Filed 9/18/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ERIC IRVINE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172066
v. (Marin County Super. Ct.
TIARE JUNE IRVINE, No. FL 0000904)
Defendant and Appellant.
In May 2024, Eric Irvine obtained a domestic violence temporary
restraining order (TRO) against his ex-wife, Tiare Irvine. 1 She was arrested
a week later and charged with, among other things, battery of a former
spouse. Three times, the trial court granted her requests to continue the
hearing on Eric’s petition for a restraining order. But it denied a fourth
request — which was based on her intent to assert her Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent due to the pending criminal case — and issued a three-
year restraining order after a hearing. On appeal, she contends the court
abused its discretion by denying her request to continue the hearing until
after her criminal matter had been resolved.
1 Intending no disrespect, we use first names to avoid confusion. All
dates refer to 2024 unless otherwise indicated. We grant Eric’s unopposed
request for judicial notice of records from Tiare’s criminal case. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)
1
Respondents in a domestic violence restraining order proceeding who
intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination are
not automatically entitled to a continuance. (People v. Coleman (1975)
13 Cal.3d 867, 885.) Instead, when determining whether good cause exists to
delay the hearing, the trial court should balance the respondent’s Fifth
Amendment rights against competing interests, such as the petitioner’s
interest in moving forward and the potential prejudice a delay would cause
them; the court’s interest in the efficient use of judicial resources; the
interests of nonparties; and the purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq., undesignated statutory references are to this
code; DVPA). (Alpha Media Resort Investment Cases (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
1121, 1132.) The record demonstrates the court below appropriately
considered the competing interests before denying Tiare’s request for a fourth
continuance. As no abuse of discretion appears, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Eric and Tiare married in 2014 and divorced in 2022. In late 2023, she
began harassing him with “non-stop” text messages and “calls from multiple
phone numbers.” He blocked her messages, but she told him if her messages
“stop going through [she] will make another account and keep calling.” Her
messages were “manipulative” and “threatening.” She repeatedly indicated
she was “on the verge of committing suicide, describing the particular
methods she plan[ned] to use, writing sentimental farewells, sending [him]
bills for her funeral expenses, even filming herself swallowing huge numbers
of unknown pills.” When her messages did not have their desired effect, she
“threatened to damage [his] career and reputation by spreading falsehoods
about [him] on social media.”
2
When Tiare learned Eric was in a new relationship, her “harassment
and abuse reached a new level of menace and violence.” On May 6, she
texted that she’d “found [his girlfriend]. . . . I know who she is.” She sent
him the name, age, employer, phone number, and e-mail address of his
girlfriend and threatened to contact her. Later that day, she sent messages
to his girlfriend in which she expressed her intent to commit suicide and a
“ ‘suicide video’ ” of her ingesting many pills. Tiare was detained for
psychiatric treatment.
On May 8, Eric filed a petition for a restraining order and obtained a
TRO, which included him and his girlfriend as protected parties. On May 11,
Tiare called him hundreds of times and did so again the next day. On the
evening of May 13, she told him she was “out of the hospital now.” The next
day, she sent his girlfriend a message that said, “ ‘I’m out,’ ” and asked to
“ ‘talk.’ ” Tiare e-mailed her — copying Eric on the e-mail — offering
relationship “advice” and again expressing an intent to commit suicide. She
also called Eric more than 1,000 times in a seven-hour period starting early
on May 14. He went to the police station, spoke with officers, and returned
home.
Shortly after Eric arrived home, Tiare entered the yard and “came
straight at [him], swatting away [his] cell phone as [he] tried to call 911.” As
he cried out for help, she repeatedly bit his fingers, shoulder, and wrists,
requiring him to go to the emergency room. When the police arrived, she was
clutching his shirt and refused to let go; they had to pry her off him. She was
arrested and charged with, among other things, battery of a former spouse
and unauthorized entry of an occupied dwelling. A judge issued an
emergency protective order (EPO) — it barred her from contacting Eric or
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coming within 100 yards of him or his home — and the police served her with
the order.
On May 17, the trial court in the criminal matter issued a criminal
protective order (CPO) — it prohibited Tiare from abusing or contacting Eric
or coming within 100 yards of him, his home, workplace, or vehicle, but it did
not list his girlfriend as a protected party — and Tiare was served with the
order at the hearing. Despite the orders, she returned to the home on May
19. Neighbors identified her, and she fled when an officer responded to the
scene. She was arrested the next day for violating a court order. Undeterred,
once released from custody, she phoned and e-mailed Eric on May 23,
admitting she’d come to the property days earlier, acknowledging the EPO
and CPO, and expressing awareness of the next day’s hearing on his request
for a restraining order. She also made disparaging remarks about him and
his girlfriend.
At the May 24 hearing on the petition for a restraining order, the
parties appeared, Tiare accepted service of the TRO, and the trial court
continued the hearing to June 25 to give her time to file a response. On June
25, both parties — now represented — appeared, but Tiare’s counsel did not.
Tiare said her counsel advised her not “to proceed . . . today on the basis of
the criminal charges.” The court and Eric’s counsel agreed the hearing
should be continued to allow Tiare’s counsel to appear, and the matter was
continued to August 27. But the court warned “this will be the last
continuance.”
But Tiare’s counsel sought another continuance at the August 27
hearing. He said she was in residential treatment in Florida, continued to
face criminal charges, and had a “right not to incriminate herself.” Eric’s
counsel objected. He noted the matter had been pending for almost four
4
months, the trial court had previously indicated no further continuances
would be granted, witnesses had been subpoenaed to testify, and Eric and his
girlfriend had taken time off work to attend the August 27 hearing.
Moreover, counsel noted “this is no small matter to continue this for my client
and his family. It’s a very emotional situation.” Ultimately, the court
continued the matter to September 24, finding good cause owing to Tiare
being in residential treatment. But it indicated it would grant no further
continuances and would proceed the next time even if she appeared and
asserted her right to remain silent.
On September 24, the parties appeared with their attorneys, and
Tiare’s counsel sought a fourth continuance. He cited the still pending
criminal matter and her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and he
argued the civil and criminal matters arose “out of the same facts” and Eric
would not be prejudiced because the CPO remained in place. Eric’s counsel
opposed the request; he noted, under Tiare’s reasoning, the matter should be
continued indefinitely until the criminal case was resolved. Tiare’s counsel
conceded his client’s concern would remain so long as the criminal case was
“open” — she planned to request mental health diversion in the case but
apparently had not done so yet — and he argued that moving forward while
the case was pending would violate her constitutional rights. 2 The trial court
denied the request for another continuance and proceeded with the hearing.
Based on Eric’s petition, exhibits, and declaration, the court concluded he had
proven Tiare had committed acts of abuse, and it issued a three-year
restraining order protecting Eric and his girlfriend.
2 Tiare’s motion for diversion was granted in January 2025; she
completed a 12-month diversion; and in January 2026 — more than 20
months after Eric filed his restraining order petition — her criminal case was
dismissed and the CPO was terminated.
5
DISCUSSION
Tiare contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her
request to continue the hearing on Eric’s restraining order petition until her
criminal case was resolved. She argues her intent to assert her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, under the circumstances here,
obligated the court to delay resolution of Eric’s request. We disagree.
The DVPA was enacted “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse,
and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in
the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) To address this “urgent
public safety and public health crisis,” the Legislature designed the
proceedings to be “streamlined” and “expeditious.” (§ 6309, subd. (a)(1)(A);
Rivera v. Hillard (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 964, 983; S.A. v. Maiden (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 27, 40 [“expedited and simplified”]; see Goals for Autism v.
Rosas (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1045 [civil restraining order matters “to be
resolved promptly, and generally within a matter of weeks”].) To wit, the
Legislature provided a TRO generally must be “issued or denied on the same
day” a request is submitted, a hearing must generally take place within 21
days of the ruling, and hearings must “take precedence over all other matters
on the calendar that day.” (§§ 6326, 242, subd. (a), 244.)
Section 245 further evidences the Legislature’s intent to fashion an
expedited process. It entitles a respondent “to one continuance for a
reasonable period” to file a response. (§ 245, subd. (a); Ross v. Figueroa
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 861–862 [construing predecessor statute]; Goals
for Autism v. Rosas, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046 [construing nearly
identical provision].) Otherwise, upon a showing of good cause, either party
may request a continuance. (§ 245, subd. (b); N.M. v. W.K. (2024) 100
6
Cal.App.5th 978, 983 [“[s]uch a continuance is discretionary”].) This balances
“due process considerations with the need to promptly conduct hearings and
issue restraining orders” when petitioners meet their burden, and it
“preserves the trial court’s right to control the proceedings and resolve these
matters in a timely fashion.” (Goals for Autism, at p. 1048.) We review the
denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion, implying findings in support of
a court’s order. (In re Marriage of Tara & Robert D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
871, 881; In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 93–94.)
Here, as per section 245, subdivision (a), the trial court granted a first
continuance to give Tiare time to respond to Eric’s petition. And as per
section 245, subdivision (b), it granted a second and third continuance after
finding good cause, i.e., the absence of her attorney at one hearing, and her
being in residential treatment for the next one. But it denied her fourth
continuance request — which was “based on the 5th Amendment” and her
pending criminal case — impliedly determining she had failed to demonstrate
good cause for yet another continuance. (N.M. v. W.K., supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
Under the Fifth Amendment, a person cannot “be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)
The right “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative
or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” (Kastigar
v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 444–445, fns. omitted.) But “ ‘the fact
that a man is indicted cannot give him a blank check to block all civil
litigation on the same or related underlying subject matter. Justice is meted
out in both civil and criminal litigation. The overall interest of the courts
7
that justice be done may very well require that the . . . remedy due a civil
plaintiff should not be delayed (and possibly denied). The court, in its sound
discretion, must assess and balance the nature and substantiality of the
injustices claimed on either side.’ ” (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d
at p. 885; Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision (9th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 322,
324.)
As both parties acknowledge, state and federal courts have concluded
the decision to delay “civil proceedings pending the outcome of a parallel
criminal case should be made in light of the particular circumstances and
interests at hand.” (Alpha Media Resort Investment Cases, supra, 39
Cal.App.5th at p. 1132; Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th
876, 887; Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, supra, 45 F.3d at pp. 324–
325.) In the context of DVPA proceedings, when deciding whether to delay a
restraining order hearing, a trial court should consider and weigh (1) the
respondent’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the
burden that proceeding with the hearing would impose; (2) the petitioner’s
interest in proceeding, and the potential prejudice they would suffer as a
result of a delay; (3) the court’s interest in efficiently managing judicial
resources; (4) the interests of nonparties; and (5) the DVPA’s purpose of
expeditiously resolving domestic violence proceedings. (See Alpha Media
Resort Investment Cases, at p. 1132.) The record reflects the trial court here
appropriately took account of the relevant interests before denying Tiare’s
request for a fourth continuance.
Respondent’s interest: At the September 24 hearing, Tiare’s attorney
noted the criminal matter was still pending, and he asserted the restraining
order hearing “implicates direct issues or arises out of the same facts as the
criminal case.” Although she had a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent,
8
Tiare “wanted to testify and tell her side of the story” but could not do so
without potentially incriminating herself. On the other hand, Eric’s attorney
noted that the petition for a restraining order was filed before the acts giving
rise to the criminal charges so the hearing could focus on the allegations in
the DV-100 form, which mainly concerned Tiare’s many text messages, e-
mails, social media posts, and phone calls. 3 Moreover, Tiare’s assertion of her
right to remain silent did not prevent her from opposing the issuance of the
restraining order. She remained free to cross-examine his witnesses, attempt
to undermine his evidence, offer other witnesses or evidence of her own, or
argue he failed to meet his burden. She also could have sought use immunity
so she could testify without fear of her testimony being used against her
later. (Pacers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 686, 688.)
Petitioner’s interest: At the September 24 hearing, Eric’s counsel noted
the matter had been pending for nearly five months, it had previously been
continued three times, and the trial court warned the parties on two prior
occasions that no further continuances would be granted. Counsel also
observed the grounds cited for Tiare’s request essentially meant the court
should “indefinitely postpone” the hearing until the criminal matter ended,
and the failure to resolve the matter had been “enormously stressful on my
client and his family.” At the August 27 hearing, counsel noted each
continuance required Eric and his girlfriend to take time off work, arrange
3 As Eric notes, an individual may not make a “blanket assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination.” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th
227, 267.) Instead, the assertion must allow a trial court to “ ‘make “a
particularized inquiry, deciding, in connection with each specific
area . . . whether or not the privilege is well founded.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 268.)
While Tiare’s counsel did not explain how testifying about the allegations in
the DV-100 would implicate her right against self-incrimination, we need not
resolve whether her assertion of the privilege had merit.
9
for the appearance of witnesses, and continue to confront a “very emotional
situation.” 4 And Eric points out that, at each continued hearing, he and his
girlfriend had to confront their abuser, “a traumatic and anxiety-inducing
event.” Finally, repeated continuances raise the specter of lost evidence,
faded memories, or unavailable witnesses. (Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court,
supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 887.)
At the hearing and on appeal, Tiare contends Eric would not have been
prejudiced by another continuance because the CPO remained in effect. But
as Eric correctly notes, domestic violence restraining orders “and other
protective orders are not fungible.” The DVPA gives a petitioner significant
control over the process. They decide whether to seek a restraining order;
what remedies to request; and whether to seek to modify, terminate, or renew
its terms. Moreover, domestic violence restraining orders “may sweep more
broadly than criminal protective orders.” (Lugo v. Corona (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 865, 870.) Here, for example, Eric requested and obtained a
TRO that protected his girlfriend, while the CPO did not include her as a
protected party. And unlike the restraining order, the trial court noted the
CPO would likely cease whenever the criminal case was resolved. Moreover,
Eric notes the CPO was not effective in curbing Tiare’s abuse.
Court’s interest: Trial courts have an important interest “in fairly and
expeditiously disposing of civil cases, and in efficiently utilizing judicial
4 We are mindful that “the vast majority” of litigants in domestic
violence proceedings are unrepresented — perhaps more than “ ‘90 percent of
the time.’ ” (Ross v. Figueroa, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 & fn. 3.) As
amicus curiae Bay Area Legal Aid notes, continuances may force litigants to
repeatedly arrange for childcare, navigate transportation hurdles, and risk
their jobs due to taking time off work to attend hearings. Given the burdens
caused by multiple continuances, some litigants may abandon meritorious
restraining order petitions.
10
resources.” (Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 306.)
“Courts must control the pace of litigation, reduce delay, and maintain a
current docket so as to enable the just, expeditious, and efficient resolution of
cases.” (Id. at pp. 306–307; § 244 [restraining order hearings to “be set for
trial at the earliest possible date and shall take precedence over all other
matters”].) That interest is advanced by the denial of requests to delay
proceedings. (Alpha Media Resort Investment Cases, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1132.) Here, the trial court’s desire to efficiently resolve the pending
restraining order request is evident. At the June 25 hearing, the court
continued the matter due to the failure of Tiare’s counsel to appear, but it
warned her, “No more continuances, okay? [¶] You can proceed with or
without a lawyer, but this will be the last continuance.” At the August 27
hearing, the court nonetheless granted another continuance because Tiare
was not present due to being in residential treatment but noted it would
grant no further continuances even if she appeared and asserted her Fifth
Amendment right.
Tiare asserts she was only seeking a short continuance because “there
was a trial date set a month away in the criminal case.” She
mischaracterizes the record. At the August 27 and September 24 hearings,
she made clear she would be asserting her Fifth Amendment right as a basis
for a continuance so long as her “criminal case is pending.” Moreover, while
she planned to seek mental health diversion in her criminal case, she
apparently had not done so as of the September 24 hearing. And her counsel
indicated he would be seeking a continuance of the restraining order hearing
until her charges were dismissed (pursuant to her successful completion of
diversion) or otherwise resolved (if she was unsuccessful). Thus, the record
11
belies the notion that one more short continuance would have resolved the
issue. 5
Interest of nonparties: The record demonstrates the trial court was
aware of the interest of nonparties in resolving the matter without further
delay. A law enforcement officer was present at the June 25 hearing, having
been subpoenaed by Eric. The continuance of the matter required the court
to order the officer to appear at the August 27 hearing. The same officer
appeared at the August 27 hearing, along with a second officer. The
continuance of that hearing meant that both witnesses had to be ordered to
appear at the September 24 hearing, and the court apologized to them for the
inconvenience. Additionally, while Eric’s girlfriend was listed as a protected
party in the TRO, she too was a nonparty whose interest was served by not
further delaying a resolution of the request for a restraining order.
Purpose of the DVPA: As previously discussed, the Legislature intended
DVPA proceedings to be “streamlined” and “expeditious” to address the
“urgent public safety and public health crisis” of domestic violence. (Rivera v.
Hillard, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 983; § 6309, subd. (a)(1)(A); Goals for
Autism v. Rosas, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.) Prompt resolution of
requests for restraining orders serves the purpose of preventing further acts
of domestic abuse and providing “for a separation of the persons involved in
the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) The repeated continuance
of DVPA matters undermines this legislative purpose because, among other
things, it leaves the parties without a final resolution of the restraining order
request, it forces the parties to come into repeated contact with each other at
5 Of course, we know now that the criminal case was not resolved until
January 2026, upon Tiare’s successful completion of diversion.
12
the courthouse, and it may discourage petitioners from pursuing meritorious
requests because of the attendant burdens associated with a lengthy process.
(Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 889.)
Contrary to Tiare’s assertion, the record demonstrates the trial court
was aware of and weighed these various interests. Tiare’s counsel cited
Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court to the court, so it was aware of the need to
balance the competing interests. Counsel explained his client intended to
assert her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent despite her desire to
address the allegations. But the court also questioned whether the fact that
the allegations in the DV-100 preceded the criminal charges meant she could
proceed with the hearing. For his part, Eric’s counsel explained the impact
the various continuances was having on Eric and his girlfriend. And the
court twice expressed its intent not to grant further continuances, and it
expressed concern that Tiare would seek a delay for an indefinite period. The
court also acknowledged the impact repeated continuances was having on
nonparties, such as the law enforcement witnesses. Finally, the court
expressed awareness that this litigation was in the context of the DVPA.
The record reflects the trial court appropriately considered and
weighed the competing interests before denying Tiare’s request for a fourth
continuance. By denying the request, the court impliedly found that, to the
extent that Tiare’s Fifth Amendment rights were implicated, that interest
was outweighed by the countervailing factors — that is, the interests of Eric,
the court, and nonparties in having the matter resolved without further
delay, and the purpose of the DVPA in resolving the matter expeditiously.
The court did not abuse its discretion by reaching that conclusion.
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Eric Irvine is to recover his costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
14
_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A172066; Irvine v. Irvine
15
Superior Court of Marin County, Beth S. Jordan, Judge.
Katsuranis & Rodriguez, Francisco J. Rodriguez and Lauren Katsuranis for
Defendant and Appellant.
Family Violence Appellate Project, Jennafer Dorfman Wagner, Taylor
Campion; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Jennafer M. Tryck, James Rex Lee,
Nicholas Whetstone, Rachel Iida and Ani Boyadjian for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Erin Orum, Brenda Star Adams, Julie Lemmer; Levine Advocacy and Elana
R. Levine for Bay Area Legal Aid as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Respondent.
16