Filed 7/10/26 L.A. v. Super. Ct. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
L.A. et al., 2d Juv. No. B353876
(Super. Ct. Nos. 25JV00421,
Petitioners, 25JV00422)
(Santa Barbara County)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
Respondent;
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
L.A. (Mother) and M.A. (Father) petition for extraordinary
writ, challenging the juvenile court’s order bypassing
reunification services and setting the matter for a selection and
implementation hearing regarding their daughters A.M.A. and
A.I.A. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.452.) We deny the petitions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (CWS)
received a referral regarding five-month-old A.I.A. and
18-month-old A.M.A. after A.I.A. was brought to the hospital limp
and nonresponsive on September 29, 2025. The parents reported
that nine days earlier, on September 20, A.I.A. accidentally fell
from a pillow face-first onto a desk, causing bruising to her face.
The parents did not see a medical provider until September 25.
The medical provider directed the parents to take A.I.A. to the
emergency room, but the parents did not do so. A.I.A. had
several injuries, including skull fractures, wrist and leg fractures,
head trauma, and bruising on multiple parts of her body. A.I.A.
was comatose and transferred to Stanford Children’s Hospital.
A.M.A. was taken into protective custody.
CWS spoke to Dr. Melissa Egge, who reported that the
parents’ explanation for the injuries and timeline did not match
the extent of injuries, and that there were likely multiple
incidents causing injury. The injuries were “more likely a result
of shaking or slamming the baby against a surface.” The treating
physicians at Stanford Hospital reported that A.I.A. had been
seizing throughout the day, requiring antiseizure medication.
The doctors were suspicious of child abuse due to the amount of
trauma, which would “usually result from a major car accident.”
The doctors were also concerned about multiple fractures with
different ages of healing, suggesting that some injuries stemmed
from a different incident. The parents’ story on how these
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
injuries occurred did not match the type and severity of A.I.A.’s
injuries.
CWS filed an amended dependency petition alleging that
both A.M.A. and A.I.A. suffered or were at substantial risk of
suffering serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)) and that the
parents failed to protect or supervise them (id., subd. (b)(1)). As
to A.I.A., the petition alleged the parents inflicted severe physical
abuse and cruelty (id., subds. (e), (i)). As to A.M.A., the petition
alleged sibling abuse (id., subd. (j)).
CWS filed a jurisdiction report recommending the juvenile
court sustain the petition and the children remain out of home
care with no visitation ordered. The social worker reported that
Mother and Father had been participating in services and their
goal was to reunify with their children. The social worker spoke
with Dr. Egge, who said that some of the injuries occurred at
different times. Dr. Egge believed there were at least two
incidents that resulted in injury to A.I.A. with a “very serious
head injury” happening on September 29. In reviewing A.I.A.’s
eye injuries, Dr. Egge reported there was a lot of blood behind her
eyes and torn retinas. A.I.A had no eyesight as a result of her
injuries.
As to A.I.A.’s development, Dr. Egge stated that she
suffered a serious brain injury and that her prognosis was
uncertain. It was possible that A.I.A. would have cerebral palsy
or be required to use a wheelchair in the future. A social worker
from Stanford Hospital said that A.I.A.’s prognosis could not be
predicted at this time, but that the child would need continual
reassessment and appointments with specialists in the future.
After discharge, A.I.A. would need a neck brace for four to six
weeks, a feeding tube, and splints. A doctor at Stanford Hospital
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noted that A.I.A. was currently stable but that she was at risk of
seizures and was on antiseizure medication. As to A.M.A., she
completed an X-ray, ophthalmology consultation, and CT scan
that showed no physical evidence of trauma or abnormalities.
CWS filed a disposition report recommending that the
children be declared dependents of the court and that the juvenile
court deny reunification services to the parents under section
361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (6) and set a selection and
implementation hearing (§ 366.26). The social worker reported
that A.M.A. appeared to be comfortable in her resource home.
A.I.A. was placed in a specialized confidential resource home due
to her extensive needs. She had to have eye surgery, and her
development had been impacted due to her brain injury.
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, several
family members testified on behalf of Mother and Father.
Mother testified, recounting what occurred on September 20. She
said A.I.A. was moving normally after the fall, but Mother
decided to call the clinic on September 24 to schedule an
appointment. At the appointment on September 25, the medical
provider recommended getting “imaging” done, but Mother opted
not to do so because there was “no sense of emergency.” On
September 29, Mother observed A.I.A. acting normally in the
morning. Later that day, Father told Mother to come directly
home from work. When Mother came home, Father told her they
needed to go to the hospital because A.I.A. was unresponsive.
The social worker assigned to the case testified that she did
not believe services could be offered to prevent reabuse because
the parents had not taken accountability for what had happened.
Thus, there was no service that could “accurately” address the
underlying issue. The social worker believed it would not be
4
detrimental to the children to deny reunification services due to
the extent of A.I.A.’s injuries and the “high risk” of reabuse. She
also believed that A.M.A. was likely at risk and the abuse could
shift to her. The social worker opined it would not be in the
children’s best interest for their parents to receive services
because of the children’s age and the significance of A.I.A.’s
injuries. Although the social worker acknowledged the parents
participated in services, “there has not been the recognition that
the abuse was inflicted non-accidentally. Therefore, we can’t
work with a parent that’s not giving us ownership of their
actions.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
sustained the allegations in the petition. The court found that
the medical and expert evidence regarding the extent of A.I.A’s
injuries was “uncontradicted and undisputed,” and that the
evidence supported that the injuries were nonaccidental. The
court also found that the presumption under section 355.1
applied—that the injuries were the result of the unreasonable or
neglectful acts of the parents and that such a finding was prima
facie evidence of the allegations under section 300, subdivisions
(a) and (b). The court found the parents did not present contrary
evidence and also found the subdivision (a) and (b) allegations
true.
As to the allegation that the parents inflicted severe
physical abuse (§ 300, subd. (e)), the court found that even
though it was unclear who committed all the injuries, the parents
were the sole caretakers and that the parents either knew or
reasonably should have known of the abuse. The court relied
upon the medical evidence and the opinions of doctors regarding
the severe extent of A.I.A.’s injuries. The court also found that
5
the parents “minimize[d]” A.I.A.’s injuries suffered on September
20. The court noted that “despite the evident bruising and
swelling the child suffered and despite the recommendations of
the nurse practitioner” to go to the emergency room, the parents
“delayed the care.” The court found that there was a “reasonable
inference that they minimized the injuries that occurred to the
child during the prior injuries,” and that there “seems to be a
pattern here.” The court also found Mother’s testimony to be not
credible and that she “knew or reasonably should have known of
the abuse.”
The court also denied reunification services to Mother and
Father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (6) based
on the finding that A.I.A. was brought within the court’s
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e) and that A.I.A’s
severe physical abuse was due to the parents’ conduct. The court
found there was “no competent evidence” that reunification
services were likely to prevent reabuse. The court set a section
366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Section 300, subdivision (e)
Mother and Father contend the juvenile court erred in
bypassing reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(5) and (6). Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5),
reunification services need not be provided where the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that “the child was brought
within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of
Section 300” for “severe physical abuse by a parent.”
We review Mother and Father’s challenges to the juvenile
court’s true finding on section 300, subdivision (e) for substantial
evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) “ ‘In making this
6
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (Ibid.)
Under section 300, subdivision (e), a child comes within the
dependency court’s jurisdiction where the “child is under five
years of age and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent,
or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or
reasonably should have known that the person was physically
abusing the child. For the purposes of this subdivision, ‘severe
physical abuse’ means any of the following: any single act of
abuse that causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if
left untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement,
permanent physical disability, or death; . . . or more than one act
of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising,
significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or
unconsciousness . . . .”
Here, substantial evidence supports the true finding on the
section 300, subdivision (e) allegation. A.I.A., who was only five
months old at the time of the referral, suffered injuries from
“severe physical abuse.” She had multiple skull fractures, eye
injuries, bruising on multiple parts of her body, and wrist and leg
fractures. She was also comatose for a time and suffered
seizures. A.I.A. also suffered developmental delays, and while
her prognosis was unknown, it was possible she could be blind
and have permanent brain injury. Some of her injuries were
older and in different stages of healing, indicating there were
multiple instances of abuse.
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Although it was unclear whether only Father or both
parents inflicted all the injuries, the juvenile court was not
required to identify the offending party to sustain the section
300, subdivision (e) allegation. It could do so if the evidence
showed that the parent knew or reasonably should have known of
the abuse. (In re E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 670.) And
here, substantial evidence supports that Mother and Father
knew or reasonably should have known of the abuse.
The extent of A.I.A.’s injuries was severe and similar to the
type of injuries sustained in a major car accident. As the juvenile
court observed, it would be “hard to believe that the parent would
not know or reasonably not know that their child had suffered
these injuries.” Furthermore, Dr. Egge and the treating
physicians at Stanford Hospital opined that the injuries were
consistent with child abuse and that Mother and Father’s
explanations were inconsistent with the actual injuries. The
evidence also reflects that the parents minimized and delayed
treatment of the injuries. A.I.A. suffered injuries on September
20 that caused bruising to her face, the parents did not seek
immediate treatment and took her to an appointment five days
later, and they did not follow the medical provider’s direction to
take A.I.A. to the emergency room. This evidence supports the
court’s findings that the parents were evasive, knew of the abuse,
and minimized and contributed to the abuse by delaying care.
Mother and Father contend the juvenile court relied on
“untested and incomplete medical conclusions” that were “not
subject to cross-examination” and “no medical professionals
testified to explain how they reached their conclusions.” They
also assert there was no “independent medical testimony or
evaluation” to “test or challenge” the medical conclusions. We are
8
not persuaded. Mother and Father did not call their own medical
expert to dispute the medical evidence or conclusions. Nor did
they subpoena the doctors that examined A.I.A. On appeal, we
will affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports the juvenile court’s finding. And we do
not determine issues of fact and credibility or reweigh the
evidence. (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Substantial
evidence including the medical records and the opinions of
doctors support the juvenile court’s finding.
Bypass of reunification services
Generally, when a child is removed from the parent’s
physical custody, “the juvenile court shall order the social worker
to provide child welfare services.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) However,
“[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent . . .
when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence” one of the
enumerated circumstances under section 361.5, subdivision (b).
(Id., subd. (b).)
We review a juvenile court’s decision to bypass
reunification for substantial evidence. (In re Brooke C. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 377, 382.) “We review the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing
evidence standard.” (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684,
694, italics omitted.)
1. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5)—reunification services as to
A.I.A.
Reunification services need not be provided where the
juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “the
child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under
9
subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that
parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5).) If this bypass provision applies,
the court “shall not order reunification . . . unless it finds that,
based on competent evidence, those services are likely to prevent
reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try
reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is
closely and positively attached to that parent. The social worker
shall investigate the circumstances leading to the removal of the
child and advise the court whether there are circumstances that
indicate that reunification is likely to be successful or
unsuccessful and whether failure to order reunification is likely
to be detrimental to the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3).) In
determining likelihood of success, the court may consider “[t]he
failure of the parent to respond to previous services, the fact that
the child was abused while the parent was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, a past history of violent behavior, or testimony
by a competent professional that the parent’s behavior is unlikely
to be changed by services.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).)
Substantial evidence supports bypass of reunification
services as to A.I.A. pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5).
A.I.A. is a child brought under dependency jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (e). As we explained, substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that Mother and Father
inflicted or knew or reasonably should have known that someone
inflicted severe physical abuse on A.I.A.
Mother and Father contend the juvenile court “did not
adequately consider whether any identified concerns could be
mitigated through reunification services, supervision, or safety
planning.” But they did not present competent evidence to show
that services are likely to prevent reabuse or that failure to try
10
reunification will be detrimental to the child. Where “neither
parent was even willing to acknowledge that nonaccidental injury
occurred, . . . it is difficult to imagine how any services would
have been likely to prevent reabuse.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 308, 327; see also In re Raul V. (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 290, 301.)
Here, Mother and Father denied that A.I.A.’s injuries were
nonaccidental. As the social worker testified, without recognizing
the abuse was nonaccidental, reunification services cannot
address behaviors that led to the dependency. There was also no
evidence that the failure to try reunification would be
detrimental to the children. A.I.A. was only five months old at
the time of the referral. There was no evidence that she had a
close and positive attachment to her parents such that she would
suffer detriment without reunification. As there was no
competent evidence to show that reunification services would
likely prevent abuse or that failure to try reunification would be
detrimental to A.I.A., bypass of reunification services was
mandatory. (In re Raul V., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 292.)
2. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)—reunification services as to
A.I.A. and A.M.A.
Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), reunification
services need not be provided where the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that “the child has been adjudicated a
dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result
of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, [or] a
sibling . . . by a parent . . . and the court makes a factual finding
11
that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services
with the offending parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
“A finding of the infliction of severe physical harm . . . may
be based on, but is not limited to, deliberate and serious injury
inflicted to or on a child’s body or the body of a sibling . . . of the
child by act or omission of the parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(C).)
“ ‘The Legislature did not intend subdivision (b)(6) to apply to
deny reunification services to a negligent parent; rather, the
parent must have been complicit in the deliberate abuse of the
child.’ ” (J.J. v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 456.)
In determining whether reunification services will benefit
the child, the court “shall consider any information it deems
relevant, including”: (1) the specific act or omission comprising
the severe physical harm inflicted on the child or the child’s
sibling, (2) the circumstances under which the abuse or harm was
inflicted, (3) the severity of the emotional trauma, (4) any history
of abuse of other children by the offending parent, (5) the
likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the care of the
offending parent within 12 months with no continuing
supervision, and (6) whether the child desires to be reunified with
the offending parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (i).)
The court “shall not order reunification for a parent” under
subdivision (b)(6) “unless the court finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision
to bypass services as to both A.I.A. and A.M.A. pursuant to
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) due to the severe physical harm
inflicted upon A.I.A. Mother and Father were the sole caretakers
of A.I.A. and A.M.A. and there is no evidence that anyone else
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inflicted abuse on A.I.A. Here, the evidence supports that Father
inflicted some of the injuries to A.I.A. The child was in Father’s
care when the serious injuries occurred—Mother testified that
she was not in the room when A.I.A. allegedly fell on September
20 and that A.I.A. became nonresponsive at some point before
Mother returned home from work on September 29.
Additionally, the evidence supports that both Mother and
Father inflicted serious injury through omission. They failed to
properly treat A.I.A.’s injuries by delaying treatment for several
days after September 20, despite the visible bruising on the
child’s face. They then did not follow the medical professional’s
direction to take A.I.A. to the emergency room. The fact that
Mother and Father told a story that was inconsistent with the
severity of the injuries, delayed treatment after the September 20
incident, and did not follow medical advice, support they were
both complicit in the deliberate abuse of A.I.A.
Substantial evidence also supports that reunification
services would not benefit the children. As to the enumerated
factors under section 361.5, subdivision (i), most factors,
including the parents’ actions and omissions and the
circumstances of the abuse, weigh against a finding that
reunification services would benefit the children. A.I.A. was an
infant. She suffered “multiple . . . very egregious and serious
injuries which will result in essentially lifelong disabilities,” and
these injuries were “non-accidental in nature.” The social worker
testified there was a “high risk” of reabuse and that A.M.A. was
at risk of abuse shifting to her.
We also conclude substantial evidence supports that
reunification would not be in the best interest of the children.
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) Here, the social worker testified that due
13
to the significance of A.I.A.’s injuries, both children were at risk
of reabuse, and there would be no detriment in bypassing
reunification because of the children’s young ages. Mother and
Father did not present clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
DISPOSITION
The petitions for extraordinary writ are denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
L.A., in pro. per., for Petitioner L.A. (Mother).
M.A., in pro. per., for Petitioner M.A. (Father).
No appearance for Respondent.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.