Lakshmanan v. City of Stockton

Filed 8/25/08 Lakshmanan v. City of Stockton CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

Defendant City of Stockton (City) appeals from the judgment in favor of plaintiff Nagarajan Lakshmanan declaring a Stockton City zoning ordinance unconstitutional. The provision of the ordinance at issue disallows the operation of a Rooming or Boarding House in residential districts zoned for low-density, medium density, and estate uses. The trial court found the ordinance ambiguous, making the ordinance susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in violation of Lakshmanans right to equal protection.

The City appeals from the judgment and Lakshmanan cross-appeals from the order denying his request for public interest attorney fees.

No evidentiary hearing was held but the parties submitted the case on trial briefs that do not disagree on the facts that Lakshmanan owns at least six single-family dwellings in the City of Stockton, those dwellings have more than two rooms, the dwellings are located in a low-density residential (RL) zoning district, and Lakshmanan leases each of those dwellings to multiple individuals. According to Lakshmanans trial brief, all of the dwellings were rented to multiple individuals on a month-to-month basis. Accordingly, we predicate our opinion on these agreed-upon facts.

Lakshmanans constitutional challenge is premised on the theory the ordinance is overbroad in that it bars the owner of a single-family dwelling with three or more rooms, located in an RL zone, from leasing the dwelling even to a single tenant. That is, Lakshmanan asserts that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to others. However, outside of a First Amendment challenge, one may not attack a legislative enactment on grounds that are not shown to be applicable to the challenger and since Lakshmanan asserts that he does not lease any of his dwellings to one tenant, he lacks standing to mount his constitutional attack. We shall therefore reverse the judgment and dismiss the cross-appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Although no evidentiary hearing was held, the parties do not dispute that Lakshmanan is the owner of at least six single-family dwellings with more than two rooms. The dwellings are located in the City of Stockton in areas zoned for residential, low-density usage (RL). According to Lakshmanans trial and appellate briefs, [t]he homes were rented to multiple individuals on a month-to-month basis.

After receiving a number of administrative citations for violating the zoning laws, Lakshmanan filed a complaint requesting declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds Stockton Municipal Code section 16-220 (SMC) is unconstitutional on its face and as-applied to him because it discriminates against renters and impairs contractual rights.

SMC section 16-220.020 states the allowable land uses and permit requirements. It is followed by a table (Table 2-2) of allowable land uses. Single-family dwellings are permitted in residential low-density (RL) zoning districts while Rooming and Boarding Houses are permitted in residential high density (RH) and commercial downtown (CD) zoning districts provided an administrative permit is obtained. Rooming and Boarding Houses are not allowed in districts zoned residential low-density (RL), residential estates (RE) and residential medium-density (RM).

Single-family dwelling is defined as A freestanding residential building designed for and/or occupied exclusively by one living unit that includes one kitchen and permanent provisions for living, sleeping, eating, sanitation, and parking. Also includes factory-built, modular housing units constructed in compliance with the Uniform Building Code (UBC) and mobile homes/manufactured housing on permanent foundations. May also include living quarters without kitchen facilities for domestic employees (maid, etc.). Does not include Rooming and/or Boarding Houses.

Rooming and/or Boarding Houses are defined as A dwelling structure, or part thereof, that has no more than one dining room and in which, for compensation, three or more rooms are leased and/or meals are provided by the week or month. Does not include the rental of one or two rooms (Single-Family Dwellings).

Defendant City filed an answer that denied the factual assertions in Lakshmanans complaint and Lakshmanan dismissed his cause of action for injunctive relief prior to trial.

The matter was scheduled for trial, but no evidentiary hearing was held and the matter was submitted on the parties trial briefs.^[1] In the judgment, the trial court found the ordinance ambiguous because it does not include words such as rented to individuals under separate rental agreements or leases, either written or oral. In the trial courts view, this ambiguity renders the ordinance unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution in that it is susceptible of arbitrary enforcement because it is not narrowly tailored to apply to the rental of rooms to individuals under separate rental agreements.

Lakshmanan moved for an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which the court denied. Both parties now appeal. The City appeals from the judgment. Lakshmanan appeals from the order denying his motion for attorney fees.

DISCUSSION

Lakshmanan challenged the constitutional validity of section 16-220 on the grounds it is overbroad and violates his rights to equal protection and privacy. His equal protection claim is based on the theory the ordinance discriminates against owners of single-family dwellings by prohibiting the leasing of a single-family dwelling with three or more rooms located in the prohibited zoning districts (RE, RL, or RM) while allowing owner-occupants to live in such dwellings in those districts. This prohibition, Lakshmanan concludes, invades his property right to rent his home on a month-to-month basis.

On appeal, the parties address the merits of Lakshmanans claim, which he now asserts is limited to a facial attack. We requested supplemental briefing on the question whether Lakshmanan has standing to raise these constitutional challenges and conclude that he does not. We shall therefore reverse the judgment.

A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. [Citation.] (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 (Tobe).) Nonetheless, as a general rule, constitutional challenges may only be raised by a member of the class of persons affected by the measure. (Johnson v. Department of Social Services (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 878, 883; Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 872, 876-877 (Matrixx).) While there is an exception to this rule (Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 410-411 [113 L.Ed.2d 411, 424-425]; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 559562 [119 L.Ed.2d 351, 363-365]; Matrixx, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 877), the proof necessary to show that the litigant comes within the exception is fact intensive.^[2]

Thus, it is well established that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. (United States v. Raines (1960) 362 U.S. 17, 21 [4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529].) The overbreadth doctrine may be raised only with respect to challenges made under the First Amendment. All other challenges must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." (United States v. Mazurie (1975) 419 U.S. 544, 550 [42 L.Ed.2d 706, 713].)

Here the ordinance at issue must be treated as presumptively valid. (Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1102; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 460.) Indeed, the City has broad authority under its police power to adopt zoning ordinances to protect the public health and general welfare of its residences. (Cal. Const., art XI, 7; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U.S. 365, 386-395 [71 L.Ed. 303, 310-314]; Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 484-488.) Pursuant to this authority, it may establish strictly private residential districts as part of a general comprehensive zoning plan. (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino (1946) 29 Cal.2d 332, 337-338; Suter v. City of Lafayette (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1131.) Moreover, because maintenance of the residential character of its neighborhoods is a proper zoning purpose (Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1579, 1590), the City may exclude the operation of a boarding house business from a residential zone. (City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 133.)

Thus, the City is authorized to enact a zoning ordinance that excludes boarding houses from its strictly residential neighborhoods and Lakshmanan concedes as much. He argues however, that the Citys ordinance is overbroad and violates his right to equal protection and his tenants rights to privacy by failing to limit the definition of a rooming or boarding house to transient or commercial uses, or to residences or dwellings when three or more rooms are rented to individuals under separate rental agreements or leases. (See 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 30 [finding an ordinance drafted with this limitation is constitutional].) In sum, he argues that his rights were violated because the ordinance bars owners of single-family dwellings with two or more rooms located in a zone designated RL from leasing the dwelling to even a single tenant under a single rental agreement.

Lakshmanan lacks standing to challenge the ordinance on this basis. First, he may not assert the overbreadth doctrine because this case does not implicate the First Amendment.

As to claims of equal protection and privacy, the record shows only that Lakshmanan owns at least six such homes, which he asserts were rented to multiple individuals on a month-to-month basis. This statement is ambiguous and the record does not clarify whether he rented his homes to multiple individuals by renting each home to one person or family under a single rental agreement or by renting each home to multiple individuals under separate rental agreements. If the former is a description of the true facts, he would have standing to raise his equal protection claim. If the latter describes his circumstances, namely that he rents his houses to multiple individuals under separate agreements, he would not have standing. As the agreed-upon matters are inadequate to determine which circumstances apply in this case, Lakshmanan has failed to establish his standing to raise an equal protection claim.

Similarly, he lacks standing to raise a privacy claim.^[3] He argues that his tenants privacy rights are violated because enforcement of the ordinance requires the City to make inquiry into whether the occupant of the dwelling is the owner or a tenant and if the occupant is a tenant, to further inquire into the number of rooms occupied and the duration of the rental agreement. Since this argument is based upon hypothetical situations that are inapplicable to Lakshmanan,^[4]he is barred from raising this claim. We therefore conclude the trial court erred when it declared the ordinance unconstitutional.^[5]

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The City of Stockton is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

BLEASE , Acting P. J.

We concur:

DAVIS , J.

BUTZ , J.

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^[1] Lakshmanan proffered no evidence and the trial court sustained Lakshmanans objections to the Citys evidence.

^[2] To come within this exception, the litigant must show: (1) the litigant suffers a distinct and palpable injury in fact, thus giving him or her a concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute; (2) the litigant has a close relationship to the third party such that the two share a common interest; and (3) there is some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. (Matrixx, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 876-877.)

^[3] The privacy rights asserted by Lakshmanan are those of his tenants, which the City argues he has no standing to raise. (See Matrixx, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) We do not address this argument because we have resolved the standing issue on other grounds.

^[4] Lakshmanan poses two hypothetical situations: (1) the rental of an entire home to one person or a single family under a single rental agreement; or (2) the rental of three rooms to a single individual in a 14-room house that is occupied by the owner, who lives in the other 11 rooms.

^[5] Lakshmanan requests attorney fees and costs on appeal and in his cross-appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney fees. Both claims are made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which authorizes a court may award attorneys fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest under specific circumstances. (Italics added.)

In light of our disposition, we deny Lakshmanans request for attorney fees and costs on appeal and dismiss his cross-appeal as moot.