Filed 7/28/26 Jones v. Jones CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALBERTA ROSE JONES, H052038
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23CV413077)
v.
DONALD DAVID JONES,
Defendant and Respondent.
In April 2018, a district court in Lincoln County, Oklahoma issued a “decree of
divorce and dissolution of marriage” between Alberta Jones and Donald Jones.1 Five
years later, in March 2023, Alberta filed a complaint for fraud against Donald in Santa
Clara County Superior Court, alleging that Donald intentionally stole her marital assets
that had been located in California, and seeking more than $8 million in damages.
The superior court ultimately dismissed Alberta’s lawsuit in its entirety in 2024,
on the grounds that Oklahoma had exclusive jurisdiction over the issues raised in the
complaint.
On appeal, Alberta challenges the trial court’s dismissal and three distinct orders
that preceded it. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Because the parties share the same surname, we subsequently refer to them by
their first names.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Oklahoma proceedings
Alberta and Donald were married on February 26, 1980, in San Jose. In January
2015, Alberta filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Lincoln County, Oklahoma.
On April 24, 2018, a district court in Lincoln County, Oklahoma issued a decree
of divorce and dissolution of marriage between Alberta and Donald (Oklahoma decree).
On March 15, 2023, a court of civil appeals in Oklahoma affirmed the Oklahoma
decree.
B. California proceedings
On March 24, 2023, Alberta filed the complaint in this action.2 It alleged one
cause of action against Donald for “intentional fraud to unlawfully take marital property
and personal property belonging to [Alberta].” Specifically, the complaint alleged that
Donald took and “wrongfully concealed” Alberta’s “marital assets” that had been located
at two houses in Sunnyvale and Pacific Grove. The complaint sought “$8 million plus
interest and damages.”
Shortly after filing the complaint, Alberta filed a “motion to set aside default and
default judgment” (motion). The motion sought to set aside “the default and any
judgment thereon taken against [Alberta] in the State of Oklahoma.” Referring to the
Oklahoma decree as “the default judgment,” Alberta argued that the Oklahoma district
court lacked jurisdiction over the “marital assets” because they had been located in
California. Further, she argued that Donald had obtained the Oklahoma decree
fraudulently, by inaccurately claiming he was a resident of Oklahoma and that the couple
had been legally separated, when in fact they were just living apart.
2
Alberta had also filed an earlier petition for dissolution of marriage in Santa
Clara County Superior Court case number 17FL003304, on August 8, 2017. Although the
parties make references to the 2017 lawsuit, the record does not clearly indicate what
transpired, or how or whether the lawsuit was resolved. In any case, it is immaterial to
our consideration of the issues presented in this appeal.
2
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on June 23, 2023. The trial
court’s order stated: “This court does not have jurisdiction to set aside an order or
judgment that was issued by an Oklahoma state court.” Alberta later filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied on August 21, 2023.
Shortly after the trial court had denied the initial motion, Alberta had also filed a
request for entry of default against Donald, in which she asserted that the complaint
sought $10 million in damages. The court granted the request on July 3, 2023.
On September 7, 2023, Donald sought to set aside the default and obtain an order
dismissing the action altogether, on the grounds that the Oklahoma court had exclusive
jurisdiction “over the issues set forth in [the] complaint and … a divorce judgment
regarding the same issues was entered several years ago in Oklahoma.” Donald filed
three documents in support of his request at the time: (1) a “memorandum of points and
authorities in support of his request to set aside default”; (2) a “declaration in support of
his motion to set aside default”; and (3) a civil case cover sheet. The record does not
include any noticed motion or reference to any such motion filed at that time.
Donald based his request to set aside the default on Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b), which provides in part that a court may “relieve a party or
the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding
taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.”
Later in September, Alberta filed a motion for sanctions against Donald’s attorney,
in which she argued that he had falsely represented to the court that he had filed a notice
of appearance in the case. According to Alberta, Donald’s attorney had set a hearing for
3
December 12, 2023, without paying the appropriate filing fees or filing a notice of
motion.3
Alberta also filed a separate motion in November 2023, in which she moved to
strike the three documents Donald had filed in September—the points and authorities,
declaration, and civil case cover sheet—on the grounds that the court clerk had
improperly filed them after Donald’s default had been entered.
On December 7, 2023, Donald filed a motion to set aside the default, calendared
for February 20, 2024. He argued again that the default should be set aside pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, and again requested that the trial court dismiss
Alberta’s lawsuit on the grounds that the Oklahoma court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the issues set forth in the complaint.
In January 2024—before the hearing on Donald’s motion to set aside the default
and dismiss the case—the trial court entered a judgment in Alberta’s favor, pursuant to a
request for entry of judgment she had submitted in November 2023. The judgment
included an award of damages to Alberta for more than $10 million.
C. Hearing and trial court order
A hearing was held on February 20, 2024, on three pending motions: (1) Alberta’s
motion for sanctions; (2) Alberta’s motion to strike Donald’s September 7, 2023, filings;
and (3) Donald’s motion to set aside the default and dismiss the case. The trial court
initially issued minute orders for the motions, which reflected that it denied Alberta’s
motions and granted Donald’s.
The court subsequently issued a written order on June 4, 2024, memorializing its
rulings on the three motions (order). The order stated that it denied Alberta’s motion to
strike documents and her motion for sanctions, and granted Donald’s motion “to set aside
3
The trial court denied the initial motion for sanctions—because it was unclear
whether Donald had been properly served—but without prejudice to Alberta filing a
subsequent noticed motion, which she did on December 11, 2023.
4
default and default judgment.” With respect to Donald’s motion, the order stated that
Alberta “did not oppose this motion,” and that “[t]he case is dismissed in its entirety as
the State of Oklahoma has exclusive jurisdiction over the issues raised in [the
complaint].”
D. Appeal and appealability
Alberta initially filed a notice of appeal on April 16, 2024. We later augmented
the record to include the order and deemed the notice of appeal filed on June 4, 2024,
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d).
Code of Civil Procedure section 581d provides in part that “[a]ll dismissals
ordered by the court shall be in the form of a written order signed by the court and filed
in the action and those orders when so filed shall constitute judgments and be effective
for all purposes … .”
The order here meets those requirements, and is therefore an appealable
“judgment.” (See, e.g., Roe v. Doe 1 (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 965, 972; City of Los
Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Bd. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 157.)
II. DISCUSSION
Alberta, proceeding on appeal in propria persona, argues that it was legal error by
the trial court to dismiss the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction.
A. Standard of review and principles of appellate review
We review a trial court’s order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction de novo.
(Robbins v. Foothill Nissan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1769, 1774; citing Finnie v. District
No. 1—Pacific Coast Dist. etc. Assn. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318; Stratton v. First
Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083.)
Notwithstanding that, a fundamental principle of appellate review is that we
presume a trial court’s judgment is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to
demonstrate that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal. (L.O. v. Kilrain
5
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (Kilrain); Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564 [error must be affirmatively shown].)
In addition, an appellant must support each claim of error with meaningful
analysis and citation to legal authority. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 947, 948.) The failure to raise a point or support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority allows the reviewing court to deem unsupported contentions
forfeited. (Ibid.; Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
An opening brief must, among other things, provide a summary of significant facts
limited to matters in the record and include record citations in support of factual
assertions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C).) A reviewing
court may not consider any statements of fact not supported by the record or any claims
of error based on unsupported statements. (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 937, 947.)
B. Analysis
Alberta has largely failed to comply with the requirements set forth above. In
short, we have difficulty discerning clear arguments in her briefs and, where we may be
able to, Alberta has failed to cite applicable authority and analogize it to the facts at issue
here. Moreover, where she does make factual assertions, they are almost entirely devoid
of citations to the record.
For instance, the “legal argument” section of Alberta’s opening brief contains
three parts. The first part is headed, “Article IV, Section 1: of the United States
Constitution—the Full Faith and Credit Clause puts a judgment behind the Constitution.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) The text that follows cites two United States
Supreme Court case—Williams v. North Carolina (1942) 317 U.S. 287 (Williams I), and
Williams v. North Carolina (1945) 325 U.S. 226 (Williams II)—which Alberta claims
stand for the proposition that “the federal government determines marriage and divorce
6
statuses between state lines,” and that “[t]he Clause does not make a sister-State
judgment a judgment in another State.”
In Williams I, the United States Supreme Court held that divorce decrees from a
Nevada court were entitled to full faith and credit in North Carolina because Nevada’s
jurisdiction regarding the decrees was not at issue on appeal. (Williams I, supra, 317
U.S. at pp. 292–293.) In Williams II—a case dealing with the same parties and same set
of facts—the Supreme Court subsequently held that, in fact, the Nevada court did not
have jurisdiction to issue the decrees. (Williams II, supra, 325 U.S. at pp. 227, 237.) In
other words, the two cases stand for the general proposition that a judgment entered
without jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit.
To the extent Alberta means to argue that the Oklahoma decree at issue here was
entered without jurisdiction, she has made no demonstration to that effect. Instead, she
merely states: “Appellant alleged and made her claims clear in the Superior Court of
California Santa Clara County not once but repeatedly. Court documents reflect these
facts.” Alberta has failed to support her argument with meaningful analysis, reasoned
argument, or citations to the record, so we consider it forfeited. (Kilrain, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
The second part of Alberta’s legal argument section is headed “jurisdictional
issues in divorce where are the assets located and what state has control of the assets
[sic].” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) Under this heading, Alberta devotes several
pages to summarizing the purported state of the law regarding various jurisdictional
doctrines, and citing certain United States Supreme Court cases. However, she fails to
apply any of the cited principles or authority to the facts of this case, or even mention
such facts. It is not clear what arguments Alberta means to present in this section.
As one example, Alberta quotes the following statement from Kline v. Burke
Construction Co. (1922) 260 U.S. 226, 230: “The rule, therefore, has become generally
established that where the action first brought is in personam and seeks only a personal
7
judgment, another action for the same cause in another jurisdiction is not precluded.” Yet
Alberta does not explain how the cited case or maxim applies here. To the extent she
means to argue that the rule demonstrates the Oklahoma court lacked jurisdiction over
assets that were located in California, she has failed to support her argument with
meaningful analysis, reasoned argument, or citations to the record, so we consider it
forfeited. (Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)4
The third part of Alberta’s legal argument section is headed “federal question
reviewable judgment rendered by a court having no jurisdiction over California assets.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) The text that follows begins: “For the reasons to be
stated, we are of opinion that the case is not reviewable on appeal; that it presents a
federal question reviewable on certiorari; because of its importance, certiorari should be
granted, and that the judgment must be reversed.” It is not clear what the purpose of that
text is, or why Alberta would contend her case is not reviewable on appeal.
The remainder of the text in this part of the legal argument section is no clearer.
As another example, Alberta states: “In this Article, Mr[.] O’Brien examines the role of
full faith and credit in resolving the conflict.” It is unclear what article Alberta is
referring to, or who “Mr. O’Brien” is—there are no other references to him in her briefs
on appeal, and no citation accompanying the reference.
We can discern no coherent arguments in this part of the legal argument section.
4
Nor would such an argument have any merit. In California, for instance, “family
courts regularly use their jurisdiction over in-state divorcing spouses to order them to
take whatever action is necessary to transfer interests in real property located out of state,
and there is no jurisdictional obstacle to having divorcing spouses account for such
property.” (Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 393, 405; citing Fam.
Code, § 2660, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Economou (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1466,
1479–1483; Muckle v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 226 [“ ‘ “a court
having jurisdiction of the parties ... may adjudicate their rights to land located in another
state.” ’ ”].) Moreover, Alberta was free to challenge—and did challenge—the
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts within that state’s judicial system.
8
Finally, we note that the “factual allegations/procedural background” (boldface &
capitalization omitted) section of Alberta’s opening brief also includes various legal
assertions. For instance, Alberta cites her complaint as alleging that her assets “were
intentionally stolen” by Donald, never left California, and were not marital assets.
However, Alberta makes no argument that the trial court improperly dismissed the case
on jurisdictional grounds.
Similarly, Alberta argues that the default judgments against Donald were “legally
obtained,” as Donald had failed to file a timely response “after being duly properly
served a summons and complaint.” Yet, she fails to address the scope of the trial court’s
authority to set aside the defaults and subsequently dismiss the case on jurisdictional
grounds.
And Alberta argues that the trial court “falsely stated” that she did not oppose
Donald’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment. While the record does
appear to reflect that Alberta opposed the motion, she does not argue or demonstrate on
appeal that any such false statement by the trial court constituted prejudicial error. An
appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error. (Scheenstra v. California Dairies,
Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 403.) To satisfy that burden, an “appellant must
provide an argument and legal authority to support [her] contentions. This burden
requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. ‘Issues do not have a life
of their own: If they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority,”
they are forfeited. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
Alberta failed to carry that burden here.
In short, none of the assertions included in the factual background section
addresses the fundamental question presented in this appeal: whether the trial court’s
dismissal of the case, on the ground that the Oklahoma court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the issues presented in the complaint, was in error.
9
We are mindful of the fact that Alberta is self-represented, but this does not
exempt her from compliance with the general rules set forth above. A party who acts as
her own attorney “ ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no
greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [self-represented litigants obligated to make intelligible
argument supported by citation to record and legal authority].)
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent may recover his costs on appeal.
10
___________________________________
Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
______________________________________
Lie, J.
Jones v. Jones
H052038