Filed 8/11/26 Isaacson v. Trancas PCH CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
DEAN R. ISAACSON, B340983
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 18STCV05502)
v.
TRANCAS PCH LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin C. Brazile, Judge. Affirmed.
Dean R. Isaacson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Resch Polster & Berger, Robert W. Barnes, and Stacey N.
Knox for Defendant and Respondent.
__________________________
Dean Isaacson appeals from the judgment entered after the
trial court dismissed his complaint against Trancas PCH LLC
(Trancas) for failing to timely bring the case to trial under Code of
Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360.1 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 19, 2018, Isaacson filed a complaint against
Trancas and Susan B. Wilstein, as administrator of the estate of
David Wilstein, alleging claims for breach of contract and fraud.2
According to the complaint, Trancas was formed in 1999 to acquire
and develop certain real property in Malibu, David Wilstein was
Trancas’s sole manager until his death in July 2017, and one of
Trancas’s members, 1, 2, 3 LLC (123), was a limited liability
company managed by Isaacson. Isaacson alleged Trancas and
David Wilstein failed to perform on oral promises to pay him a
developer’s fee upon the Malibu property’s sale.3 Susan Wilstein
was dismissed from the action in November 2019.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 The complaint also named as a plaintiff D.I.D.M.
Development Corporation, which was later dismissed from the
action for failing to secure attorney representation. We augment
the record to include the complaint. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1)(A).)
3 On the same day Isaacson filed his complaint, 123 filed a
separate action against Trancas and Susan Wilstein alleging claims
for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty based on
Trancas’s alleged failure to pay 123 proceeds from the property’s
sale in accordance with Trancas’s operating agreement. 123’s
action was dismissed in July 2019 for its failure to secure attorney
representation.
2
Trancas first propounded requests for production on Isaacson
in January 2020 and sought multiple times to meet and confer after
Isaacson failed to timely respond. When Isaacson failed to respond
to the meet and confer attempts, Trancas filed a motion to compel
in November 2021. The trial court granted Trancas’s motion and
awarded it sanctions, and ordered Isaacson to serve verified
responses, without objection, within 60 days. Shortly before that
new deadline, in February 2022, Isaacson produced some
documents that appeared to relate to claims in a separate action.
He did not provide any written responses to Trancas’s requests.
Trancas’s efforts to obtain further compliance by meeting and
conferring and providing deadline extensions were largely
unsuccessful. When Isaacson provided verified responses in April
2022, they contained numerous objections.
In May, June, and July 2022, the court granted Trancas’s
motions to compel and corresponding requests for sanctions based
on Isaacson’s failures to timely or properly respond to form
interrogatories, requests for admission, and special interrogatories.
In July 2022, the court also granted Trancas’s ex parte application
to continue the original trial date of August 2, 2021, to August 8,
2022, based on Isaacson’s continued discovery noncompliance and
his failure to communicate about pretrial issues.
Trancas next moved for terminating sanctions. Before the
motion was heard, in July 2022, the parties agreed to participate in
mediation and to continue the trial to April 3, 2023. Mediation
never took place, but the parties engaged in settlement discussions
over several months that ultimately proved unsuccessful. In
October 2022, Isaacson moved to continue the trial to August 14,
2023, based on his intention to conduct discovery. The court
granted the unopposed motion.
3
In November 2022, Isaacson produced over 2,000 pages of
documents in response to Trancas’s requests but also represented
he had additional responsive documents that had not yet been
produced. Isaacson continued to make unfulfilled promises to
produce these additional documents throughout 2023.
On August 3, 2023, the court granted Trancas’s ex parte
application to continue the trial “not less than 60 days” on the basis
that its client representative and primary witness, John Spranza,
had undergone major surgery and thus was not available for trial.
The court continued the trial to November 27, 2023.
Later in August 2023, the court granted Isaacson’s motion to
further continue the trial to accommodate his request to conduct
discovery. The court reset the trial for January 8, 2024, and, over
Trancas’s objection, reopened discovery for Isaacson to conduct
Spranza’s deposition and to propound requests for production, with
a new discovery cutoff date of December 1, 2023.
In October 2023, Trancas filed an ex parte application to
continue the trial “to a date in the February-March 2024
timeframe” based on Spranza’s unavailability due to plans for
medical treatment and prepaid foreign travel. The court granted
the application and continued the trial to July 29, 2024.
On December 3, 2023, Isaacson proposed that Spranza’s
deposition take place on December 5 or in February or March 2024.
Trancas responded that it was not ready to proceed with and notice
was inadequate for a deposition on December 5 but agreed to make
Spranza available for a deposition in late February or early March
2024. Isaacson did not respond to Trancas’s later proposal of
specific dates in late February 2024.
On May 29, 2024, Isaacson propounded requests for
production on Trancas.
4
Two days later, Trancas filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
Isaacson had failed to bring the action to trial by May 20, 2024, as
required by the five-year rule under section 583.310. Trancas
argued Isaacson had no excuse and that dismissal for his
noncompliance with the rule was mandatory under section 583.360.
As an alternative basis for relief, Trancas sought dismissal of the
action as a terminating sanction under section 2023.030,
subdivision (d)(3).
Isaacson opposed the motion. He argued Trancas was
thwarting the court’s August 2023 discovery order by failing to
make Spranza available for a deposition in June or July 2024. He
contended Trancas’s conduct caused irreparable damage to his due
process rights and hamstrung his ability to oppose the dismissal
motion and bring the case to trial. Isaacson also asserted Trancas
should be estopped from moving for dismissal because its requests
to continue the trial in August and October 2023 were designed to
exhaust the five-year period under section 583.310. He further
asserted that Trancas prepared the court’s October 2023 order
continuing the trial to July 29, 2024, knowing it “would scheme
later … to ask the trial to be dismissed.”
Before Trancas’s reply deadline, the court posted a tentative
ruling to deny Trancas’s motion. The court explained that, “due to
illness, the Judicial Officer of this department has been unavailable
for a jury trial from April through June 2024. This is an
impossibility that made it such that trial could not be commenced
until July 2024. That means the time to bring the suit to trial was
tolled by almost two months. Therefore, the current July 29, 2024,
trial date is still within the 5-year rule. The Court also does not see
how Plaintiff has not been diligent when he is a pro per litigant and
Defendant has requested at least two trial continuances since
August 2023.”
5
In its reply, Trancas argued the court’s tentative ruling
analysis was contrary to case law providing that, even if the judicial
officer in the assigned department had been unavailable for that
period, Isaacson was responsible for seeking relief to ensure the
matter proceeded to trial before the five-year deadline passed.
Isaacson’s failure to do so, Trancas argued, demonstrated a lack of
reasonable diligence, which was fatal to any tolling argument he
made.
After hearing argument, the court granted Trancas’s motion
to dismiss.
A few days later, Isaacson moved for reconsideration, arguing
dismissal was improper because the court denied his June 2024
motion to compel Spranza’s deposition, which would have produced
facts to challenge Trancas’s dismissal motion. Isaacson also argued
the court had issued a stay based on the judicial officer’s
unavailability due to illness, which in turn meant the five-year
period had not yet expired. The trial court denied the motion,
noting Isaacson’s “fail[ure] to demonstrate new facts or law that
could not have been presented before.” The court also struck
Isaacson’s subsequent peremptory challenge of a judicial officer
under sections 170.1 and 170.6.
Although Isaacson prematurely appealed from the unsigned
order granting Trancas’s motion to dismiss, we treat the appeal as
filed after the judgment of dismissal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(d)(1); see In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 900, 906.)
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 583.310 requires that “[a]n action shall be brought to
trial within five years after the action is commenced against the
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defendant.” Under section 583.360, subdivision (a), if the action is
not brought to trial by the five-year deadline, the action must “be
dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of the
defendant.” The requirements under these provisions “are
mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception
except as expressly provided by statute.” (Id., subd. (b); see Rel v.
Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 882, 888-889
[“ ‘The purpose of the five-year dismissal statute is to prevent the
prosecution of stale claims where defendants could be prejudiced by
loss of evidence and diminished memories of witnesses. [Citation.]
The statute also protects defendants from the annoyance of having
unmeritorious claims against them unresolved for unreasonable
periods of time.’ ”].)
In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Judicial
Council issued Emergency Rule 10(a), which provided:
“ ‘Notwithstanding any other law, including … section 583.310, for
all civil actions filed on or before April 6, 2020, the time in which to
bring the action to trial is extended by six months for a total [time]
of five years and six months.’ ” (See Oswald v. Landmark Builders,
Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 240, 246.) Other circumstances in which
the five-year period shall be extended are set forth under section
583.340, which provides: “In computing the time within which an
action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall
be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions
existed: [¶] (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was
suspended. [¶] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or
enjoined. [¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason,
was impossible, impracticable, or futile.”
“To avoid dismissal under the section 583.340, subdivision (c)
exception, a plaintiff must prove (1) a circumstance establishing
impossibility, impracticability, or futility, (2) a causal connection
7
between the circumstance and the failure to move the case to trial
within the five-year period, and (3) that [the plaintiff] was
reasonably diligent in prosecuting [the] case at all stages in the
proceedings.” (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 313, 323 (Tanguilig); see Bruns v. E-Commerce
Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 731 (Bruns) [“The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that the circumstances warrant
application of the section 583.340[, subdivision (c),] exception.”].)
The trial court “must determine what is impossible, impracticable,
or futile ‘in light of all the circumstances in the individual case,
including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the
proceedings themselves.’ ” (Bruns, at p. 730.) The California
Supreme Court has explained “ ‘there must be “a period of
impossibility, impracticability or futility, over which plaintiff had
no control,” ’ because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable
delay.” (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th
1081, 1102 (Gaines).) Further, “[i]t is well established that
‘ “ ‘[e]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it
within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in
making the computation.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Time consumed by the
delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition
of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of
waiting for a place on the court’s calendar [is] not within the
contemplation” ’ ” of section 583.340, subdivision (c). (Gaines, at
p. 1101.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under
section 583.360 for abuse of discretion. (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th
at p. 1100, fn. 8; see Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 [“The trial
court has discretion to determine whether [the § 583.340, subd. (c)]
exception applies, and its decision will be upheld unless the plaintiff
has proved that the trial court abused its discretion”].) Under that
8
standard, we review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial
evidence and its conclusions of law de novo. (Gaines, at p. 1100.)
The court’s application of the law to the facts is reversible only if
arbitrary and capricious. (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting
Trancas’s Motion and Dismissing Isaacson’s Action
Isaacson filed the underlying action on November 19, 2018.
With Emergency Rule 10(a)’s six-month extension of the five-year
period under section 583.310, Isaacson had until May 20, 2024, to
bring his case to trial. When he failed to do so, Trancas moved to
dismiss his case on May 31, 2024. The court granted the motion
and dismissed the action pursuant to section 583.360.
Isaacson argues the trial court abused its discretion in several
ways. He first contends the five-year period was tolled from David
Wilstein’s death in July 2017—i.e., before Isaacson commenced the
underlying action—through his filing of his opening brief on appeal
because Spranza was not properly appointed to replace Wilstein as
Trancas’s manager pursuant to the company’s operating agreement,
which in turn left Trancas without legal authority to participate in
the case and the trial court without jurisdiction. Isaacson forfeited
this argument by not raising it in the trial court. (See Tanguilig,
supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 330 [fact-based tolling claims for
purposes of the five-year deadline under section 583.310 were
forfeited when not argued in the trial court].) Even if we
disregarded the forfeiture, Isaacson points to nothing in the record
to support his claim of Spranza’s improper appointment or
Trancas’s incapacity aside from the relevant operating agreement
provision.
The rest of Isaacson’s arguments are based on purported
tolling under section 583.340, subdivision (c), for “impossible,
9
impracticable, or futile” circumstances. Isaacson contends he was
reasonably diligent in trying to bring the action to trial and that the
delays in his doing so “were completely and totally beyond [his]
control.” The trial court could reasonably conclude this was not the
case.4
Isaacson asserts tolling should apply for (1) the period covered
by Trancas’s two granted continuances of the trial date to account
for Spranza’s medical and travel plans and (2) the period in which
the assigned trial court judge was unavailable due to illness.5
Working around scheduling conflicts of the opposing party and the
court is far closer to “ ‘delay caused by ordinary incidents of
proceedings ... [that is] not within the contemplation’ ” of section
583.340, subdivision (c), than circumstances establishing
impossibility, impracticability, or futility. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th
at p. 731; accord, Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1101 [“This rule
reflects the Legislature’s understanding that a reasonably diligent
plaintiff should be able to bring the case to trial within the
relatively lengthy period of five years notwithstanding such
4 Isaacson points to the trial court’s tentative ruling to deny
Trancas’s dismissal motion and asserts the court erred in reversing
that ruling. However, “a trial court’s tentative ruling is not binding
on the court; the court’s final order supersedes the tentative ruling.”
(Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 300.) Thus, we disregard any reliance
Isaacson places on it. (Ibid.; see Oswald v. Landmark Builders,
Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 249, fn. 6.)
5 Isaacson provides no support for his assertion that the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the action during the period in which the
trial court judge was unavailable due to illness. (See WFG National
Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881,
894 [“we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority”].)
10
ordinary delays. [Citation.] To hold otherwise would allow
plaintiffs to litigate piecemeal every period, no matter how short, in
which it was literally impracticable to try the case, thus rendering
the statute ‘utterly indeterminate, subjective, and
unadministerable.’ ”].)
Moreover, with respect to the trial court judge’s absence for
several months, as the judge stated at the hearing on the motion to
dismiss, “Even though I was out, I was still ruling on ex partes, I
was still following calendars. So it could have been brought to my
attention even when I was out. You could have advanced it or I
could have sent it to Department 1 to see if another court could
have heard the case. The obligation is on the plaintiff to raise those
issues. It wasn’t done here.”
But even assuming these periods involved circumstances
establishing impossibility, impracticability, or futility, the record
does not show Isaacson was “reasonably diligent in prosecuting [his]
case at all stages in the proceedings.” (Tanguilig, supra,
22 Cal.App.5th at p. 323, italics added; see Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th
at pp. 730-731 [“ ‘The critical factor in applying these exceptions
[under § 543.340, subd. (c)] to a given factual situation is whether
the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her
case.’ ”].) To the contrary, the most significant source of delay in
Isaacson’s bringing the case to trial was his persistent discovery
noncompliance. Based on Isaacson’s failures to timely and properly
respond to its requests, Trancas was forced to file several motions to
compel. The court granted each and awarded Trancas sanctions
every time. Trancas was also forced to secure at least one
continuance of the trial date because of Isaacson’s discovery
noncompliance.
For his part, Isaacson also sought multiple continuances of
the trial date to conduct discovery that he then failed to timely
11
pursue. While Isaacson complains about his inability to take
Spranza’s deposition before the court ruled on Trancas’s dismissal
motion, the record shows Isaacson only started pursuing the
deposition after the revised discovery cutoff had passed and after
three and a half months of preceding inaction. Then he stopped
responding when Trancas proposed post-cutoff dates for the
deposition to proceed and only returned to the topic once the five-
year deadline had passed and Trancas had filed its dismissal
motion.
Isaacson likewise does not address that the final continuance
of the trial date to July 29, 2024, was made on October 3, 2023, or
seven and a half months before the five-year deadline on May 20,
2024. The record shows Isaacson did nothing to raise the issue
during that time.
Similar circumstances were present in De Santiago v. D & G
Plumbing, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 365, 370 (De Santiago),
where the trial court on its own motion continued the trial date
beyond the five-year deadline. The appellate court rejected the
appellant’s tolling argument, explaining the appellant had not
established it “was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the case ...
during the final six months of the five-year period.” (Id. at p. 374.)
The court explained, “[d]uring this time, [the appellant] had a duty
to bring to the trial court’s attention the fact that the trial court set
the trial for a date after expiration of the five-year period, and
object. Upon becoming aware of the impending expiration of the
five-year period, the trial court in all likelihood would have given
the case priority for the purpose of trying the case before the five-
year period expired. [The appellant’s] attorney failed to alert the
trial court that the trial date was beyond the five-year mark ..., and
thus, in effect, [the appellant] acquiesced in the court’s setting the
trial date beyond the five-year mark.” (Ibid.) The court added,
12
“[the appellant] also had a duty to take whatever other measures
were available to attempt to accelerate trial of the case before
expiration of the five-year period, including bringing a motion to
advance the trial. Even after the court set the case for trial beyond
the five-year mark, there was ample time to move to advance the
trial date pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1335.” (De
Santiago, at p. 374; see also Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [“ ‘ “Where a plaintiff possesses the
means to bring a matter to trial before the expiration of the five-
year period by filing a motion to specially set the matter for trial,
plaintiff’s failure to bring such motion will preclude a later claim of
impossibility or impracticability.” ’ ”]; Wale v. Rodriguez (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 129, 133 [“Appellant was not entitled to assume
that a motion to specially set would have been futile. His failure to
so move was fatal.”].)
Like the appellant in De Santiago, Isaacson failed to object to
the setting of the trial date after the expiration of the five-year
period or otherwise bring the issue to the trial court’s attention in
the final seven and a half months before that deadline passed. His
failure to do so demonstrates a lack of reasonable diligence and, in
turn, fatally undermines his tolling argument. (De Santiago, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 [“[The appellant] was not reasonably
diligent in bringing its case to trial during the last six months of the
five-year period and thus the impracticability exception does not
apply.”].)
Finally, reasonable diligence is not shown in Isaacson’s cited
actions taken after the five-year deadline passed, including his
filing an ex parte application to advance his motion to compel
Spranza’s deposition before the dismissal motion hearing. These
efforts were moot because, at that point, the case could be and
13
eventually was properly dismissed for Isaacson’s failure to timely
bring it to trial under section 583.360.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Trancas is entitled to its costs on
appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
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