Filed 7/2/26 J.R. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
J.R., B341822
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV37608)
v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
(NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT);
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
RECALL OR STAY REMITTITUR
Defendant and Respondent.
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 2,
2026, and modified on June 30, 2026, is modified further as
follows:
On page 3, in the first paragraph of the Factual and
Procedural Background, part A, the name Daryl Lott is
misspelled and corrected to read Darryl Lott.
This modification does not constitute a change in judgment.
Appellant’s request to recall or stay the remittitur is
denied.
__________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. M. KIM, J.
Filed 6/30/26 J.R. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
J.R., B341822
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV37608)
v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
(NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT);
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S
SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF
Defendant and Respondent.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 2,
2026 is modified as follows:
1. On page 3, in the first paragraph of the Factual and
Procedural Background, part A, the name David Lott is corrected
to read Daryl Lott.
2. On page 15, a footnote 7 is inserted following the
sentence: In the absence of such evidence, there is no triable
question of fact as to whether an LAUSD administrative
employee acted negligently in failing to protect J.R. from Lott.
The inserted footnote shall read:
7 At the hearing before this court, J.R. argued the jury
could have inferred from LAUSD’s failure to preserve Lott’s
personnel file that the documents therein would have specifically
identified an administrative employee with knowledge suggesting
Lott posed a danger to students. But a jury could only draw such
inferences from a showing that LAUSD willfully suppressed or
destroyed the personnel file. (See, e.g., Sprague v. Equifax, Inc.
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1051.) Our record does not support
this. J.R. further suggested the trial court could not fairly fault
J.R. for not providing information contained in documents
LAUSD failed to preserve. But J.R. does not identify any
authority requiring LAUSD to retain records from 1989 when
K.D. was a student, or any other former employee personnel
records.
3. All remaining footnotes after inserted footnote 7 on
page 15 are renumbered.
These modifications do not constitute a change in
judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on June 2, 2026 and
request for judicial notice filed in support of the petition for
rehearing on June 5, 2026 are denied.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. M. KIM, J.
2
Filed 6/2/26 J.R. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
J.R., B341822
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV37608)
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison M. Mackenzie, Judge. Affirmed.
J.R., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Artiano Shinoff, Paul V. Carelli IV and Maurice A. Bumbu
for Defendant and Respondent.
J.R. (J.R.) sued respondent Los Angeles Unified School
District (LAUSD), alleging an LAUSD employee sexually abused
him while he was a student in the district. The trial court granted
LAUSD’s summary judgment motion on the basis that J.R. had
failed to name the district employee who knew or had reason
to know of the alleged abuse. In so doing, the court interpreted
Government Code section 815.21 and cases applying it as
categorically requiring a plaintiff who seeks to hold a public entity
vicariously liable for the actions of its employee to identify that
employee by name. We interpret this authority as more broadly
requiring identifying information about the employee sufficient
for the jury to assess the plaintiff ’s claims. This may, but does not
necessarily, require a plaintiff to identify the employee by name.
The court nevertheless reached the correct result. The record
before us reflects that LAUSD met its initial burden on summary
judgment, and that J.R.’s opposition evidence did not meet his
burden. As to J.R.’s negligence claims, the opposition evidence
did not include any identifying information about the LAUSD
administrative or supervisory employees allegedly aware of the
abuser’s propensities. As to J.R.’s Penal Code section 11166 failure
to report claim, the opposition evidence did not identify a mandated
reporter with allegedly reasonable suspicion of J.R.’s abuse. The
opposition evidence was thus insufficient to create a triable issue
of fact as to LAUSD’s vicarious liability for either the allegedly
negligent failure of any LAUSD administrative or supervisory
employee to protect J.R. or the alleged failure of any LAUSD
mandated reporter to fulfill his or her Penal Code section 11166
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Government Code.
2
duty. On this basis, summary judgment was correct. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On December 1, 2022, J.R. sued LAUSD and its former
employee, David Lott. He alleged that, in 2005–2006, Lott was a
teacher’s assistant at George Washington Preparatory High School
(George Washington), a school within LAUSD, where J.R. was an
underage student. J.R. alleged “that Lott oversaw the school[’]s
weightlifting club, and arranged bodybuilding photoshoots, where
he would rub oil on [J.R.] and other students, as a pretext to fondle
their genitals.” J.R. “further allege[d] that Lott sexually assaulted
him.” J.R. asserted causes of action against LAUSD for negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention of Lott, negligent supervision of a
minor, and failure by a mandated reporter to report suspected child
abuse as required by Penal Code section 11166.
B. Summary Judgment Briefing
LAUSD moved for summary judgment. It contended J.R.’s
negligence claims failed “because [he] [had] no evidence that any
named supervisor or administrator at the school acted negligently
in their hiring, supervision, or retention of Lott or failed to
adequately supervise [J.R.]” LAUSD further contended J.R. could
not prove his failure to report abuse claim, because the evidence
did not “show . . . that any named school employee knew or had
a factual basis from which to reasonably suspect that any child
had been abused by Lott.” LAUSD based both arguments on J.R.’s
interrogatory response that “he never told any school officials about
Lott’s abuse,” and that “there were no witnesses to the alleged
sexual assault, other than [J.R.] and Lott.”
3
Before filing his opposition, J.R. requested a continuance to
gather additional evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)2
J.R.’s request explained he had learned of another former George
Washington student, later identified as a woman named K.D., suing
LAUSD and alleging Lott sexually abused her. The court granted
the continuance.
Thereafter, J.R. obtained and supported his opposition with
a declaration from K.D. It appears from our limited record on
appeal and the parties’ briefing that J.R. had not identified K.D.
as a source of relevant evidence before this point, nor had he offered
any other evidence suggesting anyone had reported Lott’s abuse to
LAUSD.3
K.D. declared that, in 1989, Lott sexually assaulted her in
the locker room. She declared that she reported the assault to an
English teacher named “Ms. Mason,” a counselor, and an “unnamed
school administrator.” J.R. argued, inter alia, that this reporting
2 “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication,
or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but
cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the
motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained
or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)
3 The record on appeal does not include the parties’ briefing
on summary judgment. Nor does the court’s minute order ruling
on the motion catalog the evidence offered by the parties, except
that it discusses the K.D. declaration and references J.R.’s
admission in discovery that he did not report the abuse and
that no one witnessed it. At the hearing, the court stated that,
besides the K.D. declaration, “there [was] nothing else” provided
“to establish a triable issue of fact of the vicarious liability.”
4
put LAUSD administrative personnel sufficiently on notice of Lott’s
propensity to abuse.
C. Summary Judgment Hearing
During the hearing on the motion, J.R.’s counsel
acknowledged that no evidence before the court identified an
administrative or supervisory employee of LAUSD to whom
K.D. allegedly reported her abuse or “the entire full name” of the
teacher to which K.D. allegedly reported her abuse. J.R.’s counsel
represented that he could obtain such evidence, because he had
recently learned from LAUSD the identities of “the administrators
and the teacher that K.D. described in her deposition.” Defense
counsel, however, did not provide these names, did not offer to do
so in a written proffer, nor request a continuance or leave to offer
additional evidence.
During the hearing, LAUSD described the K.D. declaration
as from “a self interested litigant” and as “a hearsay document . . .
from 1989.” This triggered a colloquy between the court and
counsel about whether, even if K.D. had identified a specific
individual to whom she reported Lott’s abuse, this could support
a finding that LAUSD knew or should have known Lott was likely
to abuse J.R. 16 years later. In this context, the court commented
that the K.D. declaration seemed to address a “totally different time
period[ ]. . . . [¶] . . . I don’t know if there’s case law on this. But it
does seem[ ] at some point the time period makes a difference.” The
court further commented: “This issue of the temporal difference in
time[,] maybe this is going to have to be litigated with the Court
of Appeal[ ]. . . . [¶] . . . I just don’t see how that can be enough to
create a triable issue of fact on this idea that the vicarious liability
for something that happened years and years and years later[,] . . .
[¶] . . . it does seem too attenuated.”
5
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter
under submission.
D. Order Granting Summary Judgment
The court granted the motion in a written order issued
later the same day. The order did not rely on—or even reference—
the temporal attenuation issue discussed at the hearing. Nor did
it rely on or reference LAUSD’s critiques of the K.D. declaration
as unreliable. Rather, the court’s order relied entirely on the lack
of evidence identifying the specific employee for whose actions
LAUSD was to be held vicariously liable. The court concluded this
prevented J.R. from proving his claims, citing Munoz v. City of
Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1113 (Munoz), disapproved
of on unrelated grounds by Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013)
57 Cal.4th 622. As to the negligence claims, which require an
administrative or supervisory employee to have been negligent,
the court noted the K.D. declaration contained no identifying
information for such an LAUSD employee. As to the Penal Code
section 11166 cause of action, the court deemed K.D.’s identification
of an English teacher, “Ms. Mason,” insufficient without a first
name.
The court entered judgment in LAUSD’s favor, and J.R.
appealed.4
4 J.R. filed numerous motions to augment the record on
appeal and requests for judicial notice, some of which we have
already ruled on. We rule on J.R.’s pending requests and motions
in a separate order issued concurrently with this opinion.
6
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Legal Framework
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial
burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no triable
issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar); see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Only if that party makes such a showing does the burden shift
to the opposing party to produce evidence to challenge the moving
party’s evidence. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850; Saelzler v. Advanced
Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 (Saelzler).) Where, as
here, the moving party is a defendant, it may shift the burden
by making an affirmative “ ‘ “showing” that one or more elements
of the cause of action cannot be established.’ ” (Saelzler, supra,
at p. 768; Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32
Cal.4th 1138, 1142; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(1)–(2)
& (p)(1)–(2); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317,
355–356.)
Our review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is
de novo. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028,
1037.) We therefore independently analyze the evidence in the
record that was presented to the trial court, except that to which
objections were properly sustained, under the same summary
judgment legal framework applicable in the trial court. In so
doing, “[w]e liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment [citation], and assess whether the
evidence would, if credited, permit the trier of fact to find in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment under applicable legal
standards.” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109.)
7
B. Applicable Principles of Vicarious Liability
1. Vicarious Liability of School District
When School Employee Sexually Molests
a Student
“[P]ublic entity tort liability is exclusively statutory.” (C.A. v.
William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861,
868 (C.A.), citing § 815.) Section 815.2 authorizes liability “for
injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of
the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or
omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause
of action against that employee or his personal representative.”
(§ 815.2, subd. (a).)
When a teacher sexually assaults a student, the teacher
is not acting within the scope of the teacher’s employment, and
a school district is not vicariously liable for that conduct. (See
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 452.)
School district personnel do, however, “owe students under their
supervision a protective duty of ordinary care.” (C.A., supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 865.) Accordingly, “if individual [d]istrict employees
responsible for . . . supervising teachers knew or should have
known . . . that [a teacher] posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of
harm to students under his supervision, . . . the employees owe[ ]
a duty to protect the students from such harm.” (Virginia G. v.
ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855.)
When an administrator or supervisor’s breach of that duty results
in a teacher sexually abusing a student, the school district may be
vicariously liable for that breach. (See C.A., supra, at p. 878; id.
at p. 879 [“public school district may be vicariously liable under
section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors
8
in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually
harasses and abuses a student”].)
Similarly, a district may be vicariously liable when a
“ ‘mandated reporter’ ” employed by the district—such as a teacher
or certain other school employees—fails to fulfill his or her Penal
Code section 11166 duty to report child abuse to the police or county
welfare department. (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015)
62 Cal.4th 168, 186; see Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist.
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 138 (Lawndale).) That duty exists
“ ‘whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional
capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has
knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter
knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse
or neglect.’ ” (B.H., supra, at p. 186; see Pen. Code, § 11165.7.)
“[A]n injured minor may bring a civil action where ‘ “a breach of
the mandated reporter’s duty to report child abuse” ’ causes the
minor’s injuries.” (Lawndale, supra, at p. 138; B.H., supra, at
pp. 188–189, fn. 6.)
2. Identifying the Employee for Whose
Actions a Defendant Is Vicariously Liable
In C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th 861, our state Supreme Court
held that, at least at the pleading stage, a plaintiff relying on
a section 815.2 theory of vicarious liability need not identify
the specific employee for whose actions the public entity is to
be held vicariously liable. (C.A., supra, at p. 872.) The high
court’s reasoning in so holding focuses on the pleading as an
early procedural stage. (Ibid.) The court specifically declined to
determine whether a plaintiff can prevail at trial without naming
the employee. (Id. at p. 872, fn. 5 [distinguishing Munoz, supra,
120 Cal.App.4th 1077 on this basis].)
9
In order to prove what section 815.2 requires, however—
that a public employee engaged in tortious conduct while acting in
the scope of his or her employment—a plaintiff necessarily must
identify that employee with a level of specificity sufficient for the
jury to assess those requirements. We agree with J.R. that this
does not necessarily require providing the employee’s name. (See
Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2012 ed.)
foll. § 815.2, p. 240 [“it will not be necessary in every case to identify
the particular employee upon whose act the liability of the public
entity is to be predicated” (italics added)].) It does, however,
require some identifying information about the employee—at
a minimum, the employee’s role and/or job title. Knowing the
employee’s role at the entity informs both the scope of his or her
employment and what duties the employee owed (or did not owe)
the plaintiff.
Citing Perez v. City of Huntington Park (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th
817, 820 (Perez), J.R. suggests a plaintiff can establish section 815.2
liability without providing the employee’s name, and without
identifying the employee in any way. He relies on the following
language from that decision, which echoes the legislative comment
to section 815.2: “The plaintiff may be unable to identify which
employee committed the wrongful act, but this is not fatal to the
employer’s liability, if the evidence establishes that some employee
in the scope of employment committed the wrongful act.” (Perez,
supra, at p. 820, italics added; see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32
West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2012 ed.) § 815.2, p. 240 [“[a]ll that will be
necessary [under section 815.2] will be to show that some employee
of the public entity tortiously inflicted the injury in the scope of his
employment under circumstances where he would be personally
liable”].) But in order to prove “some employee [of the public entity
10
defendant] in the scope of employment committed the wrongful
act” (Perez, supra, at p. 820), a plaintiff necessarily must provide
identifying information about the employee sufficient to establish
what the scope of his or her employment was, and whether the
employee committed the wrongful conduct.
Perez does not provide an example to the contrary. Rather, in
Perez, the plaintiff offered identifying information about—including
the names of—four police officers, also named as defendants
alongside the City. (Perez, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 818–819.)
The plaintiff offered evidence that these four specifically named
officers repeatedly ascended and descended the stairs in plaintiff ’s
building while responding to a dispatch call. (Id. at p. 819.) When
the plaintiff, standing in the stairwell, asked what was going on,
two officers struck him. (Ibid.) Neither the plaintiff nor the trial
court could “determine with specificity which of the . . . officers
who were at the scene, . . . hit [the plaintiff].” (Ibid., italics
omitted.) The court nevertheless found “that two of [them] . . . did
in fact strike [the plaintiff] without any cause or provocation” and
that whichever officers did so were “acting in their official capacity
and were in the course and scope of their employment at the time.”
(Ibid., italics omitted.) Under these circumstances, even though
the plaintiff could not specifically identify which officer struck him,
the identifying information plaintiff provided about the four officers
was sufficient for the court to assess section 815.2 liability. (Id.
at p. 820.) Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s
judgment holding the City vicariously liable. (Ibid.)
In Munoz, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, by contrast, the
plaintiff provided no information identifying the public employees
for whose conduct plaintiffs sought to hold the City liable—neither
their names, nor their titles, nor any other information. In this
11
context, Munoz notes that “[u]nless the employee is identified, the
trier of fact will not be able to determine if the elements needed
to assert vicarious liability have been proved. [Citation.] Thus,
the doctrine [of vicarious liability] clearly contemplates that
the negligent employee whose conduct is sought to be attributed
to the employer at least be specifically identified, if not joined
as a defendant.” (Id. at p. 1113.) The plaintiff in Munoz failed
to “specifically identif[y]” the allegedly negligent employees not
because he failed to provide their names, but because he failed to
provide any identifying information about them at all, preventing
the court from assessing whether such employees had been
negligent while acting within the scope of the employment.
C. J.R.’s Arguments
J.R. argues we must reverse summary judgment because
the court incorrectly applied the law on vicarious liability of public
entities, incorrectly applied the summary judgment burden-shifting
framework, and failed to view the K.D. declaration in the light most
favorable to him.5 We disagree.
5 These are the only arguments J.R. raises on appeal. In
some of his motions to augment and requests for judicial notice, J.R.
references (but does not attach) other evidence as well. (See, e.g.,
fn. 8, post.) He does not discuss this evidence in his briefing and,
based on our limited record, the evidence was not presented to the
court below.
In some of his motions to augment and requests for judicial
notice, J.R. also accuses his trial counsel of failing to provide
relevant evidence to the trial court. This issue is not before us on
appeal—nor would we have a sufficient record to assess such a
contention in any event. We thus do not consider, and express no
opinion on, the actions of J.R.’s trial counsel.
12
1. The Court Did Not Weigh Evidence or
Create New Law
J.R. makes several arguments that assume the court granted
summary judgment on bases it did not. J.R. argues the court
“imposed a temporal limitation on notice and vicarious liability”
by concluding “evidence of prior notice was legally insufficient due
to the passage of time” while “simultaneously acknowledging that
no statute or case law articulates such a rule.” He supports his
argument with citations to the court’s discussion of temporal
attenuation during the hearing. But the court’s order and stated
reasoning for granting the motion never mentions these concepts,
nor does its reasoning imply the court relied on them.
J.R. further argues the court improperly weighed the
evidence. He contends the court disregarded the K.D. declaration
as biased and unreliable hearsay, despite the lack of a sustained
evidentiary objection. Nothing in the court’s order suggests the
court declined to consider the K.D. declaration. To the contrary,
in its order, the court analyzed whether K.D.’s declared testimony,
if found true, could create a triable issue of fact.
2. LAUSD Met Its Initial Burden on
Summary Judgment
J.R. argues LAUSD did not meet its initial summary
judgment burden, because it merely pointed to the lack of
“additional corroborating evidence,” rather than demonstrating J.R.
did not have and could not reasonably obtain evidence to support
his claims. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)
J.R.’s negligence claim requires him to establish “a
supervisory or administrative employee of the school district”
knew or should have known that Lott was likely to sexually
assault J.R. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 865.) His Penal Code
13
section 11166 failure to report child abuse claim requires him to
establish a mandated reporter employed by the district learned
information supporting a “reasonable suspicion” that J.R. had been
abused. (Lawndale, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) To
establish J.R. could not prove these elements, LAUSD offered J.R,’s
undisputed interrogatory responses that he never told anyone about
Lott abusing him, and that the only individuals who knew about the
abuse at the time would have been Lott and J.R. LAUSD’s motion
thus identified more than the mere absence of evidence to support
an element of J.R.’s claims, and the burden shifted to J.R. The
court correctly applied the summary judgment burden-shifting
framework.
3. J.R. Has Not Established That He Met His
Burden in Opposing Summary Judgment
The court rejected the K.D. declaration as insufficient to
defeat LAUSD’s summary judgment motion as to J.R.’s negligence
claims, because it did not identify the name of any administrative
or supervisory employee to whom K.D. reported Lott’s abuse.6
Although section 815.2 does not necessarily require J.R. to
provide the name of this employee, it does require him to provide
identifying information sufficient for the jury to assess his claims.
6 We need not opine on whether, as the court concluded
below, the reference in the K.D. declaration to “Ms. Mason” the
English teacher without providing the teacher’s first name is an
insufficient identification of a mandated reporter for purposes
of J.R.’s Penal Code section 11166 claim. To the extent this was
error, J.R. does not so argue in his appellate briefing. We thus
also do not reach the issue of whether the failure of a mandated
reporter to report K.D.’s abuse could provide a basis for a Penal
Code section 11166 claim based on abuse J.R. suffered.
14
Nothing in the K.D. declaration reflects—or even supports a
reasonable inference about—the roles or duties this administrative
employee had at the school or his or her tenure there. Indeed, like
the plaintiff in Munoz and unlike the plaintiffs in Perez, J.R. did not
provide evidence supporting any identifying information about the
employee. Absent additional evidence identifying which employee
knew or had reason to know about Lott’s alleged abuse of K.D.,
a trier of fact would have no basis for assessing whether, over
15 years later, LAUSD administrative personnel knew or should
have known Lott posed a danger to J.R. (See, e.g., Spinner v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
172, 187 [summary judgment opposition could not establish triable
question of fact as to knowledge using the “bare possibility of
theoretical access [to the information many years earlier] premised
on mere speculation”].) In the absence of such evidence, there is
no triable question of fact as to whether an LAUSD administrative
employee acted negligently in failing to protect J.R. from Lott.
J.R. has not argued, either below or on appeal, that other
evidence before the court at summary judgment, besides the K.D.
declaration, sufficiently identified an administrative or supervisory
employee with knowledge of Lott’s propensities.7 Rather, he
7 In a September 2, 2025 motion, J.R. asked that we take
judicial notice of his November 16, 2023 certified deposition
transcript, which the motion describes as including testimony
“directly identif[ying] an administrator with statutory reporting
obligations under Penal Code [section] 11166”—namely, “Kim
Bly, athletic director, . . . who personally observed abuse in
the gymnasium when defendant Lott massaged [J.R.] in her
presence.” (Capitalization omitted.) He did not, however,
provide this transcript or even an excerpt from it supporting
15
argues that, even if the evidence he presented at the motion hearing
was insufficient, he could have obtained evidence to support his
claims, and LAUSD failed to prove he could not. He suggests
he could have conducted further discovery, that K.D. might later
remember additional information not contained in her declaration,
and/or that a protective order restricted the evidence he could
present in opposing summary judgment. But the court could only
rule based on the evidence before it, not evidence J.R. speculated he
might later offer. The court had already granted J.R. a continuance
to gather additional evidence regarding K.D., resulting in J.R.
offering the K.D. declaration. J.R.’s counsel did not request another
continuance or proffer the names of the LAUSD administrator and
teacher counsel claimed to have recently learned of. Nor does the
record suggest the protective order restricted J.R. from disclosing
additional information about K.D.’s reports. Indeed, it is unclear
how a protective order would have restricted J.R. from providing
such evidence to the trial court in a sealed filing.8
his description of his testimony. Nor does J.R. argue that
this evidence was before the court at summary judgment. (See
Monteleone v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 509, 514
[“[a]ppellate review of summary judgment is limited to the facts
presented in documents submitted to the trial court”].)
8 On appeal, J.R. identifies categories of evidence he claims
the protective order prevented him from presenting: “sworn
deposition testimony describing direct communications with the
perpetrator, including admissions of misconduct; [¶] . . . detailed
accounts of conduct occurring on campus, including photographic
activity and physical contact; and [¶] . . . documentary evidence,
including images produced during discovery.” Even assuming
his failure to provide record support for this contention does not
waive it (see L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620),
16
J.R. cites cases holding that a defendant seeking summary
judgment must establish the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain
the necessary evidence to support his claims. (See, e.g., Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854; Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 768.)
But his authorities do not support the proposition inherent in J.R.’s
argument: That after the burden has shifted to a plaintiff opposing
summary judgment, the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment by
speculating about additional evidence he might be able to marshal.
“[C]onjecture and speculation” that he might have been able
to obtain such evidence, if given more time, is “insufficient” to meet
that burden. (Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 1, 11; see ibid. [“opposition to summary judgment
will be deemed insufficient when it is essentially conclusionary,
argumentative or based on conjecture and speculation”].)
As an appellate court, we have the task of assessing the
arguments properly raised and the record the appellant presents
us. Unless the record and arguments before us reveal reversible
error, we must affirm. Here, they do not.
the materials he describes speak to whether abuse occurred, not
whether an LAUSD administrative or supervisory employee had
reason to know about or suspect it. Thus, these materials would
not have assisted him in opposing summary judgment in any
event.
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
18