Filed 9/22/26 K.R. v. J.C. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Amador)
K.R., C105377
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 25CV14808)
v.
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
J.C. appeals from a five-year restraining order prohibiting him from harassing
K.R., his neighbor. J.C. contends (1) he was denied due process when the trial court
heard related matters at a single hearing, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the restraining order.
Because J.C. has not established a denial of due process or abuse of discretion,
we will affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
In September 2025, K.R. filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order
alleging that J.C., her neighbor, yelled at her many times over a three-year period.
K.R. alleged that she operated a pet-sitting service, and that J.C. yelled at her for letting a
client’s dog off leash, threatened to shoot a client’s dog, threatened another neighbor with
a “pig prod,” yelled at K.R. at the post office, and came onto K.R.’s property numerous
times to yell at her. According to K.R., J.C.’s aggressive and unpredictable behavior
caused K.R. to fear that J.C. would become violent, traumatized her, and caused her
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clients to stop using her services. K.R. attached a police report based on an incident
involving one of her clients.
J.C. denied K.R.’s allegations, asserting that a tree-trimming crew had entered
his property without notice and damaged his electric fence, causing nine pigs to escape.
He denied threatening or harming any animal or person and said any yelling was part
of directing the tree-trimming crew to leave his property and the chaotic retrieval of his
pigs. He denied the incident at the post office. J.C. added that the Amador County
District Attorney’s Office had attempted to pursue criminal trespassing charges against
him for going onto neighboring properties to retrieve his animals, causing significant
tension with his neighbors. J.C. asserted that any complaints about animal escapes
pertained to ordinary farming incidents and were exaggerated.
The trial court heard this matter with two other related requests for restraining
orders that are not the subject of this particular appeal. As relevant here, K.R. and J.C.
testified, another neighbor testified, and K.R. placed a photograph into evidence.
The trial court granted K.R.’s request for a restraining order.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends he was denied due process when the trial court heard the
various related matters in a single hearing. We disagree.
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing … of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1048, subd. (a).)1 It appears the trial court conducted a joint hearing because three
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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restraining order requests had been filed that shared common facts and witnesses, and all
three sought protection from J.C. On this record, J.C. has not established a due process
violation.
II
J.C. further claims the trial court abused its discretion in granting the restraining
order. Specifically, he argues there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
order, the trial court improperly relied on third-party allegations, and the trial court failed
to make required findings. J.C. has not overcome the presumption that the trial court’s
order was correct.
We will not reverse the trial court’s decision unless there is a showing of a clear
abuse of discretion. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904,
912.) We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, resolving all
factual conflicts and questions of credibility in the respondent’s favor and drawing all
legitimate and reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (Ibid.; Schild v. Rubin
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)
Section 527.6 “provides for ‘expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.’
[Citation.] The statute enables a person who has suffered harassment—defined by the
statute as ‘unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses
the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose’—to ‘seek a temporary restraining order
and an injunction prohibiting harassment … .’ (§ 527.6, subds. (a)(1), (b)(3); see id.,
subd. (b)(1), (6)(A).) ‘The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress … .’ (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) [¶] A trial court generally must hold a
hearing on a section 527.6 petition within 21 days of the court’s grant or denial of a
temporary restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (g).) At the hearing, the trial court ‘shall
receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the
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judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an
injunction shall issue prohibiting the harassment.’ (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) The court need
not make express findings, but rather, ‘the granting of the injunction itself necessarily
implies that the trial court found that [the respondent] knowingly and willfully engaged in
a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed [the petitioner].’ ”
(Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 88-89.)
Rule 8.120 of the California Rules of Court provides: “If an appellant intends to
raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court,
the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of
the following: [¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript under rule 8.130; [¶] (2) An agreed
statement under rule 8.134; or [¶] (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.120(b).)
Here, the record does not contain a reporter’s transcript, and J.C. has not provided
us with either an agreed statement or a settled statement. This appeal is thus based solely
on the clerk’s transcript. “Although in certain instances a reporter’s transcript may not be
necessary, … [citation] on issues such as the instant one involving the abuse of discretion
standard of review, a reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled statement of the
proceedings is indispensable.” (Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 79.) “The
absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the [hearing] precludes a
determination that the trial court abused its discretion.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal
Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 448.)
“It is axiomatic in appellate review that a judgment of a lower court is presumed
correct. [Citations.] This presumption has special significance when, as in the present
case, the appeal is based upon the clerk’s transcript. ‘It is elementary and fundamental
that on a clerk’s transcript appeal the appellate court must conclusively presume that the
evidence is ample to sustain the findings.’ ” (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d
147, 154.) “ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
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intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. …” ’ [Citations.] ‘A necessary
corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, … the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty &
Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416, italics omitted.) “[A]n appellant
has the burden of producing a record affirmatively showing error [citation] and if any
matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the
order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” (Riley v.
Dunbar (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 452, 455.) Accordingly, if no record of the hearing is
furnished, “we must presume that the evidence adduced there is sufficient to support the
judgment.” (Diamond View Limited v. Herz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 612, 615, fn. 2.)
These rules are dispositive in this case. With no record of what happened at the
contested hearing, J.C. has not provided us with any evidentiary basis for challenging
the trial court’s order. (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989)
210 Cal.App.3d 510, 522.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the civil harassment restraining order is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
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