Filed 8/25/26 Jones v. Chico Mobile Home Park CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
TIM JONES et al., C103096
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CV00451)
v.
CHICO MOBILE HOME PARK, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Plaintiffs are current and former residents of a mobile home park owned and
operated by defendants Chico Mobile Home Park, LLC, and BoaVida Communities,
LLC, (together, defendants). Plaintiffs sued defendants for failing to properly maintain
common areas and facilities within the park. Defendants moved to compel arbitration.
The trial court denied the motion, and defendants appeal, arguing the trial court erred in
finding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) inapplicable and the
alleged arbitration agreement unconscionable. We will affirm on another ground; namely,
that defendants failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement or agreements
binding on all plaintiffs by a preponderance of the evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are current and former residents of a mobile home park in Chico. They
commenced the instant action in February 2024 and filed the operative first amended
1
complaint in July 2024. That pleading asserts 18 causes of action on behalf of 69 current
and former residents, who range from toddlers to senior citizens.1
The first amended complaint alleges plaintiffs live in the park “pursuant to written
and verbal lease agreements between plaintiffs, as tenants, and defendants … , as
landlords, owners, and managers.” It purports to attach as an exhibit “certain leases
between plaintiffs and defendants that are exemplars of the form leases utilized by
defendants for each plaintiff.” Despite the use of the plural “leases,” the first amended
complaint attaches only one lease agreement, by and between Chico Mobile Home Park,
as owner, and plaintiff Karla A. McGee, as tenant (the McGee agreement).
The McGee agreement is signed, dated, and contains an initialed arbitration
provision that states in pertinent part: “To ensure speedy resolution of disputes, neutral
arbitration is used to resolve disputes. Arbitrator shall determine costs based on ability to
pay. Arbitration applies to all claims for personal or bodily injury; and, claims for
property damage and any claimed loss or expense whatsoever (apart from damages
incidental to an unlawful detainer action). Arbitration shall be under the [FAA], as
mobilehomes and appurtenances are constructed, shipped, financed and leased in
interstate commerce.” 2 The first page of the McGee agreement, entitled “summary of
1 Those causes of action are: (1) negligence, (2) negligent hiring, (3) negligent
supervision, (4) negligent invasion of private right of occupancy, (5) breach of the
implied warranty of habitability – negligence, (6) breach of the implied warranty of
habitability – intentional, (7) nuisance – negligence, (8) nuisance – intentional, (9)
negligent infliction of emotional distress, (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress,
(11) breach of the implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, (12) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (13) breach of contract, (14) elder abuse
- financial abuse, (15) constructive eviction, (16) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200), (17) declaratory relief, and (18) retaliatory eviction.
2 The arbitration provision continues:
2
provisions,” and other provisions as to term and base rent, are struck through with the
words, “Rejected KM 9/1/17.”
Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of all claims by all plaintiffs in
September 2024. The motion argued plaintiffs purchased mobile homes and leased
spaces in the park in arms-length transactions affecting interstate commerce. As such, the
motion argued plaintiffs were required to arbitrate under the FAA. The motion relied on
the arbitration provision in the McGee agreement, stating: “Unless otherwise referenced,
this Motion will refer to this [arbitration provision] as an exemplar of all of the
[arbitration provisions] contained within the Leases. Accordingly, it will be assumed that
the [arbitration provision] applies to all Plaintiffs in this action.”
The motion was supported by the declaration of Aric Resnicke, identified only as
an authorized agent of defendant BoaVida Communities. The Resnicke declaration
generally described the process for purchasing a mobile home and leasing space in the
park, noting: “If a person is interested in buying a home in the Park, the person must buy
the home and enter into a lease agreement for the space where the home is located. A
“A. The arbitrator shall determine all issues including whether the dispute may
be arbitrated. State laws shall not apply. Commercial Rules of the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) procedures apply. No joinder of actions or
consolidation or class actions allowed. The award may be entered as a court
judgment. Any alternative dispute resolution organization within 75 miles shall
select 5 proposed arbitrators, each side strikes up to 2 names, the least expensive
per hour of any remaining may be the arbitrators. Arbitration shall be completed
within 4 months from demand for arbitration.
“B. No party shall recover their attorney’s fees in arbitration (notwithstanding
an attorney’s fee clause to the contrary in this agreement). Discovery permitted as
per federal law; punitive damages are allowed up to ten percent of compensatory
damages if any. The arbitration shall be as soon as possible by schedule
determined by the arbitrator. This clause is intended to promote federal policy
favoring arbitration to be construed per AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, decided in
April[] 2011 by the United States Supreme Court.”
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person may not buy a home without also leasing space.” The Resnicke declaration did
not discuss form lease agreements or arbitration; however, Resnicke averred: “I have
reviewed the leases and arbitration agreements for the individuals listed attached to the
[first amended complaint] as Exhibit A.” He further averred: “I am not aware of anyone
challenging the terms of the arbitration agreement.” The Resnicke declaration attached a
copy of the first amended complaint as an exhibit.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel arbitration. They argued the FAA was
inapplicable, and arbitration was precluded by the Mobilehome Residency Law. (Civ.
Code, § 798 et seq.) They also argued defendants failed to prove the existence of an
arbitration agreement as to all but McGee, and the McGee agreement “appears to have
been rejected.” They added: “The lease of Karla McGee was attached to the operative
complaint in this matter merely as an example of services provided by the park. It is not
logical to extrapolate from one lease from one homeowner that each plaintiff agreed to
the arbitration clause or even had the same form of lease.” Plaintiffs also argued the
McGee agreement’s arbitration provision was unconscionable, and enforcing the
provision would lead to inconsistent results.
Plaintiffs’ opposition was supported by the declaration of Tim Jones. Jones
averred that he became a resident of the park in 1998, before defendants owned or
managed the property. He further averred that he signed a lease agreement upon
becoming a tenant, but no longer had a copy of the agreement and did not believe it
contained an arbitration provision. He further averred that neither defendant had ever
asked him to sign a new lease or arbitration agreement, and he was not aware of them
asking any other resident to do so.
Defendants filed a reply brief. As relevant here, defendants argued they
“justifiably relied” on the first amended complaint’s allegation that the McGee agreement
was an “exemplar[] of the form leases utilized by defendants for each plaintiff” in
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preparing the motion to compel arbitration, and it was “fair to hold all of the individual
Plaintiffs to these allegations because each voluntarily joined this particular action.”
The trial court heard argument and entered an order denying the motion to compel
in January 2025. The trial court found the FAA was inapplicable, and the arbitration
provision in the McGee agreement was unconscionable. The trial court did not address
plaintiffs’ argument that defendants failed to establish the existence of an arbitration
agreement. No party requested a statement of decision. This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a party to a civil action asks the trial court to compel arbitration of the
pending claim, the court must determine whether an “agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)3 “Because the existence of the agreement
is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of
proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal, supra, at p. 413.)
“While public policy favors contractual arbitration of disputes, arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to
do so.” (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 584-585
(Brockman).)
The trial court determines whether an arbitration agreement exists in a summary
proceeding (§ 1290.2), applying a three-step burden-shifting framework. (Brockman,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 586 [“Although the burden of persuasion is always on the
moving party to prove the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the
burden of production may shift in a three-step process”].) First, the moving party bears
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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the burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy. (Ibid.) This can be done by stating the arbitration provision verbatim or
attaching a copy to the petition or motion or stating the provision verbatim. (Ibid.; see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 (rule 3.1330) [“The provisions must be stated
verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and
incorporated by reference”].) “ ‘At this step, a movant need not “follow the normal
procedures of document authentication” and need only “allege the existence of an
agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule [3.1330].” ’ ” (Brockman,
supra, at p. 586.)
“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party
disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of
producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. [Citation.] The
opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify
under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not
remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember
signing the agreement.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
158, 165 (Gamboa).) The opposing party need not prove the inauthenticity or invalidity
of the alleged arbitration agreement at this step but need only submit sufficient evidence
to create a factual dispute and shift the burden back to the moving party, who retains the
ultimate burden of proving the existence of the agreement by a preponderance of the
evidence. (West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.)
“If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third
step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance
of the evidence remains with the moving party.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp.
165-166.) When the opposing party presents sufficient evidence to raise a factual dispute
in the second step, the trial court should ordinarily allow the moving party to submit reply
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evidence establishing the agreement’s authenticity or validity. (See, e.g., Sprunk v.
Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 794 (Sprunk) [trial court properly admitted
moving party’s evidence on reply because nonmoving party placed arbitration
agreement’s validity at issue in opposition papers].)
“We review an order denying a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of
discretion unless a pure question of law is presented. In that case, the order is reviewed
de novo.” (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1047, 1056-1057.) Whether the moving party has satisfied its initial burden
of production “presents a legal question, subject to de novo review.” (Id. at p. 1057; see
also Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804, 811
[same].) Whether the opposing party’s evidence was sufficient to create a factual dispute
shifting the burden back to the moving party is also subject to de novo review. (West v.
Solar Mosaic LLC, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992-993.) With respect to the ultimate
question whether the moving party has established the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence, “ ‘the question for the reviewing court is
whether that finding is erroneous as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Specifically, the
question becomes whether appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” ’ ” (Garcia v. Stoneledge
Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 52.)
Our review is superficially complicated by the trial court’s reluctance to address
whether there exists an arbitration agreement binding on all plaintiffs, or only one
(McGee). As always, however, “we review results and not reasoning.” (Travis v. Brand
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006; see also D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [“ ‘No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by
authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling
or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for
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a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be
sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its
conclusion’ ”].) “Therefore, if the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel
arbitration is sustainable on any theory of law, it will be affirmed.” (Mayflower Ins. Co.
v. Pellegrino (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332.)
B. Analysis
We begin our analysis with the first step of the burden-shifting framework, which
requires us to independently consider whether defendants made a prima facie showing of
the existence of an arbitration agreement. (See Espejo v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1056-1057.) As previously
discussed, defendants’ motion to compel arbitration was supported by the Resnicke
declaration, which attached a copy of the first amended complaint as an exhibit. The first
amended complaint attached a copy of the McGee agreement, and the McGee agreement
contains an arbitration provision. Defendants thus carried their initial burden of
production as to the existence of an arbitration agreement binding on McGee. (See
Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165 [“The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden
by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to
bear the [opposing party’s] signature’ ” or “by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in
the motion”].)
With respect to the other plaintiffs, defendants observed the McGee agreement
was characterized in the first amended complaint as exemplary of the “form leases
utilized by defendants for each plaintiff.” Relying on that characterization, defendants
went on to say they “assumed” the arbitration provision “applies to all Plaintiffs in this
action.” We conclude defendants’ showing was enough to meet their initial burden of
production, though perhaps just barely so. (See Sprunk, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 793
[moving defendant in putative wage and hour class action satisfied rule 3.1330 by
attaching “examples of the two different versions of the arbitration provision” to general
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manager’s declaration].) The burden thus shifted to plaintiffs to produce evidence
creating a factual dispute as to the existence of an arbitration agreement binding on all
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ opposition explained the McGee agreement was only attached to the
first amended complaint “as an example of services provided by the park,” and not to
establish the existence of a uniform lease agreement. They emphasized the Resnicke
declaration averred only that Resnicke “reviewed the leases and arbitration agreements
for the individuals listed,” but stopped short of saying all such individuals were bound by
an agreement containing an arbitration provision. They offered the declaration of Jones,
a longtime resident who preceded defendants’ ownership and management of the park
and denied signing any agreement containing an arbitration provision. Based on our
independent review, we conclude the Jones declaration was sufficient to demonstrate a
factual dispute as to the existence of an arbitration agreement binding on all plaintiffs.
(See, e.g., Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 167 [the plaintiff “met her burden on the
second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and
would not have signed it if she had been aware of it”]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group,
Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846 [“In the face of [the plaintiff’s] failure to recall
signing the [arbitration] agreement, [the defendant] had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the electronic signature was authentic”].) The burden
thus shifted back to defendants to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with
admissible evidence, by a preponderance of the evidence. (Gamboa, supra, at pp. 165-
166.)
Defendants failed to carry that burden. They acknowledged in reply that the
motion to compel arbitration rested on “the assumption that the [arbitration agreement]
applies to all Plaintiffs in this action.” As before, that assumption was entirely based on
the first amended complaint’s allegation that the McGee agreement was an “exemplar[]
of the form leases utilized by defendants for each plaintiff.” But even assuming all
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plaintiffs signed some form of lease agreement (an assumption at odds with the first
amended complaint’s allegation that some plaintiffs were bound by oral lease
agreements), and assuming further that all such agreements contained arbitration
provisions, there was no evidence that any plaintiff other than McGee agreed to arbitrate.
(Cf. Sprunk, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 793-794 [moving defendant established
existence of arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence by submitting
supplemental declaration on reply averring that all class members signed at least one of
two versions of arbitration provision].) That being so, the trial court could have—and
arguably should have—denied the motion to compel arbitration at the third step of the
burden-shifting framework, without the necessity of deciding whether the FAA applied or
whether the McGee agreement was unconscionable. (See Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture
LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 51 [“Even when an agreement provides that it is
governed by the FAA, courts must first apply state law principles in determining whether
the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate”]; see also Brockman, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 587 [“the need to raise a defense to enforcement arises only if the
moving party first meets its burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement
between the parties. This is so because ‘the existence of [an arbitration] agreement is a
statutory prerequisite to granting [a] petition’ to compel arbitration, which imposes on the
moving party ‘the burden of proving [the agreement’s] existence by a preponderance of
the evidence,’ regardless of the opposing party’s claimed defenses”].)
Defendants argue for the first time on appeal that the first amended complaint’s
characterization of the McGee agreement as an “exemplar[] of the form leases utilized …
for each plaintiff” constitutes a judicial admission that all plaintiffs agreed to arbitration.
However, “ ‘ “[i]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider
claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not presented to
the trial court.” ’ ” (Bank of America, N.A. v. Roberts (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1386,
1398-1399.) This is true even where appellants present a purely legal argument for the
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first time on appeal. (See Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 591-592; id. at p.
591, fn. 12.) In any case, defendants’ argument fails.
“ ‘Judicial admissions are admissions of fact that “may be made in a pleading, by
stipulation during trial, or by response to request[s] for admission.” ’ [Citation.] …
[J]]udicial admissions pertain to factual allegations—they do not involve legal theories,
legal conclusions, legal arguments, or assertions concerning mixed questions of law and
fact. [Citations.] Further, a judicial admission is an unequivocal concession of the truth
of a matter. [Citation.] Thus, unclear, equivocal, uncertain, or ambiguous statements do
not create binding judicial admissions.” (Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of
Modesto, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1140.) The first amended complaint’s
characterization of the McGee agreement as an “exemplar[] of the form leases … utilized
for each plaintiff” does not amount to an unequivocal concession that each plaintiff
agreed to arbitrate.
By definition, an “exemplar” is “one that serves as a model or example.”
(Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dict. Online (2026) <https://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/exemplar> [as of Aug. 19, 2026], archived at
<https://perma.cc/V6KY-UUCE>.) To say that the McGee agreement is an “exemplar[]
of the form leases utilized … for each plaintiff” is not to say that each plaintiff signed an
agreement identical to the McGee agreement. The McGee agreement is 22-pages long,
and contains 47 separately numbered provisions, some with multiple subparts. The first
amended complaint does not say the McGee agreement contains the same terms as lease
agreements signed by other plaintiffs, and it seems obvious that an agreement could serve
as an “exemplar” for some purposes but not others. For example, the McGee agreement
could have been offered as an exemplar of defendants’ contractual duty to maintain
common areas within the park or provide services to each plaintiff but not as an exemplar
of any other term of the agreement. And even assuming the first amended complaint
judicially admits that each plaintiff was presented with an agreement containing an
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arbitration provision, we have been given no reason to suppose each plaintiff agreed to
such a provision. We therefore reject defendants’ argument that plaintiffs judicially
admitted the existence of an arbitration agreement.
For all of these reasons, we conclude defendants failed to establish the existence of
an arbitration agreement binding on all plaintiffs, rather than just one. Having so
concluded, it is unnecessary to consider whether the FAA should have applied or whether
the McGee agreement was unconscionable.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Plaintiffs
are entitled to recover their reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
FEINBERG, J.
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