Filed 11/2/26 Jones v. Eaton CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
DEREK JONES, B342733
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC710289)
v.
JOSEPH EATON,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Derek Jones, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sinclair Braun Kargher, Kevin S. Sinclair, and Andrew H.
Steinberg for Defendant and Respondent.
When plaintiff and appellant Derek Jones (Jones) filed his
third amended complaint in this action, he revised his claim for
breach of written contract to allege the claim against all (not just
some) defendants, including defendant and respondent Joseph
Eaton (Eaton). Eaton prevailed on a motion to dismiss the
lawsuit for failure to timely bring the case to trial, and he later
moved for attorney fees under a provision in the pertinent
contract that authorizes recovery of such fees. The trial court
granted the motion and awarded Eaton fees from the date the
court determined Eaton began legal tasks related to the third
amended complaint. In this appeal from the attorney fees ruling,
we consider whether Eaton was eligible for fees under the
contract (including whether he qualifies as the prevailing party)
and whether the amount of the court’s fees award was an abuse
of its discretion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Dispute Giving Rise to Litigation, As Alleged
Jones and his former wife owned a two-unit residential
property and resided in one of the units with their children for
many years. In February 2014, Jones met with Eaton, Michael
Alladawi (Alladawi), William Go, and Nagaraj Murthy, who
represented they were partners in an entity called the “Plaza
Group.” They ultimately offered to procure a $500,000 loan for
Jones with the residential property serving as the collateral.
When Jones struggled to stay current on the loan, the Plaza
Group brokered a refinance. Eaton was directly involved in
communications regarding the refinance on behalf of the Plaza
Group.
2
In February 2016, the trustee under the deed of trust
issued a notice of default that warned $46,107.42 in loan
payments were overdue and a foreclosure sale could soon be set.
Jones and Alladawi then engaged in discussions about retiring
the debt. On May 20, 2016, the trustee issued a notice of
trustee’s sale stating a sale had been scheduled for June 15, 2016,
and demanding $640,841.28 to redeem the property. Alladawi
subsequently assured Jones he would postpone the sale as
needed.
By June 13, 2016, Jones and Alladawi agreed Jones would
pay counsel for the Plaza Group to prepare a formal forbearance
agreement. Jones paid the agreed-upon amount, counsel for the
Plaza Group circulated a draft of the forbearance agreement on
June 15, and Alladawi and Jones responded with comments.
Around noon that day, Alladawi sent Jones a text message
stating the postponement of the trustee’s sale had been processed
and counsel circulated an amended version of the agreement.
The following day, Jones signed the agreement as amended.
As relevant here, the forbearance agreement provided
IKON would postpone the trustee’s sale to July 1, 2016, if it
received a $10,000 wire transfer on or before June 16, 2016. On
June 16, Jones wired the $10,000 to IKON using the wire
instructions Alladawi provided to him. He also sent Alladawi a
text message with a screenshot of the initiated wire transfer.
Jones later discovered, however, that Alladawi had provided him
the wrong routing number.
On June 17, 2016, without any further notice, the trustee’s
sale was held and IKON purchased the property for $100,000.
IKON later sold the property to Industrial Strength Investments
3
M, LLC (Industrial Strength), a limited liability company of
which Eaton was both manager and member.
Eaton subsequently communicated to Jones that he might
be willing to sell the property back after a certain period of time
or under certain conditions. Though Jones pursued negotiations
and presented Eaton with at least one formal letter of intent,
Eaton eventually initiated unlawful detainer and trespass
proceedings against Jones and his family.
B. Jones Sues
In June 2018, Jones filed a complaint against Eaton and a
group of other defendants (Umbrella Capital Group, Inc. dba The
Plaza Group Realty (The Plaza Group), IKON, Alladawi, Go, and
Umbrella Group, Inc. (collectively, the Umbrella Defendants)).1
The complaint alleged the Umbrella Defendants engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to loan money to Jones secured by his
residential property and then, through a series of predatory and
deceptive acts, obtained the equity in the property by foreclosing
and selling the property to Industrial Strength. The complaint
alleged Eaton was a principal or partner in the Plaza Group and
a manager and member of Industrial Strength.
Among the causes of action in the initial complaint was a
breach of written contract cause of action alleging IKON
1
Jones filed the complaint in both his individual capacity
and his capacity as trustee of the trust that held title to the
property. Although certain versions of the complaint were also
brought on behalf of other plaintiffs, our background summary
focuses on Jones because he was the only remaining plaintiff
when judgment was entered in Eaton’s favor.
4
breached its written forbearance agreement with Jones to
postpone the foreclosure sale. Though the title of the cause of
action reflected it was alleged against IKON alone, the
paragraphs comprising the cause of action asserted “IKON and
Alladawi” breached the forbearance agreement. Jones also
alleged a cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact
agreement against IKON and Alladawi. The complaint’s prayer
for relief sought, among other things, attorney fees and costs
pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 (a statute authorizing
recovery of attorney fees for an action on a contract where the
contract permits recovery).2
Jones later filed both a first amended and second amended
complaint, each of which similarly asserted it was alleging a
breach of written contract claim against IKON only and a breach
of implied-in-fact contract claim against IKON and Alladawi.
Eaton demurred to the second amended complaint, and the trial
court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.3
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Civil Code.
3
The Umbrella Defendants also demurred to the second
amended complaint, and their demurrer was sustained without
leave to amend. Jones appealed, and we partially affirmed and
partially reversed. (Jones v. Umbrella Capital Group, Inc. (Dec.
5, 2025, B325981) [nonpub. opn.].) We remanded with directions
to let some of Jones’s claims against the Umbrella Defendants
proceed until resolved by other process.
5
C. The Third Amended Complaint
Jones filed his third amended complaint on August 30,
2022. Among other things, the third amended complaint alleged:
the defendants were agents, partners, joint venturers, or alter
egos of each other and all their actions were authorized and
approved by the others; Eaton was a partner in the Plaza Group
and was directly involved in communications on behalf of the
Plaza Group regarding Jones’s loan; and Eaton was fully aware of
and directly participated in defendants’ scheme to steal the
equity in plaintiff’s home. The third amended complaint further
alleged Eaton “repeatedly teased the possibility of selling the
[p]roperty back to [p]laintiffs” and Jones pursued negotiations
with Eaton in good faith but Eaton never earnestly engaged in
the discussions.
Unlike prior iterations of the complaint, the title of the
breach of written contract cause of action in the third amended
complaint represented it was being alleged against “All
Defendants,” thereby including Eaton. As before, the claim
alleged Jones entered into a forbearance agreement with IKON
in June 2016, Jones performed under the forbearance agreement,
and IKON and Alladawi breached the forbearance agreement. It
also alleged Jones had the resources to bring the loan current at
the time of the trustee’s sale but he did not because he believed
he had entered into an enforceable forbearance agreement. And
it alleged Jones was entitled to recover attorney fees and costs
against IKON pursuant to section 1717 because the forbearance
agreement has an attorney fee clause.4 The cause of action did
4
It further alleged that provisions providing for the payment
of attorney fees and costs were also set forth in the deed of trust,
6
not identify any written contracts that had allegedly been
breached other than the forbearance agreement.
The third amended complaint also retained a cause of
action for breach of an implied in fact agreement against IKON
and Alladawi only. The third amended complaint’s prayer for
relief generally demanded attorney fees pursuant to section 1717.
The signature block at the end of the third amended
complaint in the appellate record is not signed. Jones did not
immediately serve the third amended complaint, and as of
October 2023, he still had not served it on Eaton.
D. Errata to the Third Amended Complaint and Eaton’s
Motion to Dismiss the Lawsuit Pursuant to the Five-
Year Rule
In October 2023, Jones filed a motion seeking leave to file a
fourth amended complaint. Neither the proposed fourth
amended complaint nor Eaton’s opposition to the motion are in
the appellate record. The court denied the motion in mid-
November.
Jones then filed a notice of errata to the third amended
complaint, which attached both an executed signature page and
the exhibits to the complaint. The copy of the forbearance
agreement attached to the notice of errata, which was signed by
Jones only, containes an attorney fee clause which reads:
“Borrower shall pay all costs and expenses, including attorneys’
fees and costs, incurred by Lender in enforcing any of the terms
note, and guaranty entered into in connection with the loan, and
that Jones was entitled to recover attorney fees and costs
pursuant to the provisions and section 1717.
7
of this Agreement or the other Loan Documents, whether or not
any legal proceedings are instituted by Lender. Without limiting
the generality of the immediately preceding sentence, such costs
and expenses shall include all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred
by Lender in connection with any federal or state bankruptcy,
insolvency, reorganization, or other similar proceeding by or
against Borrower which in any way affects Lender’s exercise of
its rights and remedies under any or all of the Loan Documents.”
The record indicates Jones filed a second notice of errata on
January 18, 2024, and Eaton filed an ex parte application to
strike it. Jones’s opposition to the ex parte application to strike
confirmed he “recently clarified that all of the[ ] contract-related
causes of action are alleged against Eaton” and further asserted
“every incarnation of [p]laintiffs’ complaint has contained
allegations that Eaton is responsible for the acts of his [c]o-
[d]efendants and vice-versa.” Jones added that his contract-
based causes of action “all allege that Eaton participated in
devising and executing the bait-and-switch scenario in which
Plaintiffs were promised an opportunity to restore the Trust’s
ownership of the subject property post-foreclosure when in reality
Eaton had already arranged to purchase it from his Plaza Group
partners.”
At around the same time, Eaton filed a demurrer to the
third amended complaint. The demurrer is not in the appellate
record. Shortly thereafter, Eaton also filed a motion to dismiss
the action for failure to timely prosecute under the five-year rule.
The trial court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss and
vacated the hearing on the demurrer. The court thereafter
entered judgment, Jones appealed, and we affirmed the judgment
8
in a prior opinion. (Jones v. Eaton (May 20, 2026, B338670)
[nonpub. opn.].)
E. The Motion for Attorney Fees
1. The parties’ arguments
After entry of judgment in his favor, Eaton filed a motion
for attorney fees and costs seeking to recover $237,845 in fees
and costs incurred between October 2020 and April 2024. Eaton
argued section 1717 rendered the fee provision in the forbearance
agreement reciprocal and enforceable by non-contracting parties
and contended he was the prevailing party. With the fees
motion, Eaton’s counsel submitted a declaration that attached
redacted copies of their billing statements.
Jones opposed the fees motion and argued (in marked
contrast to his opposition to Eaton’s earlier motion to strike his
second notice of errata) that none of the third amended
complaint’s causes of action alleged Eaton breached the
forbearance agreement—to which Eaton was not a party. Jones
did concede the third amended complaint’s breach of written
contract cause of action identified Eaton as a defendant, but he
contended this was not significant because the text of the
allegations did not assert Eaton breached the forbearance
agreement. Jones also argued Eaton could not be deemed the
prevailing party on a contract action because Eaton did not
engage in any substantive advocacy related to the breach of
contract claim. Jones further argued the amount of fees
requested should be reduced in any event because (1) section
1717 only allows recovery of fees related to a contract cause of
action and there would be no difficulty separating the fees Eaton
incurred defending against contract and non-contract claims, and
9
(2) Eaton had not established the fees sought were reasonable
(though Jones did not contest specific items in the attorney
billing statements).
The trial court held a hearing on Eaton’s motion for
attorney fees. Jones argued that if a fee award was warranted at
all, incurred fees should only be permitted going forward from the
date of the filing of the third amended complaint. The court
asked Jones if he had calculated how much the fee award would
be if measured in that fashion. Jones responded he had not—
explaining he first wanted to see the court’s tentative ruling and
suggesting he could submit further briefing. The court indicated
the calculation should have already been done because that is
part of what must be done in opposing a motion for attorney fees.
The court took the matter under submission and later
requested further briefing from Eaton on the basis of the
requested fees, which Eaton submitted. The court permitted
Jones to file a response, which he did. That response contended
the only contract Eaton was alleged to have breached was an
agreement to sell the property back to Jones at a modest
premium—not the forbearance agreement. Jones did not submit
any specific objections to requested fees or propose a different
calculation for a reasonable fee request.
2. The court’s ruling
The court granted Eaton’s motion for attorney fees in part,
awarding him fees incurred after Jones served the third amended
complaint. The court stated Jones first alleged Eaton was liable
for breach of the forbearance agreement in the third amended
complaint and it was on that basis that Eaton as the prevailing
party was entitled to attorney fees and costs under the
10
forbearance agreement. Eaton was therefore only entitled to fees
and costs from the period after he was served with that iteration
of the complaint.
The court also explained it was “difficult to determine when
plaintiff’s service of the Third Amended Complaint on Eaton
required Eaton’s counsel to undertake specific legal tasks in
response to the allegations made therein that Eaton breached the
Forbearance Agreement.” The court found the billing records did
“not reflect precisely when Eaton’s counsel received and studied
the Third Amended Complaint” and stated it would “assume that
Eaton’s counsel began legal tasks related to the Third Amended
Complaint (while concurrently attending to other tasks required
by the long pending litigation) in October 2023.”
The court then tabulated the attorney fees and costs
incurred from October 2023 through April 2024, based on the
time records submitted, which totaled $99,071.65, plus $2,032.75
in costs.
II. DISCUSSION
When Jones filed the third amended complaint, he revised
his cause of action for breach of written contract to allege it
against all defendants, including Eaton. He also alleged all
defendants were responsible for the damages alleged in the
complaint under theories of vicarious liability, and he therefore
could have recovered fees from Eaton had he succeeded on his
claim. Jones, however, did not succeed, and because there is no
colorable argument that Eaton should not have been deemed the
prevailing party, the trial court did not err in awarding Eaton
attorney fees. Further, since Jones provides neither an adequate
record on appeal nor an alternative suggestion of what amount of
11
attorney fees should have been awarded, he has not
demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
Eaton fees incurred from October 2023 through April 2024.
A. Eaton Is Entitled to Fees Pursuant to the Forbearance
Agreement
1. Eaton is eligible for fees pursuant to section
1717
Section 1717, subdivision (a) provides: “In any action on a
contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s
fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall
be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party,
then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on
the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the
contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in
addition to other costs.” “‘[S]ection 1717 was enacted to establish
mutuality of remedy where [a] contractual provision makes
recovery of attorney’s fees available for only one party [citations],
and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney’s fees
provisions. [Citation.]’” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863,
870; Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128.)
“[A] party is entitled to attorney fees under section 1717 ‘even
when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable,
invalid, unenforceable[,] or nonexistent, if the other party would
have been entitled to attorney’s fees had it prevailed.” (Hsu,
supra, at 870.) We review the issue of whether a party is legally
entitled to attorney fees de novo. (Pulse Technology Consulting
Group, Inc. v. Skowron & Bunning LLP (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
824, 834.)
12
Jones’s third amended complaint amended the title of the
cause of action for breach of written contract, which was
previously alleged only against IKON, to allege it against all
defendants. When he did so, he alleged this cause of action
against Eaton.5 The only written contract that the cause of action
alleged was breached was the forbearance agreement, which
contains an attorney fee clause requiring a borrower to pay “all
costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees and costs, incurred
by Lender in enforcing any of the terms of this Agreement or the
other Loan Documents . . . .”6 That means Eaton was entitled to
recover attorney fees on the action on the contract.
It is no response, as Jones argues, that the allegations
specific to the breach of written contract cause of action do not
mention Eaton by name. The general allegations in the
complaint allege all defendants were agents, partners, joint
venturers, or alter egos of the others, and all their actions were
authorized and approved by the others. If Jones had succeeded
in his claim for breach of contract, and had proven Eaton was
liable as an agent, partner, joint venturer, or alter ego of IKON,
he would have been entitled to attorney fees from Eaton pursuant
to the combination of the forbearance agreement and section
1717. As a result, section 1717 provides Eaton may recover
5
Jones never contended this was a scrivener’s error. Indeed,
his own attorney admitted the cause of action was alleged against
Eaton at the hearing on the motion for attorney fees.
6
Jones’s claim that Eaton was sued for breach of a property
buyback agreement is belied by the text of the third amended
complaint itself, which does not allege the existence of a written
buyback agreement.
13
attorney fees even though he is not a signatory to the contract.
(Reynolds, supra, 25 Cal.3d at 128.)
Jones also protests that the cause of action for breach of
written contract only sought fees from IKON. While the
allegations specific to that cause of action expressly request fees
from IKON alone, the prayer for relief seeks judgment against
“Defendants” and more broadly requests attorney fees pursuant
to contract and section 1717. In addition, the fact that Jones did
not expressly allege that he sought fees from anyone other than
IKON in the breach of contract cause of action would not have
precluded him from obtaining fees from Eaton had he succeeded.
(See Yassin v. Solis (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 524, 533 [“There is no
requirement that a party plead that it is seeking attorney fees,
and there is no requirement that the ground for a fee award be
specified in the pleadings”].)
Finally, Jones relies on Super 7 Motel Associates v. Wang
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 541, 549 for the proposition that section
1717 does not render a nonsignatory defendant liable for attorney
fees if that defendant would not have been liable for fees had the
plaintiff prevailed. The court in Super 7, however, found the
defendant would not have been liable for attorney fees because
the plaintiff was suing for recission of a contract, recission could
not be obtained against the nonsignatory defendant, and the
plaintiff’s remaining claims against the defendant sounded in
fraud. (Id. at 549-550.) Here, by contrast, Jones sued Eaton for
breach of contract and alleged theories of liability that would
have extended to Eaton had Jones’s claim been successful. Super
7 is thus inapposite.
14
2. Eaton is the prevailing party
Jones also contends the trial court erred by determining
Eaton the prevailing party on the contract. Section 1717,
subdivision (b) provides a court “shall determine” the prevailing
party on a contract and, with exceptions not relevant here,
provides “the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party
who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.”
(§ 1717, subd. (b)(1).)
“[I]n deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the
contract,’ the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the
contract claim or claims with the parties’ demands on those same
claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the
pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.
The prevailing party determination is to be made . . . only by ‘a
comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and
failed to succeed in its contentions.’ [Citation.]” (Hsu, supra, 9
Cal.4th at 876.) The defendant is the prevailing party as a
matter of law where the trial court enters judgment of dismissal
against the plaintiff for failure to prosecute. (Elms v. Builders
Disbursements, Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 671, 672, 674-675
[five-year mandatory dismissal]; see also Wong v. Davidian
(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 264, 267-268, 271 [three-year discretionary
dismissal].)
Jones contends the trial court was not required to name a
prevailing party in this scenario. He is incorrect. While section
1717 provides a court “may also determine that there is no party
prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section,” that does
not grant a trial court unfettered discretion to make such a
determination. Rather, “when the results of the litigation on the
contract claims are not mixed—that is, when the decision on the
15
litigated contract claims is purely good news for one party and
bad news for the other . . . a trial court has no discretion to deny
attorney fees to the successful litigant. Thus, when a defendant
defeats recovery by the plaintiff on the only contract claim in the
action, the defendant is the party prevailing on the contract
under section 1717 as a matter of law.” (Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
875-876.) That is what happened here.
Jones also contends the trial court erred because the record
contains no evidence the court analyzed the pleadings and
compared the extent to which each party succeeded and failed on
its contentions, as discussed in Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 875-876.
But the result here was an unequivocal victory in Eaton’s favor,
so an express analysis would have added nothing of substance.
Moreover, in the absence of affirmative indications to the
contrary—and there are none here—we presume the trial court
considered all necessary factors in reaching its decision.
(Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 240, 255.)
B. Jones Has Not Demonstrated the Trial Court Abused
Its Discretion in Calculating the Amount of Fees
Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the amount
of a reasonable attorney fee award. (The Kennedy Com. v. City of
Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 465.) An attorney
fee award “will not be set aside absent an affirmative showing of
abuse of discretion . . . .” (Horning v. Shilberg (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 197, 210.) “We presume the trial court’s award is
reasonable and the court considered appropriate factors in
reaching its decision, even though the court may not have
rendered a written ruling. The trial court is not required to state
16
each charge it finds reasonable or unreasonable . . . . [Citation.]”
(Pollock v. Kelso (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1195.) “The
burden is on the party complaining to establish that discretion
was clearly abused and a miscarriage of justice resulted.”
(Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 498, 505.)
1. Apportionment
“Where a cause of action based on the contract providing
for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the
contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees under
section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action.”
(Reynolds, supra, 25 Cal.3d at 129.) However, “[a]ttorney’s fees
need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an
issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper
and one in which they are not allowed.” (Id. at 129-130.)
Additionally, “[a]pportionment is not required when the claims
for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not
impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and
noncompensable units.” (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.) “Where fees are authorized for some
causes of action in a complaint but not for others, allocation is a
matter within the trial court’s discretion.” (Amtower v. Photon
Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1604.)
Eaton submitted billing records for the relevant time period
to the trial court. Jones did not object below to any particular
charges or the hours spent on any categories of work—nor does
he do so on appeal. Instead, Jones only generally complains the
trial court must have awarded fees in connection with Eaton’s
defense of non-contract claims and erred in doing so.
17
First, Jones argues Eaton was not forced to defend against
any contract claims because the third amended complaint was
never served and it was the only iteration of the complaint that
identified Eaton in the breach of written contract claim. Whether
or not Jones ever complied with his obligation to serve the third
amended complaint, it undeniably became the operative
complaint in the matter, as evidenced, among other things, by
Eaton having filed a demurrer to the third amended complaint.
Second, Jones contends that even if Eaton was forced to
defend against a contract-based claim and was entitled to fees,
the trial court was required to at least analyze whether the
contract and tort-based claims were necessarily intertwined and
attempt to quantify and differentiate the two. However, Jones
made no attempt to demonstrate the fees incurred by Eaton with
respect to the contract claim were not common to both the
contract and non-contract claims. Nor does the sparse appellate
record provide us with a basis to reach that conclusion. The
party challenging a fee award “has an affirmative obligation to
provide an adequate record so that we may assess whether the
trial court abused its discretion.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal
Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447.) Jones has not met
that obligation. For example, though the record contains Jones’s
opposition to Eaton’s motion to dismiss, it does not contain the
motion Eaton filed. Nor does it contain Eaton’s demurrer to the
third amended complaint, or any other motions or briefs Eaton
filed during the period for which the trial court awarded fees. We
thus have no basis to conclude the trial court, which was not
required to provide a detailed explanation for its fee award,
either failed to analyze whether fees could be apportioned or
abused its discretion in impliedly determining they could not.
18
2. Time period
Jones additionally contends the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Eaton fees beginning in October 2023. In
its order, the court stated Eaton’s counsel’s time records did not
reflect precisely when Eaton’s counsel was required to undertake
specific legal tasks in response to the allegations in the third
amended complaint and the court assumed counsel began tasks
related to that complaint in October 2023. Though Jones states
Eaton did not file any pleadings related to the substance of the
third amended complaint until three months later in January
2024, he does not identify an alternative date upon which he
contends Eaton’s counsel began working on matters related to the
third amended complaint.
Based on our review of the time records in the appellate
record, it appears the work Eaton’s attorneys performed in
October and the first half of November 2023 related to Jones’s
motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. The records
reflect work in the second half of November 2023 directly related
to the third amended complaint.7 This does not, however, suffice
to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion because the
appellate record contains neither the proposed fourth amended
complaint nor Eaton’s opposition to the motion for leave to
amend. Without such documents, we cannot conclude that work
relating to the proposed fourth amended complaint did not also
involve either work directly stemming from Jones’s cause of
7
Our review of the billing records also reveals Eaton’s
counsel began performing at least some work directly related to
the third amended complaint in September 2022.
19
action for breach of written contract against Eaton or work on
issues common to that cause of action.8
“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many
hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging
party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient
argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that
fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not
suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v.
California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)
Based on the limited appellate record, we cannot conclude the
trial court abused its discretion in selecting October 2023 as the
starting point for its award of contractual attorney fees.
8
Jones’s motion for leave to file the fourth amended
complaint does not, for example, suggest that one of the
amendments was removing Eaton as a defendant to the cause of
action for breach of written contract.
20
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Eaton is awarded costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
KIM (D.), J.
KUMAR, J.*
*
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
21