Filed 10/2/26 Lanc v. Movagar CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
JASON LANC, B338153
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV09560)
NICK MOVAGAR et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Dismissed.
California Lawyers Group and Michael Stuart Brown for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Joseph C. Campo, Tracy
D. Forbath, Ernest Slome, and Daniel R. Velladao for Defendants
and Respondents.
Plaintiff Jason Lanc (Plaintiff) appeals from an order
summarily adjudicating five of six causes of action Plaintiff
brought against his former lawyers in connection with an
attorney fee dispute. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal five
months after being served with notice of entry of the trial court’s
summary adjudication order. We consider whether we have
jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2018, Plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident. Two days later, he retained Nick T.
Movagar, Steven Sibouye Yamin, Daniel J. Reeves, and Movagar
& Yamin APLC, doing business as M&Y Personal Injury Lawyers
(M&Y) (collectively, Defendants), to pursue a claim against the
other driver and her insurance carrier. Eight months later,
Plaintiff retained a different law firm, California Lawyers Group
(CLG), to represent him in connection with his accident claims.
After CLG filed a complaint against the other driver, M&Y
asserted a lien on any settlement payment that may be received
from the other driver or her insurer.1
In July 2020, CLG advised Defendants that Plaintiff’s
lawsuit had settled for the policy limits of $250,000. After the
other driver’s insurer issued a single settlement check listing
Plaintiff, M&Y, and CLG as payees, a dispute arose among the
1
M&Y later withdrew its lien, while reserving its right to
recover the reasonable value of the services it rendered to
Plaintiff. M&Y asserted its attorneys spent 22.9 hours on
investigating Plaintiff’s claims and was owed $12,595 for that
legal work.
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payees, which delayed Plaintiff’s receipt of his share of the
settlement.
In March 2021, Plaintiff sued Defendants for intentional
interference with contract (first cause of action), conversion
(second cause of action), breach of fiduciary duty (third cause of
action), declaratory relief (fourth cause of action), intentional
infliction of emotional distress (fifth cause of action), and
negligent infliction of emotional distress (sixth cause of action).
Plaintiff alleged Defendants were not entitled to any share of the
settlement proceeds because he and M&Y never entered into a
written contingency agreement as required by the Business and
Professions Code and because M&Y “never performed or provided
any material legal services or expended much time or effort.” He
alleged further that Defendants’ refusal to promptly endorse the
settlement check caused him to suffer economic damages and
emotional distress.
A year later, Defendants filed a cross-complaint seeking the
fair and reasonable value of the legal services they provided to
Plaintiff, as well as equitable indemnity and contribution from
CLG.
Defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, for summary adjudication in February 2023. Among
other things, Defendants argued Plaintiff could not establish any
damages proximately caused by their alleged misconduct because
the outstanding medical liens ($259,892), funding loans
($11,000), and attorney fees ($112,500) (a total of $383,392)
exceeded the amount of the settlement. Plaintiff opposed the
motion.
At an October 2023 hearing, the trial court declined to
grant summary judgment but summarily adjudicated all causes
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of action—except the declaratory relief claim—in Defendants’
favor. The court found Plaintiff could not prove any harm from
Defendants’ alleged misconduct because he received $65,000 from
the settlement proceeds and he was “not entitled” to any portion
of the settlement proceeds beyond that in light of the amount of
the outstanding medical liens, which exceeded the amount of the
settlement. The court reasoned the declaratory relief claim
should proceed because a controversy existed over whether
Defendants were “entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and in
what amount.”
On November 9, 2023, Defendants filed and served a notice
of entry of order attaching copies of the trial court’s minute order
and its written ruling on the motion for summary judgment or, in
the alternative, summary adjudication. Five months later, on
April 10, 2024, Plaintiff noticed an appeal from the trial court’s
ruling.2
II. DISCUSSION
We lack jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the order
Plaintiff purports to challenge (summary adjudication of fewer
than all of the causes of action in his complaint) is a non-
appealable order. Because we so hold, we need not discuss
whether Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was untimely.
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only
when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable
judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com’n (2001) 25
2
The notice of appeal incorrectly identified the challenged
order as a judgment of dismissal entered on February 26, 2024.
Plaintiff corrected the mistake in his civil case information sheet.
4
Cal.4th 688, 696; accord, Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th
121, 126 [“The existence of an appealable judgment is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal”].) “A reviewing court
lacks jurisdiction to consider appeals from a nonappealable order,
and has the duty to dismiss such appeals.” (In re Javier G. (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1201.)
“‘Generally, an order granting summary adjudication is an
intermediate order which is “reviewable on appeal from the final
judgment in the action.” [Citation.]’” (Wilson v. County of San
Joaquin (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.) An order granting summary
adjudication may be appealable, however, if it effectively resolves
the entire action. (See, e.g., California Assn. of Psychology
Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 9 [summary adjudication on
seventh cause of action effectively disposing of entire case is an
appealable judgment]; Belio v. Panorama Optics, Inc. (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101 [holding an appeal from “the trial court’s
order granting summary adjudication as to the first cause of
action” was properly before the court because the order
“‘effectively disposed of the case’”].)
The trial court’s order here, resolving fewer than all of the
causes of action Plaintiff brought against Defendants, did not
dispose of the entire action. Even after the summary
adjudication order, the fourth cause of action for declaratory
relief (with it the question of whether and in what amount
Defendants were entitled to a share of the settlement proceeds)
and the claims Defendants raised in their cross-complaint
remained outstanding. The summary adjudication order is
therefore not an appealable order and we lack jurisdiction to
decide this appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Defendants are awarded costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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