees in the audit more favorably” by sending letters
accepting the resignations of a 19-year-old employee and a 39-
year-old employee and inviting them to reapply for a position.
“ ‘Evidence that an employer treated “similarly situated”
employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class “ ‘ “more
favorably” ’ ” is probative of the employer’s discriminatory or
retaliatory intent.’ ” (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 663, 688.) “Another employee is similarly
situated if, among other things, he or she ‘ “engaged in the same
conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing
circumstances.” ’ ” (Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 172.)
Again, Lazo does not dispute that all employees flagged by the
audit were confronted with the results of the audit and were
either terminated or resigned. Lazo also does not dispute that
the employees who received letters inviting them to reapply
“chose to voluntarily quit in lieu of being terminated.” Even
assuming the letters constituted more favorable treatment, Lazo,
who challenged the misconduct identified by the audit, does not
demonstrate that she was similarly situated to employees who
conceded the misconduct allegations and resigned.
Lazo contends that “her job position was assumed by three
newly hired employees who were all under 22 years old and had
only been employed by SGI for less than 14 weeks” and that these
24
employees did not have “skillsets preferable over Lazo’s.” Lazo
argues this is significant because according to the general
manager, “ ‘most’ applicants for the cashier position were over
40 years old, yet SGI inexplicably hired no one over 40 years old
when it hired 17 new employees.” (Emphasis omitted.)
“[R]eplacement with a younger worker is not enough, by itself, to
constitute age discrimination,” but it may, “in conjunction with
other factors, help show age discrimination.” (O’Mary v.
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 563,
582.) Although she asserts the under-40 applicants were less
qualified than the applicants over 40, Lazo does not adduce any
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
the job applicants over 40 years old were equally qualified or
otherwise similarly situated to the new, under-40 hires. (See
Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 369 [plaintiff employee’s “raw age
comparisons” did not create an inference of age-based
discrimination given “the weak evidence that the workers
retained or hired over him were similar or comparable except for
their dates of birth”].) For these reasons, we conclude “the
comparative-age evidence cited by [Lazo], even if [] adequate to
demonstrate a prima facie case, is insufficient for trial in the face
of [SGI’s] strong contrary showing that its reasons were
unrelated to age-related bias.” (Id. at p. 367.)
Finally, Lazo argues that she established pretext because,
in an email flagging Lazo’s mishandled transactions, SGI’s loss
prevention auditor described Lazo as “an elderly female cashier.”
Lazo contends that in their depositions, the auditor and an SGI
senior management member who received the auditor’s email
both testified they could not estimate Lazo’s age and they could
not tell her age from the video footage of the mishandled
25
transactions. Lazo does not argue the “elderly” comment
constitutes direct evidence of age discrimination, but she argues
a jury could “reasonably conclude SGI’s witnesses were
deliberately avoiding talking about Lazo’s age in an effort to hide
the true motives behind Lazo’s termination.” We conclude this
deposition testimony was insufficient to raise a triable issue of
material fact as to SGI’s pretext. (See Arnold v. Dignity Health
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 428 [“benign . . . comments” on an
employee’s age which only “raise a weak suspicion of
discriminatory animus . . . do[] not amount to substantial
evidence of discriminatory animus necessary to defeat a
summary judgment motion”].)4
4. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary
Adjudication of the Age Discrimination Claim Despite
Pending Discovery Motions
Lazo argues the court erred by granting summary
adjudication of her age discrimination claim because she had
pending discovery motions relating to certain redacted emails
SGI management sent before Lazo’s termination. Lazo asserts
“the redacted communications may have contained direct
evidence of age discrimination by SGI’s [management] at the
time of Lazo’s firing.”
Section 437c, subdivision (h), provides: “ ‘If it appears from
the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential
to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be
4 Because we affirm summary judgment as to Lazo’s age
discrimination claim, we need not address the parties’ arguments
regarding Lazo’s corollary claim for punitive damages.
26
presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make
any other order as may be just.” “Subdivision (h) was added to
section 437c ‘ “[t]o mitigate summary judgment’s harshness,” ’
. . . ‘for an opposing party who has not had an opportunity to
marshal the evidence.’ [Citation.] The statute mandates a
continuance of a summary judgment hearing upon a good faith
showing by affidavit that additional time is needed to obtain facts
essential to justify opposition to the motion.” (Cooksey v. Alexakis
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 253-254 (Cooksey); accord, Frazee v.
Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 634.)
To warrant a mandatory continuance, the supporting
declaration “must show: ‘(1) “Facts establishing a likelihood that
controverting evidence may exist and why the information sought
is essential to opposing the motion”; (2) “The specific reasons why
such evidence cannot be presented at the present time”; (3) “An
estimate of the time necessary to obtain such evidence”; and (4)
“The specific steps or procedures the opposing party intends to
utilize to obtain such evidence.” ’ ” (501 East 51st Street, etc. v.
Kookmin Best Ins. Co., Ltd. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 924, 939
(501 East); accord, Johnson v. Alameda County Medical Center
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 521, 532 (Johnson).) If the affidavit does
not make such a showing, “we review the trial court’s denial of
appellant’s request for a continuance for abuse of discretion.”
(Cooksey, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 254; accord, Johnson, at
p. 532.)
Lazo argues she raised a likelihood the redacted emails
between members of SGI management contained direct evidence
of age discrimination. SGI responds that these redacted emails
were communications with SGI’s in-house counsel, Alex
27
Kalinsky, and thus protected by attorney-client privilege. Even
assuming Lazo demonstrated the redacted emails would have
defeated SGI’s summary judgment motion, we conclude Lazo did
not make the showing required by section 437c, subdivision (h),
to require a mandatory continuance of summary judgment for
further discovery.
Here, Lazo filed motions to compel discovery of the
redacted emails on July 1, 2024, and these motions were set for a
hearing on November 26, 2024. Lazo’s opposition to summary
judgment was filed July 2, 2024, set for a hearing on July 17, and
continued to November 26, 2024. Although her motions to
compel were already pending, and the summary judgment
hearing was initially set well before the discovery hearing, Lazo’s
opposition only requested denial of the summary judgment
motion and did not request a continuance to complete the
requested discovery.
Rather, Lazo’s opposition argued that SGI engaged in
“discovery abuse provid[ing] an additional and alternative reason
to deny the [motion for summary judgment] under [] § 437c(h),”
and it “request[ed] that the Court deny the motion for summary
judgment/adjudication in its entirety.” (See Lewinter v. Genmar
Industries, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1224 [appellants
“waived any objection to the trial court having ruled on the
summary judgment motion before it decided their motion to
compel” where they “failed to request a continuance of the
hearing on the summary judgment motion for the purpose of
conducting additional discovery”]; accord, Roman v. BRE
Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1056-1057; Clark v.
Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 182,
fn. 32.) Indeed, Lazo did not request a continuance of any
28
particular length of time to pursue disclosure of the redacted
emails. (See Johnson, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 532 [to
support continuance of summary judgment for further discovery,
opposing party must provide “ ‘estimate of the time necessary to
obtain [the desired] evidence’ ”]; accord, 501 East, supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.)
Lazo therefore did not establish the criteria for a
mandatory continuance for further discovery under section 437c,
subdivision (h). Because Lazo does not otherwise argue on
appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a
continuance, we therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to grant
summary adjudication of the age discrimination claim.
C. The Trial Court Erred By Granting Summary Judgment on
Lazo’s Claim for Meal and Rest Break Violations and Her
Related Statutory Claims
1. Governing Law
Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a), provides: “An
employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of more
than five hours per day without providing the employee with a
meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total
work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours,
the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the
employer and employee. An employer shall not employ an
employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day
without providing the employee with a second meal period of not
less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no
more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by
mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first
meal period was not waived.” (See Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating,
29
Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 899, 909 (Bradsbery).) Wage Order
No. 5-2001 of the Industrial Wage Commission governs rest
periods for restaurant employees: “10 minutes for shifts lasting
more than two hours up to six hours, [and] 20 minutes for shifts
lasting more than six hours up to 10 hours.” (Brinker Restaurant
Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1018, 1029 &
fn. 1 (Brinker); accord, Bradsbery, at pp. 909-910; see Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 11050.) Section 226.7 of the Labor Code states that
“[a]n employer shall not require an employee to work during a
meal or rest . . . period mandated pursuant to an applicable
statute,” and “[i]f an employer fails to provide an employee a
meal or rest . . . period in accordance with a state law, including,
but not limited to, an applicable statute . . . , the employer shall
pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s
regular rate of compensation for each workday that the meal or
rest . . . period is not provided.” (Lab. Code, § 226.7, subds. (b) &
(c).)
Absent circumstances not present here, “ ‘an employer is
obligated to provide an “off-duty” meal period . . . in which the
employee “is relieved of all duty during [the] 30-minute meal
period.” ’ ” (Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 685, 705.) This meal period must be
“uninterrupted” and the employee must also be “free to leave the
premises,” i.e., to be free from “any duty or employer control” and
“to come and go as they please.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
pp. 1035-1037.)
“There is no meal period violation if an employee
voluntarily chooses to work during a meal period after the
employer has relieved the employee of all duty.” (Donohue v.
AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58, 67 (Donohue); accord,
30
Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1040 [“the employer is not
obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is
performed”].) Accordingly, “[p]roof an employer had knowledge of
employees working through meal periods will not alone subject
the employer to liability. . . . On the other hand, an employer
may not undermine a formal policy of providing meal breaks by
pressuring employees to perform their duties in ways that omit
breaks.” (Ibid.) An employer may not “exert[] coercion against
the taking of, creat[e] incentives to forgo, or otherwise
encourag[e] the skipping of legally protected breaks.” (Ibid.)
“[E]mployers’ responsibilities are the same for meal and
rest periods.” (Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc. (2016)
2 Cal.5th 257, 265 (Augustus).) As with meal periods, “[d]uring
required rest periods, employers must relieve their employees of
all duties and relinquish any control over how employees spend
their break time.” (Id. at p. 260.)
An employer moving for summary judgment on meal and
rest break violations may satisfy its initial burden of production
by “establish[ing] the defense that it genuinely relieved
employees from duty during meal [and rest] periods” and that
“employees voluntarily chose to work” during such periods.
(Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 79.) If the employer satisfies
this burden, then the burden of production shifts to the employee
to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of
action or a defense. (Ibid.)
2. Lazo Demonstrated a Triable Issue of Fact as to
Whether SGI Provided Off-Duty Meal Periods
Lazo argues she introduced evidence that she did not
receive “uninterrupted [and] timely meal and rest breaks
31
because, as the sole cashier working the graveyard shift, she was
constantly on duty and had to tend to customers at all hours of
the night.” For this reason, Lazo submits the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment on her causes of action for meal and
rest break violations, failure to provide accurate wage
statements, failure to pay unpaid wages at discharge, and her
UCL claim.5
In support of its motion, SGI adduced evidence of “lulls” in
the nightshift that “can last anywhere from 30 minutes to an
hour” and that the two employees (the cook and cashier)
5 SGI argues Lazo’s opening brief forfeited any challenge to
the court’s ruling on her claims for inaccurate wage statements,
failure to pay wages at time of discharge, and the UCL claim.
SGI contends Lazo did not address all grounds supporting
summary adjudication of these claims. In her reply, Lazo argues
she did not “waive or abandon any claim of error” as to these
causes of action because they are “derivative violations or
damages” to the meal and rest break violations.
We conclude Lazo has not forfeited her arguments as to
these derivative claims because they were predicated on SGI’s
failure to provide meal and rest breaks. (See Rodriguez v.
E.M.E., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1031, 1046 [“[b]ecause
summary adjudication was improperly granted with respect to
appellant’s rest break claim . . . it was also improperly granted
with respect to the derivative claims,” including failure to provide
accurate pay statements, unfair business practices, and failure to
pay wages due]; Krantz v. BT Visual Images (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 164, 178 [reversing summary judgment as to both
substantive and derivative claims because causes of action which
“depend upon the validity (or invalidity) of the preceding claims
for relief” must “stand or fall depending on the fate of the
antecedent substantive causes of action”].)
32
scheduled for the night shift could “cover for the other during
breaks.” A senior vice president employing management staff for
SGI declared that the “cook could take orders while [] Lazo took a
break,” and Lazo “could have allowed, or easily trained, the cook
to do this.” SGI also identified evidence that Lazo did not inform
SGI she was not taking meal and rest breaks.
Even assuming that SGI met its initial burden to show it
did provide off-duty breaks, we conclude Lazo raised triable
issues of material fact regarding whether SGI relieved her of her
duties so she could have meal and rest periods. Lazo provided a
sworn declaration attesting that “the [c]ooks whom [she] worked
with did not handle the register or customer transactions and did
not do [her] position during [her] shifts,” and “[t]he cook did not
cover for [her] and could not, because he/she has a different job,
does not know how to use the register, and cannot take orders
while cooking at the same time.” Lazo also produced deposition
testimony from Junior Gonzales, a cook who worked with her on
the overnight shift, who stated he did not use the cash register
and did not know how it worked.
Lazo also declared she was “not free to leave the restaurant
during the graveyard shift and [she] always had to be available
at a moment’s notice” “because [she] always needed to be
available when a customer came through the drive-thru and
there was no one to cover for [her].” Gonzales similarly testified
he “needed to be at the restaurant” during the entire overnight
shift because he “didn’t know when somebody was [going to] come
through the drive-through.” Lazo averred her managers “created
[the] work schedules and were aware that [she] was the only non-
cook employee helping customers during the graveyard shift.”
33
This evidence raised material questions of fact as to
whether SGI satisfied its obligation to provide Lazo off-duty meal
and rest breaks. Although Lazo agreed there were long lulls in
customers on the overnight shift, a reasonable trier of fact could
find from Lazo’s declaration that she was not “relieved . . . of all
duty” (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 67) during these lulls
because SGI expected her to be available if a customer came
through the drive-through. (See Augustus, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
pp. 270-271 [“on-call rest periods” did not satisfy “employer’s
obligation to provide breaks relieving employees of all work-
related duties and employer control”].) Because SGI scheduled
one cashier and one cook on the overnight shift, a reasonable
trier of fact could also find that Lazo could not take an off-duty
break given the evidence that the cook was not trained as a
cashier and that he could not perform both jobs at once.
SGI argues its policy required employees to take breaks,
Lazo was told to take breaks, and Lazo did not report any issue
taking compliant breaks. But an employer’s “obligation to
provide [employees] with an adequate meal period is not satisfied
by assuming that the meal periods were taken, because
employers have ‘an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers
are actually relieved of all duty.’ ” (Cicairos v. Summit Logistics,
Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949, 962 (Cicairos) [reversing grant
of summary judgment to employer on meal break violations
where plaintiff employees’ evidence showed employer “did not
schedule meal periods” or “monitor compliance,” and “pressured”
employees on tasks, “making [them] feel that they should not
stop for lunch”].) Similarly, an employer may be liable if
employees “did not take their full 10-minute rest breaks because,
as a practical matter, the defendant did not permit [employees] to
34
take their rest breaks.” (Id. at p. 963 [triable issue of fact on rest
break claim where employees “said they felt pressured not to take
their rest breaks”].) We therefore reverse the summary
adjudication of Lazo’s claims for meal and rest break violations,
failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay
unpaid wages at discharge, and unfair or unlawful business
practices.
D. Trial Court Erred by Granting Summary Adjudication of
SGI’s Alleged Failure To Produce Required Wage Records
1. Governing Law
As relevant here, Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a),
provides: “An employer, semimonthly or at the time of each
payment of wages, shall furnish to their employee . . . an accurate
itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned,
(2) total hours worked by the employee . . . (5) net wages earned,
[and] (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee
is paid.” “For purposes of this subdivision, ‘copy’ includes . . . a
computer-generated record that accurately shows all of the
information required by this subdivision.” (Lab. Code, § 226,
subd. (a).) Subdivision (e)(1) provides that “[a]n employee
suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure
by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to
recover” actual damages or statutory penalties, as well as costs
and attorney’s fees. “An employee is deemed to suffer injury for
purposes of this subdivision if the employer fails to provide
accurate and complete information as required . . . and the
employee cannot promptly and easily determine from the wage
statement alone . . . net wages paid to the employee during the
pay period or any of the other information required to be provided
35
on the itemized wage statement,” including the inclusive dates of
the pay period. (Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (e)(2)(B).) “ ‘[P]romptly
and easily determine’ means a reasonable person would be able to
readily ascertain the information without reference to other
documents or information.” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(C).)
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of Labor Code section 226 require
the employer to “afford current and former employees the right to
inspect or receive a copy of records pertaining to their
employment, upon reasonable request to the employer,” within
“21 calendar days from the date of the request.” “A failure by an
employer to permit a current or former employee to inspect or
receive a copy of records within [this] time . . . entitles the
current or former employee or the Labor Commissioner to recover
a seven-hundred-fifty-dollar ($750) penalty from the employer.”
(Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (f).)6
Labor Code section 226 “is intended to require employers to
provide an adequate wage statement, itemizing the information
to be included, ‘to assist the employee in determining whether he
or she has been compensated properly.’ ” (Raines v. Coastal
Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 675.)
“For purposes of section 226(e), a plaintiff is ‘injured’ ‘if the
accuracy of any of the items enumerated in § 226(a) . . . cannot be
ascertained from the four corners of the wage statement.’
6 Lazo’s complaint also alleged SGI violated Labor Code
section 1198.5, which requires employers to maintain and provide
for inspection “personnel records . . . relating to the employee’s
performance, including education or training records, or to any
grievance concerning the employee.” (Lab. Code, § 1198.5,
subd. (a)(1).) Lazo does not raise any argument in her opening
brief that SGI failed to provide such personnel records.
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[Citation.] An actual injury is shown where ‘there is a need for
both additional documentation and additional mathematical
calculations in order to determine whether [a plaintiff was]
correctly paid and what they may be owed.’ ” (Id. at p. 676.)
2. Lazo Raised a Triable Issue of Fact Regarding Her
Labor Code Section 226 Claim
Lazo argues SGI failed to produce her wage records
reflecting the inclusive dates of the pay periods she worked.7 In
Lazo’s view, the spreadsheet SGI provided “did not contain all
information shown on the wage statements and payroll reports,”
and she was “unable to see the days and hours she worked and,
thus, whether there were any meal period violations.”
SGI argues Lazo forfeited this argument, but Lazo
adequately preserved the issue. In its summary judgment
motion, SGI asserted Lazo received “a computer-generated record
that accurately shows” all the information required by Labor
Code section 226. In her summary judgment opposition, Lazo
argued SGI did not provide her with “signed payroll reports and
paystubs, thereby violating [her] rights,” and the “computer
spreadsheet . . . did not include all information shown on the
payroll reports and wage statements.” Lazo’s separate statement
disputed that SGI provided a complete personnel and wage
records file, stating the “file did not contain any of [her] paystubs
. . . , the payroll reports showing [Lazo’s] signatures and hours or
work . . . , or any of [Lazo]’s work schedules before March 2023,
such that [she] was unable to see the hours she worked on each
7 Lazo also argues the records did not reflect her net wages,
but she does not explain how the “net pay” column on the
spreadsheet did not satisfy this requirement.
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day (and whether there were any meal break violations). [¶] . . .
[T]he computer spreadsheet did not show all information
contained in [Lazo’s] paystubs, such as the Period Begin/Period
End date for each paycheck.”
Lazo raised a triable issue of material fact as to the
adequacy of the wage records SGI produced because the wage
records did not reflect the dates included in the pay periods. (See
Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (a) [wage statements must reflect “the
inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid”];
cf. Cicairos, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 961 [reversing grant of
summary judgment on Lab. Code § 226 claim because statements
did not “show how many hours the driver worked each day”].)
Although SGI asserts the computer-generated spreadsheet
“accurately showed all the required information,” SGI does not
identify, and our review does not disclose, where the spreadsheet
contains the dates included in each pay period. Lazo also raised
a triable issue as to whether she was injured by this omission
because she could not determine, without additional
documentation, the dates of work for which she was paid. (See
Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (e)(2)(B)(i).) SGI was therefore not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
E. Separate Statement
Lazo argues the court erred by granting summary
judgment due to errors in SGI’s separate statement. In Lazo’s
view, “SGI repeatedly combined multiple facts and arguments
into one ‘undisputed material fact’ and then cited to a large group
of evidence, without any clarification as to which evidence
supported which facts/arguments.”
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“A party moving for summary judgment or summary
adjudication must support the motion with ‘a separate statement
setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the
moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material
facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting
evidence.’ ” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 (Parkview
Villas); accord, Batarse v. Service Employees Internat. Union,
Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 828.) “The summary
judgment statute provides that, if either party fails to comply
with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failure
may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground to
decide the motion adversely to the offending party.” (Parkview
Villas, at p. 1209; see Batarse, at p. 828.)
Lazo does not establish that the trial court prejudicially
erred by considering SGI’s separate statement. Lazo contends
the separate statement “unfairly placed a significant burden on
Lazo and the court to wade through hundreds of facts that had
been combined without any clearcut citations to evidence or
parallel citations in the motion.” But Lazo does not argue that
she was prevented from properly responding to SGI’s separate
statement. Indeed, the court properly exercised its discretion to
consider the summary judgment motion on its merits despite any
procedural defects with the separate statement. (Cf. Parkview
Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1211-1212 [where opposing
party’s separate statement “fail[ed] to explicitly state the nature
of the dispute concerning [the] proposed undisputed material
facts and to describe the evidence supporting its position the facts
were controverted,” party’s “failure to comply with the[]
requirements for a separate statement made the task of the trial
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court more difficult” but did not prevent the trial court from
exercising its “discretion to decide the merits of the motion”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the superior court is directed
to vacate its order granting SGI’s motion for summary judgment.
The superior court shall enter a new order granting summary
adjudication on the cause of action for age discrimination and
denying summary adjudication on the causes of action for meal
and rest break violations, failure to provide accurate wage
statements, failure to pay unpaid wages at discharge, failure to
produce wage records, and unfair or unlawful business practices.
The parties shall bear their costs on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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