Filed 7/21/26 In re Z.R. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B347170
In re Z.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02808C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
James W. Tritt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Joshua T. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order
asserting dependency jurisdiction over his son, Z.R., under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).1 The
sustained dependency petition alleged that mother had a history
of substance abuse that rendered her incapable of providing Z.R.
and his half brother, J.R., with regular care and supervision.2
The petition also alleged that father had failed to comply with
court orders from a prior dependency proceeding and had not
mitigated the risks from his prior domestic violence against
mother. On appeal, father contends the evidence was insufficient
to support the jurisdictional findings. We find no error and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior Dependency Proceedings
In March 2017, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
concerning neglect as to J.R. The caller reported that J.R. lived
with his maternal grandmother; father often beat mother at
maternal grandmother’s home; and mother and father left J.R.
with maternal grandmother two weeks earlier and had gone “to
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code. Mother is not a party to this
appeal.
2 Although we discuss relevant evidence and allegations
concerning J.R., this appeal concerns only Z.R.
2
an unknown destination.”3 In December 2017, DCFS received
another referral concerning J.R. and Z.R., who was then a
newborn. The caller reported that father was “non-compliant
with the ongoing case plan.” Mother was reportedly afraid of
father because of previous domestic abuse.
In 2018, the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition
alleging that father’s domestic abuse of mother placed J.R. and
Z.R. at substantial risk of harm. The court found true allegations
that mother and father had a history of domestic violence,
including an incident in 2017 in which father pushed mother to
the ground, repeatedly hit and bit her, and covered her mouth to
prevent her from calling for help. The court found that father’s
violent conduct against mother, and mother’s failure to protect
J.R. from father, placed J.R. and Z.R. at substantial risk of
suffering serious, nonaccidental physical harm. (§ 300,
subds. (a), (j).) The court also sustained an allegation that
mother’s alcohol abuse rendered her unable to provide the
children with regular care and supervision. (Id., subds. (b), (j).)
The juvenile court ordered father to complete a 52-week
domestic violence program, parenting education, and individual
therapy to address domestic violence and anger management. A
status review report from 2018 indicates that father informed his
social worker that he was discharged from a domestic violence
program for poor attendance and had not provided verification of
his reenrollment.
In 2019, the juvenile court terminated dependency
jurisdiction and awarded mother sole legal and physical custody
3 Father was arrested in 2017 for inflicting corporal injury on
a spouse or cohabitant. The record does not indicate whether the
arrest led to any criminal charges.
3
of the children. The court ordered that father’s visits with Z.R.
were to be monitored and could not take place in mother’s home.
In November 2024, DCFS received a referral regarding Z.R.
Z.R. was reportedly present during a domestic violence incident
between father and his girlfriend. Father and the girlfriend
pushed each other, father stabbed her with a pen, and father
“poked her and scratched her on her back and side.” Z.R. heard
but did not see the incident. Father was arrested and charged
with inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and preventing
and dissuading a victim from reporting a crime. Father’s
girlfriend obtained a criminal protective order against father. In
March 2025, the charges were dismissed on speedy trial grounds.
2025 Investigation and Initial Hearing
In February 2025, DCFS received another referral
regarding J.R. and Z.R., now ten and seven years old,
respectively. The reporting party suspected that mother had
relapsed and was abusing drugs. Mother had been seen in an
area known for drug sales. The reporting party did not know if
mother had the children with her or left them alone and
unsupervised at the motel where they were living.
In the ensuing investigation, DCFS learned mother lived
with maternal grandmother and maternal aunt until October
2024. Maternal aunt and maternal grandmother reported that
mother exhibited aggressive behavior at home. Mother would
often go out, leaving the children at home, and return
intoxicated. Maternal aunt obtained a restraining order against
mother in October because mother threatened to fight her after
maternal aunt told her to leave maternal grandmother’s home
due to her behavior. Mother had previously rented a room from
maternal grandmother’s friend. Maternal grandmother learned
4
that mother stole from the friend’s home and had returned to the
house intoxicated several times.
Maternal aunt and maternal grandmother heard from
“multiple sources” that mother was currently abusing substances.
They believed mother’s substance abuse was consistent with her
recent aggression. Maternal aunt also said both children
mentioned that mother and her friends “do ‘things’ ” in the
bathroom at the motel. Maternal grandmother told a social
worker that mother attended Alcoholics Anonymous in middle
school and relapsed around the time Z.R. was born in 2017.
According to maternal aunt and maternal grandmother,
when mother came to pick the children up from maternal
grandmother’s house, the children often did not want to leave
with her. On one occasion, Z.R. said he did not want to leave
with mother because she did not feed him. Maternal aunt was
unsure if Z.R. made the comment just to indicate he did not want
to go with mother and she was unable to ask additional
questions. Maternal grandmother had to pick up the children
from school on multiple occasions because mother had to
“travel[ ] hours away for work.” Maternal grandmother believed
this was inconsistent with mother’s claim that she cleaned
houses for a living.
A counselor at the children’s elementary school was
assigned to work with the family due to the children’s chronic
absences. Z.R. had 69 tardies and 14 absences, and J.R. had 37
tardies and 11 absences. The counselor attempted to contact both
parents, but father did not respond, and mother was evasive and
difficult to reach. Both children were “present and on time” when
in maternal grandmother’s care.
5
Mother initially denied any substance abuse or use. She
attributed the children’s tardiness and absences from school to
her not having a car, a recent move, or other causes. Mother also
admitted that maternal aunt and maternal grandmother kicked
her out of the house. Mother said this happened because she
“ ‘was going out a lot’ ” and it upset them. She also admitted that
J.R. had refused to leave maternal grandmother’s house and
return to mother in the past. Mother relied on maternal
grandmother for “tasks involving the children” and she felt that
maternal grandmother had “influence” over matters concerning
them. This led to tension between mother and maternal
grandmother. J.R. told a social worker that mother and maternal
grandmother “ ‘don’t talk to each other.’ ”
In February 2025, mother tested positive for
methamphetamine. She denied methamphetamine use and
refused to discuss services.
One month later, maternal grandmother told a social
worker she believed mother was “doing much worse.” The
children had stayed with maternal grandmother several times
over the prior month. J.R. still sometimes refused to return to
mother. Mother called maternal grandmother twice since her
positive drug test because she did not have money for food. After
the first call, maternal grandmother dropped off food at the motel
for mother and the children. Mother called maternal
grandmother several days later to ask for cash and hung up when
maternal grandmother refused. Mother confirmed that she had
recently asked maternal grandmother for money for food.
Although she did not want the children removed from her, she
preferred that they remain with maternal grandmother.
6
The investigation also revealed that Z.R. had been
regularly visiting father every one or two weeks for variable
periods, sometimes days at a time. Mother believed father lived
with paternal grandmother, but she did not speak to father, did
not know where he lived, and claimed she did not have his or
paternal grandmother’s contact information. She knew father
did not complete his court-ordered classes and that he was
supposed to have monitored visits with Z.R. Mother did not
explain how she ensured Z.R.’s visits with father were monitored.
She was not aware of the 2024 domestic violence incident
between father and his girlfriend. Paternal grandmother
reported that father lived with his girlfriend and sometimes came
to her house with Z.R. She was not present in 2024 during the
incident that led to father’s arrest for domestic violence.
On March 25, 2025, DCFS detained the children from
mother pursuant to a removal order and placed them with
maternal grandmother. J.R. told a social worker he believed his
mother had “ongoing issues” and needed help.
On March 27, 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition. The
petition alleged that J.R. and Z.R. were at substantial risk of
serious physical harm because mother’s abuse of alcohol,
marijuana, and methamphetamine rendered her incapable of
providing the children with regular care or supervision. (§ 300,
subds. (b)(1)(A), (D), (j).) Father was not named in the petition.
At the initial hearing, the juvenile court detained Z.R. and J.R.
from mother and their respective fathers. The court ordered
DCFS to provide family reunification services and monitored
visits for mother and monitored visits for father as to Z.R. The
court ordered that father be provided with domestic violence
referrals so that he might “complete his prior orders.”
7
Further Investigation
In April 2025, when an investigating social worker read the
petition’s allegations to mother, she responded, “ ‘It is true. It is
all true.’ ” Mother admitted her past alcohol abuse and her
recent use of methamphetamine, which led to the positive test
result. She had started using methamphetamine two years
earlier and used it monthly. She admitted that she abused
alcohol, marijuana, and, more recently, methamphetamine, as a
coping mechanism when she was overwhelmed. When she used
substances, she left the children in the care of maternal
grandmother and would “ ‘leave without saying anything.’ ”
Mother had again tested positive for methamphetamine in
April 2025. She admitted that she used methamphetamine the
day of the drug test because she was upset about losing a friend.
Mother’s substance abuse counselor reported that mother had
missed several sessions of her substance abuse program in April
and was warned that she would be discharged for noncompliance.
Mother later told her substance abuse counselor that she recently
relapsed and wanted to remain in the program.
Maternal grandmother told the investigating social worker
that mother had started drinking in middle school. Mother
improved after attending treatment but worsened after father’s
abuse. Because mother left home and returned intoxicated when
she lived with maternal grandmother, and later with maternal
grandmother’s friend, maternal grandmother and maternal aunt
were concerned that mother was leaving the children
unsupervised at the motel. Maternal aunt reported that mother
drank, used marijuana, and on one occasion, asked maternal
aunt to search her purse for “ ‘a little baggie with white
8
substance,’ ” which led maternal aunt to believe mother was
using illegal drugs as well.
When questioned by the social worker, J.R. said he did not
feel safe or comfortable returning to mother. He said that to feel
safe returning to mother, she would have to stop drinking. J.R.
explained that “ ‘[w]hen [mother] drinks, she just falls asleep and
doesn’t want to get up or do anything.’ ” Z.R. said he did not
know what drugs are. He admitted he had refused to return to
the motel, but said that was because it was boring. However,
when asked where he felt most comfortable and safe, Z.R. replied
that he wanted to visit father and mother but wanted to remain
at maternal grandmother’s home. Both children told the social
worker they did not want to return to mother at the motel.
Mother confirmed that father did not complete any of the
classes the juvenile court ordered in 2018. Mother knew that the
court ordered father to have monitored visits with Z.R., but she
moved in with father after the case closed. After mother
separated from father, she would drop Z.R. at paternal
grandmother’s home every other weekend for visits with father.
The investigating social worker also interviewed father.
When asked about the 2017 domestic violence incidents, father
said that it “ ‘was many years ago’ ” and he was “ ‘much younger
and immature.’ ” He admitted that he did not participate in the
court-ordered classes and programs. Father stated, “ ‘It is going
to sound bad, but I just did not have the time to be doing all
that. . . . I did not make that my priority and did not want to deal
with it.’ ” Father denied that he was the aggressor in the
domestic violence incidents. He stated that he only would “ ‘bear
hug’ ” mother when she became violent after drinking to stop her
from hurting herself. He explained: “Maybe I did leave bruises
9
on her from holding her down because she is big, I needed to use
my strength to stop her from making a scene.” The social worker
asked father about the 2024 domestic violence incident with his
girlfriend. Father said, “ ‘Well what it says there is what
happened. That is all that happened.’ ”
On May 2, 2025, DCFS filed a first amended petition
adding the allegation that mother and father’s failure to comply
with the previous orders of the juvenile court placed Z.R. at a
substantial risk of harm under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
The petition alleged that father failed to complete court-ordered
classes and therapy to address anger management and domestic
violence, and father had unmonitored contact with Z.R. Soon
after the petition was filed, father enrolled in parenting and
domestic violence classes.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
At the May 28, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court sustained
the petition as pled. The juvenile court declared Z.R. a dependent
of the court, found by clear and convincing evidence that there
was “a substantial danger to [Z.R.’s] physical and mental well-
being,” and ordered him removed from mother and father. The
court found the current placement with maternal grandmother
was appropriate. The court ordered DCFS to provide family
reunification services and monitored visits for both parents.
Father was ordered to complete a 26-week domestic violence
program for batterers and parenting education classes.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
As relevant here, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes
dependency jurisdiction if a child “has suffered, or there is a
10
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of” a parent’s “failure or inability . . . to
adequately supervise or protect the child” and “inability . . . to
provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . .
substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A), (D).) Subdivision (j)
authorizes dependency jurisdiction when a child’s sibling has
been abused or neglected and there is a substantial risk the child
will similarly be abused or neglected.
To establish that dependency jurisdiction is warranted
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the child welfare agency
must prove: (1) the parent’s neglectful conduct, or failure or
inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious
physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness. (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.) If
the agency alleges substantial risk, the risk to the child “must
exist ‘ “at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.” ’ [Citations.]” (In
re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.) “To establish a defined
risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some
reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct
will recur. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re D.L., at p. 1146.)
However, “the court need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591,
602.)
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . ., we look to see
if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
11
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ [Citations.]” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) “ ‘ “We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment,
but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Jurisdictional Findings
A. Mother’s conduct
Father contends that mother’s conduct failed to provide a
basis for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). He
argues there was no evidence that mother’s “occasional
methamphetamine use” rose to the level of substance abuse or
created a risk of harm to Z.R. We reject the argument. Father’s
contention relies on a selective view of the jurisdictional findings
and ignores the considerable evidence that mother’s substance
abuse significantly impaired her ability to care for Z.R.
Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes dependency
jurisdiction where a parent’s substance abuse—the excessive use
of drugs or alcohol—renders the parent unable to regularly care
for a child. (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 540.) “The finding
of dependency cannot be based on substance abuse alone;
jurisdiction requires a substantial risk of harm to the child
arising from the substance abuse.” (In re J.A. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046.)
Mother’s use of methamphetamine was not the sole basis
for jurisdiction. The juvenile court sustained the allegation that
mother’s use of alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine
created a risk of harm to Z.R. Mother became dependent on
alcohol when she was a minor. She admitted that she used
12
alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine to cope with
hardships, including when she left father three years earlier and
when she was kicked out of maternal grandmother’s home in
2024. She tested positive for methamphetamine twice before the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Maternal grandmother and
maternal aunt reported that while mother was living with
maternal grandmother, she would leave without warning and
return intoxicated and aggressive, leading maternal aunt to seek
a restraining order. At a prior residence, she also returned to the
home visibly intoxicated and stole from the landlord.
Further evidence supports the conclusion that mother’s
substance abuse rendered her unable to adequately care for Z.R.
Maternal grandmother and maternal aunt reported that when
mother lived with them, she disappeared for hours or days
without making plans for childcare, informing her family where
she was going, or letting them know when she would return.
Mother admitted that she went out “ ‘a lot’ ” and left her children
at maternal grandmother’s home without saying anything. The
maternal relatives were justifiably concerned that this pattern
continued when mother and the children were living in a motel
room.
Additional evidence suggested other manifestations of
neglect. The children told maternal relatives that they were
present when mother “did things” with her friends in the
bathroom of the motel. J.R. told a social worker that when
mother drank, she fell asleep and would not get up to do
anything. Z.R. told the maternal aunt that mother did not
always feed him. The children were frequently late or absent
from school. Mother was evasive and nonresponsive when a
school counselor attempted to contact her. The juvenile court
13
could reasonably infer that this conduct was the result of
mother’s substance abuse. (See In re Natalie A. (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 178, 185 [juvenile court could infer nexus between
drug use and failure to care and supervise where father left
children with paternal grandparents to smoke marijuana]; cf. In
re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1227 [evidence that mother
with mental illness lived alone, “lacked a second caregiver” and
“was alienated from maternal grandparents, who had previously
provided significant support” created risk of harm].)
Father cites In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 646, to
support his contention that mother’s substance abuse did not
place Z.R. at harm. L.C. does not aid his argument. The court in
L.C. reversed jurisdictional findings based on a guardian’s
sporadic use of methamphetamine because the drug use did not
interfere with his care of the child. He dropped the child off and
picked her up from school every day, took her to medical
appointments, and helped her with homework. (Id. at pp. 652,
653.) Further, after the initiation of the dependency action, the
guardian stopped using drugs, arranged his own drug tests, and
enrolled in substance abuse classes before the jurisdictional
hearing. (Id. at p. 653.)
Here, there is no similar evidence that mother reliably met
Z.R.’s daily needs. Both of mother’s children expressed an
unwillingness to live with mother and made statements
indicating she was unable to adequately care for them.
Moreover, unlike the guardian in L.C., mother was unable to
mitigate her drug use before the jurisdiction hearing. She
initially denied her substance abuse and, despite DCFS
involvement, continued to use substances. Indeed, mother told a
social worker that everything in the detention report was true.
14
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
conclusion that mother’s substance abuse created a risk of serious
physical harm to Z.R.4
B. Father’s conduct
Father further contends that the evidence was insufficient
to support the jurisdictional finding that his conduct created an
ongoing risk of harm to Z.R. Because jurisdiction was proper
based on mother’s conduct, we need not consider whether it was
also proper based on father’s conduct. (In re J.C. (2014) 233
Cal.App.4th 1, 3.) We nevertheless exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of father’s contention and conclude substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding. (Id. at p. 4.)
It is undisputed that father’s custody and visitation were
limited due to the domestic violence allegations found true in the
prior dependency proceeding, and the risk father’s conduct posed
to Z.R. that had not been ameliorated by the time the case closed.
It is further undisputed that father had not participated in the
services ordered in the prior proceeding, which were intended to
allow him to safely reunify with Z.R. DCFS’s investigation in
2025 revealed that father did not acknowledge the seriousness of
his past conduct, the court’s prior orders, or his failure to
participate in services. He admitted that he did not enroll in
counseling because he did not prioritize it or “ ‘want to deal with
it.’ ”
4 Having concluded that substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b), we need not separately address father’s
contention that insufficient evidence supported a finding of
jurisdiction under subdivision (j). (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 322, 330 [“Section 300 contemplates that jurisdiction
may be based on any single subdivision.”].)
15
Father additionally minimized his past domestic violence
toward mother. Yet, he admitted that during an unmonitored
visit with Z.R. in 2024, he engaged in a violent incident with a
girlfriend. Father did not deny the allegations that he poked,
scratched, and stabbed the girlfriend with a pen, leading her to
obtain a criminal protective order against him. Although father
claimed the incidents with mother happened when he was much
younger and immature, the far more recent incident with another
romantic partner, when Z.R. was in his care, was an indication
that father’s conduct was not significantly changed. As such, the
juvenile court could reasonably conclude that father’s failure to
comply with the previous juvenile court orders placed Z.R. at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. (See In re
John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1125 [mother’s violation of
order requiring monitored visits and “no indication mother
understood or accepted the seriousness of violating a court order”
supported § 300, subd. (b)(1), jurisdiction]; see also In re D.B.
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [affirming jurisdiction finding
where father “gave no sign he would change his conduct” towards
daughter]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is
a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely
to modify their behavior in the future without court
supervision’ ”].)
Father’s reliance on In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
104 (Jesus M.), is misplaced. In Jesus M., the appellate court
reversed a juvenile court’s jurisdictional order under section 300,
subdivision (b), because the lower court concluded the father’s
repeated violations of a restraining order caused emotional and
not physical harm to the children. (Jesus M., at p. 112.) Since
the juvenile court expressly rejected domestic violence as a basis
16
for jurisdiction and solely relied on the father’s violation of the
restraining order, the reviewing court determined it could not
affirm the juvenile court order based on evidence of the father’s
past domestic violence. (Ibid.) Although the Jesus M. court also
observed that any past domestic violence between the parents
was remote in time and there was no evidence that the father
was still violent, those observations were not the basis for the
court’s ultimate holding.
Here, the evidence of domestic violence was not remote,
and the circumstances differ significantly from those presented in
Jesus M. In this case, there was a prior sustained dependency
petition, there were existing juvenile court orders intended to
eliminate the risk of harm to Z.R., father failed to comply with
those orders, and father engaged in domestic violence against
another partner while Z.R. was in his care, indicating an ongoing
risk of Z.R. suffering serious physical harm as a result of father’s
conduct. In Jesus M., the juvenile court found only a risk of
emotional harm, and, at the end of the opinion, the court
suggested the “[m]other was not without options other than
resort to dependency proceedings” to address the father’s
violations of a restraining order. (Jesus M., supra, 235
Cal.App.4th at p. 113.) In this case, there was no other party
who might take steps to protect Z.R. from the effects of father’s
conduct.
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings based on father’s conduct.
17
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
OCHOA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
18