Jiang v. Chow CA2/7

Filed 8/10/26 Jiang v. Chow CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

RUIZENG JIANG, B343403

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 19CMCV00360)

CHUN MAN CHOW,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Fumiko Wasserman, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Carl K. Osborne and Carl K. Osborne for
Defendant and Appellant.
Lo & Lo, Kelvin J. Lo and Brendan T. Molloy for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
___________________________
INTRODUCTION

Chun Man Chow appeals from the judgment after the trial
court found him liable on Ruizeng Jiang’s breach of contract and
related causes of action. Chow contends substantial evidence did
not support the court’s finding he signed the contract the court
found he breached, which the parties refer to as the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Chow argues that
someone forged his signature on the MOU and that the trial
court erred in disregarding the testimony of his expert witness,
relying on the court’s lay handwriting comparison, and crediting
the testimony of a witness who later recanted. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Jiang Invests in Muse Logistics, Inc.
Jiang lives in Shanghai, China, and wanted to immigrate to the
United States. Jiang asked a family friend, Yu Li, to help him obtain a
visa. Li suggested they form a business to make Jiang eligible for an
EB-5 investor visa.1 Li introduced Jiang to Chow, with whom Li had a
business called Athena Freight Inc.
Jiang, Li, and Chow decided to form Muse Logistics, Inc., a
logistics and transportation company, to help Jiang obtain a visa.
Jiang gave Li power of attorney to “‘process and sign all

1
The EB-5 immigrant investor program provides a pathway
to lawful permanent residency for foreign nationals who invest at
least $1,050,000 (or $800,000 in a Targeted Employment Area) in
an American commercial enterprise and create at least
10 full-time jobs for American workers. (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)
et seq.; see Wu v. Liu (11th Cir. 2025) 131 F.4th 1295, 1297.)

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documents relate[d] to [his] applications to the immigration
investor program.’”
Chow directed attorney Donald Matson to draft the
company’s incorporation documents, including the MOU.
Because Jiang could not read, write, or speak English, Li
translated the MOU into Chinese for him. Jiang alleged that in
December 2016 the parties signed the MOU, confirming their
desire to form Muse in support of Jiang’s immigration
application.
The MOU named Li chairman of the board, chief executive
officer, and secretary, and Chow secretary of the board and chief
financial officer. Jiang agreed to invest $505,000, in exchange for
a 40 percent ownership interest in Muse, and Li and Chow each
agreed to invest $250,000, in exchange for a 30 percent
ownership interest each. The MOU gave Li and Chow “‘the
exclusive right to manage the business’” and prohibited them
from taking “‘any illegal action.’” The MOU also stated that, if Li
and Chow mismanaged the business so that Jiang did not get a
visa, Li and Chow would pay all immigration appeal costs.
On February 9, 2017 Jiang invested $505,000 in Muse. Li
and Chow, however, never made their $250,000 investments.
Instead, Li and Chow withdrew Jiang’s investment from Muse’s
bank account and made $137,400 in loans to Li, Li’s former
father-in-law, Athena Freight, and an unidentified payee.
Athena Freight repaid $15,000 on one of these loans, but none of
the other borrowers repaid anything. Chow and Li withdrew the
rest of the $505,000 from Muse’s bank account through “checks
and wire transfers for consultation fees to Athena Freight and Li,
payments to Athena Freight and Li for unidentified purposes,

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checks issued for the purpose of ‘cash’, a payment to [Li] for an
unidentified purpose, and service charges.”

B. Jiang Files This Action
In February 2019 Jiang sued Chow and Li for breach of
contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, concealment, and promissory fraud. Jiang
alleged that Li signed the MOU on December 16, 2016 and that
Chow signed the MOU on December 19, 2016. Jiang alleged Li
and Chow breached the MOU, misappropriated or converted
Jiang’s investment, and committed fraud. Despite the fact he
instructed Matson to draft the MOU, Chow maintained he never
signed it. Chow claimed that someone forged the signature on
the last page of the MOU and that he never agreed to invest
$250,000 into Muse.

C. Jiang Prevails After a Court Trial
At trial Jiang introduced an office lease for Muse, which
included a signature the parties agreed was Chow’s. Jiang
claimed Chow’s signature on the lease was nearly identical to the
signature on the MOU.
Li testified that he “personally saw Chow sign the MOU”
and that he did not forge Chow’s signature. Li later recanted this
testimony, stating that he originally thought he and Chow signed
the MOU at the same time, but that he later recalled Chow gave
him a signed copy of the MOU. The trial court found Li’s original
testimony—that he witnessed Chow sign the MOU—more
credible. The court also observed the MOU had three sets of
initials in the lower right-hand corner of each page. Jiang and Li

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confirmed two of the three initials were theirs.
Chow called a forensic handwriting expert, Bart Baggett, to
testify on the authenticity of the disputed signature on the last
page of the MOU. Baggett testified he compared samples of
Chow’s signature with the signature on the MOU and concluded
Chow did not sign the agreement. Baggett stated there were
“several ‘significant differences’ in pen lifts, letter formation, and
stroke velocity” between the signature on the MOU Jiang claimed
was Chow’s and other examples of Chow’s signature. Baggett
admitted on cross-examination he did not compare Chow’s
signature on the lease with the signature on the MOU because he
did not receive the lease before he concluded his analysis. The
trial court found that this admission damaged Baggett’s
credibility and that the signature on the lease and the signature
on the MOU were “very similar.”
The court ruled in favor of Jiang and against Chow and Li
on Jiang’s causes of action for breach of contract (the MOU),
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, concealment,
and promissory fraud. The court rejected Chow’s claim someone
forged his signature on the MOU. In finding Chow signed the
MOU and was bound by it, the trial court cited the similarities
between Chow’s signatures on the MOU and the office lease, Li’s
original testimony he saw Chow sign the MOU, and the presence
of three sets of initials on each page of the MOU. The court
determined this evidence outweighed Baggett’s forensic analysis,
which the court found “less persuasive.” The court stated that,
though it did not exclude Baggett’s testimony, the court was
giving it “limited weight” because Baggett did not consider
Chow’s signature on the lease. The court also discredited Li’s

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recantation and found more credible his original testimony he
saw Chow sign the MOU. The court awarded Jiang $505,000 in
damages. The court entered judgment in favor of Jiang and
against Chow and Li on the complaint in the amount of $505,000,
plus $238,110.96 in prejudgment interest.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
Finding Chow Signed the MOU
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Gajanan Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 780, 792.) “We construe findings of fact
liberally to support the judgment; consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the judgment; draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings; and infer that the trial court
“‘impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its
decision.’”” (Ibid.; see Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 860, 873.) We defer to the trial court’s factual
findings “where there is substantial evidence supporting them.”
(Greif v. Sanin (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 412, 442; see
LA Investments, LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061
[“When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground there is no
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is
any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
will support it.”].) We do not “‘reweigh the evidence, redetermine
the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is
evidence to support it.’” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical

6
Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173; see Harley-Davidson,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding
Chow signed the MOU. The trial court compared the signature
on the MOU with Chow’s signature on the lease and found the
signatures “very similar.” The court considered that Baggett,
though a handwriting expert, did not compare the signature on
the lease, which admittedly was Chow’s, with the signature on
the MOU; that Li testified he saw Chow sign the MOU; and that
Chow instructed Matson to prepare the MOU. (See In re
Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614 [the testimony of a
single witness may be sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence]; Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 481, 500 [same].) The trial court was in the best
position to weigh the evidence and judge the witnesses’
credibility. (See Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th
372, 385; Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570,
582-583 (Schmidt).)
Chow contends a factfinder may only reject expert opinion
when the record supplies “‘other evidence’” or a “rational basis”
for doing so. Chow argues the trial court’s reliance on Li’s initial
testimony did not “furnish a non-arbitrary basis to discard
uncontradicted technical evidence on handwriting authorship.”
This contention is essentially disagreeing with the trial
court’s credibility findings, something we do not review. (See
Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582 [“in a bench trial, the
trial court is the ‘sole judge’ of witness credibility,” and the “trial
judge may believe or disbelieve uncontradicted witnesses if there
is any rational ground for doing so”].) Moreover, “‘the trier of fact
may accept part of the testimony of a witness and reject another

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part even though the latter contradicts the part accepted.’”
(Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
1078, 1086; see Minnegren v. Nozar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 500,
513.) The reviewing court must accept the portion or statement
that supports the judgment, rather than the portion that would
defeat it. (Minnegren, at p. 514.)
The trial court resolved the conflict in Li’s testimony in
favor of the original version, stating “[t]he Court does not find
Li’s change of testimony that he didn’t see Chow sign the MOU to
be credible.” (See Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582
[“‘[a] trial judge has an inherent right to disregard the testimony
of any witness’”].) Though the court could have found Li’s
recantation more credible than his original testimony, the court
did not have to do so. (See Boermeester v. Carry (2023) 15 Cal.5th
72, 97-98 [factfinder is entitled to find the witness’s first
statement was more credible than a later recantation].)

B. Evidence Code Section 1417 Authorized the Trial
Court To Compare Chow’s Signatures
Chow argues Evidence Code section 1417 did not allow the
court to ignore unrebutted forensic testimony and make an
independent handwriting comparison, or at least not without
stating a rational reason.2 Chow’s premise is legally incorrect
and he mischaracterizes the record.
Section 1417 authorizes the trier of fact to determine
whether handwriting is genuine by comparing it with
handwriting “(a) which the court finds was admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence
Code.

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(b) otherwise proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
court.” Jiang submitted the office lease, which included Chow’s
signature. Section 1417 authorized the court to use that
signature to authenticate Chow’s signature on the MOU. (See
Estate of Nielson (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 796, 801 [factfinder is
“authorized to determine the authenticity of the ‘questioned
handwriting by comparison’” with handwriting that admittedly is
the handwriting of the defendant].) Moreover, the trier of fact
can make that determination “without the aid of the oral
testimony of any witness,” expert or lay. (Ibid.; see People v.
Rodriguez (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 545, 554 [section 1417
authorizes the factfinder to determine whether a party signed a
document by comparing questioned handwriting to an
“authenticated exemplar of the defendant’s handwriting”].) And
though section 1417 does not require the court to state a reason
for not crediting the testimony of an expert witness, the trial
court articulated one: Baggett did not consider the signature on
the lease that everyone agreed was Chow’s. (See Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. 6354 Figarden General Partnership (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 370, 392 [trier of fact may reject expert
testimony, even when the opposing party offers no competing
expert testimony, so long as the court does not reject it arbitrarily
or unreasonably]; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 964, 979 [trier of fact may reject even
uncontradicted evidence as not credible].)
As stated, the trial court also cited the three, not two, sets
of initials on the pages of the MOU as circumstantial evidence
Chow signed the MOU. Chow argues that what he calls the
court’s “initials rationale” did not “provide independent
corroboration” because “the MOU shows initials on the pages for

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the other signatories, while Chow’s purported signature appears
only on the final page.” It is not entirely clear what Chow is
arguing. If he is arguing his signature appears only on the final
page of the MOU, he is correct, but that is also true for the other
signatories. If Chow is arguing his initials do not appear on each
page along with the initials of Li and Jiang, Chow is (mostly)
incorrect: There are three sets of initials on every page of the
MOU except the first page. Neither argument, however, affects
the court’s authority under section 1417 to compare handwriting
samples and determine whether a signature is genuine.
Chow also argues the trial court erred in finding the
initials on the MOU corroborated Chow’s signature on the MOU
because Chow disputed whether the initials were authentic.
Chow asserts that the “initials are not independent proof that
Chow signed the final page; they are part of the same disputed-
authorship issue” and that the court “did not have a handwriting
expert authenticate the initials.” Section 1417, however,
authorized the trial court to use the lease to authenticate Chow’s
signature and his initials on the MOU. (See Estate of Nielson,
supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at pp. 800-801 [trier of fact may
authenticate “‘questioned handwriting’” by comparing it to an
admitted exemplar without expert testimony].)
Chow argues the trial court erred in arbitrarily rejecting
the only forensic handwriting testimony there was at trial and
failing to give a “rational, record-supported basis” for rejecting
that testimony. Chow argues Li’s initial testimony, the court’s
handwriting comparison, and the initials on the MOU did not
“furnish a non-arbitrary basis to discard uncontradicted technical
evidence on handwriting authorship.” Chow’s argument fails.
First, the court did not reject Baggett’s expert testimony.

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The court considered Baggett’s testimony, found it unpersuasive,
and gave it “‘limited weight.’” There was nothing wrong with
that. (See Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 106 [trial
court, “as the trier of fact, was entitled to determine how much
credence and weight the testimony deserved”]; Powerhouse
Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 867, 877 [trier of fact “has the power to give
whatever weight it chooses to the evidence”]; Rony v. Costa (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 746, 755 [“The finder of fact is only required to
give expert testimony . . . the weight it believes it deserves, and
remains entitled to make the final determination.”].)
Second, as discussed, the trial court did not arbitrarily give
limited weight to Baggett’s testimony. Despite Chow’s insistence
the court did not identify “any defect in Baggett’s methodology,
exemplars, assumptions, or reasoning,” the court gave a reason
for finding Baggett’s conclusion “unpersuasive”: Baggett did not
consider a key document in the record, namely, the lease, or
consider whether Chow’s signature on the lease matched the
signature on the MOU. (See Howard v. Owens Corning (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 621, 632-633 [trier of fact did not arbitrarily
reject uncontradicted expert testimony where there was reason to
doubt the expert’s testimony; a factfinder “is not bound by the
expert’s opinion,” but gives “each opinion the weight which it
finds that opinion deserves”].)
Indeed, the trial court found Baggett’s failure to review and
consider the lease hurt his credibility. (See Schmidt, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582 [“[c]redibility determinations . . . are
subject to extremely deferential review” because the “‘trial judge
has an inherent right to disregard the testimony of any
witness’”]; see also Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971)

11
3 Cal.3d 875, 890 [provided “‘the trier of fact does not act
arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even
though the witness is uncontradicted,’” and this rule “is applied
equally to expert witnesses”].) Contrary to Chow’s assertion,
Jiang did not have to rebut Chow’s “technical proof with
[a] competing handwriting expert” for the court to give Baggett’s
testimony limited weight. (See Foreman & Clark, at p. 890 [trier
of fact may reject expert testimony even when the opposing party
offers no competing expert, so long as the rejection is not
arbitrary or unreasonable]; see also In re Marriage of Falcone &
Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 [“the judge may reject any
evidence as unworthy of credence, even uncontradicted
testimony”].)

C. Any Error in Finding Chow Signed the MOU Was
Harmless
Finally, even if the trial court arbitrarily discounted the
testimony of Chow’s handwriting expert and erred in finding
Chow signed the MOU, any such error was harmless. In addition
to ruling Chow breached the MOU, the court ruled against Chow
on Jiang’s causes of action for conversion, breach of fiduciary
duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, intentional
misrepresentation, concealment, and false promise. Chow does
not challenge any of the court’s findings on these causes of action.
(See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800-802 [to
prove a miscarriage of justice, the appellant must show it is
“‘reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the
error’”]; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574;
640 Octavia LLC v. Walston (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 861, 869.)

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Chow asserts, in one cursory sentence at the end of his opening
brief, he is also challenging the court’s rulings on “any claims
that rise or fall” with the court’s finding he signed the MOU.
Chow, however, does not provide any citations to the record or
reasoned argument in support of his assertion, thus forfeiting the
argument. (See Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 39 [“[t]he absence of reasoned legal
argument supported by citation to authority allows this court to
treat the contention as forfeited”]; Audish v. Macias (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 740, 751 [to demonstrate error, “‘“an appellant
must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record”’”]; Centex
Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
789, 796-97 [failure to provide record citations forfeits an
argument on appeal].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J. STONE, J.

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