Filed 8/24/26 Khalsa v. Dhillon CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GURMAIL SINGH KHALSA et al., H052385
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 20CV361652)
v.
BHUPINDER SINGH DHILLON et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs Gurmail Singh Khalsa and Harpal Singh Chahal were among a 21-
person slate of candidates for seats on the elected leadership committee of a religious
non-profit association. They sued the incumbent committee members, as well as two
newspapers and their managers, alleging defendants made defamatory statements in the
leadup to the election. Defendants moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit
against public participation (SLAPP) under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which
provides that any “cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be
subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
The trial court initially denied the special motion to strike, finding that plaintiffs’
claims did not arise from defendants’ protected activity. After we reversed that order and
remanded for consideration of whether plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claims,
the trial court found plaintiffs had not shown a probability of prevailing and struck the
entire complaint. Plaintiffs now challenge the trial court’s order granting the special
motion to strike. As we will explain, we will affirm the order as to most defendants. But
because we conclude plaintiffs demonstrated at least minimal merit in three causes of
action against two of the defendants, we will reverse the order as to those particular
claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Khalsa and Chahal were candidates for seats on the Parbandhak
Committee of the Sikh Gurdwara in San Jose. The Gurdwara is a religious non-profit
association, and the Parbandhak Committee serves as its board of directors. Defendants
Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, Sukhdev Singh Bainiwal, Gurinder Pal Singh, Hardev Singh
Takhar, Rajinder Singh Manger, Sohan Singh Dhanota, Pritam Singh Grewal, Surjit
Singh Bains, Kirpal Singh Atwal, Bahadur Singh Deol, Narinder Kaur Maheru,
Narinderpal Singh, Balbir Singh Bains, Dharam Singh Dhillon, Haparminder Singh
Powar, Gubux Singh Dhillon, Kuldip S. Shergill, Gurpreet Singh Sethi, Harjinder Singh
Ladhar, Pritpal Kaur, and Sharanjit K. Bandal were incumbent members of the committee
running for reelection against plaintiffs’ slate.
An election was initially scheduled for September 2019, before it was enjoined by
court order. In September 2019, the incumbent committee mailed a six-page document
entitled “Election Manifesto and Other Information” to voters’ homes. Plaintiffs allege
the document contained numerous false statements, such as that plaintiffs’ slate was “ ‘a
group of people with … criminal record’ ”; the slate had been “ ‘blessed by the Indian
Agent Jasjit Chela’ ”; members of the slate “ ‘do not have a clean record’ ” and some
“ ‘have a criminal or questionable record’ ”; Khalsa was “ ‘accused, arrested and
convicted of fraud’ ” against the United States Postal Service (USPS); and business
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partners of Khalsa “ ‘basically have cheated’ ” the Gurdwara’s congregation by using the
“ ‘hard-earned money’ ” of the congregation “ ‘for their own benefit.’ ”
Khalsa alleges defendant publication Kafla Newspaper and its managing editor,
defendant S.P. Singh, published two false statements about him in September 2019: that
he “ ‘was arrested for fraud in the USPS’ ” and “ ‘was also accused of doing unethical
transactions in transferring property.’ ” Both Khalsa and Chahal allege defendant
publication Sanjhi Soch Weekly Newspaper and defendant Boota Singh Basi, its
president and chief editor, published false statements about them in September 2019.
The September publication referenced Chahal’s “ ‘criminal background’ ” that was “ ‘full
of black deeds’ ” and said he would “ ‘start cheating and taking advantage of innocent
people at the Gurdwara’ ” if elected. It said of Khalsa that “ ‘his background is
criminal’ ”; “ ‘he was arrested for fraud by the post office’ ”; he was “ ‘criminally
prosecuted in a case for transferring properties to others’ ”; “ ‘he was handcuffed’ ”; and
his son—described as having committed rape—is “ ‘following in his father’s
footsteps[.]’ ”1
In October 2019, the Sanjhi Soch Weekly Newspaper allegedly published
additional false statements about Khalsa. The October publication stated that Khalsa “ ‘is
known because of his Black Deeds in the public’ ” and “ ‘now he is known as newspaper
thief’ ” after stealing copies of the September publication that criticized him. It also
stated that, while Khalsa wears “ ‘religious dress’ ” at the Gurdwara, “ ‘his habits are of
thieves.’ ”
Plaintiffs sued members of the committee and both newspapers for libel, false
light, and intentional interference with contractual relations. Defendants moved to strike
the complaint, arguing the claims arose from defendants’ protected activity and lacked
1
As both newspapers are published in the Punjabi language, we quote verbatim
the English translations from plaintiffs’ complaint and supporting declarations;
defendants do not appear to dispute the accuracy of those translations.
3
merit. The trial court’s initial denial of the motion was reversed on appeal and the matter
remanded for consideration of the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis: whether
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claims.
On remand, the trial court found Khalsa and Chahal were limited purpose public
figures who would need to prove “actual malice” by clear and convincing evidence to
prevail on their libel and false light claims. As evidence of defendants’ actual malice,
plaintiffs cited their letters to defendants demanding retraction of certain statements, and
a crudely dismissive response by the Sanjhi Soch Weekly Newspaper posted on social
media. The trial court found plaintiffs’ showing insufficient to state a prima facie case,
reasoning that spite or ill will “is not enough by itself to establish actual malice.” Noting
that plaintiffs had abandoned their claim of intentional interference with contractual
relations, the court granted the special motion to strike the complaint in its entirety.
II. DISCUSSION
In this second appeal, plaintiffs seek reinstatement of their libel and false light
claims. They appear to accept the trial court’s determination that they would be required
to prove actual malice as limited purpose public figures, but challenge the court’s
conclusion that they did not make a sufficient prima facie showing of actual malice.
The anti-SLAPP statute provides litigants with a “procedural remedy to dispose of
lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055–1056.) Rather than insulating litigants from any
liability arising from protected activity, the anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for
weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Courts evaluate anti-SLAPP motions in a two-step
process. First, the moving party must show the challenged claims arise from protected
activity. If the moving party meets that burden, in the second step the nonmoving party
must show a probability of prevailing on the merits. (See Navellier v. Sletten (2002)
29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [“Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP
4
statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal
merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.”].)
We review de novo the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion. (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) Given the scope of
the remand in the earlier appeal, we necessarily focus on whether plaintiffs demonstrated
a probability of prevailing on the merits. We do not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) We accept
plaintiffs’ evidence as true and consider defendants’ showing only to determine if it
defeats the claims as a matter of law. Our inquiry is limited to whether plaintiffs have
“stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment.” (Id. at pp. 384–385.)
Public figures alleging defamation must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that any false statement was made with “ ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” (New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 279–280.) We apply this heightened standard of proof
in assessing whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their
claims. (Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.) Actual malice is
evaluated subjectively; the defendant must have made the allegedly false statement with
knowledge that it was false or with actual doubt concerning its truth. (Reader’s Digest
Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 257–259, fn. 11.) “To establish a
false light claim based on a defamatory publication, a plaintiff ‘must meet the same
requirements’ as for a defamation claim.” (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652,
687.)
A. CLAIMS AGAINST INCUMBENT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Plaintiffs’ claims against the incumbent committee members are based on
statements in the “Election Manifesto and Other Information” distributed to voters to
urge support for the incumbents over plaintiffs’ slate of candidates. Some of the
5
allegedly defamatory statements refer to plaintiffs’ entire 21-person slate as a group;
some refer to other people and are not “of and concerning” Khalsa or Chahal so as to
support their libel and false light claims. (See Blatty v. New York Times Co. (1986)
42 Cal.3d 1033, 1046 [“plaintiff must effectively plead that the statement at issue either
expressly mentions him or refers to him by reasonable implication”].) For example, the
manifesto states that two of Khalsa’s former business partners “basically have cheated”
the Gurdwara’s congregation by using the “hard-earned money” of the congregation “for
their own benefit.” Although the manifesto mentions Khalsa’s connection to those two
people, Khalsa and Chahal do not explain in the complaint or in their opposition to the
anti-SLAPP motion how statements expressly mentioning only other people should be
reasonably interpreted as referring to them.
The manifesto also describes plaintiffs’ slate as a “group of people with
opportunistic, greedy, deceitful and criminal record” whose members “ ‘do not have a
clean record’ ” and asks how “[t]hose who have a criminal or questionable record” will
conduct committee business with integrity. It is undisputed that multiple members of the
slate (including Khalsa) had criminal records at the time, although Chahal apparently did
not. Chahal points to a declaration in which he states that nonspecific references to a
candidate’s “ ‘record’ ” would be interpreted in the Sikh community as referring to a
criminal record. Although the manifesto expressly refers to plaintiffs’ slate as “a group
of people with “opportunistic, greedy, deceitful and criminal record[s],” it also references
those who have such “criminal or questionable” records, suggesting there are others in the
slate who do not. A reasonable interpretation of those statements is that some members
of plaintiffs’ slate have criminal records; others have analogous character flaws; and
plaintiffs’ slate should be opposed on those grounds. Chahal’s limited evidentiary
showing does not sufficiently demonstrate a probability of establishing that the
incumbent committee members falsely accused him of having a criminal record.
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Some of the allegedly defamatory statements specifically refer to Khalsa and/or
Chahal. The manifesto states that Khalsa “was accused, arrested and convicted of fraud
in the USPS” and “was also accused of doing unethical transactions in transferring
property.” It describes plaintiffs’ slate as having been “blessed by the Indian Agent Jasjit
Chela”—a statement that could reasonably be interpreted as drawing a connection
between all 21 members of the slate and the state of India (an association that, according
to the record, would be viewed negatively in the relevant community).2 (See Mullins v.
Brando (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 409, 423, fn. 13.) But plaintiffs have not demonstrated a
probability of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the incumbent committee
members made those statements with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.
The record indicates the statements were based on similar allegations published in the
Kafla Newspaper, and plaintiffs do not allege the incumbent committee members outside
that publication disbelieved or doubted its reliability. Plaintiffs do provide a letter they
sent to defendant Bhupinder Singh Dhillon (president of the committee) demanding
retraction of numerous allegedly false statements, but the letter does not contain proof of
the statements’ falsity. Nor do plaintiffs allege that any of the committee members
responded to the letter in a manner suggesting actual malice. (Cf. Mitchell v. Twin
Galaxies, LLC (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 207, 222.) We note that even if Khalsa were able
to show the previously mentioned statements about his business partners’ purported
financial misdeeds were “of and concerning” him, those statements are not mentioned in
the demand letter and the letter thus would not support a finding that they were made
with actual malice.
2
As Chela is not a party to the case before us, the relevant question is not whether
the statement was defamatory as to him but whether it was defamatory in what it implied
about Khalsa and Chahal. The record includes a 2003 East Bay Express article
apparently contradicting the statement’s characterization of Chela as an Indian agent, but
that article would not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the 2019 statement
about Khalsa and Chahal was made with actual malice.
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Khalsa’s claim of actual malice in the statements directly mentioning him is also
contradicted by the record. A background check performed at the request of the
incumbent committee members revealed that Khalsa had been sued for fraudulently
transferring property, supporting the statement that he was “accused of doing unethical
transactions in transferring property” (which Khalsa does not appear to challenge on
appeal). The background check also revealed that Khalsa’s USPS employment was
terminated in 2002 after he was found to be operating a taxi business while collecting
workers’ compensation benefits. He alleged wrongful termination in a 2007 civil lawsuit,
stating in his complaint that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had denied
his request for reconsideration. Based on information provided by a former member of
the committee, a 2015 article in the Sanjhi Soch Weekly Newspaper said of Khalsa that
“Federal agents caught him red handed and he was handcuffed with his hands on the
back.” In a declaration, defendant Dhillon describes witnessing a television broadcast of
Khalsa being “caught” by USPS investigators in 2001. Although none of that evidence
shows that Khalsa was convicted in a criminal case for fraud against the USPS,
“laypersons not trained in the law commonly use the word ‘convicted’ to refer to civil
findings.” (Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1168.) The word
“arrested” would likewise commonly be used to describe a person being “caught” and
“handcuffed” by federal agents, as had been reported about Khalsa within the local Sikh
community. Khalsa and Chahal have not shown a probability of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that any false statements about them in the campaign materials were
made with actual malice.
B. CLAIMS AGAINST KAFLA NEWSPAPER AND MANAGING EDITOR S.P. SINGH
Khalsa alleges in the complaint that Kafla Newspaper and its managing editor S.P.
Singh falsely said he “ ‘was arrested for fraud in the USPS’ ” and “ ‘was also accused of
doing unethical transactions in transferring property.’ ” As explained in our discussion of
claims against the incumbent committee members, a background check conducted on the
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committee’s behalf revealed that Khalsa had been sued for fraudulently transferring
property. Singh states in a declaration that the Kafla Newspaper story was based on
“documentary evidence” discovered in connection with that background check, and a
complaint against Khalsa seeking to set aside a fraudulent property transfer is included in
the record. On appeal, Khalsa does not appear to challenge the trial court’s ruling as it
applies to the statement that he was “ ‘accused of doing unethical transactions in
transferring property.’ ”
As to the remaining statement from the Kafla Newspaper publication (that Khalsa
“ ‘was arrested for fraud in the USPS’ ”), Khalsa states in a declaration that he “was not
arrested nor … convicted for fraud against the US Postal Service.” Khalsa further
declares that “ ‘conviction’ and ‘arrest’ denotes a criminal proceeding” and “[t]here was
no criminal proceeding brought against me by the US Postal Service.” But his
declaration leaves open the possibility of civil proceedings or workplace investigations
involving fraud, and says nothing about the nature or extent of those possible proceedings
or investigations. (The record contains evidence that Khalsa’s USPS employment was
terminated for a fraud-related reason and others in the local Sikh community had reported
that he was “caught” by federal agents during a fraud investigation.) As one appellate
court has observed, “[f]alse statements that are completely ‘fabricated by the defendant’
or ‘so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation’
are particularly likely to have been made with actual malice” while “false statements that
have some element of truth to them are logically less susceptible to such a finding.”
(Annette F. v. Sharon S., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170.) On this record, Khalsa
cannot show that the single statement at issue is “so far from the truth as to permit an
inference of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.” (Ibid.)
The surrounding circumstances provide little support for an inference that Kafla
Newspaper and Singh knew the statement was false or harbored serious doubts about its
truth. Khalsa again points to his letter demanding that Singh retract the statement and
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several others (including the apparently true statement that Khalsa was “ ‘accused of
doing unethical transactions in transferring property’ ”); he does not allege that Singh or
anyone else affiliated with the newspaper responded in any way to the demand letter.
Khalsa argues the newspaper improperly relied on information provided by Dhillon on
behalf of the incumbent committee members roughly one week ahead of the scheduled
leadership committee election. Under the circumstances presented here, a failure to
adequately investigate does not alone support an inference of actual malice. (Cf. Khawar
v. Globe Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 276–277.) Khalsa has not shown a
probability of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the single allegedly
false statement in the Kafla Newspaper article was published with actual malice.
C. CLAIMS AGAINST SANJHI SOCH WEEKLY NEWSPAPER AND CHIEF EDITOR
BOOTA SINGH BASI
Plaintiffs allege the Sanjhi Soch Weekly Newspaper and its president and chief
editor Boota Singh Basi published false statements about them in September and October
2019. Allegedly false statements in the September publication referred to Chahal’s
“ ‘criminal background’ ” and described Khalsa as “ ‘arrested for fraud by the post
office’ ”; “ ‘handcuffed’ ”; and “ ‘criminally prosecuted in a case for transferring
properties to others.’ ” The October publication described Khalsa’s reputation for
“ ‘Black Deeds’ ” and said he had stolen copies of the September edition because he was
“ ‘unable to bear’ ” its contents (implicitly referring to the September statements about
his criminal history, see Issa v. Applegate (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 689, 702 [“a statement
of opinion that implies a false assertion of fact is actionable”]). After plaintiffs
demanded retraction of numerous allegedly false statements in the September
publication, Basi and the newspaper allegedly responded with a crude social media post.
Basi states in a declaration that the 2019 articles’ statements about Khalsa were
based on an article published in the same newspaper in 2015. That article references the
USPS fraud investigation as well as a rape it says was committed by Khalsa’s son, but
10
does not mention any property transfer or criminal prosecution involving Khalsa. Basi
identifies the source of the 2015 information as Sarabjot Duley, who at that time was a
member of the Gurdwara’s leadership committee running for reelection against Khalsa.
According to Basi, Khalsa “never objected to the information” published in any of the
articles in the five years leading up to filing the operative complaint. Basi’s declaration
does not provide a source for the September 2019 article’s statement that Chahal had a
criminal background, or otherwise address Chahal’s allegations. It also does not address
plaintiffs’ demands for retraction or Basi’s alleged response on social media.
Khalsa and Chahal have each signed declarations stating that the newspaper
falsely described their criminal records. They have also provided an uncontested English
translation of a social media post apparently made by Basi in October 2019 giving a
crude response to their retraction demands. Defendants urge the response should be
construed as showing the newspaper’s “confidence in the truth of its reporting,” and
indeed that is one possible interpretation of the evidence. But a trier of fact could
alternatively find actual malice in publishing numerous false statements about the
straightforward details of plaintiffs’ criminal records, the lack of any real explanation
about where much of the false information came from, and the tone and content of Basi’s
response to demands for retraction of the false statements. The evidence could support at
least an inference that the newspaper and Basi “acted with reckless disregard in making
the accusation[s] with no apparent support in the evidence.” (Walker v. Kiousis (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1445.)
Crediting plaintiffs’ evidence as we must, we conclude they have shown the
minimal merit necessary to proceed with their first cause of action for libel against the
newspaper and Basi. They have also shown the minimal merit necessary to proceed with
their second cause of action for libel per se. (See Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 385 [“Perhaps the clearest example of libel per se is an
accusation of crime.”].) And because their false light claim must meet the same
11
requirements as their defamation claims, they have shown the minimal merit necessary to
proceed with that third cause of action as well. Our conclusion rests on the statements
falsely characterizing plaintiffs’ criminal records. Other allegedly false statements of fact
in the same publication may constitute nonactionable statements of opinion when viewed
in isolation, but they may suggest actual malice insofar as they demonstrate ill will
toward plaintiffs. We need not consider those additional statements in detail given our
conclusion that plaintiffs may proceed on their first three causes of action with respect to
the publications containing those statements. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820–821; accord, Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 [defining a “claim for relief” as the “act or set of acts supplying a
basis for relief”].) We will reverse the order and remand for reinstatement of those three
causes of action against the newspaper and Basi.
D. PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiffs seek to challenge the trial court’s ruling on their objections to certain
evidence submitted by defendants in connection with supplemental briefing after our
previous remand. The challenged evidence appears in defendant Dhillon’s second
supplemental declaration and relates to plaintiffs’ purported sponsorship of a campaign
ad in a non-party publication. The objections are immaterial to the issues raised in this
appeal and do not affect our analysis. The challenged evidence was submitted in support
of defendants’ special motion to strike, and this appeal will fully dispose of that motion.
We therefore need not decide whether the trial court properly overruled plaintiffs’
evidentiary objections.
E. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs ask us to reverse a separate order awarding attorney fees and costs to
defendants entered after the special motion to strike was granted. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Plaintiffs do not cite to any such order in the record. The record
does contain a memorandum of costs in which defendants’ trial counsel requests
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$13,978.95 in filing and motion fees, as well as attorney fees in an amount “TBD per
motion to be filed,” but it does not appear to contain a motion or any order concerning
fees and costs. We have found the requisite merit in three causes of action against two
defendants, and that partial success in this appeal may be relevant to any request for
attorney fees and costs. But as no order awarding attorney fees and costs is properly
before us, we lack jurisdiction to act on the issue.
III. DISPOSITION
The order granting the special motion to strike is reversed. The matter is
remanded with instructions to enter a new order denying the special motion to strike as to
the complaint’s first, second, and third causes of action against defendants Sanjhi Soch
Weekly Newspaper and Boota Singh Basi; granting the special motion to strike as to the
complaint’s first, second, and third causes of action against all other defendants; and
granting the special motion to strike as to the complaint’s fourth and fifth causes of action
against all defendants. In the interest of justice, the parties shall bear their own appellate
costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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____________________________________
Grover, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________
Wilson, J.
H052385
Khalsa et al. v Dhillon et al.