Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

LaSalle v. Vogel CA4/3

Filed 9/16/26 LaSalle v. Vogel CA4/3
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/16/26 LaSalle v. Vogel CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANGELE LASALLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065427

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00836641)

JOANNA T. VOGEL, OPINION

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Erick L. Larsh, Judge. Affirmed.
Channels Law Group, Walter D. Channels; Mauriello Law Firm
and Thomas D. Mauriello for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joanna T. Vogel, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Nancy Levin and
Nancy Levin for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
The question presented is whether a remand from an appellate
court to the trial court based on the reversal of an order denying a motion to
set aside a judgment resulting from the entry of default qualifies as a
“remand for a new trial” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section
583.320, subdivision (a)(3). In this case, we conclude that it does.
Angele LaSalle filed a complaint against Joanna Vogel in
February 2016. LaSalle took Vogel’s default in April 2016. Vogel filed a
motion to set aside the default, which the trial court denied. A default
judgment was entered on July 21, 2017. We reversed the default judgment in
a published opinion filed on June 11, 2019. (See LaSalle v. Vogel (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 127 (LaSalle).) The remittitur was filed in the trial court on
August 13, 2019.
Five years later, the case had barely progressed, if at all.
Consequently, Vogel’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section 583.320, subdivision (a)(3),
which provides that plaintiff has three years from the filing of the remittitur
to “again” bring a case to trial “[i]f on appeal . . . a judgment is reversed and
the action remanded for a new trial.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).) After multiple
continuances, the trial court granted the motion and entered judgment of
dismissal on February 25, 2025.
LaSalle argues the trial court erred in granting the motion
because the reversal of the default judgment on appeal did not function as a

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2
remand for a new trial, citing Misic v. Segars (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1149,
1150–1154 (Misic). We find Misic distinguishable in key respects, and thus
not persuasive in this case. We therefore affirm the dismissal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
The remittitur in this matter was issued on August 12, 2019, and
was filed in the trial court on August 13, 2019. Soon after, counsel for both
parties communicated via e-mail, agreeing that LaSalle would amend her
complaint. Meanwhile, the court scheduled a case management conference for
December 2, 2019.
LaSalle substituted in new counsel in September 2019. On
September 26, Vogel’s counsel sent LaSalle’s new attorney a letter, in part
asking her to honor previous counsel’s agreement. She received no response
to this letter, and the parties proceeded to the case management conference
on December 2, at which time the court ordered counsel to meet and confer.
The case management conference was continued to January 21, 2020.
The two attorneys met and conferred, but LaSalle’s counsel
refused to honor previous counsel’s agreement to amend the complaint.
Instead, the new attorney advised Vogel’s attorney to “do whatever [she] felt
was necessary.” Vogel filed a demurrer and motion to strike on December 27,
2019, and scheduled the hearings on same for April 15, 2020. The court reset
the case management conference to occur with the demurrer and motion to
strike hearing.

2 LaSalle, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 127, provides a summary of the

relevant facts from the inception of the case until the denial of Vogel’s motion
to set aside default. (Id. at pp. 131–132.) We pick up with the filing of the
remittitur after our previous opinion was filed.

3
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in closure
orders, and the Orange County Superior Court was closed to in-person jury
trials or court trials until January 29, 2021. In May 2020, the court set the
case for trial on August 16, 2021.
When the demurrer and motion to strike were finally heard in
September 2020, the demurrer was overruled but the motion to strike was
granted in part, prompting LaSalle’s counsel to agree to amend the
complaint. The first amended complaint was filed on September 14, 2020.
After answering the complaint, in October 2020, Vogel’s counsel
served written discovery and requests for production on LaSalle, but no
responses were forthcoming. After extensions and an attempt to meet and
confer, LaSalle failed to make a full production, necessitating a motion to
compel by Vogel.
Since Vogel’s counsel was not ready for trial based on the lack of
discovery, she moved for a trial continuance. The court agreed, continuing the
trial date to January 24, 2022. However, because Vogel substituted in new
counsel, the court vacated the date and calendared a trial setting conference
for March 10, 2022.
In March 2022, Vogel filed a motion for leave to amend her
answer, and the trial court continued the trial setting conference to
September 15, 2022. Vogel filed her amended answer on July 6, but her
counsel failed to appear at the September 2022 trial setting conference.3 The
court issued an order to show cause and continued the conference to
December 15, 2022, at which time both counsel appeared. Vogel’s counsel

3 Vogel’s counsel averred that he had not checked his calendar

the day before the hearing.

4
advised the court that LaSalle had continually failed to sit for a deposition.
The court therefore ordered LaSalle to appear for deposition on January 4,
2023, and it scheduled the jury trial for November 18, 2024.4
When it set the new trial date, the court “commented that this
case was filed in 2016 and that it was over 5 years old.” Additionally, the
court “stated that it thought that Plaintiff had only 3 years after the Superior
Court’s receipt of the Remittitur from the Court of Appeal to bring the case to
trial and urged [LaSalle’s attorney] to check to see if that was true and to
make any motions she may need to make to advance the trial date.”5
The record reflects the docket in the case saw no activity in 2023.
Then, on August 13, 2024, Vogel filed a motion to dismiss under section
583.320, subdivision (a)(3). She argued LaSalle had three years from the date
the remittitur was filed, August 13, 2019, to bring the matter to trial, and
had not done so. Even accounting for exceptions provided under section
583.340, subdivision (c), Vogel argued, trial should have begun no later than
June 30, 2023.
In opposition, LaSalle’s attorney argued there “was never any
discussion regarding plaintiff filing a motion to get an earlier court date with
the court or the remittitur.” She argued all delays were due to Vogel, and
Vogel should be estopped from seeking dismissal.

4 LaSalle’s attorney claimed she tried to request an earlier date

but was told there was a backlog and November 2024 was the earliest she
could get. Vogel’s attorney claimed LaSalle’s attorney did not object to the
new trial date.
5 We quote these portions from Vogel’s attorney’s declaration filed

in support of her motion to dismiss. There was no court reporter present to
transcribe the hearing.

5
In reply, Vogel’s attorney stated continuances were necessary due
to LaSalle’s failure to comply with her discovery obligations. He also pointed
out that LaSalle never moved to specially set the case for trial to avoid
mandatory dismissal. The motion was set to be heard on September 12, 2024,
but the court continued it to October 10, then to October 24, and then to
November 15, 2024, at LaSalle’s request. On October 10, the court had posted
its tentative ruling on the motion, which was to grant the motion to dismiss
and vacate the trial date.
The trial court then stated in its October 24 minute order that it
was “not opposed to a continuance of the trial and w[ould] address the issue
on November 15, 2024.” On November 12, 2024, the court issued a minute
order reminding the parties that trial was scheduled for November 18, and
that the parties had to comply with the court’s pretrial procedures.
On November 15, Vogel filed a motion to continue the trial but
not the discovery cut-off. Vogel’s attorney did not timely appear for the
hearing that same day on the motion to dismiss, and it was taken off-
calendar. He advised the court he was re-filing the motion to dismiss that day
with the new hearing to take place on April 3, 2025.6 He also averred that
neither party had filed the required documents in preparation for trial, and
the case was not ready for trial. Vogel’s attorney then filed an ex parte
application to shorten time on the motion to dismiss and continue the trial.
He also filed a motion to set aside the court’s November 15, 2024, order
taking his motion to dismiss off calendar.

6 The record reflects that Vogel’s attorney did re-file the motion to

dismiss and scheduled the hearing for this date.

6
Vogel’s ex parte applications to shorten time on her motions were
heard on November 19, 2024. The court vacated the November 2024 trial date
and ordered all of Vogel’s pending motions to be advanced to January 17,
2025 for hearing. In setting the January 17 date, the court told LaSalle’s
attorney: “I wanted to give you all due consideration to be able to make your
very best argument. But counsel’s correct. I’m under the obligation, on my
own, to dismiss [the lawsuit], unless—and that’s the one thing I asked you
yesterday. I’ll look at any case that you have that indicates that placing a
trial date without objection is a waiver. I’ve not seen anything, and so I’m
going to give you the opportunity to do that.”
On January 6, 2025, LaSalle filed a new opposition to the motion
to dismiss. In it, she made her previous arguments in opposition, but she also
cited Misic to argue that a default judgment did not constitute a trial for
purposes of section 583.320.
At the January 17 hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial
court acknowledged Misic and “another case . . . that takes an opposite
position,” and decided to take the matter under submission. The court then
said the following to LaSalle’s counsel: “But then the question I have . . . say I
were to find that [the three-year dismissal statute] doesn’t apply. [¶] When is
the five-year date in this case? And how did you determine what the five-year
date was?” LaSalle’s counsel replied that she had not looked into the issue
“because that wasn’t the issue before the court.” She later argued that Vogel’s
counsel had “waived his opportunity” to cite any other authority for dismissal
besides what was cited in his motion. The court responded: “I’m going to
probably give some deference to both. The reason for that is, this is a
malpractice for both of you you’re dealing with, and I understand—and it’s
concerning to the court, so I want to be fair and just in all that we do. And I’m

7
going to give you both an opportunity to be heard on that because I think
there’s a consequence on either side, and the court’s concerned that I get this
right.”
On January 24, 2025, the court issued its ruling, granting the
motion under section 583.320, subdivision (a)(3). Judgment on the dismissal
was entered on February 25, and LaSalle timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
LaSalle’s appeal is based primarily on her interpretation of Misic.
She argues that a default prove-up does not constitute a “trial” for purposes
of section 583.320. She acknowledges the five-year dismissal rule (see
§ 583.310) but argues it is irrelevant because only the three-year statute was
at issue. We are not persuaded that Misic requires reversal in this case.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a judgment of dismissal under section 583.320 for
abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Under this standard, ‘“[t]he trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law
are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible
only if arbitrary and capricious.”’ [Citation.] Thus, while we review the trial
court’s order for abuse of discretion, to the extent our decision requires us to
construe [the statutes in question], the de novo standard of review applies.”
(Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 346, 354.)
II.
SECTION 583.320 APPLIES BECAUSE THE COURT’S DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS
REVERSED WITHOUT QUALIFICATION AND REMANDED WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS
“An action shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on
motion of the defendant, after notice to the parties, if the action is not

8
brought to trial within the time prescribed” in sections 583.310 to 583.360.
(§ 583.360, subd. (a).) “The requirements of [these code sections] are
mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as
expressly provided by statute.” (Id., subd. (b).)
The parties may extend the time to bring an action to trial by
way of a written stipulation or an “oral agreement made in open court.”
(§ 583.330.)7 Additionally, “[i]n computing the time within which an action
must be brought to trial,” certain periods are to be excluded: times when the
court’s jurisdiction was suspended, times during which trial was stayed or
enjoined, and times during which “[b]ringing the action to trial, for any other
reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340, subd. (c).)
The statutes provide two mandatory timeframes. The first is five
years after commencement of the action against the defendant. (See
§ 583.310.) The second is found in section 583.320, which states in pertinent
part: “If a new trial is granted in the action[,] the action shall again be
brought to trial within the following times: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) If on appeal an order
granting a new trial is affirmed or a judgment is reversed and the action
remanded for a new trial, within three years after the remittitur is filed by
the clerk of the trial court.” (§ 583.320, subd. (a)(3).)
The central question in this case is whether the remand to the
trial court based on the reversal of the default judgment in LaSalle was a
remand “for a new trial” within the scope of section 583.320,
subdivision (a)(3). We conclude it was.

7 There is no evidence in the record of any such stipulation or

agreement here.

9
Contrary to LaSalle’s contention, Misic does not require us to
hold differently. There, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in May 1985 and
did not obtain a default judgment until exactly five years later in May 1990.
(Misic, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.) The trial court granted the
defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment, and its ruling was
affirmed on appeal. (Ibid.) Two years later, the defendants moved to dismiss
under section 583.310, and the trial court granted the motion. (Ibid.) On
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that section 583.320 “gave them at least three
years from” the date the default judgment was set aside to bring the case to
trial. (Ibid.) The issue presented to the court was “whether an order setting
aside a default judgment qualifies as a ‘new trial’ order for purposes of . . .
section 583.320.” (Id. at p. 1150.) The court determined section 583.320 did
not extend the mandatory five-year period. Rather, it held that the five-year
period “was tolled . . . with the entry of the default judgment” and that the
“tolling ceased . . . with the setting aside of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 1156.)
Thus, in Misic, the applicable language from section 583.320,
subdivision (a)(3), was “If on appeal an order granting a new trial is
affirmed.” The Misic court did not think an order setting aside a default
judgment was “an order granting new trial.” That is not the question we face.
In this case, the statutory language we must construe is “or a judgment is
reversed and the action remanded for a new trial.” (§ 583.320, subd. (a)(3).)
The order appealed from in LaSalle was an order denying a
motion to set aside a default and the resulting default judgment. (LaSalle,
supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 132.) In LaSalle, the issue was not whether the
default proceeding was a “trial” or “new trial” for the purpose of determining
whether a dismissal was proper under section 583.320, subdivision (a)(3).
Instead, the appellant was essentially appealing the judgment entered

10
against her. The Misic court did not address whether the second part of
section 583.320, subdivision (a)(3) regarding “a judgment is reversed and the
action remanded for a new trial” was applicable where a party is appealing
the judgment resulting from the entry of default.
Section 583.320 “expressly applies only to a new trial of an action
in which judgment has been entered and an appeal taken with reversal and
remand for a new trial. [Citation.] ¶ Moreover, the statutory aim of [the
statute] is to ‘promote the trial of cases before evidence is lost, destroyed, or
the memory of witnesses becomes dimmed . . . [and to] protect defendants
from being subjected to the annoyance of an unmeritorious action remaining
undecided for an indefinite period of time.’ [Citation.] Hence, in the situation
where there is an unqualified reversal without directions, the effect is to
remand the case for a new trial on the merits.” (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 998, 1003 (No Oil) [interpreting section 583,
subdivision (c), previous version of section 583.320].)
There can be no dispute that the default judgment in this case
was reversed and the action remanded without further instruction, which,
per No Oil, effectively remanded the case for a new trial. As such, LaSalle
had three years from the filing of the remittitur to bring the case to trial. We
do not read Misic to hold that all default judgments are categorically exempt
from section 583.320’s deadline. Rather, we read Misic’s holding to be limited
to the issue and the procedural and factual posture described in that case.
This can be said of the cases on which Misic relied as well. Their
dispositions and holdings are the result of the procedural and factual
situations the courts addressed in those cases. In Langan v. McCorkle (1969)
276 Cal.App.2d 805 (disapproved on other grounds in Brunzell Constr. Co. v.
Wagner (1970) 2 Cal.3d 545, 555, fn. 13), the appeal was from the trial court’s

11
order dismissing the action for failing to bring it to trial within five years.
(Langan, supra, 276 Cal.App.2d at p. 807–808.) The question was whether a
plaintiff who had proven up a default judgment five years after filing his
complaint had brought the case to trial within the meaning of the five-year
dismissal statute. (Id. at p. 809.) The Langan court held that the
subsequently vacated prove-up did “not qualify as a trial within the meaning
of” the statute. (Ibid.)
In Tiholiz v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 201, the
appeal was from the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss for
failing to bring the action to trial before the expiration of the time periods in
section 583, subdivisions (b) and (c). The issue was whether an order vacating
summary judgment granted without notice to the other side was an order
granting a new trial for purposes of the three-year statute.8 (Tiholiz, at
p. 205.)
Neither Misic nor the authorities upon which it relies involved
the reversal of a default judgment on appeal. That is, these cases did not
involve or address how to characterize an appeal from a judgment resulting
from a denial of a motion to set aside a default and default judgment. Our
research has not yielded any published cases that did; only somewhat
analogous situations.
In McDonough Power Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1972)
8 Cal.3d 527 (McDonough), the California Supreme Court concluded that,
when “a judgment of dismissal, entered upon an order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, has been reversed, the action must be brought to

8 This is essentially the same statutory language analyzed in

Misic—again, not the question in this case.

12
trial within three years from the filing of the remittitur in the trial court. In
such case the determination of the issues of law raised by the demurrer
constitutes a trial within the meaning of section 583 [predecessor five-year
statute]. Upon the going down of the remittitur the cause is remanded for a
new trial whether the decision so provides expressly, is an unqualified
reversal, or, as here, contains a direction only as to the overruling of the
demurrer. Under such circumstances, the three-year provision of section 583,
subdivision (b)[now section 583.420], applies and, since the action had been
brought to trial, the five-year provision of such section has no application.”
(McDonough, at pp. 532–533.)
LaSalle argues that McDonough is inapposite because it involved
a reversal of judgment after trial. This is inaccurate; McDonough involved a
dismissal after sustaining of demurrer without leave to amend. (McDonough,
supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 529.) Although usually a contested proceeding, a
dismissal after demurrer is also likely to take place earlier in the litigation,
as is a default judgment.
Moreover, we hesitate to conclude—as LaSalle appears to
suggest—that a default judgment after prove-up can never be considered a
“trial,” or that the unqualified reversal of said judgment and remand without
instructions can never constitute a “remand for new trial” under section
583.320. Our Supreme Court has stated that a trial “‘is the determination of
an issue of law or fact’ [citation] or ‘the examination . . . of the facts or law
put in issue in a cause . . . .’” (McDonough, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 531, quoting
Berri v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 856, 859.)
A default judgment entered after prove-up is such a
determination, because the defaulted defendant admits the factual
allegations of the complaint, and the trial court must determine whether the

13
plaintiff has evidence to support his or her claim for damages. If the plaintiff
does so, the plaintiff gets a judgment. (See Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 287 [where court default judgment is requested,
“the plaintiff must affirmatively establish his entitlement to the specific
judgment requested”].)9 Here, by reversing the default judgment and
remanding without instructions, we sent the case back to the trial court to
“again be brought to trial.” (§ 583.320, subd. (a).) There would be no other
reason for us to remand.10
It is also worth noting, as Vogel correctly points out, that section
583.320’s language creates no exception for default judgments and does not
restrict the types of “judgment” covered by the three-year rule. We conclude
that the three-year dismissal statute applied because the default judgment
against Vogel was reversed on appeal and effectively remanded for new
trial.11

9 Indeed, had we affirmed the denial of Vogel’s motion to set aside

the default and default judgment in LaSalle, we have little doubt LaSalle
would have taken steps to enforce it.
10 In making this conclusion, we do not mean to suggest that all

default judgments constitute trials, and that all remands constitute remands
for new trial. Our conclusion is applicable to the facts before us.
11 Vogel also argues that the issue raised in this appeal is moot by

operation of the five-year dismissal statute. (See § 583.310.) However, her
motion to dismiss in the trial court did not cite the five-year statute, and the
prospect of dismissal under it does not appear definitively in our record until
January 17, 2025, when the trial court raised it. Under section 583.360,
subdivision (a), “notice to the parties” is required for the court to dismiss a
case sua sponte or for the defendant to move for dismissal. There is
insufficient evidence in the record to show that LaSalle was given such
notice. The only other mention of the five-year rule is claimed by Vogel’s
attorney to have taken place at the December 2022 trial setting conference,
but LaSalle disputes this, and there is no hearing transcript or remarks

14
II.
LASALLE FAILED TO MAKE A SHOWING TO THE TRIAL COURT THAT ANY OF THE
STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO DISMISSAL WERE APPLICABLE
LaSalle argues that even if section 583.320 is applicable, estoppel
and tolling principles require us to reverse the dismissal. She claims the
delays in the case were due to COVID-19 and continuances requested by
Vogel, and not by her. We do not agree with her characterization.
A. Estoppel Does Not Bar Dismissal
LaSalle is correct that the mandatory dismissal statutes do not
“abrogate[] or otherwise affect[] the principles of waiver and estoppel.”
(§ 583.140.) But she had the burden to establish that estoppel barred Vogel’s
motion. (See Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081,
1097 (Gaines).) She did not. “Equitable estoppel requires that (1) the party to
be estopped was aware of the operative facts and either intended that its act
or omission be acted upon, or acted in such a way that the party asserting
estoppel rightfully believed it was intended; and (2) the party asserting
estoppel was unaware of the facts and relied on the other party’s conduct to
its detriment.” (Ibid.)
LaSalle’s argument below, and on appeal, is that Vogel was
responsible for the delays in prosecuting her case because of repeated trial
continuances. The trial court correctly rejected this argument. The record
reflects that the delays were more on account of LaSalle’s failure to prosecute
than Vogel’s delay. LaSalle’s attorney was unwilling to honor her

about the issue in the minute order for the hearing. Nonetheless, we share
Vogel’s concern that LaSalle has potentially run afoul of the five-year rule as
well.

15
predecessor’s agreement to amend the complaint, and this resulted in the loss
of almost a year (even though some of that time was tolled due to the
COVID-19 pandemic) because LaSalle ended up amending the complaint
anyway. Vogel answered the amended complaint in October 2020, but
LaSalle failed to sit for her deposition until more than two years later, in
January 2023. According to Vogel, LaSalle failed to provide sufficient
responses to discovery, necessitating at least one of her requests for trial
continuance. And even when the November 2024 trial date drew near, Vogel’s
counsel notified the court that neither side was ready for trial.
The record shows the delays were for ordinary litigation activities
(Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1102), and they are not evidence that Vogel
led LaSalle to believe Vogel would not enforce statutory deadlines. Therefore,
we find LaSalle has not established estoppel.
B. The Trial Court Excluded Time as Required for Impossibility,
Impracticability, or Futility
As stated above, the computation of the three-year period must
exclude times during which “[b]ringing the action to trial, for any other
reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340, subd. (c).)
However, “[w]hat is impossible, impracticable, or futile is determined in light
of all the circumstances of an individual case, including the acts and conduct
of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves. The critical
factor in determining whether the exception applies in a given factual
situation is whether the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence in
prosecuting his or her case.” (Hughes v. Kimble (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 59, 67.)
To calculate the three-year period from August 13, 2019, the trial
court excluded from its calculations the following: six months as required
under emergency rule 10(b) (see Cal. Rules of Court, appen. I); 61 days from

16
March 17, 2020, to May 21, 2020, when the initial trial date was set; 161 days
between the initial August 2021 trial date and the January 2022 trial date;
and 91 days between Vogel’s failure to appear at the September 2022 trial
setting conference and the December 2022 trial setting conference when the
November 2024 trial date was set.
LaSalle contends the trial court failed to account for two things in
these calculations. First, she says March 2022 to December 2022 should have
been excluded because Vogel had filed a motion to amend her answer, which
was pending. Second, she argues the court should have allotted more time for
COVID-19 closures from March 17, 2020, through January 29, 2021.
We disagree that Vogel’s motion to amend the answer tolls the
three-year statute. “[W]hen the delay involves the time necessary for the
parties to conduct ordinary incidents of proceedings leading up to the trial,
the interference must deprive the plaintiff of a ‘“substantial portion” of
the . . . period for prosecuting the lawsuit’ in order to qualify as a
circumstance of impracticability.” (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1102.) The
motion for leave to amend did not deprive LaSalle of the opportunity to
continue preparing her case for trial, even if she did not yet have a set date.
Additionally, “‘[a] plaintiff has an obligation to monitor the case in the trial
court, to keep track of relevant dates, and to determine whether any filing,
scheduling, or calendaring errors have occurred.’” (Id. at p. 1104.) LaSalle
failed to exercise reasonable diligence. She could have raised the prospect of
the three-year or five-year rule and sought to specially set trial despite
Vogel’s motion. The record does not reflect that she did so.
As for COVID-19 closures, we do not see any error in the court’s
allotments for COVID. Accounting for the time the court excluded, it found
LaSalle had until December 27, 2023, to bring the action to trial. She has not

17
raised any defects in the court’s arithmetic, and the case did not come to trial
by that date. It was properly dismissed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondent to recover her
costs on appeal.

SCHWARM, J.*

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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