Filed 6/18/26 Jackson v. Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners of the City of L.A. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
NATHAN JACKSON B349636
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCP01670)
BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and
Respondent;
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Real Party in Interest
and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Nathan Jackson, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Vivienne A.
Swanigan, Assistant City Attorney, Travis T. Hall, Deputy City
Attorney, for Respondents Board of Civil Service Commissioners
and City of Los Angeles.
INTRODUCTION
In May 2019 Nathan Jackson’s former employer, the
Los Angeles Police Department, suspended him for 10 days.
Jackson, a detention officer, returned to work after his
suspension, but 45 days later, the Department discharged him.
Jackson appealed his suspension through an
administrative grievance process that culminated in the Board of
Civil Service Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles affirming
his suspension. Jackson filed a petition for a writ of
administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5)1 to direct the
Board to set aside its decision and award him back pay2 on the
ground that, among other reasons, the Department suspended
him in violation of his due process rights under Skelly v. State
1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 In employment cases involving civil service employees,
back pay “‘refers to the amount that plaintiff would have earned
but for the employer’s unlawful conduct, minus the amount that
plaintiff did earn or could have earned if he or she had mitigated
the loss by seeking or securing other comparable employment.’”
(Lowe v. California Resources Agency (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1140,
1144, fn. 3.)
2
Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly).3 The trial court
granted the petition in part and issued a writ directing the Board
to determine, among other things, whether the Department
violated Skelly and, if so, to calculate any back pay award.
Jackson appealed, but we dismissed his appeal because the
judgment was not appealable. (Jackson v. Board of Civil Service
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
648, 651 (Jackson I).)
After this court issued its remittitur the trial court issued
another writ directing the Board to take essentially the same
actions the court previously ordered the Board to take and to file
a return. In May 2025 the Board reconsidered the allegations
against Jackson, found the Department violated Jackson’s rights
under Skelly, sustained three of the four counts, and concluded
the sustained allegations supported the 10-day suspension.
Three months after the Board’s decision, Jackson filed a
motion under section 1097 for an order to enforce the writ. The
trial court granted the motion in part, ordering the Board to pay
Jackson 10 days of back pay within 20 days. Jackson appealed
again, arguing (again, among other things) the court erred in
calculating his back pay award because, in Jackson’s view, the
Department owed him not 10 days of back pay, but
approximately six years of back pay, from the date of his
3 In Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194 the Supreme Court held a
permanent civil service employee subject to discipline must “be
accorded certain procedural rights before the discipline becomes
effective,” including “notice of the proposed action, the reasons
therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the
action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in
writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.” (Id. at
p. 215.)
3
suspension in 2019 through the date the Board affirmed his
suspension in 2025. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Department Suspends Jackson, Jackson Returns
to Work, and the Department Later Discharges Him
In February 2019 the Department notified Jackson that it
was going to suspend him for 10 days. The Department based its
decision on four allegations arising out of an incident on
March 18, 2018. The Department claimed that on that date
Jackson (1) reported late to his duty assignment, (2) “reported to
work unfit for duty,” (3) left his post without authorization, and
(4) refused to provide a doctor’s note, as directed. In the section
of the notice titled “Rationale,” the Department asserted that,
when Jackson reported to work on March 18, 2018, he displayed
“the objective symptoms of being under the influence.” The
Department also asserted Jackson had “demonstrated a pattern
of escalating behavior” and recommended a 10-day suspension.
After giving Jackson an opportunity to respond to the
allegations, the Department notified Jackson that it had decided
to suspend him for 10 days, with the suspension to begin on
May 12, 2019. In its notice of suspension the Department alleged
Jackson (1) reported late to his duty assignment, (2) failed to
wear his official uniform while on duty (as opposed to reporting to
work unfit for duty), (3) left his worksite without approval while
on duty, and (4) failed to provide a doctor’s note, as directed,
again while on duty.
After serving his 10-day suspension Jackson returned to
work. Approximately 45 days later, on July 10, 2019, the
4
Department terminated his employment. The Department
discharged Jackson for misconduct arising out of incidents on
June 26, 2018, June 27, 2018, and September 3, 2018: Jackson
reported late to his duty assignment, “failed to work the DNA
assignment as directed by a sergeant,” “made false statements to
a sergeant regarding his assigned duty position,” and “made an
improper remark to a senior detention officer.”
B. Jackson Appeals His Suspension
Meanwhile, Jackson appealed his suspension to the Board.
Jackson contended, among other things, the Department violated
his rights under Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194 because the counts
the Department listed in its proposed notice of suspension did not
match the counts the Department listed in its final notice of
suspension. The parties presented evidence to a hearing
examiner, who recommended the Board find the Department
complied with the requirements under Skelly, sustain the four
counts against Jackson, and find the 10-day suspension in
May 2019 “was appropriate.” In March 2022 the Board adopted
the hearing examiner’s recommendations.
Jackson filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate
to compel the Board to set aside its decision upholding his 10-day
suspension. The trial court granted the petition in part and
issued a writ directing the Board to set aside its decision
affirming Jackson’s 10-day suspension. The court also ordered
the Board to determine whether Jackson could be disciplined
based on the Department’s jail operations manual and, if so,
reconsider the penalty “using Jackson’s permissible disciplinary
history”; determine whether the Department violated Skelly by
amending the second count and, if so, “whether [Jackson] was
5
prejudiced by not being able to argue for a lesser penalty because
there was no charge for a violation involving alcohol or drug
usage”;4 calculate “any back pay award if Skelly was violated”;
and (3) sustain the remaining counts.
Jackson appealed from the judgment, but we dismissed the
appeal. We held the judgment was not appealable because “the
superior court vacated the suspension and remanded the matter
for the Board to reconsider its findings and the appropriate
discipline” and because “Jackson will have an opportunity to
challenge any ultimate adverse disciplinary action” regarding his
suspension. (Jackson I, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.)
In August 2024 the trial court issued a writ of mandate
ordering the Board to set aside its decision upholding Jackson’s
suspension and to “reconsider the case in light of the court’s
ruling.” As relevant to this appeal, the court directed the Board
to (1) determine whether Jackson could “be disciplined” for one
instance of reporting late to his duty assignment based on the jail
operations manual and, if the Board determined that incident did
not qualify as disciplinary misconduct, “reconsider the penalty
using [Jackson’s] permissible disciplinary history”; (2) determine
whether Skelly “was violated for the addition of Count 2 for
failure to wear an official . . . uniform”; (3) sustain the remaining
counts; and (4) file a return to the writ “within 90 days from the
4 As discussed, in the notice of proposed suspension, the
Department alleged in the second count that Jackson reported to
work “unfit for duty,” which the Department described as
reporting to work displaying the objective symptoms of being
under the influence, and in the notice of suspension, the
Department alleged in the second count that Jackson reported to
work without his official uniform.
6
date the writ is served” on the Board showing what the Board did
to comply with the writ. The writ stated that, if the Board
determined the Department violated Skelly, “the remedy is back
pay from the date of discipline imposed . . . until it is upheld on
administrative appeal.”
On May 22, 2025 the Board decided not to sustain the
allegation Jackson reported late to his duty assignment on
March 18, 2018, found “the Skelly due process provisions were
NOT met,” and sustained the remaining allegations (that
Jackson failed to wear his official uniform, left his worksite
without approval, and failed to provide a doctor’s note). The
Board found the sustained allegations supported “the penalty
imposed” of 10 days’ suspension in May 2019.
C. Jackson Seeks To Enforce the August 2024 Writ of
Mandate
In August 2025 Jackson filed a motion under section 1097
to enforce the trial court’s August 2024 writ of mandate. Jackson
argued the Board failed to (1) file a return to the writ within
90 days; (2) correct “the procedural and financial consequences of
the Skelly violation it formally acknowledged on May 22, 2025”;
(3) “recalculate [his] backpay in accordance with the legal effect
of its Skelly violation finding and controlling case law”; and
(4) “address and remedy the downstream legal consequences
flowing from its own determination that [his] pre-disciplinary due
process rights were violated.” According to Jackson, the Board’s
assertion “that any backpay awarded would be capped at
10 working days” (the duration of Jackson’s suspension) “directly
conflict[ed] with the plain language of the writ and controlling
authority.”
7
The Board opposed the motion, arguing that it had filed its
return to the writ (approximately one week before filing its
opposition to Jackson’s motion), that 10 days was “the correct
calculation for backpay,” and that Jackson’s argument the Board
“bifurcate[d]” the proceedings related to the appeal of the
suspension and the appeal of the discharge was “not relevant to
the issues decided by the Board on remand pursuant to the
Court’s writ, and fall[s] far beyond the scope of what is at [issue]
in this case.” The Board stated the Department was “working on
issuing the appropriate backpay award.”
The trial court found that, because the Board filed a
(belated) return to the writ, Jackson’s argument the Board did
not file a return was moot. On the issue of how much back pay
the Department owed Jackson because of the Skelly violation, the
court stated that its August 2024 writ “may not be clear,” but
that “Jackson [was] only entitled to ten days of backpay.” The
court concluded the Department had to pay Jackson for the
10 days of wrongful suspension, but not for the additional days
Jackson claimed (from May 27, 2019 to July 10, 2019, “when he
was back on duty and receiving pay,” or from July 10, 2019 to
May 22, 2025, “when the Board affirmed his suspension”). The
court ruled that the discharge “was a separate and independent
reason for the Department not to pay Jackson” and that “the City
[was] not required to pay Jackson once he was discharged.” The
court stated that Jackson’s appeal from his suspension and his
appeal from his discharge “were not bifurcated” because “they
were separate appeals that ran on separate tracks” and that the
Board’s delay in processing Jackson’s appeal from his discharge
8
“was a matter for Jackson to raise in his discharge appeal.”5
Jackson timely appealed.
D. Jackson Appeals His Discharge, but Withdraws His
Appeal Before a Decision on the Merits
While Jackson’s appeal from the decision to suspend him
for 10 days made its way through the administrative process and
the courts, Jackson appealed his discharge to the Board on
July 11, 2019, one day after the effective date of his discharge.
On October 11, 2022, however, Jackson withdrew his appeal. The
Board notified Jackson that it received his email indicating his
“desire to withdraw [his] Appeal from Discharge” and that there
was “nothing further before the Board on this matter.” The
record in this case does not include the administrative record of
Jackson’s appeal from his discharge.
DISCUSSION
Jackson raises five issues on appeal. First, he argues the
trial court erred in limiting his Skelly back pay award to 10 days,
a limitation he asserts “finds no support” in “controlling
California authority” or this court’s decision in Jackson I, “all of
which hold that backpay runs for the entire period of wrongful
deprivation until constitutionally adequate process is afforded,
less interim earnings.” Second, Jackson argues the court erred in
“conditioning Skelly relief on [his] withdrawal of a discharge
appeal that the Board itself declined to process for years.” Third,
5 We do not decide whether the Board improperly delayed
processing Jackson’s appeal of his discharge.
9
he contends his discharge “cannot remain final” because it “was
imposed during a period later determined to be constitutionally
invalid and relied on predicates later rejected or materially
narrowed.” Fourth, Jackson asserts he is entitled to
“[c]onditional reinstatement” to return “the parties to the posture
required by Skelly before discipline may lawfully become final.”
And finally, Jackson claims the trial court failed to fully enforce
the writ and comply with the law of the case. We will discuss the
first and second arguments together, then the third and the
fourth together, and finally the fifth.
A. The Court Did Not Err in Calculating the Back Pay
Award
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1097 provides: “If a peremptory mandate has been
issued and directed to an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, and it appears to the court that a member of the tribunal,
corporation, or board, or the person upon whom the writ has been
personally served, has, without just excuse, refused or neglected
to obey the writ, the court may, upon motion, impose a fine” or
“make any orders necessary and proper for the complete
enforcement of the writ.” (See Brown v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1107,
1114; Robles v. Employment Development Dept. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 530, 546.) “The trial court that issues a writ of
mandate retains continuing jurisdiction to make any orders
necessary for complete enforcement of the writ.” (Los Angeles
Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles United School Dist.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355; accord, San Diego Unified
10
Port Dist. v. California Coastal Com. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1111,
1128.)
When we review an order enforcing a writ of mandate, “the
validity of the underlying writ is not before us. [Citation.]
Rather, ‘we review the trial court’s [e]nforcement [o]rder entered
pursuant to section 1097 . . . . Under such circumstances, at
issue is whether the trial court erred either in concluding that
[the respondent] had failed to comply with the [w]rit or in
fashioning the specifics of its [e]nforcement [o]rder. Thus, our
focus is on [the respondent’s] response to the [w]rit and the trial
court’s assessment of that response.’” (Brown v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1114; see Robles v. Employment Development Dept., supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 546.) We review de novo the amount of
back pay the Department owes Jackson. (See Roe v. State
Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036 (Roe) [reviewing
de novo “whether the [board] erred in concluding that [the
plaintiff’s] resignation cuts off an award of backpay . . . for the
due process violation”]; see also Brown, at p. 1114 [reviewing de
novo “the question of the appropriate interest rate to apply”].)
2. Jackson Lost 10 Days of Wages from His
Wrongful Suspension
As discussed, in Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194 the Supreme
Court held the employer must give the employee notice of, and
the basis for, the disciplinary action; a copy of the charges and
materials that support the proposed action; and an opportunity to
respond to the charges. (Id. at p. 215.) In Barber v. State
Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395 (Barber), on which Jackson
principally relies, the Supreme Court held the remedy for a
11
violation under Skelly “is to award back pay for the period of
wrongful discipline.” (Id. at p. 402.) The employer in Barber
dismissed the plaintiff before holding a hearing on the reasons for
the dismissal. (Id. at p. 399.) The Supreme Court stated the
“constitutional infirmity of the disciplinary procedures used” by
the employer “was the imposition of discipline prior to affording
the employee notice of the reasons for the punitive action and an
opportunity to respond.” (Id. at p. 403.) On calculating the
proper measurement of damages, the Supreme Court held that
the due process violation “is not corrected until the employee has
been given an opportunity to present his arguments to the
authority initially imposing discipline” and that the “proper
period for measuring the amount of back pay due therefore
begins at the time discipline is actually imposed and ends on the
date the board files its decision.” (Ibid.)
In Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102 (Coleman), the Supreme Court
distinguished Barber on facts analogous to the facts in Jackson’s
case. The plaintiff in Coleman did not return to work after his
disability benefits ended; the employer notified the plaintiff that,
under a statutory provision, “his unauthorized absence was
deemed an ‘automatic resignation’ from state employment.” (Id.
at pp. 1109-1110.) The employer did not give the plaintiff notice
or an opportunity to be heard “before the deemed resignation”
took effect. (Id. at p. 1111.) After concluding the employer had to
provide “some meaningful mechanism of procedural protections,”
the Supreme Court held the employee’s “separation” from his
employment without due process did not “warrant an award of
back wages.” (Id. at pp. 1118, 1124.) The Supreme Court
explained that, in Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d 395 “the employee
12
had worked until being discharged, and presumably would have
continued to do so had he not been discharged, and thus had lost
salary as a result of the due process violation,” whereas the
employee in Coleman “had not been reporting to work” and,
because “he was not working, he lost no wages from the state’s
failure to give him prior notice or an opportunity to respond.”
(Coleman, at p. 1124; see Davis v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. Personnel Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1133
[employee’s “unavailability for work due to his nonindustrial
illness justified the . . . denial of full back pay” because, “[e]ven if
[his employer] had not wrongfully demoted him, [he] would not
have appeared for work because of his illness,” which was
“unrelated to his demotion and employment”].)
Jackson lost 10 days of wages as a result of the Skelly
violation, but no more. He served his 10-day suspension and
returned to work, earning wages for 45 more days, until the
Department discharged him. The reason Jackson did not work
after the Department discharged him on July 10, 2019 was not
because of the Skelly violation relating to his suspension, but
because the Department discharged him, which was a separate
adverse employment action unrelated to the Skelly violation.
Because Jackson did not lose any earnings beyond 10 days of pay
“as a result of” (Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1124) his
wrongful suspension, the trial court correctly ruled he was
entitled to only 10 days of back pay. Stated another way, had the
Department not discharged Jackson on July 10, 2019, he would
have continued to work and earn pay through May 22, 2025,
when the Board affirmed his suspension. His back pay award in
that situation would still be 10 days because his interim wages
would offset the wages for the period of the Skelly violation
13
(May 12, 2019 to May 22, 2025). (See Kempland v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 644, 651 [employee
discharged without due process was entitled to back pay “less
interim wages earned”].) Of course, if there were a Skelly
violation in connection with the discharge (and we express no
opinion on that possibility), Jackson might be entitled to
additional days of back pay until that violation was cured. But as
we will discuss, that is not an issue in this appeal.
Jackson cites Kempland v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., supra,
155 Cal.App.3d 644 and Kirkpatrick v. Civil Service Com. (1978)
77 Cal.App.3d 940 to argue he is entitled to back pay “from the
date discipline was imposed until constitutionally adequate
process was first afforded, here, May 22, 2025, subject to offset
for interim earnings.” Like the plaintiff in Barber, the plaintiffs
in Kempland and Kirkpatrick lost the opportunity to work (and
earn wages) as a result of their employer’s decision to terminate
their employment.6 The due process violation associated with
6 See Kempland v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., supra,
155 Cal.App.3d at pages 647, 651 (employee discharged without
due process was “entitled to backpay from . . . the effective date of
discharge to the date on which he is given a meaningful
opportunity to respond to [the] notice of intention to dismiss”);
Kirkpatrick v. Civil Service Com., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at
pages 943, 946 (employee discharged without due process was
“entitled to damages, measured by back pay for the period
between his dismissal . . . and the decision of the commission
upholding his dismissal”). Jackson also cites Kristal v. State
Personnel Bd. (1976) 50 Cal.App.3d 230, but Barber disapproved
Kristal to the extent it suggested “a termination date for
measuring damage contrary to the views expressed” in Barber.
(Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 405.)
14
each employee’s discharge caused the employee to lose wages for
the duration of the violation. Here, as discussed, it was Jackson’s
discharge, not the Skelly violation related to his suspension, that
caused him to experience lost wages during most of the six-year
period for which he is seeking back pay.
Nor is there merit to Jackson’s contention the trial court
conditioned his back pay award on him withdrawing his
discharge appeal. The court simply measured the proper back
pay the Department owed Jackson. “Backpay serves to make an
employee whole for the employer’s wrongdoing. [Citations.] An
award should ‘give [the employee] what he would have earned
with the employer less any net earnings during the time
[between] his wrongful discharge and reinstatement.’ [Citation.]
[¶] The remedy should ‘return[ ] the [employee] to the financial
position he would have been in had the unlawful [conduct] not
occurred. . . . [T]he offending employer is made responsible only
for losses suffered by the [employee] as a result of [its
misconduct] . . . . It is manifest that . . . back pay . . . [is] . . .
compensatory and remedial in purpose, not punitive.’” (Davis v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. Personnel Com., supra,
152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133; see Barber v. State Personnel Bd.
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500, 513 [“‘“‘The appropriate standard for
the measurement of a back pay award is to take the difference
between the actual wages earned and the wages the individual
would have earned in the position that, but for the [employer’s
wrongful conduct], the individual would have [held].’”’”].) The
Department’s decision to discharge Jackson caused him loss of
earnings from the effective date of the discharge; the Skelly
violation in connection with Jackson’s suspension did not cause
that loss. The trial court correctly ruled the reason Jackson could
15
not earn wages from July 10, 2019 to May 22, 2025 was unrelated
to his wrongful suspension. The court did not make Jackson’s
discharge or the withdrawal of his appeal of the discharge a
condition of awarding him back pay.
Analogizing his case to Roe, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1029,
Jackson argues remedies for a Skelly violation “are not
extinguished by employee actions taken while the violation
remains uncured.” Roe, however, is distinguishable. In that case
the plaintiff received a notice from his employer dismissing him,
but when the plaintiff’s attorney met with the employer’s Skelly
officer,7 the officer told the attorney that, if the plaintiff resigned
by the date of the Skelly hearing, he could “avoid discipline.” (Id.
at p. 1033.) The plaintiff submitted his resignation before (and
did not attend) the Skelly hearing, but the employer still
terminated his employment. (Id. at p. 1034.) The personnel
board initially affirmed the termination, but after the plaintiff’s
partially successful appeal, the board found the plaintiff’s
termination “was invalid” and awarded back pay to the date of
the plaintiff’s resignation. (Id. at p. 1035.) The plaintiff appealed
again, and the court in Roe rejected the employer’s argument the
plaintiff’s resignation and failure to contest his dismissal at the
Skelly hearing cut off his right to back pay because, the court
explained, the employer “induced” the plaintiff’s resignation and
subsequent failure to appear at the hearing. (Id. at p. 1040.) The
court also concluded the plaintiff could no longer work, not
because he resigned, but because his employer terminated his
7 A Skelly officer is an individual “authorized to hear the
response of a permanent employee to proposed adverse
employment action, pursuant to Skelly . . . .” (Roe, supra,
120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033, fn. 2.)
16
employment. (Id. at p. 1041.) There is no such connection
between Jackson’s suspension and his discharge. The two
disciplinary actions were separate and distinct, as were Jackson’s
appeals of those Department decisions.8
Jackson argues this court’s decision in Jackson I is the law
of the case on how to calculate his back pay award. Jackson
misunderstands law of the case and our holding in Jackson I.
“‘“The doctrine of ‘law of the case’ deals with the effect of the first
appellate decision on the subsequent retrial or appeal: The
decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to
the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and
makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any
subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.”’” (Leider v. Lewis
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1127; accord, Prime Healthcare
Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 127,
142.) As discussed, in Jackson I we dismissed Jackson’s appeal
because the judgment was not appealable. (Jackson I, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 655.) In a footnote, we stated: “Where an
employer has disciplined an employee without affording the
procedural safeguards required by Skelly, ‘the remedy for the
employee . . . is to award back pay for the period of wrongful
discipline.’ [Citation.] The employee is generally entitled to back
pay from the date of discipline to ‘the date on which he is given a
meaningful opportunity to respond’ to the charges, ‘less interim
wages earned.’” (Id. at p. 655, fn. 7.) This statement of law was
8 Jackson cites two emails that he argues show the
Department intentionally delayed processing the appeal of his
discharge. The trial court declined to take judicial notice of these
emails, which the court characterized as “party correspondence.”
Jackson has not asked us to take judicial notice of the emails.
17
not necessary to the decision of Jackson I, and we did not rely on
it to conclude the judgment was not a final appealable judgment.
It has no effect on this appeal. (See Department of Finance v.
Commission on State Mandates (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 535, 554
[law of the case doctrine does not apply to a statement in a prior
appellate opinion where the statement “was not essential” to the
decision].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining To Consider
Jackson’s Arguments Related to His Discharge
The trial court correctly ruled Jackson’s arguments relating
to his discharge (namely, the Board unlawfully delayed
processing Jackson’s discharge appeal and improperly based his
discharge on his unresolved suspension) were matters for the
administrative appeal of his discharge. The writ Jackson sought
to enforce concerned only his suspension. As discussed, because
Jackson withdrew his administrative appeal of his discharge, the
Board never made a final decision, and Jackson did not exhaust
his administrative remedies for that adverse employment action.
The trial court did not err in declining to consider any claims
related to Jackson’s discharge. (See Plantier v. Ramona
Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 382 [“‘an
administrative remedy is exhausted only upon “termination of all
available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures”’”];
Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th
311, 321 [“‘Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
“a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.”’”]; see also
Romero v. County of Kern (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1189, 1201
18
[exhaustion requirement “applies to internal administrative
remedies that are provided in county civil service rules”].)
C. The Court Did Not Fail To Enforce the Writ
Jackson argues the trial court failed to fully enforce the
writ because (1) the writ directed the Board to reconsider “the
penalty using only [Jackson’s] permissible disciplinary history,”
but under “the current procedural posture . . . compliance with
that directive is procedurally impossible,” unless the court grants
a “conditional reinstatement and remand”; (2) the writ required
the Board to “implement the legal consequences flowing” from its
finding of a Skelly violation, but the Board “failed to implement
the remedial and procedural consequences required by controlling
authority”; and (3) the court “accepted the Board’s limited action
as sufficient and treated enforcement as moot.” Jackson’s first
argument misstates the directive in the court’s writ, which only
concerned his 10-day suspension, not the discharge or
reinstatement. As discussed, the writ directed the Board to
determine whether the Department could discipline Jackson for
one incident of tardiness in March 2018; if not, the writ directed
the Board to “reconsider the penalty” (the suspension) using
Jackson’s “permissible disciplinary history” (the disciplinary
history excluding the March 2018 tardiness incident). Nothing in
the writ directed the Board take any action concerning the
discharge, such as vacating the discharge or reinstating him.
And in any event, the proper remedy for a Skelly violation is back
pay, not reinstatement. (See Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 442, 460 [“Barber established that the only
remedy for the violation of an employee’s due process is back pay
when her discharge is justified.”]; Williams v. City of Los Angeles
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(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1217 [“the proper remedy for a
Skelly violation is an award of back pay for the period described
in Barber, rather than reinstatement”].)
Regarding Jackson’s second argument, the proper back pay
award, as discussed, was 10 days, not more. And it is unclear
what Jackson’s third argument is. He appears to argue the trial
court failed to ensure the Board provided the full remedy for the
Skelly violation as “required by law.” As discussed, the trial
court did not err in determining the proper back pay award under
the applicable authority.9
DISPOSITION
The order directing the Board to award Jackson 10 days of
back pay is affirmed. The Board is to recover its costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J.
9 Though Jackson argued in the trial court that awarding
him only 10 days of back pay conflicted with the language of the
writ, he does not make this argument on appeal.
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