Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Knight v. Johnson Controls, Inc. CA1/1

Filed 11/2/26 Knight v. Johnson Controls, Inc. CA1/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/2/26 Knight v. Johnson Controls, Inc. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DYLAN KNIGHT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172015
v.
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG19029817)
Defendant and Appellant.

Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) appeals from a postjudgment order
awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Dylan Knight under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.).1 It
contends the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) setting the hourly rate of
Knight’s attorney at $925; (2) applying the $925 hourly rate to time spent on
clerical and paralegal tasks; (3) failing to apportion the fees and costs
between Knight’s successful and unsuccessful claims; and (4) applying a
positive lodestar multiplier. We reject all contentions but the second. We
therefore reverse the order to the extent it awards fees for clerical and
paralegal work and remand to the trial court to reduce the fee award
accordingly.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History2
JCI “makes, installs and services heating, ventilation and air
conditioning systems for commercial and industrial buildings, known as
HVAC systems.” JCI hired Knight as a project team leader in 2015.
Knight filed his original complaint against JCI and Dawn DeMera, a
supervisor at JCI, in August 2019. In July 2020, Knight filed an amended
complaint, which became the operative complaint, alleging the following
causes of action: (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to provide reasonable
accommodation; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) retaliation
in violation of the FEHA; (5) retaliation for exercising his rights under the
California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) interference with CFRA rights; (7)
failure to prevent and remedy discrimination and harassment; (8) disability
harassment; (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (10) breach
of medical privacy under section 12940, subdivision (e); (11) invasion of
privacy; and (12) unfair business competition. The first four causes of action
were alleged to be violations of the FEHA. Only the eighth and eleventh
causes of action were asserted against DeMera.
In the operative pleading, Knight asserted numerous factual
allegations regarding his employment at JCI that he alleged were common to
all causes of action. He alleged that in 2017, he took a medical leave of
absence that qualified for job protection under the CFRA after he began
experiencing disabling symptoms of depression. He eventually returned to
work and resumed his duties. Knight further alleged that DeMera created a

2 We derive this portion of the background from the record of a prior

appeal arising from the judgment entered in this case (No. A170587). On our
own motion, we take judicial notice of the record of that appeal.

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hostile work environment by, among other things, publishing private
information about his medical leave, thereby exacerbating his condition and
“eventually forcing him to take additional medical leave.” He complained to
JCI’s human resources department about the alleged harassment but JCI
failed to promptly remedy the situation. When Knight was ready to return to
work from his second medical leave, he informed JCI of the work restrictions
required by his disability. In response, JCI made “unlawful” requests for
Knight’s medical information and told Knight it could not accommodate his
work restrictions. JCI did not otherwise discuss with Knight his request for
reasonable accommodation, engage in the interactive process, or respond to
Knight’s repeated inquiries about returning to work. According to Knight, he
could perform the essential functions of his job with his work restrictions. He
asserted that JCI’s alleged wrongful conduct, including its failure to remedy
DeMera’s unlawful behavior and engage in the interactive process in good
faith, constituted a constructive termination of his employment.
In May 2021, the trial court granted JCI’s motion for summary
adjudication as to eight of Knight’s causes of action. The parties
subsequently stipulated to dismissing one of Knight’s remaining causes of
action, and Knight agreed to dismiss another cause of action, leaving only his
FEHA claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the
interactive process for trial.
Following trial, the jury found in favor of Knight on both of his
remaining causes of action. The jury awarded Knight a total of $3,272,000 in
damages, consisting of lost past earnings, lost future earnings, and
noneconomic damages. The jury also awarded Knight $3.5 million in
punitive damages, but the trial court subsequently granted JCI’s motions for

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judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial as to the punitive
damages award.
B. Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Following entry of judgment, Knight moved for an award of attorney’s
fees. He sought $1,118,047 in lodestar attorney’s fees plus a multiplier of 1.5
for a total award of $1,677,071.25, plus $27,010 for his fee motion. The
award was calculated based on the number of hours Knight’s trial counsel,
Alan Cohen, expended on the case multiplied by an hourly rate of $925.
Knight’s motion was supported by the declarations of Cohen, a Bay Area
employment attorney, Sharon Vinick, and an expert on attorney’s fees.
Knight also filed a memorandum of costs seeking over $90,000 in litigation
costs.
JCI opposed the motion, arguing that the fees sought were
unreasonable because Knight was awarded approximately 15 percent of the
damages he sought and had prevailed on only 2 of his 12 causes of action. It
asserted that fees should not be awarded for work that related only to
Knight’s claims against DeMera, which were unsuccessful, and that time
spent on paralegal and clerical tasks should not be billed at an attorney’s
rate. JCI further argued that Cohen block-billed time, making it impossible
for the court to determine whether the claimed fees were reasonable and
necessary. JCI also contended that Knight sought an unreasonable hourly
rate for Cohen. Finally, it argued that a positive multiplier was not
warranted in this case and that the court should instead apply a negative
multiplier. JCI also moved to tax Knight’s costs as unreasonable,
unnecessary, improper, and disallowed under California law.
The trial court granted Knight’s request for fees in full, finding that the
amount of fees requested was not unreasonable given the results obtained,

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that Knight’s billable hours were adequately supported, and that Cohen’s
hourly rate of $925 was reasonable based on the evidence and the court’s
“own knowledge of the legal market.” The court further found that the claims
against DeMera were “so intertwined” with Knight’s successful claims “that it
would not be reasonably practicable to excise hours for time spent on the
claims against” DeMera, and that evidence of DeMera’s conduct was
potentially relevant to Knight’s economic damages claims. The court
concluded that a multiplier of 1.5 was appropriate. It granted JCI’s motion to
tax in part, reducing the costs awarded by $6,019.75.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
FEHA provides that “the court, in its discretion, may award to the
prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 12965, subd.
(c)(6).) To determine a fee award, the trial court first determines the
“lodestar” amount, calculated as the number of hours reasonably worked
times a reasonable hourly fee. (Greene v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 422; Caldera v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 601, 607.) The court has the discretion
to increase or reduce the lodestar figure “by applying a positive or negative
‘ “multiplier” ’ based on a variety of factors.” (Greene, at p. 422.)
“ ‘ “All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the
judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140
(Ketchum).) “ ‘No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations [are]
required. [Citation.] “The record need only show that the attorney fees were
awarded according to the ‘lodestar’ or ‘touchstone’ approach.” [Citation.] On

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appeal we infer all findings in favor of the prevailing parties.’ ” (Lockaway
Storage v. County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161, 193.)
Where “the sole issue before us . . . is the amount of fees awarded,” as is
the case here, our review is deferential. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “ ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best
judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ’—meaning that it
abused its discretion.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,
1095.)
B. Challenge to Hourly Rate
Citing prior fee awards in other FEHA cases, JCI argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding an hourly rate of $925 for Cohen’s
legal services because the rate does not reflect the hourly prevailing rate for
private attorneys conducting single plaintiff FEHA cases. It points out that
Knight relied on prior fee awards in non-FEHA cases to justify the rate. JCI
further contends the court improperly awarded $925 per hour for non-
attorney work. We agree with JCI’s latter contention but not its first.
The rate to be applied in determining the lodestar has been described
by our Supreme Court as “the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in
the community conducting noncontingent litigation of the same type”
(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133, italics omitted), the “ ‘ “hourly
amount to which attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be
entitled” ’ ” (ibid.), or “the prevailing hourly rate in the area for comparable
services” (id. at p. 1140; see Caldera v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 607).

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These standards do not establish, as JCI asserts, that the reasonable
hourly rate must reflect the rates charged for litigating the same type of
claims. Rather, reviewing courts have found no abuse of discretion in trial
courts setting an attorney’s hourly rate based on a comparison of rates from
similarly experienced attorneys in the same field or involved in litigation of
comparable complexity. (See, e.g., Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 24, 28, 40 [no abuse of discretion in setting hourly rate in a
statutory “ ‘lemon law’ ” case based on evidence of the hourly rates charged by
other plaintiffs’ attorneys “practicing consumer law”], disagreed with on
another ground in Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
24, 37, fn. 6; Stratton v. Beck (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 483, 486, 496 [no abuse of
discretion in setting hourly rate in a wage and hour case based on evidence of
the rates “charged by similarly experienced labor lawyers in the Los Angeles
area”]; Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3d 446,
455 [concluding that “the proper scope of comparison” for rates charged by
other attorneys was not limited to prison litigation “but rather extends to all
attorneys in the relevant community engaged in ‘equally complex Federal
litigation,’ no matter the subject matter”].)
Under these standards, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that $925 per hour was a reasonable hourly rate for Cohen’s
legal services. Knight submitted declarations from Cohen and other
attorneys regarding the prevailing rates for employment litigators in the Bay
Area. Cohen’s declaration described the work he performed on the case, his
experience as a plaintiff-side employment lawyer in the Bay Area, the
number of hours spent on this case, his current hourly rate, and his
familiarity with the hourly rates of other Bay Area employment attorneys.
Based on this knowledge, Cohen declared that his hourly rate of $925 was

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“right in the middle of what is charged by attorneys of similar skill,
reputation and experience in the Bay Area.” Knight’s fee expert concluded
that the requested rate was reasonable based in part on prior fee awards,
including from a recent individual FEHA action and an individual age
discrimination case, and the reported hourly rates from local employment law
firms for attorneys with experience similar to that of Cohen. Finally, Knight
submitted the declaration of Vinick, an experienced Bay Area employment
litigator who has worked primarily on individual employment cases. She
described her past experience with Cohen, noting his excellent work. She
concluded that Cohen’s hourly rate of $925 was “on the low side” for someone
with his level of experience and expertise.3
The foregoing evidence demonstrates that the $925 hourly rate was
within the range of reasonable rates charged by comparable attorneys doing
comparable work. The court was not obligated to accept the prior fee awards
cited by JCI as dispositive of the reasonable hourly rate; those cases involved
different markets and different evidence of the prevailing market rates.
For the first time in its reply brief, JCI attacks Knight’s expert
declaration on the ground that the declaration failed to indicate the
referenced attorneys’ skill level or reputation. Even if this argument is not
forfeited (California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control
Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1050), the Cohen and Vinick declarations were
sufficient evidence of the prevailing rates in the community. (See Stratton v.
Beck, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 496 [finding no abuse of discretion in the

3 Knight asks us to take judicial notice of a prior fee award attached to

Vinick’s supplemental declaration. We decline to do so. The court did not
consider Vinick’s supplemental declaration in making its fee decision, and the
prior fee award is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. (See People v.
Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 369, fn. 3.)

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trial court’s hourly rate award based on counsel’s declaration detailing his
experience in labor law and his familiarity with the billing rates charged by
similarly experienced labor lawyers in the area]; Doskocz v. ALS Lien
Services (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 107, 120 [no abuse of discretion in setting a
reasonable rate based on counsel’s declaration stating that counsel’s hourly
rates “were at or below market rates for attorneys with comparable
experience and skill”].)
Further, “ ‘[t]he court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity
with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.’ ” (Nishiki v.
Danko Meredith, A.P.C. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 883, 898; see 569 East County
Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
426, 437.) That is what the trial court did here. The court did not abuse its
discretion in setting an hourly rate of $925 for Cohen’s legal services.
However, we agree with JCI that the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding Knight $925 per hour for clerical or paralegal tasks. Purely clerical
or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a lawyer’s usual rate, regardless of
who performs the tasks. (Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei (1989) 491 U.S. 274,
288, fn. 10.) Calendaring, preparing proofs of service, filing, and scanning
are examples of tasks that have been found to be purely clerical and thus
noncompensable or compensable at a reduced billing rate. (Save Our
Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187.) In the trial court, JCI identified several billing
entries that it claimed reflected clerical and paralegal work, including entries
that referred to “calendaring.” Knight did not dispute the nature of this work
or present evidence of reduced billing rates; he argued only that the time
spent on those tasks was reasonably necessary to the litigation. The trial
court abused its discretion in awarding fees at attorney rates for clerical and

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paralegal work. On remand, the trial court is directed to review the
challenged time entries and disallow or reduce fees attributable to clerical or
paralegal tasks.
C. Challenge to Apportionment of Fees
JCI argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Knight
fees and costs by failing to apportion the hours Knight’s counsel spent
litigating his unsuccessful claims. Knight responds that, except as to the
claims he asserted against DeMera, JCI forfeited its apportionment
argument by failing to raise it in the trial court, and, in any event, Knight’s
unsuccessful claims were closely interrelated to his successful claims. Even
assuming JCI did not forfeit his apportionment argument, we reject the
contention on the merits.
Where a plaintiff has alleged multiple causes of action and is
statutorily entitled to fees with respect to only one or fewer than all claims,
the trial court can apportion the attorney’s fees. (Calvo Fisher & Jacob
LLP v. Lujan (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 608, 628.) However, under the FEHA,
attorney’s fees need not be apportioned where the claims involve either
common factual issues or legal issues. (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1251; see also Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car
Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133; Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129–130.) “Where fees are authorized
for some causes of action in a complaint but not for others, allocation is a
matter within the trial court’s discretion.” (Thompson Pacific Construction,
Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 555.)
JCI argues that Knight’s unsuccessful claims are legally and factually
distinct from his successful claims. It further contends the trial court may
have been confused as to how to apportion Knight’s fees because his block-

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billed entries “combine[d] work on multiple claims and parties, making it
impossible to determine how much time was spent on successful versus
unsuccessful claims.” We conclude JCI has not met its burden to
demonstrate error. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [appellant has burden to demonstrate error
with cogent legal argument and citations to authority and the record].)
First, the record does not indicate that the trial court failed to
apportion the fees and costs because it was confused about how to do so in
light of Knight’s alleged block-billing. Rather, the court found that the claims
against DeMera and JCI were “so intertwined” that apportionment was not
possible, a finding that reflected the correct legal standard for determining
whether to apportion fees. (See Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 221, 236 [no abuse of discretion in declining to apportion fees
where plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims were “ ‘inextricably
intertwined’ ” with her other claims].) Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume the court knew and properly applied the law. (McDermott Will &
Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103.)
Second, JCI does not cite anything in the record to support its assertion
that Knight’s claims rest on different factual allegations and evidence. (See
Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 235 [fees need not be
apportioned “where the claims involve either common factual issues or legal
issues” (italics added)].) To the contrary, the factual allegations in the
operative complaint were alleged to be common to all causes of action. (See
Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
413, 431 [rejecting the defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s various FEHA
causes of action were unrelated where the complaint alleged facts “common to
all causes of action”], disagreed with on another ground in Nadaf-Rahrov v.

11
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 982–983.)
Moreover, “[t]he trial court was in the best position to understand the
relationship between the claims and to determine whether time spent on a
related claim contributed to [plaintiff’s] objectives at trial.” (Greene v.
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 423.)
Further, while JCI notes the distinct legal elements for Knight’s
various causes of action, “ ‘a competent attorney must do more at trial than
present just the bare bones of [a] prima facie case.’ ” (Wysinger v. Automobile
Club of Southern California, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 431, disagreed with
on another ground in Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., supra,
166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982–983.) Here, the operative complaint described a
unified course of conduct by JCI and DeMera that Knight sought to remedy.
As alleged in the complaint, DeMera and JCI’s wrongful conduct exacerbated
Knight’s mental health, which led to Knight taking medical leave and
ultimately resigning after JCI failed to return him to work from his leave.
The trial court could reasonably conclude from the complaint allegations that
evidence of DeMera and JCI’s alleged wrongful conduct was potentially
relevant to the issue of Knight’s damages and could help explain why Knight
went on medical leave and required accommodations upon his return to work.
That Knight prevailed on only two of his causes of action is not dispositive.
Attorneys “must pursue all available legal avenues and theories in pursuit of
their clients’ objectives; it is impossible, as a practical matter, for an attorney
to know in advance whether or not his or her work on a potentially
meritorious legal theory will ultimately prevail.” (Sokolow v. County of San
Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 250.)
JCI also argues that even if Knight’s claims are related, the fee award
was unreasonable considering Knight’s “limited success.” Specifically, it

12
notes that Knight prevailed on only 2 of his 12 causes of action and was
awarded approximately $3 million in damages despite demanding
approximately $23 million in damages.
While a trial court may reduce a fee award where a claimant achieves
only limited success, a fee award should not be reduced “when a plaintiff
prevails on only one of several factually related and closely intertwined
claims.” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989; see
Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 435 [“fee award should not be
reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention
raised in the lawsuit”], superseded by statute on other grounds; Wysinger v.
Automobile Club of Southern California, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 430,
disagreed with on another ground in Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group,
Inc., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982–983.) Rather, the limited success
inquiry for related claims is “ ‘whether “the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of
success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for
making a fee award.” ’ ” (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 334, 360; Environmental Protection Information Center v.
Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 239;
see Hensley, at p. 435 [“court[s] should focus on the significance of the overall
relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended
on the litigation”].) Strict proportionality is not required. (Chavez, at p. 989.)
JCI does not explain how a $3 million recovery is a limited success
when compared to the hours expended on the case. Further, JCI has not
cited any authority demonstrating that a fee award should be reduced for
limited success where the plaintiff received a lesser award of damages than
that sought. There is authority that suggests this is not a proper basis for
reducing a fee award. (See Quesada v. Thomason (9th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d

13
537, 539 [“courts should not reduce lodestars based on relief obtained simply
because the amount of damages recovered on a claim was less than the
amount requested”]; Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 407, 427 [“[a] ‘court should not reduce the lodestar merely
because the prevailing party did not receive the type of relief that it
requested’ ”].) In short, JCI has not shown that the court abused its
discretion in declining to reduce the fee award based on Knight’s level of
success.
D. Challenge to Multiplier
Lastly, JCI contends the trial court abused its discretion in applying a
1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount. It contends a multiplier is not
warranted because there were no novel or complex legal issues, Cohen did not
display an exceptional degree of skill and expertise, the record does not
support a finding that Cohen was precluded from other work to a “significant”
extent, the contingent nature of Cohen’s representation alone does not justify
a multiplier, and the fee award inured to the benefit of Cohen. We disagree.
A court has discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar by applying
an appropriate multiplier. (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, supra,
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.) The lodestar “may be adjusted by the court
based on factors including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which
the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys,
[and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of
such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular
action.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “ ‘Any one factor may be
sufficient to apply a positive or negative multiplier.’ ” (The Kennedy Com. v.
City of Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 467.) The trial court’s

14
decision to apply a multiplier will not be disturbed “ ‘ “unless the appellate
court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ ” (Ketchum, at p. 1132.)
Here, the trial court based its ruling on multiple appropriate factors
that justified the enhancement: the contingent nature of the fee award, that
Cohen “refus[ed] other work over several years,” and that Cohen displayed
“considerable skill” in presenting the case at trial.
The contingent risk factor alone was sufficient to justify the fee
enhancement in this case. (Sonoma Land Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 978, 988; Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, 83 [“[a] contingent risk factor alone can be
sufficient to justify a fee enhancement”].) “[T]he contingent and deferred
nature of the fee award in a . . . case with statutory attorney fees requires
that the fee be adjusted in some manner to reflect the fact that the fair
market value of legal services provided on that basis is greater than the
equivalent noncontingent hourly rate.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394–395.) Here, it is
undisputed that Cohen took the case on a full contingency basis, with no
retainer or costs paid by Knight. The contingency agreement provided no
compensation in the event JCI prevailed. Under these circumstances, the
court did not abuse its discretion in adjusting the fee award to reflect the
contingent risk.
In arguing to the contrary, JCI relies on Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1174–1175, which found in a FEHA case that
where there is a reasonable expectation of statutory attorney’s fees, the
contingent nature of the litigation was an insufficient risk to justify a
multiplier. However, our Supreme Court subsequently made clear in
Ketchum that the contingent nature of a fee award is a proper factor to

15
consider in awarding an enhancement. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 1132–1133.) The court reasoned that a fee enhancement in contingency
cases “ ‘compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but
for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is
higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt
of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional loans.’ ”
(Ibid.) Subsequent cases deciding whether to award multipliers in FEHA
cases have followed Ketchum and have held that contingent risk remains a
factor to be considered in determining whether to apply a multiplier. (See
Greene v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp.
428–429; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra,
132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 394–395.)
The evidence that Cohen was precluded from other employment further
justified the fee enhancement. (See Center for Biological Diversity v. County
of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 900 [no abuse of discretion in
applying 1.5 lodestar multiplier based on contingent nature of case and the
devotion to the case required of its attorneys].) Cohen is a solo practitioner
with no administrative help. His declaration attached records describing the
work he performed on the case and how much time he devoted to the case.
Cohen stated in his declaration that because of the time he had to devote to
the case, he was “frequently” unable to return calls or emails from potential
clients. When he did speak with potential clients, he had to turn away
“some” matters. He was unable to take on new cases during “some” of the
time he was working on this case, which was pending for nearly five years.
Additionally, he had to delay work on other remunerative cases and was still
catching up on tasks in those cases several months after trial ended in this
matter. The trial court could reasonably infer from Cohen’s declaration that

16
“the demands of the . . . case substantially precluded other work during that
extended period, which makes the ultimate risk of not obtaining fees all the
greater.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra,
132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 399–400.)
JCI notes in its reply brief that the trial court made no findings
“quantifying” the extent to which Cohen was precluded from accepting other
work. It cites no authority suggesting such findings were required, however.
“We are entitled to presume the trial court considered all the appropriate
factors in choosing the multiplier and applying it to the whole lodestar.”
(Downey Cares v. Downey Community Development Com. (1987) 196
Cal.App.3d 983, 998.)
As for the final factor expressly relied on by the trial court, JCI
correctly notes that the skill of an attorney will justify a fee enhancement
“only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of
representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable
skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar
calculation.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1139.) JCI contends Cohen’s
representation in this case did not meet this standard. Specifically, it argues
that despite Cohen’s experience, he did not recognize that Knight’s
depression was a disability that might be accommodated until he had
engaged a trial consultant and a “mock jury.”
We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that the “considerable skill” Cohen displayed at trial justified a
fee enhancement.4 As mentioned, trial judges “are in the best position to

4 Contrary to JCI’s assertion in its reply brief, “[n]othing in Ketchum v.

Moses requires the trial court to recite an express finding that . . . counsel’s
representation ‘far exceed[ed]’ the level of representation that comparably

17
evaluate attorney fee awards,” because they “see the lawyers’ day to day
labors and can judge quality over the long haul.” (Pollock v. Kelso (2025)
107 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1195.) Moreover, the portion of Cohen’s declaration
that JCI cites as support for its argument does not establish that Cohen did
not recognize Knight’s depression as a disability. Rather, it shows that a
focus group provided Cohen valuable insight into how a jury might view
Knight’s disability and treatment.
In any event, the multiplier is supported by the other factors relied on
by the trial court. (See Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, supra, 222
Cal.App.4th at p. 1252 [“[w]e need not consider the first factor because the
second and third factors alone support a multiplier”]; Sonoma Land Trust v.
Thompson, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.) Accordingly, JCI has not shown
that the trial court was “ ‘ “clearly wrong” ’ ” in deciding to employ a 1.5
multiplier to enhance Knight’s fee award.5 (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
1132.)
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order awarding attorney’s fees is
reversed insofar as it awards fees attributable to clerical or paralegal tasks at
the hourly rate of $925, and the matter is remanded to permit the trial court
to review the time entries challenged as “clerical” and “paralegal” and

skilled attorneys would have provided.” (Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 43, 61.)
5 In light of our conclusion that JCI has not shown error in the trial

court’s fee award, we reject its argument that the award conflicts with the
FEHA’s purposes, because the argument appears to be predicated on JCI’s
other claims of error. Without citing the record, JCI contends the award
disregards Knight’s limited success, incentivizes plaintiffs to assert “weak or
unrelated” claims, compensates attorneys for work that did not contribute to
the actual recovery, and results in a windfall to the attorney because of the
multiplier and the “inflated” hourly rate.

18
disallow or reduce fees attributable to clerical or paralegal tasks. The parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.

_________________________
SMILEY, J.

A172015 / Knight v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

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