Filed 7/16/26 Karraa v. Outfront Media CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ANTON KARRAA et al., B336899
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCP04014)
v.
OUTFRONT MEDIA, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant,
THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
Miller Starr Regalia, Arthur F. Coon, Anthony M. Leones,
Angela J. Yu, James L. Swearingen; Davis Wright Tremaine,
James R. Sigel, Mary H. Haas and Daniel H. Leigh for Defendant
and Appellant.
Raymond N. Haynes, Jr., for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
No appearance by Defendant City of Los Angeles.
_________________________
INTRODUCTION
Appellant asks us to reverse the trial court’s order denying
its special motion to strike the causes of action for waste and
violation of the Unfair Competition Law as a strategic lawsuit
against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16.
We find appellant moving party failed to make a threshold
showing that the two challenged causes of action arise from
protected activity at prong one of the anti-SLAPP test. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Anton Karraa (Karraa) is president of plaintiff
Rabadi Service Station, Inc. (Rabadi), a corporation that owns
and operates an Exxon Mobile gas station at 6301 Santa Monica
Boulevard in the City of Los Angeles (the City). There are two
advertising signs, i.e., billboards, at Rabadi’s gas station; we refer
to them as billboard #1 and billboard #2.
Defendant Outfront Media, LLC (Outfront) is a California
limited liability company “engaged in the outdoor advertising
business in the City.” Outfront is one of the nation’s largest
outdoor advertising companies. Until August 31, 2019, Outfront
operated billboard #1 at Rabadi’s gas station pursuant to a
written license agreement between the parties’ predecessors-in-
interest.
Plaintiff J. Keith Stephens (Stephens) is the president of
plaintiff outdoor advertising company, Virtual Media, Inc.
(Virtual). He has developed and operated billboards for more
than three decades.
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B. The Civil Complaint
On December 7, 2020, Karraa, Rabadi, Stephens, and
Virtual (collectively plaintiffs) filed a complaint alleging one
cause of action against the City for writ of mandate and three
causes of action against Outfront for violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.),
waste, and private nuisance. We discuss the information
pertaining to the causes of action against Outfront for waste and
UCL violation, as those are at issue on appeal.
The complaint alleges:
The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) includes a series
of ordinances regulating the construction and operation of all
signs. Since 2002, the City has purported to prohibit all new off-
site signs (i.e., billboards); this ordinance is known as the “Sign
Ban.” LAMC section 14.4.4, subdivision (B)(11) provides that
signs are prohibited if they are “off-site signs, including off-site
digital displays” but it specified exceptions—this prohibition does
not apply to: 1) alterations that conform to LAMC section
91.6216; 2) off-site signs specifically permitted pursuant to a
relocation agreement (per Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5412); or 3) off-site
signs and off-site digital displays that are permitted based on a
legally adopted specific plan or approved development agreement.
Typically, an outdoor advertising company may earn
between $30,000 and $50,000 a month from a single billboard site
yet pay the owner of the site only $500 per month. “Many
property owners who merely seek fair market value on a ground
lease for a Billboard site are immediately threatened with the
removal of the existing Billboard. Because of . . . the purported
Sign Ban, . . . outdoor advertising companies can merely ‘relocate’
to another site next door and prevent any new sign from being
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installed at the prior site.” As a result, the owner of the site finds
itself “in a ‘take it or leave it’ situation” without power to raise
rent to fair market value.
Billboard #1 has been in existence at Rabadi’s gas station
for more than two decades. It was constructed in 1997 by an
outdoor advertising company (not Outfront), subject to a license
agreement that has been renewed and amended several times
since. With the license set to expire on August 31, 2019, Rabadi
contacted Outfront and sought a fair rent increase. Outfront
rebuffed Rabadi’s efforts and refused to negotiate in good faith.
Outfront has “thousands of [b]illboards in the City and hundreds
of thousand[s] around the county” and “threaten[ed] to just tear
down [billboard #1] that has become a legal, non-conforming
structure”1 given the Sign Ban.
Karraa contacted Stephens/Virtual to ascertain if he could
obtain “more reasonable rent.” They “came to a mutually
acceptable agreement to operate at the site of [billboard #1] when
Outfront’s license expired.” Similarly, they reached a separate
agreement about billboard #2, also operated by Outfront, for
which the license was set to soon expire.
When Outfront learned of the new contract between Rabadi
and Virtual, Outfront “told Rabadi unambiguously that if [it] did
not renege on [its] agreement with Virtual and to a far lower rent
[with Outfront], they would punish [Rabadi] by removing the
1 LAMC section 91.6216.1: “Every existing sign and/or sign
support structure constructed under a valid permit and used in
conformance with these regulations and Department approvals in
effect at the time of construction shall be allowed to continue to
exist under those regulations and approvals even though
subsequent adopted regulations and approvals have changed the
requirements.” (Italics added.)
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large steel pole that supported [billboard #1] for more than two
decades and seek to prevent any other [b]illboard from ever being
operated at the [gas station].” The large steel pole/column
supporting the billboard is “generally not reusable” with a scrap
value of “no more than $5000 to $7500.” Virtual offered to buy
the steel pole from Outfront for $180,000, which would have
saved Outfront “the $20,000 to $30,000 cost of removal.”
Outfront did not respond to the purchase offer and instead
“applied to the City’s Building Department for a permit to remove
the existing pole.”
Under the heading entitled, “The Unfair Business Tactic of
Defendant Outfront,” the complaint alleges: Outfront’s permit
application was made “without the knowledge or permission of
Rabadi or Karraa.” When Karraa learned of the application and
before any permit was issued, he objected telephonically and in
writing to the City and informed them that “the owner of the
[site] had not consented to the issuance of such a permit.” The
complaint further alleges, “In terms of evaluating whether
Outfront’s actions constituted an unfair business practice . . . , it
should be noted that what Outfront did is a misdemeanor”
pursuant to LAMC section 91.103.2.2
The City issued the permit to Outfront without responding
to the complaints of Karraa/Rabadi. Karraa called the City’s
Building Department “before Outfront acted on the wrongfully
2 LAMC section 91.103.2 provides: “Every person who
knowingly and willfully procures a building and/or grading
permit without the consent of the owner of record of the property
for which the permit is issued, or such person’s agent, is guilty of
a misdemeanor.” (Italics added.)
5
issued permit,” and demanded its cancellation. The City did not
respond to the written objection or follow-up calls.
Having obtained the demolition permit, Outfront “fulfilled
its threat to remove the above ground portions” of billboard #1 off
the service station; it “left untouched all of the underground
portions, including the support column and cement foundation,
which extends 30 to 40 feet below ground.”
Plaintiffs filed a permit application to alter, repair, or
rehabilitate billboard #1 by replacing “only the above ground
portions [i.e., the steel column] that had been dismantled by
Outfront.” The “below ground portion [of billboard #1] would cost
approximately $250,000 to $300,000 to install, while replacing
the above ground portions would cost approximately $150,000 to
$200,000. In other words, more than 50 percent of the structure
in terms of its cost remains in place on the [gas station].” The
50 percent figure is “highly significant, because LAMC [sections
91.6216.4.1 through 91.6216.4.3] provides that legal, non-
conforming [b]illboards may be ‘altered, repaired or rehabilitated’
so long as the cost of the work does not exceed 50 percent of the
replacement cost and there is no increase in height or size.”
The City “wrongfully denied” plaintiffs’ permit application
based on the Sign Ban’s prohibition of new billboard construction.
Plaintiffs initiated an administrative appeal with the City’s
Board of Building and Safety Commissioners (the City’s Board)
and later filed the underlying complaint.
Under the heading for the UCL violation cause of action,
the complaint provides: “The wrongful conduct . . . including the
intimidation of property owners to demand below market rents,
constitutes unlawful, fraudulent and unfair business acts and
practices.” Outfront’s conduct “is representative of their business
6
practices in that they regularly take unlawful, fraudulent or
unfair steps to prevent local property owners from obtaining fair
market value for ground leases.” Plaintiffs suffered “as a result
[of] the violations of law and other wrongful conduct of these
[d]efendants.” Plaintiffs requested that Outfront be enjoined
from engaging in such wrongful conduct as it related to billboard
#2 on Rabadi’s gas station (as its license will soon end) and
requested restitution of “all monies that [Outfront] avoided
paying in ground lease rent by their unfair, illegal and fraudulent
efforts to depress such rents below actual fair market value,” as
well as reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Under the heading for the waste cause of action, the
complaint provides: Outfront “committed waste and damaged the
[gas station] unreasonably” via its intentional harm to billboard
#1. In the event the harm may be repaired, plaintiffs sought
damages including loss of revenue to Virtual and loss of rent to
Rabadi during the time of such repairs. In the event Outfront’s
harm cannot be repaired, plaintiffs sought damages including the
diminished value of the gas station for “the minimum amount of
one million dollars to Rabadi and loss of revenue to Virtual.”
Plaintiffs further sought an award of treble damages pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 732, given Outfront’s intentional
and willful waste “designed as a warning to any property owner
who might demand a fair market rent” and “only made possible
through the commission of a crime and the making of a false
statement to City officials.” Plaintiffs sought an award of treble
damages as “highly appropriate” in this instance given that the
waste was “intentional” and “punitive in nature.” Plaintiffs also
asked the court to issue a prohibitory injunction requiring
Outfront “to avoid damaging” billboard #2.
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With respect to the City, plaintiffs allege the denial of their
permit application to repair or replace the billboard was unlawful
and sought a writ of mandate pursuant to LAMC section
91.6216.4 requiring the City to issue said permit. “Based on the
conduct of Outfront in connection with [billboard #1] and the
City’s refusal to follow its own LAMC, [p]laintiffs have a well
founded concern that the City will again violate the LAMC and
issue to Outfront a permit over the objections of the property
owner to damage [billboard #2].” Plaintiffs thus sought a writ of
mandate commanding the City to cease violating its duties and
obligations under the LAMC.
Finally, the complaint provides that Outfront “will attempt
to justify its action based on its alleged right under the license to
remove the billboard at the end of the term.” Plaintiffs allege
that while “the license does speak in paragraph [8] about the sign
company removing the structure at the end of the term, it
imposes two major conditions,” including that the real property
“be restored to a condition acceptable to the property owner
rather than to the sign company” and “[t]hat the property be
restored to the same condition it was in when the [b]illboard was
installed.” (Boldface omitted.) Outfront’s actions were “not the
exercise of a legitimate contractual right . . . but instead a
malicious and punitive act of vandalism.”
The complaint included as exhibits:
1) The license agreement between the parties’ predecessors-
in-interest for billboard #1, for the term December 1, 2010 until
November 30, 2015, which “shall continue thereafter on a month
to month basis, subject to the termination rights of either party
contained in this License.” Either party “may terminate this
License . . . upon thirty (30) days prior written notice delivered to
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the non-terminating party. In the event of such termination,
Licensee shall remove the Sign including, but not limited to the
above-grade and below-grade sign structures, illumination
facilities and utility connections, and all other appurtenances
thereto, and Licensee shall restore the Property to its condition
prior to the Effective Date in a manner acceptable to Licensor,
ordinary wear and tear excepted . . . . If Licensee fails to perform
its obligations . . . , Licensor, in its sole discretion, shall have the
right, but not the obligation, to remove all such signs, structures,
and any appurtenances thereto and restore the Property to such
satisfactory condition at the sole cost and expense of Licensee.”
(Italics added.)
2) The lease agreement dated November 16, 2018 between
Karraa/Rabadi and Stephens/Virtual for a term of 15 years,
where Stephens agreed to pay Karraa $7,000 per month. Virtual/
Stephens “shall be responsible for the cost to acquire the sign or
to rebuild it in an amount not to exceed $150,000.”
3) The license agreement between the parties’ predecessors-
in-interest regarding billboard #2.
4) The lease agreement dated October 26, 2020 between
Karraa/Rabadi and Stephens/Virtual regarding billboard #2,
specifying monthly rent for $3,500.
C. Special Motion to Strike
On February 19, 2021, Outfront filed a special motion to
strike the causes of action for waste and UCL violation in
plaintiffs’ complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public
participation under the anti-SLAPP statute, citing Code of Civil
9
Procedure3 section 425.16. Outfront also requested an attorney
fees award should it prevail on its motion.
The declaration of Cameron Hall—Outfront’s real estate
representative since August 2018—filed in support of the anti-
SLAPP motion, provides: “Upon Rabadi’s termination of the
License Agreement, [Outfront] proceeded with the removal of one
of the two billboards . . . from the [gas] station, as required,
agreed, and consented to under the License Agreement. Before
[Outfront] could remove its billboard, however, the City . . .
regulations required it to apply for a permit from the City’s
Department of Building and Safety approving such removal.”
The City approved Outfront’s permit application on August 22,
2019. Outfront’s permit application, attached as an exhibit to
Hall’s declaration, includes the following relevant language,
followed by Hall’s signature: “By signing below, I certify that . . .
[t]his permit is being obtained with the consent of the legal owner
of the property.” (Italics added.) The permit application identifies
Rabadi as the owner.
On September 21, 2023, plaintiffs filed their opposition to
Outfront’s anti-SLAPP motion. They argued their claims “are not
predicated on the permit application but on the damage done by
Outfront to their reversionary interest in the real property.”
“Outfront’s intentional and malicious destruction of a legal
nonconforming use is the basis for plaintiffs’ complaint and not
its unauthorized application for a building permit.” (Boldface
and some capitalization omitted.)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
10
The declaration of Stephens, filed in support of plaintiffs’
opposition, provides: Karraa “explained to me that he had been
unable to negotiate a renewal of the lease for the Subject
Billboard at a fair market value and that all his efforts to do so
had been utterly ignored by Outfront. Mr. Karraa . . . told me
that Outfront had threatened [to] just tear down the Subject
Billboard if he did not accept the amount of rent they were
willing to offer.” On August 1, 2019, Stephens emailed Outfront
and gave a 30-day written notice of termination (attached as an
exhibit) regarding its operation of billboard #1. On August 13,
2019, Stephens sent Outfront “written authorization [he] had
received from Mr. Karraa to terminate the lease.” Stephens sent
another letter (attached as an exhibit) offering to pay Outfront
$180,000 to leave billboard #1 in place at the time it vacated the
gas station. Having received no response from Outfront,
Stephens “checked the status of the [gas station] on the official
website of the [City’s] Department of Building and Safety” and
“discovered that the website showed . . . Outfront had applied . . .
for a permit to demolish the Subject Billboard.” On August 20,
2019, Stephens mailed a copy of Karraa’s letter to the City’s
Building Department (attached as an exhibit), stating: “I do not
authorize issuance of the demolition permit to the billboard
company and want it cancelled if it has already been issued.
[Stephens] has my authority to act on my behalf.” Stephens
telephoned the City’s Building Department and spoke with Sam
Chang “the same day to explain that the owner of the real
property had not consented to the issuance of any permit to
demolish the structure.” Stephens also called Outfront’s real
estate representative Hall and “demanded that the permit be
cancelled and that Outfront leave [billboard #1] undamaged.” On
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August 26, 2019, Outfront sent a construction crew and removed
the above ground components of billboard #1.
D. Trial Court’s Ruling
On January 19, 2024, the trial court denied Outfront’s
special motion to strike. As to the first prong, the court found
Outfront had not met its burden to show that plaintiffs’ causes of
action for UCL violation and intentional waste arise from
protected conduct. “[B]y its express terms, the waste claim is
based on, and arises out of, the removal of the billboard . . . itself.
While the procurement of a permit was part of the removal, the
act of filing for the permit is only incidental to the harm alleged.”
“Here, the pursuit of a . . . permit is collateral to the parties’
dispute. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ [c]omplaint is that the
license agreement did not require removal and that Defendant
needed to obtain Plaintiffs’ consent before it removed the
billboard. The thrust of Defendant’s defense is that the license
agreement required removal, and that the license agreement
itself expressly provided Defendant’s consent for removal.”
“Moreover, while Plaintiffs allege that Defendant committed a
misdemeanor by falsely representing that it had Defendant’s
consent to remove the billboard, Plaintiff is not actually claiming
harm based on the filing of the permit itself, but on the removal
of which the permit was only a necessary procedural step. While
the removal could not have been lawfully conducted without the
permit this does not mean that the overall thrust of Plaintiffs’
[c]omplaint is the permit process.” “[T]he permit application
allegations are collateral ones which provide context for the
breach of contract dispute, and aren’t themselves a basis for
recovery.” (Italics added.) Having found that Outfront failed to
meet prong one of the anti-SLAPP statute, the trial court did not
12
reach prong two, that is, whether plaintiffs demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on their claims.
Outfront timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Outfront contends it “established that Plaintiffs’
UCL and waste claims both arose from protected activity—
namely, Outfront’s application to [the City’s Building
Department] for a permit to remove the billboard, which
Plaintiffs claim was unfair, fraudulent, and illegal. The trial
court concluded otherwise only by committing two errors of law.
First, it focused on the ‘gravamen’ or ‘essence’ of Plaintiffs’ causes
of action as a whole, rather than assessing whether Plaintiffs
sought relief based at least in part on Outfront’s permit
application. Second, it treated Plaintiffs’ mere allegation that
Outfront’s permit application was criminal as though that were a
conclusively established fact. Because, under the proper
analysis, Plaintiffs’ claims arose from protected conduct,
Plaintiffs bore the burden of producing evidence to demonstrate
they have a probability of prevailing. Plaintiffs did not come
close to meeting that burden.”
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a special motion
to strike pursuant to section 425.16. (Monster Energy Co. v.
Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788; Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)
“In other words, we employ the same two-pronged procedure as
the trial court in determining whether the anti-SLAPP motion
was properly granted.” (Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection
Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652.) We consider
13
“the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(2).) In considering the pleadings and declarations, we
do not make credibility determinations or compare the weight of
the evidence; instead, we accept the opposing party’s evidence as
true and evaluate the moving party’s evidence only to determine
if it has defeated the opposing party’s evidence as a matter of
law. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th
260, 269, fn. 3.)
Because our review on appeal is de novo, we do not rely on
the trial court’s reasoning below; accordingly, Outfront’s
contention that the trial court applied “an abrogated ‘gravamen’
standard” is immaterial.
B. Applicable Law
Section 425.16 provides, inter alia, that “[a] cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) An “ ‘act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech’ ” is
defined in section 425.16 to include, in relevant part, “any
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an
issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”
(Id., subd. (e)(2).) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation
under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the
substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons
14
having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266.)
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to prevent and
deter “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Thus, the purpose of
the anti-SLAPP law is “not [to] insulate defendants from any
liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or
speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early
stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).)
When a party moves to strike a cause of action under the
anti-SLAPP law, a trial court evaluates the special motion to
strike by implementing a two-prong test: (1) has the moving
party “made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of
action arises from protected activity” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056); and if it has, (2) has the non-moving
party demonstrated that the challenged cause of action has
“ ‘minimal merit’ ” by making “a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain” a judgment in its favor? (Baral, supra,
1 Cal.5th at pp. 384–385; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 93–94; see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)). Thus, after the first
prong is satisfied by the moving party, “the burden [then] shifts
to the [non-moving party] to demonstrate that each challenged
claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and
factually substantiated.” (Baral, at p. 396.)
C. Anti-SLAPP Prong One: Arising from Protected
Activity
Outfront contends plaintiffs’ complaint advances UCL and
waste claims that arise from Outfront’s protected permit
15
application. Outfront’s initial burden at step one is to show that
plaintiffs’ causes of action for UCL violation and waste arise from
protected conduct/activity. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)
There is no question that submitting permit applications to
the City, an executive body, is petitioning activity protected by
section 425.16, subdivision (e). (See Midland Pacific Building
Corp v. King (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 264, 272 [“submission of the
High Density Tract Map to the planning commission and city
counsel” are acts “in the course of an official proceeding and were
clearly in furtherance of [defendant]s’ right of petition and free
speech.”]; see M.F. Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co., Inc.
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180, 194–195 (M.F. Farming Co.),
disapproved on other grounds in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 396, fn. 11 [site plans for the development of defendant’s
property submitted to the City of Watsonville in connection with
its permitting process qualifies as an official proceeding per
§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)]; see also City of Costa Mesa v. D'Alessio
Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 373 [the City of
Costa Mesa’s planning department qualifies as “an executive
body” per § 425.16, subd. (e)(2)].) Outfront is correct in that
regard.
Outfront is, however, incorrect in its assertion that
plaintiffs’ claims for UCL violation and waste arise from this
protected conduct. We explain why.
“The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity
each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity
is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim may be struck
only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading
to some different act for which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To
16
determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts
must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] Courts then must
evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these actions
fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884, second italics added
(Wilson); see also Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni); see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive
Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769, 783.)
Our preliminary task is to identify the alleged conduct or
activity by Outfront that supplies the elements of plaintiffs’
causes of action and forms the basis for Outfront’s liability.
(Willis v. The Walt Disney Co. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1013
(Willis); see Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
1. Cause of Action for UCL Violation
We begin with the UCL claim.
The scope of the UCL is broad. (Willis, supra,
115 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.) The UCL does not proscribe specific
acts, but broadly prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair
competition, which it defines as “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue
or misleading advertising.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; Kwikset
Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320 (Kwikset).)
Because the statute is framed in the disjunctive, a business
practice or act need only meet one of the three criteria—unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent—to be considered unfair competition. (Hale
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1381 (Hale);
Willis, at p. 1013.) Therefore, an act or practice is “unfair
17
competition” under the UCL if it is forbidden by law or, even if
not specifically prohibited by law, is deemed an unfair act or
practice. (Hale, at p. 1381.) Virtually any law—federal, state or
local—can serve as a predicate for an action under Business and
Professions Code section 17200. (Hale, at p. 1383.) The purpose
of the UCL “is to protect both consumers and competitors by
promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and
services.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949; see
Kwikset, at p. 320.)
To validly state a claim for violation of the UCL, the
complaint must specify 1) a proscribed activity—a business act or
practice forbidden by law or, even if not specifically prohibited by
law, is unfair or fraudulent (Hale, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1381; see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200); 2) actual injury—private
party suffered an injury in fact and has lost money or property
sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17204; Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v.
Expungement Assistance Services (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 544,
555); and 3) causation—party must establish that the economic
injury was the result of or caused by the unfair business practice
(Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 322).
Here, the section entitled “Preliminary Allegations” in
plaintiffs’ complaint provides context, in great detail, about the
Sign Ban and how because of it, “Many property owners who
merely seek fair market value on a ground lease for a Billboard
site are immediately threatened with the removal of the existing
Billboard. Because of . . . the purported Sign Ban, . . . outdoor
advertising companies can merely ‘relocate’ to another site next
door and prevent any new sign from being installed at the prior
site.” As a result, the owner of the site finds itself “in a ‘take it or
18
leave it’ situation” without power to raise rent to fair market
value. The complaint alleges Outfront unfairly rebuffed Rabadi’s
efforts seeking a fair rent increase and refused to negotiate as it
has “thousands of [b]illboards in the City and hundreds of
thousand[s] around the county” and “threaten[ed] to just tear
down [billboard #1] that has become a legal, non-conforming
structure” given the Sign Ban. The complaint also alleges that
upon learning of the new contract between Rabadi and Virtual,
Outfront told Rabadi “if [it] did not renege on [its] agreement
with Virtual and to a far lower rent [with Outfront], they would
punish [Rabadi] by removing the large steel pole that supported
[billboard #1] for more than two decades and seek to prevent any
other [b]illboard from ever being operated at the [gas station].”
Despite more than one offer from Karraa/Rabadi and
Stephens/Virtual to purchase the steel pole from Outfront which
would have saved Outfront the $20,000 to $30,000 cost of
removal, Outfront ignored communications, obtained a permit to
remove the billboard’s pole, and “fulfilled its threat to remove the
above ground portions” of billboard #1 from Rabadi’s gas station.
In doing so, Outfront “[i]ntimidat[ed] other small property
owners in order to discourage them from also seeking a fair
rental value,” “[c]ontinu[ed] its regular business practice of
artificially suppressing rents on the thousands of [billboard] sites
that it leases in the City,” and “[p]unish[ed] Karraa and Rabadi
for seeking a fair rental value.”
These allegations regarding Outfront’s oppressive and
threatening acts and conduct—not Outfront’s permit
application—form the basis for Outfront’s liability for unfair
business practice. (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 872, 907 [“an ‘unfair’ practice is one that offends
19
established public policy, that is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, or that
has an impact on the victim that outweighs defendant’s reasons,
justifications, and motives for the practice”]; Pastoria v.
Nationwide Ins. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1498; see Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 186–187, italics added [“[T]o guide courts
and the business community adequately and to promote
consumer protection, we must require that any finding of
unfairness to competitors under section 17200 be tethered to
some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or
threatened impact on competition.”]; see Smith v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718
[“ ‘ “the court must weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct
against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim” ’ ”].)
Rabadi allegedly suffered actual injury in that it “damaged the
[gas station] unreasonably” and caused both loss of rent to
Rabadi, loss of revenue for Stephens/Virtual, as well as
diminished the value of the gas station for the minimum amount
of one million dollars to Rabadi.
Nonetheless, we agree with Outfront that plaintiffs’ UCL
claim also arises, at least in part, from Outfront’s protected act of
submitting a permit application. A fair reading of the complaint
demonstrates there is a claim for unlawful UCL violation based
on Outfront’s filing of the permit application, in addition to the
unfair UCL violation based on Outfront’s threatening conduct
with respect to both billboards. Under the heading of the
complaint entitled “second cause of action” for “[v]iolation of
[UCL],” plaintiffs discuss Outfront’s “wrongful conduct . . .
including the intimidation of property owners to demand below
20
market rents” and how it “constitutes unlawful, fraudulent and
unfair business acts and practices.” (Italics added.) The
complaint provides that plaintiffs suffered “as a result of the
violations of law and other wrongful conduct of these
defendants.” (Italics added.) The cause of action for UCL
violation “refer[s] to and incorporate[s] . . . by reference” all
preceding paragraphs, including: “In terms of evaluating whether
Outfront’s actions constituted an unfair business practice . . . , it
should be noted that what Outfront did is a misdemeanor”
pursuant to LAMC section 91.103.2 (i.e., the knowing and willful
procurement of a permit without the consent of the property
owner). These are not allegations of protected activity that
merely provide context or are incidental. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 394.)
In fact, plaintiffs advance theories of liability under all
three of the UCL’s prongs—unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent.
Plaintiffs confirm this in their brief on appeal, in their argument
for prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis: “The UCL claim is
predicated on both unlawful and unfair business practices.
Outfront violated [LAMC] section 91.103.2, which expressly
prohibits the procurement of a building permit without the
consent of the property owner and classifies such conduct as a
misdemeanor. This violation alone satisfies the ‘unlawful’ prong
of the UCL. . . . Furthermore, by submitting a permit application
under penalty of perjury falsely claiming the property owner’s
consent, Outfront engaged in fraudulent conduct within the
meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200.”
(Italics added.) Thus, the UCL cause of action, with respect to its
unlawful and fraudulent components, rests on Outfront’s
protected activity of submitting a permit application to the City.
21
Courts frequently refer to a count that alleges both
protected and unprotected activity as a “ ‘mixed cause of action’ ”
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382), “that is, a cause of action that
rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute
protected activity and some of which do not” (Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1010). An anti-SLAPP motion may be used to
attack specific allegations constituting a claim within a pleaded
count. (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo
World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 43 (Newport
Offices).) Baral considered and disapproved a line of cases that
had held an anti-SLAPP “motion lies only to strike an entire
count as pleaded in the complaint.” (Baral, at p. 382.) “Such a
rule would allow a plaintiff, through artful pleading, to shield
particular allegations of protected activity, themselves sufficient
to give rise to a claim for relief, from a motion to strike by
intermingling them with unprotected acts.” (Bonni, at p. 1010.)
“Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to evaluating
whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff,
arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead, courts
should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts
supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a
single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are
protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the
requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Ibid.) “The
defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim
rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a
statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Id. at
p. 1009.)
While Outfront may seek to strike some of the allegations
in the mixed UCL violation claims, it is “not entitled to wholesale
22
dismissal of these claims under the anti-SLAPP law.” (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1004; see Newport Offices, supra,
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 48 [“under Baral, an anti-SLAPP motion
may be directed to specific allegations of protected activity which
constitute claims for relief but do not constitute an entire cause of
action as pleaded.”].) Where the motion to strike is directed to
the entire complaint or cause of action, the trial court must deny
the motion if there is any claim that does not arise from protected
activity; the burden is on the moving party to identify the specific
claims based on protected activity that it seeks to strike. “This is
crucial because complaints frequently include claims arising from
protected activity alongside claims arising from unprotected
activity, as well as ‘so-called “mixed cause[s] of action” that
combine[] allegations of activity protected by the statute with
allegations of unprotected activity.’ ” (Park v. Nazari (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1107, quoting Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 381.) Although a court may grant a motion to strike individual
allegations of protected activity within a mixed cause of action, a
court is not required to do so if the movant has taken the position
that the entire cause of action arises from protected activity and
requests that the entire cause of action be stricken. (See Park v.
Nazari, at p. 1106; see Dalrada Fin. Corp. v. Bonar (S.D. Cal.,
July 16, 2025, No. 24-cv-2166-WQH-BLM) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136766 at p. *30.) More specifically, the court is “not required to
take on the burden of identifying the allegations susceptible to a
special motion to strike. . . . [T]he defendant must propose where
to make the incisions.” (Park v. Nazari, at p. 1109.)
Notwithstanding the allegations of unprotected and
protected conduct in connection with the UCL cause of action,
Outfront moved to strike the cause of action “in [its] entirety.”
23
Outfront remained steadfast with its request to strike the cause
of action entirely—even on appeal, Outfront requests that we
“reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to
strike Plaintiffs’ UCL . . . claims.” Outfront did not provide us
with an alternative that delineates the discrete allegations
within the UCL violation cause of action that should be stricken,
as the unfair business practice claim/component in the UCL
cause of action does not arise from anti-SLAPP protected activity.
(See Park v. Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109 [“This is
done by identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered
paragraph or sentence in the complaint that comprises a
challenged claim” based on protected activity.].) This, despite the
fact that Outfront confirmed in its brief on appeal that “[i]n
Baral, the Court held that ‘an anti-SLAPP motion, like a
conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a
count as pleaded.’ ” (Italics added.)
While an anti-SLAPP motion may challenge any claim for
relief founded on allegations of protected activity, it does not
reach claims based on unprotected activity. (Baral, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 382.) Outfront’s failure to demonstrate that the
UCL cause of action was based solely on protected conduct as
well as its failure to differentiate the allegations of protected
conduct from those based on unprotected conduct, mandate
affirming the trial court’s order denying Outfront’s anti-SLAPP
motion as to the UCL cause of action. (See Park v. Nazari, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106 [“Because the Nazaris moved to strike
only the entire complaint, and did not identify in their motion
individual claims or allegations that should be stricken even if
the entire complaint were not, the trial court was permitted to
deny the anti-SLAPP motion once it concluded—correctly—that
24
the complaint presented at least one claim that did not arise from
anti-SLAPP protected conduct.”].)4 Outfront thus failed to carry
its burden at prong one.
This is similar to what took place in Littlefield v. Littlefield
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 815. The reviewing court there found:
“Notwithstanding the diverse range of allegations and requests
for relief, appellants moved to strike the petition altogether, or
alternatively—although it is not in any meaningful sense an
‘alternative’—every cause of action in its entirety. In an
understated concession relegated to a footnote of their trial court
briefing, appellants did acknowledge that ‘not everything in the
Petition involves protected activity.’ . . . [T]hey contended that a
‘mixed’ cause of action is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion as long
as at least one of the underlying acts is protected conduct.” (Id.
at p. 825, italics added.) “Appellants’ motion, however, did not
identify any ‘particular allegations’ of protected activity that they
contended should be stricken. And since they did not show that
the petition or any entire cause of action was based solely on
protected activity, they did not show that the court could properly
strike the petition or all of its causes of action—the only relief they
4 A court “may parse the claims in a complaint even when an
anti-SLAPP movant does not discharge his or her burden to, as
Baral says, ‘identify[ ] all allegations of protected activity, and
the claims for relief supported by them’ (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at 396)”; a court is not required to do so. (Park v. Nazari, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109, fn. 5.) “[T]he court can properly deny
the [anti-SLAPP] motion so long as the court concludes the
movant is not entitled to the relief sought, i.e., so long as the
court concludes the complaint [or cause of action, in this case]
presents at least one claim that does not arise from anti-SLAPP
protected activity.” (Ibid.)
25
sought.” (Id. at p. 826, italics added.) The reviewing court held
that appellants in Littlefield “did not show that the petition or
any cause of action asserted in it was based solely on protected
activity, and they did not identify individual allegations or claims
that they believed should be stricken even if the petition or entire
causes of action were not,” and as such, found that the trial court
had “permissibly denied their motion.” (Id. at p. 827.)
In a similar scenario in Bonni, the California Supreme
Court found: “[Bonni’s] complaint also identifies a handful of
miscellaneous retaliatory conduct not explicitly tied to any
specific event or action: that the Hospitals created a hostile work
environment, blocked Bonni from career opportunities, failed to
protect him from retaliation, subjected him to intolerable work
conditions, and misused his private, confidential health
information. The burden is on the Hospitals to demonstrate that
each of these allegations entails protected activity. [Citation.] In
the trial court, the Hospitals did not address Bonni’s allegations
individually. In this court, they offer no argument directed at
these allegations and do not explain how they arise from peer
review proceedings or any other protected activity. Accordingly,
they have not carried their burden.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 1023–1024.) We similarly find Outfront failed to carry its
burden for the UCL cause of action.
2. Cause of Action for Waste
“ ‘[W]aste is conduct (including in this word both acts of
commission and of omission) on the part of the person in
possession of land which is actionable at the behest of, and for the
protection of the reasonable expectations of, another owner of an
interest in the same land. . . . Thus, waste is, functionally, a part
of the law which keeps in balance the conflicting desires of
26
persons having interests in the same land.’ ” (Cornelison v.
Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 597–598.) Waste is defined as
an unlawful act or omission of duty on the part of a tenant,
resulting in permanent injury to the property. (Avalon Pacific-
Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1212.) In order to state a cause of action
for waste, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant
was under a duty to preserve and protect the property involved.
(Ibid.) “ ‘Waste occurs only when the injury to real property is
“sufficiently substantial and permanent.” ’ ” (Schellinger
Brothers v. Cotter (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 984, 999.) “ ‘Waste will
[be] found only when the market value of property is
permanently diminished or depreciated.’ ” (Id. at p. 1000.)
Section 732 permits an action for waste and provides there
may be judgment for treble damages upon a showing of
willfulness or maliciousness; whether or not damages should be
trebled is left to court’s discretion. (§ 732; Kanner v. Globe
Bottling Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 559, 568.) Proof of an overt
destructional urge is not required to show waste committed in
bad faith, where plaintiff may point to the defendant as a
reckless, intentional, and even malicious despoiler of property,
causing damage that is unrelated to financial fluctuations in the
economy at large. (Schellinger Brothers v. Cotter, supra,
2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
Here, Outfront argues “much of [p]laintiffs’ waste cause of
action stems from the alleged damage to their property from the
removal of the billboard. But [p]laintiffs also seek to impose
liability in part based on Outfront’s permit application that led to
that removal.” Outfront contends that plaintiffs “explicitly base
their claim for treble waste damages on Outfront’s protected
27
conduct.” Outfront argues “[b]ecause the protected permit
application is ‘alleged to justify a remedy’ for the waste claim,
that claim likewise arises out of protected activity.” We disagree.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Outfront “committed
waste and damaged the [gas station] unreasonably” via its
intentional harm to billboard #1 by dismantling the above ground
steel column supporting the billboard. The express terms of the
complaint demonstrate that plaintiffs’ waste claim is based on
Outfront’s removal of the billboard itself. Plaintiffs’ request for a
specific type of damages (i.e., treble per section 732) falls outside
the elements of a waste cause of action.
In addition to plaintiffs’ requested damages including loss
of revenue to Virtual, loss of rent to Rabadi, and/or the “minimum
amount of one million dollars to Rabadi and loss of revenue to
Virtual,” plaintiffs additionally requested treble damages
pursuant to section 732, given Outfront’s “intentional” waste that
was “punitive in nature.” While plaintiffs requested an award for
discretionary treble damages based in part on Outfront’s false
statement on the permit application to the City, a request for
treble damages does not qualify as a “cause of action” that can be
independently struck via an anti-SLAPP motion. Baral does not
construe section 425.16 to allow a court to strike a prayer or
request for specific type of relief; nor do the cases cited by
Outfront. Zanger v. City of Pasadena (C.D. Cal., Jan. 23, 2007,
CV 06-5376 ABC (Ex)) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112174, for
instance, did not separately strike a punitive damages prayer,
but struck it because it was based on an underlying defamation
cause of action that was stricken. (Id. at p. *10 [“Plaintiff has
not, and cannot establish a reasonable probability of prevailing
on his defamation claim. His sixth cause of action is hereby
28
STRICKEN. To the extent to which Plaintiff seeks punitive
damages based on the sixth cause of action, that claim is also
STRICKEN.”].)
Indeed, other cases have held that a remedy is not an
appropriate target for an anti-SLAPP motion. (See e.g., Golden
Gate Land Holdings, LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 82, 91 [claim for injunctive relief “is not a cause of
action but instead a request for a remedy not subject to the anti-
SLAPP statute”]; Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354,
1360–1361, fn. 2 [“specific performance and injunctive relief are
equitable remedies and not causes of action for injuries.
[Citations.] The anti-SLAPP statute applies only to a ‘cause of
action.’ ”]; Coretronic Corp v. Cozen O’Connor (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1392 [“the remedy sought does not affect
whether the claim is based on protected activity”]; Marlin v.
Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162, fn. omitted
[prayer for injunction preventing defendants from evicting
plaintiffs was irrelevant to whether cause of action was based on
protected activity, as “[a]n injunction is a remedy, not a cause of
action. Accordingly, the SLAPP statute does not apply where it is
the prayer for an injunction which arises from an act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech” because
SLAPP motions lie only as to causes of action].)
A request for treble damages does not constitute a cause of
action but is simply one of several remedies sought for plaintiffs’
waste cause of action. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163–164 [“ ‘There is no cause of action for
punitive damages. Punitive or exemplary damages are remedies
. . . . “Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action,
and can never constitute the basis thereof.” ’ ”]; accord
29
McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1163 [“In California there is no separate
cause of action for punitive damages.”].) Outfront has not
established that a request for treble damages presents a strikable
portion of a cause of action/complaint. We find an anti-SLAPP
motion is not properly brought to strike a pleaded remedy or
prayer for relief, rather than a claim/cause of action, based on
protected activity; the anti-SLAPP statute only authorizes a court
to strike a cause of action. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Thus, our independent review of the pleadings and the
supporting declarations discloses plaintiffs’ cause of action for
waste is not based on conduct that is protected activity.
D. Anti-SLAPP Prong Two: Probability of Prevailing on
Cause of Action
If a defendant makes its required showing in the first step,
the burden then shifts to plaintiffs to demonstrate the merit of
the claim by establishing a probability of success. (Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955,
970.) “If the defendant does not demonstrate th[e] initial prong,
the court should deny the anti-SLAPP motion and need not
address the second step.” (Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc.
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271.)
Because Outfront failed to satisfy its initial burden, we do
not reach the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis—namely,
whether plaintiffs have established a probability of prevailing on
the merits. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 [only “[i]f the
court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising
from activity protected by the statute” is the “second step . . .
reached”]; see Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 811 [“Because of the conclusions we
30
have reached regarding the first prong of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, we need not proceed to evaluate whether plaintiffs
adequately showed a probability of prevailing in the action.”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Outfront’s special motion to
strike is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
SCHERB, J.
31