Filed 6/24/26; Certified for Publication 7/13/26 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
VICTOR KHEDR et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN A173872
MATEO COUNTY,
Respondent; (San Mateo County
BROADMOOR POLICE Super. Ct. No. 21CIV03905)
PROTECTION DISTRICT et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
This petition for writ of mandate presents the question whether, in the
context of an allegation of continuing retaliatory and harassing conduct, a
government claim form that provides no dates other than the date the form
was signed and states only that the date of the loss is “ongoing” complies with
the requirements of Government Code section 910, subdivision (c). 1
Subdivision (c) requires that the notice shall include “[t]he date, place and
other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the
claim asserted.” (§ 910, subd. (c).) The trial court sustained demurrers to
several of petitioners’ causes of action on the basis that their claim forms
failed to comply with section 910. Petitioners argue that their claim forms
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
1
complied, or at least substantially complied, with section 910 because they
stated that the wrongful conduct was ongoing and the forms were dated. We
hold that petitioners’ claim notices neither comply nor substantially comply
with section 910 because they fail to specify any dates or date ranges on
which the alleged wrongful conduct occurred.
BACKGROUND
Petitioners Victor Khedr and Syed Husain were part-time police
officers with real party in interest (RPI) Broadmoor Police Protection District
(District). They, along with petitioners David Parenti and Five Points Tire
Imports, Inc. (Five Points), 2 sued the District, certain other police officers,
and certain police commissioners. Petitioners alleged they were retaliated
against and ultimately terminated after they reported fiscal mismanagement
and conflict of interest violations concerning a former police commissioner
and chief of police, Michael Connolly. 3 We summarize petitioners’
presentation of their claims and the trial court’s rulings on RPI’s demurrers.
I. Notices of Claim and RPI’s Response
On January 19, 2021, Khedr and Husain each submitted a claim form
to the District. Among other requested information, the forms ask for the
“Date of Loss.” Both Khedr’s and Husain’s completed forms state the “Date of
Loss” as “Numerous—Loss is ongoing.” In response to the request for a
description of the incident which caused him to make a claim, Khedr provides
the following narrative: “Chief of Police Michael P. Connolly, while still
serving as an elected Police Commissioner, used his role as Chair of the
2 Parenti and Five Points are not parties to this writ proceeding.
3 The real parties in interest are the District, Sylvia Koh, James
Kucharszky, Ralph Hutchens, Connolly, Patrick Tobin, Peter Nelson, John
Duncan, and Eric Eaton.
2
commission to appoint himself as the next paid Chief of Police of the . . .
District. Opon [sic] the district receiving a Public Records Request for
information pertaining to the district’s mismanagement of public funds,
Connolly threatened to terminate anyone involved with the request.
Connolly and his staff, believing that Claimant had information regarding
the inquiry into this mismanagement, harassed and interrogated Claimant at
the District and at his business, which services the district’s vehicles.
Connolly additionally implied he would take vehicles elsewhere to be serviced
and has done so with numerous vehicles. Due to the inquiry into the
district’s finances and mismanagement, Connolly and his staff proceeded to
liquidate District assets rapidly, including firearms from evidence despite
Claimant’s objection due to the District lacking authority to sell such
firearms. Connolly and staff fabricated claims against Claimant to cover up
inquiries into Connolly’s own misconduct. District management conspired
with the Board of Commissioners to pursue false claims against Claimant in
an effort to avoid examining the district’s finances which were the root of the
issues. District management took away roles from Claimant, discriminated
against him, retaliated in response to whistleblowing activities, and made
disparaging statements to intentionally cause harm to Claimant. Connolly
has threatened to conduct an internal investigation to terminate Claimant
since the District Attorney’s Office investigation was unfruitful. District
management made their intent to terminate public at a Commission
hearing.”
In response to a question asking for the basis of the claim, Khedr
states: “Connolly made statements to Claimant that he would terminate
anyone involved with a public records request into the mismanagement of the
district. District management interrogated Claimant numerous times and
3
threatened Claimant with search warrants and investigations by numerous
government agencies. The district fabricated a false case alleging stolen
firearms and referred the matter to the San Mateo County District Attorney’s
office for a criminal investigation. Despite being in possession of evidence
proving no wrongdoing by Claimant this evidence was withheld from
investigators. District management initiated a harassment campaign
against Claimant and others, including stalking Claimant, revoking and
removing employment roles from Claimant, making disparaging comments
regarding claimant and others, some even in public commission meetings.
Management even made false claims to the public and stated on the record
that Claimant and others shoudl be fired for protected whistleblower activity.
Management made disparaging statements resulting in loss of privilages and
severe ongoing economic interference.” (Sic.) Khedr’s claim form also
includes his claimed damages, a list of District employees whom he alleges
caused his injuries, a list of witnesses, and his attorney’s name and contact
information. Khedr signed and dated the form on January 19, 2021. Khedr’s
claim form does not state a date or range of dates when the alleged conduct
occurred.
Husain’s claim form’s “Description of incident” section begins with the
same statements in Khedr’s claim form regarding Connolly’s using his role as
commissioner to appoint himself chief of police, the District’s receipt of a
public records request for information regarding mismanagement of public
funds, and Connolly’s threats and harassment. Husain’s form further states:
“District staff has made disparaging comments about claimant both privately
and publicly. Claimant is informed and believes that district staff made
comments to other agencies claiming the very officers who reported
wrongdoing were now under investigation. Claimant is also informed and
4
believes that district management made public disclosures of claimant’s
private information had disparaging and conversations regarding claimant
with his coworkers. The district board allowed for management to retaliate
against claimant and other employees of the department. Claimant
submitted a whistleblower complaint to the California State Auditor’s Office,
and the Fair Political Practices Commission, and has been retaliated against
consistently for doing so. Further, claimant was reduced in seniority and
deprived of equal wages and promotional opportunities. Further, as a result
of the districts fraudulent investigation into firearms, which entangled
claimant due to commentary made by the district to other agencies,
claimant’s mother postponed a critical surgery due to ongoing false threats of
search warrants. Claimants mother resides with claimant. Claimant filed a
formal grievance with the district and its board which was ignored, thereby
waiving any defense to the claims contained therein.” (Sic.)
In response to a question asking for the basis of the claim, Husain
states: “Connolly made statements to Claimant that he would terminate
anyone involved with a public records request into the mismanagement of the
district. District management made public disclosures at public meetings
regarding their actions and interrogations. After filing multiple
whistleblower complaints Claimant fell under immense scrutiny by district
management. Management had numerous conversations with Claimant’s
coworkers leading them to shun him. Mangement also conspired a
harassment campaign against claimant and other employees of the district.
Management further made countless false statements to members of the
public in a bizarre public relations stunt. On at least two occasions Claimant
noticed district vehicles in close vicinity to his house and office. Claimant
believes district management was stalking claimant and other members of
5
the district as the sighting was only days after Claimant’s coworker’s spouse
observed the same vehicles in the vicinity of their home. The district’s board
held several meetings in closed sessions after the presentation of Claimant’s
claims, however no review of the claims of financial discrepancies were made
and instead the board conspired against claimant and his associates.” (Sic.)
Husain’s claim form also includes his claimed damages, a list of District
employees whom he alleges caused his injuries, a list of witnesses, and his
attorney’s name and contact information. Husain signed and dated the form
on January 19, 2021. Husain’s claim form does not state a date or range of
dates when the alleged conduct occurred.
On February 16, 2021, the District sent counsel for Khedr and Husain
notices of insufficiency as to each claim, stating, in part, that their claim
notices failed to comply with sections 910 and 910.2 and would not be
considered on the merits because they did not specify a date of loss. The
notices of insufficiency further stated that pursuant to section 910.8, the
District would take no action for a period of 15 days and that if petitioners
wished to correct the deficiencies, they should do so within that time period.
Petitioners did not respond to the notices of insufficiency.
On March 15, 2021, the District sent Husain’s counsel a notice of
rejection, stating Husain’s claim had been presented to the Board of
Broadmoor Police Commissioners on February 9, 2021, and rejected in its
entirety. On March 22, 2021, a similar notice of rejection was sent to Khedr’s
counsel.
II. Complaint and Demurrers
Thereafter, petitioners, along with Parenti and Five Points, sued the
District; Connolly; five police officer defendants (Patrick Tobin, Ronald
Banta, Peter Nelson, John Duncan, and Eric Eaton; collectively, officer
6
defendants); and four police commissioners (Sylvia Koh, James Kucharszky,
Ralph Hutchens, and Marie Brizuela; collectively, commissioner defendants).
The first amended complaint alleges multiple causes of action, including, as
relevant here, whistleblower retaliation (first cause of action); violation of the
Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1) (eighth cause of action);
invasion of privacy (ninth cause of action); and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (11th cause of action).
Connolly, the officer defendants, the commissioner defendants, 4 and
the District each demurred to the first amended complaint. As relevant here,
one of the issues raised in the demurrers was whether the first, eighth, ninth,
and 11th causes of action were barred based on petitioners’ failure to comply
with the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) by presenting notices of claim
that did not include the date of the acts allegedly giving rise to liability. 5
III. Trial Court’s Rulings
On April 11, 2025, the trial court issued a tentative ruling on
Connolly’s demurrer, finding, in part, that Connolly failed to establish
petitioners’ claim forms did not substantially comply with the Government
Claims Act. At the hearing on the demurrer, the trial court agreed to permit
4 Marie Brizuela is not included in the commissioner defendants’
demurrer. The petition states she was dismissed from the lawsuit, and she is
not a real party in interest in the writ proceeding.
5 Connolly’s demurrer raised the Government Claims Act issue as to
the first, eighth, ninth, and 11th causes of action, and the trial court’s order
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to those causes of action.
The demurrers of the commissioner defendants, the officer defendants, and
the District raised the Government Claims Act issue as to those same causes
of action, as well as certain additional causes of action. However, petitioners’
reply to the return clarifies that their petition seeks to challenge only the
trial court’s rulings on the demurrers to the first, eighth, ninth and 11th
causes of action.
7
supplemental briefing on the issue of substantial compliance. Following
supplemental briefing and additional oral argument, the trial court issued an
order sustaining Connolly’s demurrer without leave to amend as to the first,
eighth, ninth, and 11th causes of action on the basis that petitioners’ claim
forms failed to state the date of the alleged incidents giving rise to the claims
asserted.
The trial court’s order on Connolly’s demurrer states, in relevant part:
“Plaintiffs . . . made no ‘attempt’ to comply with the requirement of providing
a date even after being advised of the defect and given an opportunity to
remedy it or at least make an effort to substantially comply. . . . [T]he Court
finds their Claims Forms are deficient because they ‘totally omitted’ a date
and, even if their vague use of ‘numerous’ and ‘ongoing’ constitutes some level
of compliance in response to the date inquiry, it is not substantial
compliance. [¶] . . . [¶] [T]he question becomes whether the language used in
Plaintiffs’ Claims Forms here, i.e., ‘Date of Loss: Numerous—Loss is
ongoing,’ constitutes a failure to include any date or, if not, whether the
skeletal information related to date suffices as substantial compliance.
[Citation.] The key word for the Court here is ‘Loss.’ While a ‘loss’ may be
ongoing, the act causing the loss may not be. For example, if a person is
unlawfully terminated, their income loss is arguably ongoing, but the act or
tort that caused the loss was whatever day they were allegedly unlawfully
terminated. . . . [T]he acts Plaintiffs allege were committed on discreet and
known dates and Khedr and Husain failed to allege a single date or even a
date range anywhere on their Claims Forms. All three Claims Forms made
the following representation at ¶13: ‘Claimant will provide further non-
privileged information as requested by the district if deemed necessary for
consideration of this claim.’ [Citation.] Khedr and Husain were advised of
8
the date-related deficiency and provided no further information. [Citation.]
[¶] There were exact dates for many of the alleged actions by Defendant and
Khedr and Husain included none of them. . . . Alleging ‘Numerous’ for date of
loss is no better than leaving the space blank for purposes of putting the
agency on legally required notice of when the alleged harm was inflicted.
‘Loss is ongoing’ is equally devoid of value and combining them is useless . . . .
Although . . . ‘[t]he rule of substantial compliance prevents the requirement
of the impossible or absurd,’ there was nothing impossible or absurd about
Khedr and Husain being required to simply make at least some effort to
include a date on the forms. They failed to do so, even after being advised by
Defendant. Accordingly, Khedr’s and Husain’s forms were fatally defective as
a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ effort here was tantamount to an ‘entire absence
of one factor’ per Knight [v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 26 Cal.2d 764]. The
Court is mindful that the Claims Forms seek a ‘Date of Loss’ as opposed to
date of incident or some like term, but it is noteworthy that Khedr’s and
Husain’s forms contain no dates whatsoever, including in the narrative under
‘Description of incident or accident, which caused you, make this claim (sic).’
[Citation.] There isn’t even an attempt to at least set forth a date range as
the Plaintiff did in Knight.” The trial court rejected petitioners’ argument
that because the misconduct was continuous and ongoing, it was not possible
to state a single date of loss and noted that petitioners’ claim forms alleged
multiple discreet events such that petitioners could have made an effort to
provide dates.
The trial court entered subsequent orders as to the demurrers of the
District, the officer defendants, and the commissioner defendants, sustaining
without leave to amend their demurrers to several of petitioners’ claims due
to the failure to comply with the Government Claims Act.
9
Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking reversal of the trial court’s
orders sustaining RPI’s demurrers without leave to amend as to the first,
eighth, ninth, and 11th causes of action on the grounds that petitioners failed
to comply with section 910. They argue their claim forms complied with
section 910 or, alternatively, that the forms substantially complied with
section 910. We requested briefing. After consideration of the petition and
the RPI’s informal opposition and petitioners’ reply, we determined writ
review is warranted because the rulings sustained without leave to amend
RPI’s demurrers as to some but not all causes of action, which deprives
petitioners of the opportunity to plead their causes of action, and if the
rulings were erroneous, a second trial would be necessary. (Coulter v.
Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144, 148, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Strang v. Cabrol (1984) 37 Cal.3d 720, 722–724; see
Barrett v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1176, 1183.) We issued an
order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. RPI’s
filed a return by demurrer, 6 and the petitioners filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
Section 945.4 provides that “no suit for money or damages may be
brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is
6 RPI’s return by demurrer argues that mandamus relief is improper
because petitioners do not argue the existence of a ministerial duty or an
abuse of discretion. RPI’s fail to address Coulter v. Superior Court, supra,
12 Cal.3d 144, which was cited in the petition and held mandamus relief is
available when a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to some
causes of action. (Id. at p. 148.) We reject RPI’s procedural arguments and
consider the merits of the petition, which RPI’s also address in their return.
(Southern California Edison Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
573, 583, fn. 2 [addressing merits of petition when return was not verified].)
10
required to be presented in accordance with . . . Section 910 . . . until a
written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been
acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the
board . . . .” Section 910 requires that the claim state the “date, place and
other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the
claim asserted” and provide “[a] general description of the . . . injury, damage
or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the
claim.” (§ 910, subds. (c) & (d).)
The purpose of these statutes is “ ‘ “to provide the public entity
sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to
settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.]
It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the
public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.”
[Citation.] The claims statutes also “enable the public entity to engage in
fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the
future.” [Citations.]’ ” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012)
55 Cal.4th 983, 991.) “[T]he intent of the Government Claims Act is ‘not to
expand the rights of plaintiffs against government entities. Rather, the
intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly
delineated circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)
The doctrine of substantial compliance has been applied to determine
whether a plaintiff’s claim form, which is defective in some respects,
nonetheless substantially complies with all statutory requirements for a valid
claim form. (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 702, 713 (Santee).) “A claim substantially complies with a claims
statute if the parties have stated sufficient information ‘to reasonably enable
the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim
11
and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit.’ [Citation.]” (Ardon v.
City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 248.) However, the substantial
compliance doctrine has been found not to apply when a plaintiff has wholly
omitted from his or her claim form a particular statutory requirement. (See
City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 456 [compiling cases
rejecting substantial compliance argument when a statutory requirement is
missing from claim form].) “ ‘[S]ubstantial compliance cannot be predicated
upon no compliance.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Hall v. City of Los Angeles (1941)
19 Cal.2d 198, 202.)
In Knight v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 26 Cal.2d 764 (Knight), our
Supreme Court considered whether a claim asserting continuous damages
due to flooding allegedly caused by the city’s negligent installation and
maintenance of drainage facilities was fatally defective because it did not
specify the date of the accident as required by the applicable claim
presentation statute. (Id. at p. 766.) The claim stated that the damages were
“ ‘continuous and continuing’ ” and that “ ‘on or about and during the months
of February and March, 1941,’ ” the city negligently caused water to flow
through the claimant’s property. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court found the
claimant substantially complied with the claim statute. (Id. at p. 767.) It
reasoned that because the damage was claimed to have been a continuous,
progressive process, no exact date of occurrence of the accident could be
stated. However, the purposes of providing information to settle the claim or
prevent further injury were satisfied because “[t]he span of time, February
and March of a certain year, as well as up to the date of the claim was given.
Nothing would have been gained by the superfluous listing of each and every
day during that time . . . . The rule of substantial compliance prevents the
requirement of the impossible or absurd.” (Ibid.) The court found the date
12
range provided was sufficient specification to notify the defendant to
investigate the claim and rectify the condition. (Id. at p. 768.) Knight noted
the question presented did not involve a situation in which a required item
was “wholly omitted” from the claim but, rather, concerned the sufficiency of
the date information provided. (Id. at pp. 768–769.)
II. Compliance with Government Claims Act
Petitioners assert that the information presented on their claim forms
complied with section 910 and the orders sustaining RPI’s demurrers without
leave to amend should be reversed. They make an initial, cursory argument
that the District’s claim form is defective because it asks for the date of “loss”
instead of “occurrence or transaction,” as stated in subdivision (c) of section
910. Petitioners are correct that the statute requires claimants to provide the
“date . . . of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim
asserted.” (Ibid.) However, they do not provide a reasoned argument as to
how the discrepancy between the term used in the District’s claim form and
the terms used in the statute absolves petitioners from the requirement to
provide dates in their claim forms, or establish that the trial court erred in
sustaining RPI’s demurrers. Instead, they simply conclude that the date of
occurrence is different than the date of the act causing the loss. Then they
acknowledge that “the trial court recognized that the loss and the act causing
may both be ongoing—as it is in this case” and which is consistent with
common definitions of “occurrence” in the insurance context. 7 Our review of
the record indicates that despite the incorrect term used on the District’s
claim form, the parties and the trial court correctly understood the issue to be
7 Petitioners cite to insurance policy definitions of “occurrence” as
“ ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same general harmful conditions.’ ” (Caldo Oil Co. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1821, 1828.)
13
what date information a claimant must provide in asserting a claim for
continuing injury. We are not convinced reversal is warranted because the
claim form uses the term “loss” instead of “occurrence or transaction.”
Petitioners, relying primarily on Knight, assert that the occurrence was
ongoing and no specific date could be stated. However, unlike in Knight,
petitioners here provided no date range at all. (Knight, supra, 26 Cal.2d at
p. 768.) Nor did their narrative description, which listed multiple specific
events, provide any dates or date ranges. RPI’s incorrectly characterize
petitioners’ claims as not involving “some ongoing unlawful conduct” and,
instead, as involving only discrete acts. Retaliation may involve a continuing
course of conduct. (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104,
1124–1125.) However, claims involving continuous or ongoing misconduct
are not exempt from the requirements of section 910, subdivision (c). Here,
as the trial court noted, petitioners failed to provide any dates at all even
though they referred to multiple discrete instances of misconduct.
Petitioners assert that because the “occurrence was ongoing, . . . no specific
date could be stated.” However, they do not explain why this is so. Notably,
petitioner Parenti submitted a claim form on the same day which included
dates of some of the discrete instances of misconduct and which the trial
court found to be in substantial compliance with section 910.
Petitioners also argue that the date they signed the form, coupled with
the statement that the date of loss was “ongoing,” constitutes compliance
with section 910. They rely on Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los
Angeles (1943) 23 Cal.2d 193, another case involving a claim for damages
caused by flooding that occurred over an extended period of time. (Id. at pp.
202–203.) Natural Soda Products Co. addressed the timeliness of a claim
submitted more than six months after the initial injury but within six
14
months of further injury caused by flooding. (Id. at p. 203.) The claimant
was not required to present his claim within six months of the initial flooding
because “the last flooding contributed to the injury as well as the first, and it
would therefore be inaccurate to say that the first flooding was ‘the
occurrence from which the damage arose.’ ” (Ibid.) While Natural Soda
Products Co. also involved a claim alleging continuous damage, it did not
involve the question at issue here, i.e., whether a signed and dated claim
form stating that the occurrence is ongoing satisfies the statutory
requirement to state the date of the occurrence.
Petitioners argue, without citation to any additional authority, that
they complied with section 910 because “[a] claim form was submitted and
that form is dated and that form states the occurrence is ongoing—certainly
as of that date.” They go on to explain that RPI’s ongoing wrongdoing is
detailed in their first amended complaint, including that the wrongful
conduct began on June 24, 2020, when Parenti met with Koh to discuss
financial discrepancies within the District, and that Husain made a public
records request on July 1, 2020, triggering Connolly to interrogate Khedr
about the request and to threaten to fire anyone involved. Notably, while the
first amended complaint attaches dates to many of the RPI’s allegedly
retaliatory actions, no such dates are included in the claim forms. We must
resolve the issue before us based on the information contained in the claim
forms.
Petitioners next appear to suggest that the continuing violation
doctrine applies to their claims. The continuing violation doctrine “allows
liability for unlawful employer conduct occurring outside the statute of
limitations if it is sufficiently connected to unlawful conduct within the
limitations period.” (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 802
15
(Richards).) To be “sufficiently connected,” the unlawful employer conduct
occurring outside the limitations period must (1) be “sufficiently similar in
kind” to conduct within the limitations period; (2) occur “with sufficient
frequency”; and (3) “[not have] acquired a degree of ‘permanence.’ ” (Ibid.)
The doctrine has been applied to determinations of the timeliness of
government claims. (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104,
1124.) However, the timeliness of petitioners’ government claims is not at
issue here. 8 We only resolve whether the claim forms provided the
statutorily required information.
Petitioners’ petition references the continuing violation doctrine
generally and cites Richards, but it ignores the three criteria set forth in
Richards for applying the doctrine and does not even attempt to show that
their claims satisfy those criteria. More significantly, petitioners do not
explain how this doctrine validates their claim forms, which fail to include
any dates or even a date range of RPI’s allegedly wrongful conduct. Indeed,
the suggestion that the continuing violation doctrine may apply highlights
the need for petitioners’ claim forms to include dates of the allegedly wrongful
conduct. Otherwise, it is not possible to determine whether similar actions
occurred “with sufficient frequency” and were similar in kind to conduct
within the limitations period. (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 802.)
8 Petitioners also argue that the date of accrual of their claims cannot
be determined at the pleading stage and is a question of fact for the jury.
This argument is not fully developed and is beside the point. The trial court’s
ruling did not determine the timeliness or date of accrual of petitioners’
claims. Instead, it found petitioners’ failure to specify a date or date range of
the allegedly wrongful conduct violated the requirements of section 910. Nor
do we need to determine the date of accrual of petitioners’ claims in deciding
whether the trial court erred in sustaining RPI’s demurrers based on the lack
of specified dates.
16
Petitioners cite no authority suggesting that if the continuing violation
doctrine applies, then petitioners are not required to provide a date of the
occurrence causing their injury or damage. We reject their unsupported
suggestion.
III. Petitioners’ Claim Forms Do Not Substantially Comply with the
Government Claims Act
Petitioners argue, in the alternative, that their claim forms
substantially comply with the Government Claims Act. Petitioners correctly
recognize that the substantial compliance doctrine considers the purpose of
the claims statutes, which is to give the public entity timely notice of the
nature of the claim so that it may investigate and settle those having merit
without litigation. (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 713.) They then
conclude, without meaningful analysis, that their claims substantially
complied. Instead of analyzing how their claim notices—devoid of any dates
of the allegedly wrongful conduct—provided sufficient information to permit
the District to investigate their claims, they argue that RPI’s retaliatory
conduct continued after they submitted their claims. We are not persuaded
that petitioners’ allegations of retaliatory conduct occurring after they
submitted their claim forms supports their position that their claim forms
substantially complied with section 910 despite the forms’ lack of specific
dates.
Petitioners’ claim forms refer to threats of termination, a public records
request and whistleblower complaint, harassment and interrogation,
disparaging statements, false claims against petitioners, and taking away
roles from petitioners, none of which are tethered to any dates, or even date
ranges. We find that petitioners’ failure to specify a date or date range for
the alleged wrongful conduct fails to substantially comply with all of the
statutory requirements for a valid claim. (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at
17
p. 713.) While the narrative descriptions of the incident provide certain
details, the failure to provide any dates, either in the description of the
incident or in response to the “Date of Loss,” impedes the District’s ability to
investigate the matter and to prevent further damage. (Id. at pp. 713–714.)
Even if the District had actual knowledge of the circumstances referenced in
the claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied. (DiCampli-Mintz v.
County of Santa Clara, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 991 [“ ‘It is well-settled that
claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity’s actual
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim’ ”].)
Petitioners’ reply argues RPI’s do not present “any legitimate reason
they require a ‘date of loss’ to be included with the claim.” This argument is
easily dismissed as section 910 expressly requires claimants to include the
date of the occurrence or transaction. (§ 910, subd. (c).) They further argue
that RPI’s do not claim they were denied a chance to adequately investigate
the claims based on the missing date information and cite to the portion of
Roger v. County of Riverside (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510 which addresses a
public entity’s waiver of a late claim defense due to the entity’s failure to
notify the claimant of timeliness defects. (Id. at p. 523.) Petitioners again do
not develop their argument. (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994)
28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 [court does not develop arguments for a
party].) Although RPI’s do not specifically argue they lacked information to
allow them to investigate the claims, 9 case law explains this is the test for
applying the substantial compliance doctrine to defective claim forms.
(Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 713.) Moreover, to the extent petitioners
9 RPI’s argue that the date information was necessary for them to
determine whether the late claim procedures of section 911.3 and 911.4
applied.
18
intend to suggest RPI’s waived the argument that there has been no
substantial compliance with the claims statute, the record contradicts
petitioners’ suggestion. On February 16, 2021, RPI’s sent petitioners notices
of insufficiency of their claims based, in part, on the failure to specify dates.
Petitioners fail to persuade us that the substantial compliance doctrine
applies to save their claim forms. Petitioners’ failure to specify any dates, or
even a date range, for the multiple instances of alleged misconduct identified
in their claim forms, instead merely stating the date as “Numerous—Loss is
ongoing” and dating the form itself, does not constitute substantial
compliance with section 910. Such indefinite and vague information does not
provide sufficient information to allow the receiving entity to investigate
petitioners’ claims.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is denied. Real parties in interest are
entitled to their costs in this writ proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.493(a)(1)(A).)
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Burns, J.
A173872/Khedr v. Superior Court
19
Filed 7/13/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
VICTOR KHEDR et al.,
Petitioners, A173872
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN (San Mateo County
MATEO COUNTY, Super. Ct. No. 21CIV03905)
Respondent; ORDER CERTIFYING
BROADMOOR POLICE OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
PROTECTION DISTRICT et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
THE COURT: *
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 24, 2026, was
not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now
appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is
so ordered.
Dated: , P. J.
* Jackson, P. J.; Simons, J.; Burns, J.
20
A173872/Khedr v. Superior Court
Trial Court: Superior Court of the County of San Mateo
Trial Judge: Jeffrey Finigan
Counsel: Smith Law Firm and Craig R. Smith for petitioners.
No appearance for respondent.
Porter Scott, Derek J. Haynes, Dylan T. de Wit and
Steven E. Weiss for real parties in interest.
21