Filed 7/29/26 Jones v. Reamer CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
MARK G. JONES, C102087
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. CU0000795)
v.
BARBARA L. REAMER et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
_____________________________
C103552
MARK G. JONES,
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CU0000795)
v.
SIERRA ASSET INVESTMENTS LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Self-represented plaintiff Mark G. Jones appeals after the trial court sustained
demurrers to his second amended complaint without leave to amend and ordered him to
pay attorney fees. With an incomplete record and inadequate briefing, plaintiff contends
we should reverse. We affirm. Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint against two pension plans (the pension
plans), a beneficiary and a trustee of the pension plans (Barbara L. Reamer and Mitchell
T. Clarin, respectively), and a foreclosure company (Mortgage Lender Services, Inc.).
We refer to these defendants collectively as foreclosing defendants. Two months later,
plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against the same parties.
According to the first amended complaint, plaintiff purchased three properties in
Truckee in the 1980s (the properties). One of the properties contained a single-family
residence that plaintiff “occupied as his principal residence over the last several years.”
In 2016, plaintiff borrowed money from the pension plans secured by the properties. In
February 2023, the foreclosure company recorded two notices of default and election to
sell under deed of trust. Three months later, the foreclosure company recorded two
notices announcing a trustee sale of the properties on June 26, 2023. Plaintiff was
unaware of the default and trustee sale notices until May 31, 2023. On the morning of
the trustee sale, plaintiff sent written notice that he wanted to exercise his “equitable
redemption rights” by “tendering full payment” of all amounts due. Plaintiff also sought
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the sale, but the trial court denied his request.
After the denial, plaintiff immediately contacted foreclosing defendants and “implored
them” to not proceed with the sale and to allow plaintiff to make arrangements to pay the
amount due. The sale proceeded on June 26, 2023.
Plaintiff alleged foreclosing defendants “undertook a wrongful, illegal and
clandestine non-judicial foreclosure” of the properties in violation of sections “2923 and
2924 et seq, Federal statutory provisions and … common law.” He alleged 13 causes of
action for: (1) violation of the Homeowner Bill of Rights, specifically sections 2923.5,
2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, and 2924.18; (2) violation of section 2923.5 “and/or”
2923.55, also within the Homeowner’s Bill or Rights; (3) declaratory relief regarding the
respective rights and duties of the parties; (4) injunctive relief enjoining the trustee sale;
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(5) accounting of what plaintiff owed the pension plans; (6) negligence based on
foreclosing defendants’ breach of their duty of care in servicing the promissory note;
(7) fraud based on foreclosing defendants’ wrongful foreclosure using false
representations and omissions; (8) set aside the trustee’s sale; (9) void or cancel the
trustee’s deeds upon sale; (10) wrongful foreclosure based on violations of the
Homeowner Bill of Rights “and various requirements of applicable Federal Law”;
(11) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (12) violation of the
unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.); and (13) quiet title.
In October 2023, foreclosing defendants demurred to the first amended complaint
and requested judicial notice of several exhibits. The request for judicial notice and
attached exhibits are not in the record. In support of the demurrer, foreclosing defendants
offered the following factual summary with citations to the exhibits.
In September 2016, plaintiff borrowed $360,000 from the pension plans and used
the properties as security for a promissory note. The promissory note listed an Ohio
address for plaintiff. According to the terms of the note, plaintiff was required to make
interest only payments and pay the entire loan balance three years later (the maturity
date). Deeds of trust were recorded against the properties.
Plaintiff’s loan was modified four times between October 2017 and April 2022 “in
an effort to help [plaintiff] avoid foreclosure.” Under the second modification, the
maturity date was extended by two years. Under the third modification, plaintiff was
loaned an additional $100,000, and if plaintiff did not pay the loan in full by the maturity
date, plaintiff would need to list the properties for sale and use a pension plan trustee as
his real estate agent. Under the fourth modification, the maturity date was extended by
15 months (to December 21, 2022) and plaintiff was required to enter into a listing
agreement with the pension plan trustee to enable him to sell two of the properties by
April 18, 2022. If the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the loan balance,
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plaintiff would need to enter a listing agreement with the pension plan trustee to sell the
third property.
In February 2023, the foreclosure company recorded notices of default against the
properties and sent those notices to plaintiff’s Ohio address listed in the promissory note.
In May 2023, notices of sale were recorded against the properties. Those notices were
mailed, posted to the properties, and published in a local newspaper.
In support of the demurrer, foreclosing defendants argued (1) they followed the
applicable foreclosure laws and (2) plaintiff failed to allege his ability to tender all
amounts due. For those reasons, plaintiff’s derivative causes of action (for negligence,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair competition, and to quiet
title and to set aside the trustee sale and the resulting deeds) should also be dismissed.
Foreclosing defendant also argued: (1) plaintiff’s accounting cause of action did not
allege uncertainty as to the damages owed to him and improperly sought an accounting of
the money he owed; and (2) plaintiff’s fraud cause of action failed to plead fraud with
particularity and was refuted by his own allegations.
In opposition to the demurrer, plaintiff asked the court to disregard the request for
judicial notice and argued foreclosing defendants were turning a demurrer into a motion
for summary judgment. If the demurrer was sustained, he sought leave to amend.
The court granted the requests for judicial notice and sustained the demurrer with
leave to amend. The court concluded: (1) based on exhibits in the request for judicial
notice, plaintiff admitted he resided in Ohio; (2) plaintiff failed to allege that foreclosing
defendants were lenders under section 2924.18, subdivision (b); (3) plaintiff failed to
allege he took out the loan for personal, family, or household purposes as required under
section 2924.15, subdivision (a); (4) plaintiff failed to allege the requisite delinquency to
trigger federal law; (5) judicially noticed facts demonstrated that foreclosing defendants
provided the requisite notice under section 2924i; (6) the accounting cause of action
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failed because it improperly sought to determine how much plaintiff owed; and (7) the
fraud cause of action was not pled with specificity.
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint asserting the same 13 causes of action.
He added three defendants – Sierra Asset Investments, LLC, SPFF, LP, and Veritas
Capital, LLC (collectively, buyer defendants) – to the causes of action for injunctive
relief and quiet title, alleging they had purchased the properties at the trustee sale.
Plaintiff also alleged: (1) he had used the home on one of the properties as “his principal
residence … since early in calendar year 2020” and the pension plan beneficiary and
trustee were aware of that fact; (2) the loan was made for personal, family, or household
purposes; (3) “upon information and belief,” the pension plans were described in section
2924.18, subdivision (b); (4) an accounting was required because the proceeds from the
trustee sale resulted in overpayments, making plaintiff owe an unknown amount;
(5) foreclosing defendants committed fraud because they failed to inform plaintiff of the
actions they were taking to implement the nonjudicial foreclosure; and (6) foreclosing
defendants did not send the notices of default or trustee sale to the property where he now
resided.
Foreclosing defendants filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint, again
with a request for judicial notice of several documents. The request for judicial notice is
not in the record on appeal. Foreclosing defendants argued plaintiff’s amendments had
not remedied the issues raised in their first demurrer; the fraud cause of action failed to
allege a representation, intent to induce reliance, and reliance; and the quiet title cause of
action was also deficient because the complaint was not verified and buyer defendants
had not been served.
Plaintiff opposed the demurrer, objecting to the judicial notice request and
claiming foreclosing defendants’ arguments were incorrect, frivolous, irrelevant, and
improper for demurrer. Plaintiff requested leave to amend but did not identify how he
would amend his pleading.
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The trial court took judicial notice of some of the documents and sustained the
demurrer. The court concluded plaintiff failed to: (1) sufficiently allege that foreclosing
defendants were subject to the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights; (2) properly allege a
violation of federal law; (3) allege a violation of section 2924i because judicially noticed
facts established compliance with that law; (4) state a cause of action for declaratory
relief; (5) allege a cause of action for accounting because judicially noticed facts
indicated plaintiff had all facts necessary to calculate sums due to him; (6) allege a
specific legal basis for a duty that foreclosing defendants owed him; (7) allege reliance or
satisfy the particularity requirements for a fraud claim; (8) allege wrongful conduct,
damage, and tender for purposes of his claims for wrongful foreclosure and to set aside
and void the trustee sale and resulting deeds; (9) allege a breached contract for purposes
of this breach of good faith claim; and (10) allege that foreclosing defendants had an
adverse claim to title. The court also faulted plaintiff for using “the disfavored and
ambiguous practice of incorporating all paragraphs of his complaint in each claim.”
Because plaintiff did not demonstrate how he could cure these defects, the trial court
denied leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal as to foreclosing defendants.
Foreclosing defendants then filed a motion for attorney fees based on the original
promissory note and the deeds of trust. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the award
was excessive and had no contractual basis. The court rejected plaintiff’s arguments and
granted the motion.
Between June 2024 and October 2024, buyer defendants each filed separate
demurrers to the second amended complaint. They argued they were innocent, bona fide
purchasers of the properties and plaintiff failed to allege they committed any wrongful
conduct. The court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered
judgments of dismissal.
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Plaintiff timely appeals from the judgments and the order granting foreclosing
defendants’ motion for attorney fees. We granted plaintiff’s motion to consolidate the
appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Demurrer
“Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must
show the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of
action. If the complaint fails to plead, or if the defendant negates, any essential element
of a particular cause of action, this court should affirm the sustaining of a demurrer.”
(Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
Although we apply de novo review to an order sustaining a demurrer without
leave to amend (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42), we presume the order is correct and require the appellant to
overcome that presumption (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6). The
appellant must do so by: (1) following the appellate rules of procedure; (2) providing an
adequate record for review; and (3) affirmatively demonstrating error by showing that the
facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of all causes of action. (Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609; Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052.)
Plaintiff fails to comply with these standards in four ways.
First, plaintiff misunderstands his burden on appeal. He contends defendants
“have not met their burden of demonstrating that … [their demurrers] should be sustained
by the [t]rial [c]ourt without leave to amend.” As to his causes of action for negligence,
wrongful foreclosure, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair
business practices, he points to foreclosing defendants’ “minimal arguments for the
demurrer” and contends those arguments are a “throw-away variety” and an admission
that he stated sufficient facts. Similarly, he contends he pled “dozens of ‘requisite factual
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allegations establishing [his] right to title,’ contrary to the unsupported assertion of
[foreclosing defendants] … which is yet another throw-away argument.” These
contentions improperly place the burden on defendants to show their demurrers were
properly sustained.
Second, plaintiff’s briefing fails to follow the appellate rules of procedure.
Plaintiff begins his argument by incorporating by reference the demurrer oppositions he
filed in the trial court. This is not the proper way to brief an issue on appeal. (Colores v.
Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1301, fn. 2 [“[I]t is not appropriate to
incorporate by reference, into a brief, points and authorities contained in trial court
papers, even if such papers are made a part of the appellate record”].) The remainder of
his argument lacks sufficient development and citation to authority. (In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Plaintiff summarily
asserts five “opposition comments” and then refers to those comments throughout his
brief. But he does not sufficiently develop these comments for us to meaningfully review
them. (See Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862
[when an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument, we treat
the point as waived].) He also contends he pled sufficient facts to support his accounting,
negligence, and fraud causes of action without analyzing the applicable law or how the
trial court erred in applying the law to the alleged facts. Plaintiff’s contentions are
deficient. He must “do more than assert error and leave it to [us] to search the record and
the law books to test his claim.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.)
The same is true of plaintiff’s causes of action that foreclosing defendants violated
the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights. Plaintiff contends he sufficiently alleged that the
Homeowner’s Bill of Rights laws applied to foreclosing defendants, but his contentions
are cursory, lack citation to authority, and would require us to make and develop his
arguments. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) The
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Homeowner’s Bill of Rights1 is a “complex set of enactments” that has undergone
multiple revisions since 2012. (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 279, 295; Stats. 2012, ch. 86; Stats. 2012, ch. 87; Stats. 2018, ch. 404;
Stats. 2024, ch. 601.) Explaining those enactments and how they apply to plaintiff and
foreclosing defendants needs more analysis than plaintiff has offered.2
Third, plaintiff fails to address all the grounds on which the trial court sustained
the demurrer. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 880.) For
instance, the trial court concluded plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim was deficient
because it sought redress of past wrongs and was defeated by his own allegations and
exhibits attached to his pleading. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff failed to
identify a specific contract that foreclosing defendants breached for purposes of his
breach of covenant of good faith cause of action. Plaintiff does not address why these
conclusions were incorrect, and we will not make those arguments for him. (Allen v. City
of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
And fourth, plaintiff fails to provide a complete record for our review. In
sustaining foreclosing defendants’ demurrer to the declaratory relief and accounting
causes of action, the trial court found support in judicially noticed facts. Because
plaintiff’s record on appeal does not include the request for judicial notice, we cannot
determine whether the trial court properly considered the relevant documents. (See Scott
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 752-761 [role of judicial
1 §§ 2920.5, 2923.4–2923.7, 2924, 2924.9–2924.12, 2924.15, 2924.17–2924.20.
2 Because plaintiff has not demonstrated that he pled viable causes of action for
foreclosure law violations, he has also not demonstrated that he sufficiently pled his
derivative causes of action for unfair competition and injunctive relief, and to quiet title
and set aside the trustee sale and void the resulting deeds.
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notice in demurrer].) For this reason, we must resolve this issue against plaintiff.
(Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
Although we are mindful that plaintiff represents himself on appeal, as he did in
the trial court, he “ ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no
greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (First American Title Co. v.
Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.) Because plaintiff does not provide an
adequate record or cogent argument explaining how his allegations state viable causes of
action, we must affirm the orders sustaining the demurrers.
II. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him leave to
amend his complaint. We disagree.
When a trial court has sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, “we must
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect [can be cured by]
amendment.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) “The
plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment could cure the defect.” (Ibid.) To
meet this burden, the plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his complaint
and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.” (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
Here, plaintiff did not meet that burden in the trial court. He argued leave to
amend should be granted but did not indicate what amendments he would make. His
showing is equally deficient on appeal. He identifies the trial court’s disapproval of his
incorporation of allegations in each cause of action and contends the trial court should
have allowed him to correct that issue. But he does not address how he could amend his
pleading to address the other grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.
Instead, he summarily contends the facts he alleged were sufficient so the trial court
improperly sustained the demurrer. We also reject his argument that the trial court’s
order was “devoid of any reasoning and explanation” so he “cannot attempt to guess”
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what amendments are needed. He cites no authority requiring the trial court to provide
more explanation that it did. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 472d; Marin Assn of Public
Employees v. Marin (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 674, 691-692.)
III. Motion for Attorney Fees
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting the attorney fee motion because
(1) “there is no basis under a contract pursuant to [section 1717, subdivision (a)] for the
recovery” of the fees and (2) the requested amount of fees is grossly excessive. In
support, plaintiff incorporates the opposition to the fee motion that he filed in the trial
court. Plaintiff’s briefing is deficient and compels us to affirm the trial court’s order.
As covered, we presume the trial court reached the right result, so plaintiff is the
party who must demonstrate error. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
Merely claiming error is not enough: the appellant must support his contentions with
cogent argument, meaningful legal analysis, and adequate record citations. (United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146, 153; Cal Rules
of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) Plaintiff cannot meet those standards by
incorporating by reference arguments made in papers in the trial court. (Korchemny v.
Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1048, fn. 6.) Here, plaintiff challenges the basis
and amount of the fee award, but he provides no meaningful legal analysis, instead
referring us to the arguments he made in the trial court. This deficient briefing forfeits
plaintiff’s claims on appeal. (Korchemny v. Piterman, at p. 1048, fn. 6.)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgments of dismissal and the postjudgment order granting
attorney fees. Foreclosing defendants and buyer defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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