Filed 9/30/26 Kennedy v. ADT Commercial CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PATRICK KENNEDY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065438
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-01388535)
ADT COMMERCIAL LLC et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly A. Knill, Judge. Dismissed.
Rissell Law, Melody Rissell Leonard; Gelb Law and Yisrael Gelb
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Littler Mendelson, Karimah J. Lamar and Carolyn G. Hudson for
Defendant and Respondent ADT Commercial LLC.
Fraser Watson & Croutch, Todd E. Croutch and Daniel K. Dik for
Defendant and Respondent Concentra Health Services, Inc.
* * *
Appellant Patrick Kennedy sued ADT Commercial LLC (ADT)1
and Concentra Health Services, Inc. (Concentra), alleging various causes of
action based on his claim that he was fired because of a physical disability.
The trial court sustained ADT’s and Concentra’s demurrers without leave to
amend except for a single cause of action for invasion of privacy. Kennedy
later filed a request for dismissal of the entire action with prejudice, which
was entered by the clerk. Kennedy then submitted a proposed judgment,
which the court rejected due to his earlier dismissal of the action.
On appeal, Kennedy argues the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrers because he alleged facts sufficient to constitute discrimination
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900
et seq.), wrongful termination as a matter of public policy, and aiding and
abetting.
We conclude the appeal must be dismissed because Kennedy’s
voluntary dismissal operated to terminate the action and forfeited the right
to challenge any orders the trial court issued prior to the entry of dismissal.
The unsigned minute order rejecting the proposed judgment is not a final
appealable judgment.
1 ADT has since changed its name to Everon, LLC. We continue
to address the company as ADT for the sake of consistency with the lower
court record.
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kennedy filed a complaint against ADT and Concentra, alleging
the following causes of action: (1) disability discrimination (Gov. Code,
§ 12940, subd. (a)), (2) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation (Gov.
Code, § 12940 subd. (k)), (3) failure to engage in a good faith interactive
process (Gov. Code, § 12940 subd. (n)), (4) failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation (Gov. Code, § 12940 subd. (m)), (5) retaliation in violation of
(FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 subd. (h)), (6) wrongful termination in violation
of public policy, (7) violation of constitutional right to privacy, (8) unlawful
medical inquiry in violation of FEHA, and (9) aiding and abetting in violation
of FEHA. Except for the wrongful termination in violation of public policy
claim, all causes of action were against ADT and Concentra.
ADT filed a demurrer to the complaint. On September 16, 2024,
the trial court sustained ADT’s demurrer to the first through fifth, eighth,
and ninth causes of action without leave to amend, sustained the demurrer
as to the sixth cause of action with leave to amend, and overruled the
demurrer as to the seventh cause of action.
Kennedy filed a first amended complaint, alleging causes of
action for: (1) disability discrimination (against Concentra), (2) failure to
prevent discrimination (against Concentra), (3) retaliation in violation of
FEHA (against Concentra), (4) wrongful termination in violation of public
policy (against ADT), (5) violation of constitutional right to privacy (against
ADT and Concentra), (6) unlawful medical inquiry in violation of FEHA
(against Concentra), and (7) aiding and abetting in violation of FEHA
(against Concentra). ADT demurred to the wrongful termination in violation
of public policy cause of action. Concentra demurred to all causes of action
against it, except for the violation of constitutional right to privacy. On
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February 14, 2025, the trial court sustained ADT’s demurrer to the wrongful
termination claim without leave to amend. On February 21, 2025, the court
sustained Concentra’s demurrer on the first, second, third, sixth, and seventh
causes of action without leave to amend. As a result, the only remaining
claim against ADT and Concentra was the fifth cause of action for violation of
the constitutional right to privacy.
On March 4, 2025, Kennedy filed a request for dismissal with
prejudice as to the “[e]ntire action of all parties and all causes of action.” The
court clerk entered the dismissal as requested on the same day. On March 18,
2025, Kennedy submitted a proposed judgment. On March 20, 2025, the trial
court rejected the proposed judgment in an unsigned minute order, noting
that the entire action had been dismissed on March 4, 2025.
Kennedy filed a notice of appeal, appealing from the trial court’s
orders of September 16, 2024, February 14, 2025, February 21, 2025, and
March 20, 2025.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether an order or judgment is appealable presents “‘“a
question of law”’” that is subject to “‘the non-deferential, de novo standard [of
review].’” (Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc.
(2026) 20 Cal.5th 91, 97 (Maniago); see Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real
Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 759, 762.)
II.
THERE IS NO FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER
Appellate courts have jurisdiction over a direct appeal only where
there is an appealable order or judgment. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices
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Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696; Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121,
126 [an appealable order or judgment “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
appeal”].) The “right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor
Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5; Griset, at p. 696 [“A trial
court’s order is appealable when it is made so by statute”].) With certain
exceptions not applicable here, “appealable judgments and orders are listed
in Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.”2 (Walker v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 19.)
Because we conclude that Kennedy’s voluntary request for
dismissal with prejudice operated to terminate the action and the unsigned
minute order rejecting a proposed judgment submitted by Kennedy is not a
final appealable order, we must dismiss the appeal.3
A. Kennedy’s Voluntary Dismissal of the Action Operated to Terminate the
Action
“Section 581 permits a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim
prior to the ‘actual commencement of trial.’ [Citation.] As used in section 581,
the phrase ‘commencement of trial’ has been interpreted to include pretrial
rulings that ‘effectively dispose’ of the claim at issue.” (Maniago, supra,
20 Cal.5th at p. 98.) “[A] plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss a claim after a
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3 We invited the parties to file letter briefs addressing whether
the March 20, 2025, order rejecting a proposed judgment submitted by
Kennedy constituted an appealable order or judgment. Additionally, after the
California Supreme Court decided Maniago, we invited the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing the impact of the opinion on the instant case.
We have read and considered the parties’ letter briefs and supplemental
briefs.
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demurrer has been ‘sustained without leave to amend, or . . . sustained with
leave to amend and the plaintiff fails to amend within the time allowed by
the court.’” (Ibid., quoting Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Lynx Iron Corp.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 67, 76 (Lewis C.).) “A voluntary dismissal ‘“is
accomplished by filing with the clerk a written request therefor. If in proper
form, the dismissal is effective immediately.’”” (Maniago, at p. 98, quoting
S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 380 (S.B. Beach).)
Voluntary dismissal of an action on a plaintiff’s request is
generally deemed a ministerial act, not a judicial one, from which no appeal
will lie. (H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
1357, 1365; see S.B. Beach, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 380 [voluntary dismissal is
not appealable]). “Respecting appealability, ‘there is no kinship of a voluntary
dismissal to a final judgment. A willful dismissal terminates the action for all
time and affords the appellate court no jurisdiction to review rulings on
demurrers or motions made prior to the dismissal.’” (Yancey v. Fink (1991)
226 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1343; see Maniago, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 98.)
““‘Alternatively stated, [a] voluntary dismissal . . . deprives the court of both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction [over the dismissed claims], except
for the limited purpose of awarding costs and . . . attorney fees.’”” (Maniago,
at p. 99, quoting Lewis C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 76.)
In addition to violating the rules governing voluntary dismissals,
permitting an appeal here would violate the principles of the one final
judgment rule. (Maniago, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 102.) “Codified in section
904.1, subdivision (a)(1), ‘the one final judgment rule . . . precludes an appeal
from a judgment disposing of fewer than all the causes of action extant
between the parties . . . . The theory of the rule is that “‘piecemeal disposition
and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and
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that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the
case.’”’” (Maniago, at p. 101, quoting Kurwa v. Kislinger (2013) 57 Cal.4th
1097, 1101.) Allowing an appeal here would encourage “piecemeal appellate
review that the final judgment rule is designed to avoid.” (Maniago, at
p. 101.)
Here, even though Kennedy had one remaining cause of action
for violation of constitutional right to privacy, he voluntarily dismissed the
entire action with prejudice, which terminated the action and forfeited his
right to appeal. (See Maniago, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 99 [“[T]he effect of the
Maniagos’ voluntary dismissal was not to confer jurisdiction on the appellate
court, but rather to terminate the action and forfeit any right to appeal”].)
In this case, although the trial court sustained the demurrers
without leave to amend as to a majority of the claims, Kennedy’s cause of
action for invasion of privacy had not been foreclosed. Thus, as in Maniago,
we lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, like this one, which was taken
after a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of an entire action following an
order sustaining in part and overruling in part a demurrer.
B. The Unsigned Minute Order Rejecting the Proposed Judgment Is Not
Appealable
For a “dismissal” to constitute a judgment and be effective for all
purposes, including the right to appeal, it “shall be in the form of a written
order signed by the court and filed in the action.” (§ 581d, italics added.)
“Thus, ‘[a]n order that is not signed by the trial court does not qualify as a
judgment of dismissal under section 581d.’” (Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 759, 766.) Accordingly, the March 20, 2025, unsigned
minute order rejecting the proposed judgment does not constitute a final
appealable order under section 581d.
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Kennedy’s letter brief acknowledges that the trial court did not
enter a signed order of dismissal but argues we should nevertheless consider
his appeal. Kennedy argues that the March 20, 2025, order was in fact a final
and appealable order, citing Matthai v. Kennedy (1906) 148 Cal. 699, 700 and
Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 303–304. However, those cases
were decided under a prior version of section 581d, which, unlike the current
version, permitted an unsigned minute order of dismissal. (See Powell v.
County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1578 [“‘prior to 1963, under
section 581d a dismissal in the form of a[n unsigned] minute order was
proper’”].)
Kennedy could have sought expedited review by means of a
petition for writ of mandate. A petition for writ of mandate is the traditional
method for challenging an interlocutory order where “‘the plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law and will otherwise suffer irreparable injury.’”
(Maniago, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 102; §§ 1085, 1086; Los Angeles Gay &
Lesbian Center v. Superior Court (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 288, 299–300.) “Writ
relief may be appropriate, for example, ‘when it appears that the trial court
has deprived a party of an opportunity to plead his cause of action or defense,
and when extraordinary relief may prevent a needless and expensive trial
and reversal.’” (Maniago, at p. 102.) Kennedy argues that this is precisely
what occurred here when the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers
without leave to amend to all but a single cause of action.
However, an argument like this is “properly presented through a
petition for writ of mandate, not a direct appeal of a voluntary dismissal.”
(Maniago, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 102.) Because “[t]he interests of clients,
counsel, and the courts are best served by maintaining, to the extent possible,
bright-line rules which distinguish between appealable and nonappealable
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orders” (Mid-Wilshire Associates v. O’Leary (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1455–
1456), we respect the “[s]trong policy reasons” that underlie the one final
judgment rule (id. at p. 1455). Accordingly, we decline to exercise our
discretion to treat Kennedy’s appeal as a writ proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Respondents are
entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
SERVINO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
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