Filed 8/27/26 Kowalski v. 220 San Vicente Holdings CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
LAURA KOWALSKI, B351140
(Los Angeles County
Cross-complainant and Super. Ct. No. 24SMCV03048)
Respondent,
v.
220 SAN VICENTE HOLDINGS,
LLC,
Cross-Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed.
Snipper Wainer & Markoff and Maurice Wainer; Law
Offices of H. Joseph Nourmand and H. Joseph Nourmand for
Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
Teshale Law and Dagmawi Teshale; Schwimer Weinstein
and Michael E. Schwimer for Cross-Complainant and
Respondent.
__________________________
Cross-defendant 220 San Vicente Holdings, LLC (San
Vicente) appeals from the trial court’s order denying its special
motion to strike the cross-complaint filed by Laura Kowalski
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.161. In its opening brief, San Vicente focuses on the
trial court’s failure to move beyond the first step in its
anti-SLAPP analysis to the second step assessing cross-
complainant’s probability of prevailing on her claims. San
Vicente argues that had the court conducted that assessment, it
would have found that Kowalski’s claims lack merit.
Anti-SLAPP motions differ from demurrers or motions that
solely test the sufficiency of claims. Anti-SLAPP motions exist to
protect acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.
Because San Vicente does not meet its step one burden of
showing that the claims against it depended upon protected acts,
it was unnecessary for the trial court to reach step two. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
In June 2024, SoCal Investment Company LLC (SoCal)
filed two actions against Kowalski arising from her lease of a unit
1 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation.”
2
in a Santa Monica apartment building (the long-term unit): an
unlawful detainer action and a civil action for breach of lease.
The cases were consolidated. Kowalski filed a cross-complaint
against SoCal and San Vicente with the following allegations.
Kowalski began living in the long-term unit in 2016, and
SoCal acquired the building in 2017. She developed a disability
due to long COVID that included cognitive and neurological
difficulties, and SoCal and San Vicente knew about her disability.
In 2021, SoCal and Kowalski entered into a temporary relocation
agreement pursuant to which Kowalski agreed to vacate her unit
while SoCal renovated the building. SoCal agreed to notify her
when it received final inspection approvals from the city and
restore her to possession of the long-term unit. SoCal leased a
unit (the temporary unit) from San Vicente and placed Kowalski
there. Kowalski agreed to pay her regular rent to SoCal, and
SoCal was responsible for paying the rent for the temporary unit.
SoCal completed the renovations and received final project
approval in June 2024. It did not allow Kowalski to return to the
long-term unit, and it ceased paying the rent for the temporary
unit. Though San Vicente knew Kowalski was not responsible for
making rent payments for the temporary unit directly to it, it
harassed her, demanded that she vacate, and sought her
removal. Eventually, San Vicente succeeded in “remov[ing] her
from possession” of the temporary unit.
Both the long term and temporary units that Kowalski
inhabited were subject to Santa Monica Rent Control Law. After
she lost possession of the units, SoCal and San Vicente were able
to rent or offer to rent the units at significantly higher rates. She
believes both So Cal and San Vicente “acted with a financial
incentive to remove” her. Kowalski asserted SoCal and San
3
Vicente acted as each other’s agents, joint venturers, or alter egos
throughout the relevant time frame.
Kowalski asserted causes of action against both
cross-defendants for wrongful eviction, tenant harassment (Santa
Monica Municipal Code, § 4.56), violation of Civil Code
section 1940.2, negligence, breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, unlawful business practices under Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq., intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED), and housing discrimination in
violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov.
Code § 12955). She asserted additional cross-claims against
SoCal only.
B. San Vicente’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
San Vicente filed a special motion to strike the entire
cross-complaint, or in the alternative, each cause of action
against it and three specific sentences that appeared in the
cross-complaint’s general allegations.2 In support, it filed
declarations from the building’s manager, Cara Holmgren, and a
request for judicial notice.
Holmgren attested that, in June 2021, San Vicente and
Yousef Golshirazian (Golshirazian)3 entered into a lease for the
temporary unit, which identified Kowalski as a nonsignatory
2 San Vicente sought to strike two sentences in the general
allegations: one sentence alleging that it “demanded” that Kowalski
vacate the temporary unit and another alleging that San Vicente acted
with a “financial incentive” to remove her.
3 Holmgren did not explain Golshirazian’s relationship with
SoCal. However, a copy of the relocation agreement attached to
Kowalski’s declaration was signed by Golshirazian as
“Member/Manager” of SoCal.
4
occupant. There was no rental agreement between Kowalski and
San Vicente. San Vicente received rental payments for the
temporary unit until November 2024. By December 2024, unpaid
rent exceeded $13,000, and San Vicente served a notice to pay
rent or quit on Golshirazian and Kowalski. San Vicente
requested judicial notice of an unlawful detainer complaint it
filed in January 2025 against them for possession of the
temporary unit and Kowalski’s answer to the complaint.
According to Holgrem, Kowalski vacated the unit shortly after
answering, and San Vicente dismissed the action in March 2025.
San Vicente argued that the entire cross-complaint was
subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose “solely out of
its exercise of a right to petition the Court through an unlawful
detainer” action. It contended the cross-claims arose exclusively
from Golshirazian’s failure to pay rent, San Vicente’s service of a
notice in anticipation of the unlawful detainer action, and its
prosecution of that action.4 San Vicente requested attorney fees.
Kowalski filed a declaration in support of her opposition.
She described SoCal’s refusal to return possession of the long-
term unit and its “coordinated effort” with San Vicente to push
her out of the temporary unit. In October 2024, she learned from
Holmgren that Golshirazian had communicated SoCal’s intent to
stop paying rent on the temporary unit. Holmgren also said she
was receiving frequent requests from SoCal’s attorney to “push”
for Kowalski’s removal, ascertain her moveout date, and “keep
pressing” her. Thereafter, Holmgren repeatedly asked Kowalski
4 The parties devoted much of their briefing in the trial court to
the merits of the cross-claims. Because we do not reach the second
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we do not repeat these arguments.
5
for a moveout date and told her she needed to leave. Kowalski
informed Holmgren of her dispute with SoCal and her disability.
According to Kowalski, San Vicente used the evacuation
that was necessitated by a January 2025 wildfire “to further its
effort to remove [her] from the temporary unit” and “make [her]
continued occupancy impossible.” Management sent
building-wide communications acknowledging the health risks
posed by fire debris and ash and promising to hire vendors for
cleanup. Kowalski obtained a remediation estimate showing
hazardous ash contamination in her unit and gave San Vicente
permission to enter. However, San Vicente did not remediate the
temporary unit, even though it knew that her health condition
and contamination made it unsafe for her to return. In
March 2025, Kowalski vacated because the unit was
uninhabitable and because she had been subjected to harassment
and pressure to leave.5
Kowalski argued that San Vicente’s acts of coercion and
intimidation and its termination of her tenancy were not
protected conduct. She argued that San Vicente was
“bootstrapping” protected conduct into the cross-complaint
because the pleading did not reference a notice to pay rent or
quit, an unlawful detainer complaint, or other litigation. She
explained why she was likely to prevail on her cross-claims and
requested attorney fees.
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the
cross-complaint did not arise from protected activity. It found the
“gravamen of the [cross-]complaint” relied on “the violations of
Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 4.36 governing the
5 Kowalski did not mention the unlawful detainer action or
related notice in her declaration.
6
relocation of tenants for construction purposes.” Kowalski’s
action was not based on San Vicente’s “filing or service of the
notices or an unlawful detainer action—although that certainly
may add context to the allegations.” The court declined to reach
the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis and denied the
requests for attorney fees.
San Vicente appealed from the order denying its motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law - the Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to
a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) Filing a lawsuit is an exercise of one’s
constitutional right of petition and statements made in
connection with or in preparation of litigation are subject to
section 425.16. (Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
303, 312.)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) “If the defendant carries its burden,
the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least
‘minimal merit.’” (Ibid.)
7
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo, and in so doing, conduct the same two-step analysis.
(Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World
Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42.) We analyze the issues
independent of the trial court’s reasoning, and if the decision is
correct on any theory, we affirm the order regardless of the
correctness of the grounds on which the court reached its
conclusion. (White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 270, 287.)
B. Analysis
San Vicente contends the cross-claims arose from protected
conduct—filing the unlawful detainer action and service of a rent
notice—and the trial court erred in deciding these activities were
merely context for other claims based on unprotected conduct.
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity
underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.) It is defendant’s burden to identify
the acts upon which each challenged claim rests and show how
they fall within a statutorily defined category of protected
activity. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
871, 884.) A “‘claim may be struck only if the speech or
petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just
evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for
which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Where the
“[d]efendant provides no analysis of the elements necessary to
prove each cause of action, how allegations related to the
[protected] speech supply the necessary elements of each cause of
action, and whether there are other allegations supporting the
causes of action that are not protected conduct,” its motion fails.
(Pechkis v. Trustees of California State University (2026) 119
8
Cal.App.5th 497, 506 (Pechkis); see also Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1012.)
In the trial court, San Vicente’s step one argument was
that all of Kowalski’s claims arose “exclusively from the failure to
pay rent by [Golshirazian], the service of a notice in anticipation
of, and the prosecution of, an action for unlawful detainer,
against [Golshirazian], which action was eventually dismissed
when possession was relinquished by those in possession
including [Kowalski].” Making this conclusory assertion was not
enough. San Vicente did not supply the elements of any cause of
action. It did not analyze whether there were other allegations of
unprotected conduct supporting the causes of action. It did not
meet its step one burden.
On appeal, San Vicente similarly contends, without citing
the record, that the cross-complaint “expressly target[ed] San
Vicente’s eviction[-]related conduct” by “alleg[ing]” that “San
Vicente demanded that [Kowalski] vacate the [t]emporary [u]nit,
served a rent notice, and initiated an unlawful detainer action
after the rent for the unit went unpaid.” San Vicente has neither
analyzed the elements necessary to prove each cause of action nor
explained how only protected conduct supplies necessary
elements. It is also inaccuratethat the cross-complaint “alleged”
the service of a “rent notice” and the initiation of an “unlawful
detainer action,” as these terms do not appear in the pleading.
San Vicente’s contention remains insufficient to carry its step one
burden.
9
To the extent that San Vicente makes a cursory effort to
address five of the eight cross-claims6 individually on appeal, its
efforts are inadequate. Without any citations to the record, it
argues that the “sixth cause of action . . . is predicated on an
alleged ‘abuse of legal process.’” It further argues the “seventh
cause of action” alleges that “San Vicente wrongfully sought to
terminate [Kowalski’s] occupancy” and the “ninth cause of action”
alleges “San Vicente sought to remove [Kowalski] from
possession.” The “tenth cause of action,” San Vicente contends,
was based on its “unlawful business practices based on [its]
‘initiating an eviction action,’” and portions of the “eleventh cause
of action” relied on allegations of “‘aggressive litigation tactics’
and efforts to deprive [Kowalski] of possession.”7 These
conclusory arguments are forfeited, as San Vicente not only failed
to raise them below but also fails to explain and support them
adequately on appeal. (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1526 (Hunter) [anti-SLAPP step one
argument was waived where plaintiff failed to provide any reason
for not presenting it to the trial court]; Swain v. LaserAway
6 San Vicente’s opening brief does not discuss whether the
wrongful eviction, negligence, and FEHA cross-claims arose from
protected conduct, and we treat any challenge to these causes of action
as forfeited. (BioCorRx, Inc. v. VDM Biochemicals, Inc. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 727, 743.)
7 These arguments do not appear under the first subheading
(“The Challenged Claims Arise from Protected Petitioning Activity”) of
the opening brief’s “Argument” section but appear on the second to last
page of the brief under the subheading (“The Harassment Claims
Fail”). (Boldface, underscoring, and some capitalization omitted). San
Vicente’s failure to provide proper headings is an additional reason we
find forfeiture of its arguments. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 172, 179; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
10
Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [even when
review is de novo, it is limited to issues that have been
adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s opening brief];
WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 881, 894 (WFG) [reviewing court may disregard
points that are unsupported by citations to the record and
conclusory arguments that are unsupported by pertinent legal
authority].)
We note that San Vicente fails to recognize or address
substantively potentially unprotected conduct Kowalski alleged
in support of the cross-claims. (Pechkis, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th
at p. 506.) San Vicente does not discuss, for example, the
allegations that it acted as SoCal’s agent or in coordination with
SoCal to cause Kowalski’s displacement and emotional harm in
violation of Santa Monica laws protecting renters. It does not
address the evidence that it wrongfully sought to remove
Kowalski from possession of the temporary unit by refusing to
remediate, other than to cite Central Valley Hospitalists v.
Dignity Health (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 203, 217–219. San Vicente
suggests this case holds that a court must analyze only the
complaint, not a declaration, in deciding an anti-SLAPP motion.
This is inaccurate. In Central Valley Hospitalists, the complaint
lacked factual detail. (Id. at p. 217.) The court found that
declarations submitted in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion
provided facts indicating the claims were not based on protected
activity. The court concluded the motion was properly denied.
(Id. at pp. 207, 217.)
11
Because San Vicente has not carried its step one burden, it
is unnecessary for us to address the parties’ step two arguments.8
(Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 776, 784.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Kowalski is entitled to
her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
8 San Vicente requested to strike the entire cross-complaint or
entire causes of action, and as we have explained, did not meet its first
step burden of showing they were based entirely upon protected
conduct. To the extent San Vicente contends the trial court erred in
denying its request to strike three statements in the cross-complaint’s
general allegations, San Vicente has forfeited its request. It failed to
analyze these allegations in its motion at the trial court or to supply
cogent argument supported by authority and citations to the record to
show that it was necessary to strike these allegations on appeal.
(Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526; WFG, supra, 51
Cal.App.5th at p. 894.)
12