Filed 7/8/26 Jackson v. Applied Materials CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
KEVIN F. JACKSON, H053886
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 25CV460357)
v.
APPLIED MATERIALS, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant Kevin Jackson appeals from a judgment following an order
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. He argues that a court reporter should
have been provided to him, without charge, for depositions he wanted to take in an
arbitration previously compelled by the federal district court. This is the same argument
he already made to the federal court in 2022, and it was resolved against him. The
superior court here determined that the issue had been litigated and resolved by another
court, and so it sustained the demurrer without leave to amend based on issue preclusion,
among other reasons.
Jackson has failed to meet his burden on appeal to show error because he does not
address any of the grounds upon which the trial court sustained the demurrer. Instead, he
attempts to reargue the merits of the arbitration and the federal district court’s ruling. We
conclude that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer based on issue preclusion
and uncertainty, and we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. The Federal District Court Case
In August 2020, Jackson filed a complaint for employment discrimination in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California against defendants and
respondents Applied Materials, Inc. and Keith Dupen (collectively, Applied Materials or
Defendants) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He asserted claims for
retaliation, race discrimination, and job prevention, based on acts occurring between
June 2019 and March 2020. Jackson filed an amended complaint for violation of
Title VII, race discrimination, and retaliation in September 2020.
In April 2021, the federal district court granted Applied Materials’ motion to
compel arbitration and stayed the action. Jackson then filed a motion for administrative
relief asking the district court to appoint a court reporter for depositions to be conducted
in the arbitration, but the court ordered that the request be made to the arbitrator. The
arbitrator ordered Jackson to secure a certified court reporter for each deposition.
1 The parties have submitted requests for judicial notice in connection with the
appeal. Defendants request judicial notice of the Declaration of Carmen Varden in
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action Pending
Arbitration from the original federal district court case between the parties, which
includes Jackson’s employment agreement, and the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules
& Procedures. In his brief, Jackson requests judicial notice of “California Superior Court
Submission 5-23-24,” which appears to be a list of witnesses for deposition, and
“Claimant Response to Summary Disposition 3-3-22,” which was filed with the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. None of these documents are relevant to the resolution of this
appeal, and we deny the requests for judicial notice. (See Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [“Although a court may judicially notice a
variety of matters [citation], only relevant material may be noticed.”].)
Jackson also filed a motion to augment the record with financial records for
Applied Materials that appear to be intended to show Applied Materials’ ability to pay
damages, including punitive damages. There is no indication that these records were
before the trial court or that they have any relevance to the issues now on appeal. The
motion to augment is denied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155; DeYoung v. Del Mar
Thoroughbred Club (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 858, 863.)
2
Following a November 2021 telephonic hearing on discovery and case management
issues, the arbitrator denied the request for deposition costs to be paid by Applied
Materials, finding that Jackson had shown no authority to support such a payment.
In March 2022, the arbitrator held a hearing on a motion for summary disposition
by Applied Materials. Focusing on the effect of Jackson’s termination agreement, the
arbitrator issued an interim decision in which he granted the motion. In June 2022, the
arbitrator issued a final decision reaffirming the interim decision and awarding attorney
fees and costs to Applied Materials.
In October 2022, the district court confirmed the arbitrator’s interim award of
summary disposition and final award of attorney fees and costs, and it issued a judgment
against Jackson. Jackson appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and the appellate court issued a memorandum opinion affirming the district court’s
judgment in October 2023.
Jackson filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court,
but the court closed the case in May 2024 for failure to pay the docket fee and failure to
submit a petition in compliance with the rules of the court.
B. The Santa Clara County Lawsuit
Jackson filed a complaint in the Santa Clara County Superior Court—this case—
on March 5, 2025 against the same defendants. On April 28, 2025, he filed a first
amended complaint (FAC), alleging the following: “Plaintiff was denied a court reporter
during a court-ordered mandatory arbitration hearing by both the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California San Jose by Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi
and by JAMS Arbitration Firm, Judge Mark Pierce in violation of the California State
Supreme [Court] (Jameson v Desta) & (Dogan v Com[]anche H[i]lls APT. INC).”
In June 2025, Applied Materials filed a demurrer to the FAC. Applied Materials
asserted that the FAC was barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, that the
FAC was uncertain, and that the FAC failed to state sufficient facts to set forth any cause
3
of action. After a hearing on October 8, 2025, the trial court concluded that the FAC was
barred by issue preclusion (not claim preclusion), that it was uncertain, and that it failed
to state a cause of action for a due process violation. The trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend.2
Jackson filed a notice of appeal on November 17, 2025, after entry of the formal
order sustaining the demurrer, even though a judgment was not entered by the trial court
until February 19, 2026. We issued an order on our own motion deeming the notice as
having been timely filed on February 19, 2026. (See Mukthar v. Latin American Security
Service (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 284, 288 [“when [an] order is followed by a judgment,
the appellate court may deem [a] premature notice of appeal to have been filed after the
entry of judgment”].)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
any legal theory. [Citation.]” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th
145, 162 (Novartis).) “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.]’ ”
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “Although we review the complaint de
novo, ‘ “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to
establish every element of the cause of action and overcoming all of the legal grounds on
which the trial court sustained the demurrer, and if the defendant negates any essential
2 Shortly before Applied Materials’ filing of the demurrer to the FAC, Jackson
filed a “Motion to Request New Trial,” which contained the same allegations as the FAC.
The trial court denied this motion in the same October 8, 2025 order sustaining the
demurrer. Jackson does not discuss this motion on appeal, and we deem it abandoned.
(See Golden v. Golden (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 401, 404.)
4
element, we will affirm the order sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action.
[Citation.] We will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be
sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant
asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings.” ’ [Citation.] It is the trial court’s
ruling we review, not its reasoning or rationale. [Citations.]” (Kahan v. City of
Richmond (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 721, 730.) “Where the demurrer was sustained without
leave to amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.
[Citation.]” (Novartis, supra, at p. 162.)
B. Appellant’s Burden on Appeal
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment
challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error. [Citation.]” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1573.) “[E]rror is never presumed, and the appealing party must affirmatively
demonstrate error on the face of the record. [Citations.]” (People v. Davis (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 168, 172.)
This appeal arises from the California Superior Court’s order sustaining
Defendants’ demurrer, and yet Jackson does not address the demurrer at all. Instead, his
entire brief is about the arbitration, reiterating arguments he made to both the arbitrator
and the federal district court that he should have been given a court reporter and that
Defendants breached their contractual obligations. None of Jackson’s arguments are
about the state trial court’s order on the demurrer, including whether issue preclusion
might apply or whether there were material deficiencies in the FAC. Consequently,
Jackson has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating any error by the trial court.
C. Issue Preclusion
Even if we were to consider the appeal on the merits, we would conclude that the
trial court correctly determined that issue preclusion applies to bar Jackson’s lawsuit.
5
“The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one case is not
relitigated in a later case.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326.) “Preclusion
comes in two main forms: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. [Citation.] As the
names suggest, claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire claims (or ‘causes of
action’) [citation], while issue preclusion prevents relitigation of specific issues
[citation].”3 (Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 323
(Grande).) We are concerned here with issue preclusion, which “applies (1) after final
adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the
first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity
with that party. [Citations.]” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813,
825.) We are also concerned here with the effect of a federal court judgment. As a
general rule, “[f]ull faith and credit must be given to a final order or judgment of a federal
court. [Citations.] Such an order or judgment has the same effect in the courts of this
state as it would have in a federal court.” (Levy v. Cohen (1977) 19 Cal.3d 165, 172–
173.) The federal action therefore has preclusive effect in a California state court just as
any state court adjudication would.
The sole issue raised by Jackson’s FAC is his request for a court reporter in
connection with the arbitration. This request was denied by the arbitrator, and that denial
was confirmed by the district court and affirmed on appeal by the Ninth Circuit. There is
no dispute that this issue was resolved in the federal case between the same parties, as
Jackson repeatedly raised the issue with the district court, including in his opposition to
the petition to confirm the arbitration award. Similarly, there is no dispute that the
federal action was final for purposes of issue preclusion, because there was “no further
3 We note that courts often used the terms “res judicata” and “collateral estoppel”
to refer to claim preclusion and issue preclusion, respectively, but “claim preclusion” and
“issue preclusion” are now the more current terms. (See Grande, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 323.)
6
judicial act remain[ing] to be done to end the litigation.” (People v. Scott (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 905, 919.) Therefore, regardless of whether we would reach (or the trial
court here would have reached) the same conclusion as the arbitrator regarding Jackson’s
entitlement to a court reporter at Applied Materials’ expense, that is not an issue for
either us to resolve or the trial court to have resolved, because it was already resolved in
the federal court. All required elements for the application of issue preclusion were met
here, barring Jackson from pursuing the same issue in California state court.
D. Uncertainty
Defendants also demurred to the FAC on the ground of uncertainty. A party may
demur to a complaint on the ground that the pleading is uncertain, meaning that it is
ambiguous and unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) Generally,
“[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some
respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures. [Citations.]” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
612, 616.) In this case, however, the entirety of the FAC consisted of a single sentence,
which neither specifies any cause of action nor mentions Defendants at all.4
Notwithstanding Defendants’ knowledge of the earlier federal action, it is not apparent
how Defendants could reasonably respond to the FAC, given that it does not even allege
any conduct on their part. The FAC was properly subject to a demurrer for uncertainty.
E. Leave to Amend
“We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s denial of leave to amend.
[Citation.] We determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the defect could
4 Again, that sentence was: “Plaintiff was denied a court reporter during a court-
ordered mandatory arbitration hearing by both the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California San Jose by Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi and by JAMS
Arbitration Firm, Judge Mark Pierce in violation of the California State Supreme [Court]
(Jameson v Desta) & (Dogan v Com[]anche H[i]lls APT. INC).”
7
be cured by amendment. [Citation.]” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 13, 24.) It is the appellant’s “burden to identify specific facts showing
the complaint can be amended to state a viable cause of action. [Citation.]” (Minnick v.
Automotive Creations, Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1004.)
Because issue preclusion applies to bar Jackson from proceeding with any claim
arising out of the denial of a court reporter in arbitration, and because he made no attempt
to explain to the trial court how this defect, or any other in the FAC, could possibly be
cured by further amendment, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
deny leave to amend.5
In light of our conclusion that the demurrer was properly sustained without leave
to amend based on issue preclusion and uncertainty, we do not need to address the
remaining issue of whether the FAC properly stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to Defendants. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(1).)
5 Jackson also does not attempt to articulate how his pleading could be amended in
his briefs on appeal.
8
CHUNG, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILSON, ACTING P. J.
BROMBERG, J.
Jackson v. Applied Materials Inc. et al.
H053886
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.