Filed 10/5/26 In re Z.L. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re Z.L., a Person Coming B348256
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP04044A
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Juan M. Valles, Commissioner. Affirmed.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother J.G. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders taking
jurisdiction over her daughter, Z.L., and removing Z.L. from her
custody. Mother asserts insufficient evidence supports
jurisdiction, removal, and aspects of the reunification case plan
the court selected for mother. We affirm.
I.
The Department of Children and Family Services initiated
these dependency proceedings in light of mother’s drug use
around the time of Z.L.’s birth. Mother tested positive for cocaine
metabolites when admitted for labor in December 2024, two days
before Z.L. was born. The positive result did not correlate with
mother’s prescribed pain medications. At birth, Z.L. evidenced
withdrawal symptoms, including tremors, that required
observation and did not fully abate even after six weeks. A
toxicology test of Z.L.’s meconium, which would reflect mother’s
drug use over the prior four to five months, showed positive
results for amphetamine, benzoylecgonine (a cocaine metabolite
formed when the body breaks down cocaine), cannabinoids,
gabapentin, hydromorphone, methamphetamine, m-OH-
benzoylecgonine, morphine, and norhydrocodone.
On December 30, 2024, the department filed a dependency
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), alleging mother’s prior and current substance
abuse endangered Z.L. (Unspecified statutory references are to
the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The next day, the court
detained Z.L. and ordered monitored visitation. Three days later,
the court placed Z.L. with maternal cousin Jessica C., the relative
caregiver, where she has remained throughout the proceedings.
2
A.
The department investigated mother and reported case
progress in advance of the jurisdiction hearing to be held at the
end of April 2025.
The department learned of mother’s dependency history
dating back 14 years. In 2010 and 2014, the department
substantiated allegations of physical abuse based on mother
hitting or slapping one of her two older daughters. In 2022, the
court sustained a dependency petition and took jurisdiction over
those older daughters. Mother, during an unsupervised visit
with her 14-year-old daughter, had given the child five marijuana
edibles and then laughed at her. Mother, in another incident
around the same time, stabbed that 14-year-old daughter
(leaving a scar), punched her “a couple of times to knock her out,”
and pushed her into the stove (causing bleeding and a half-inch
linear scab). Mother also hit the other daughter, “dragged her up
the stairs,” and grabbed her throat. (Several years earlier,
mother had choked that same daughter in the other’s presence.)
Mother also told one of the daughters to kill herself. That
daughter had suicidal ideations and was attending therapy to
process her awareness that her sister had been sexually abused
by mother’s then-boyfriend. Finally, according to the sustained
allegations, mother had recently stabbed and killed a dog and,
back in 2010, had attempted to stab the father of those older
daughters. As a result of the 2022 proceedings, mother lost
custody of both of these daughters.
When the department interviewed mother in January 2025,
she denied having a history with the department.
Mother’s criminal history included charges of inflicting
corporal injury on a spouse (three times), assault with a non-
3
firearm deadly weapon (two times), selling marijuana, battery on
a peace officer, willful cruelty to a child (two times), disobeying a
court order (five times), vehicle theft, displaying a false
identification to law enforcement, second-degree robbery,
burglary, grand theft, and battery. The arrests, convictions, or
warrants spanned from 2005 to 2024, though the record does not
indicate the resolution of any particular offense.
The department interviewed various family members.
None said mother used illicit drugs. Z.L.’s father had known
mother since high school and described a one-year relationship
with her, which ended in 2024. He was unaware of mother’s
pregnancy until a few weeks before speaking with the
department.
The relative caregiver told the department of mother’s
mental health struggles. Mother had paranoia. Mother would
also stay up for three to four days at a time. The caregiver
believed mother’s issues stemmed from maternal grandmother’s
death in a 1997 violent crime. The caregiver surmised mother
started abusing drugs after treating knee pain with opioids. The
caregiver relayed how mother had physically fought with one of
her now-adult older daughters at the detention hearing on
December 31, 2024. Finally, the caregiver advised, in early
February, that Z.L.’s withdrawal tremors had “calmed down” and
Z.L. was doing well.
Mother had a monitored visit with Z.L. on January 31 and
February 12, 2025, apparently without issue. Mother failed to
confirm a February 7, 2025 visit. Through March, visitation
proved difficult to arrange because mother would not request
visits in advance, but the day of. Visitation aside, mother was
4
unresponsive to, and uncooperative with, the department and its
scheduling and oversight requests.
By late March and into April 2025, mother’s behavior
towards the department transitioned from dilatory to
threatening. After a social worker was unable to bring Z.L. to a
scheduled visit site and tried to relocate the meeting, mother left
the social worker the following voice message: “you are going to
make me do something to you lady, I promise you.” The social
worker responded by text message, “Ok. I gave you a choice and
you are saying No. Visit is cancelled. I don’t have time for this. I
will let my supervisor know what happened. We can try again
next week.” Mother then replied, by text message: “How are you
telling me that you’re not going to come when I’m already here at
the library. The money I spent to come way out here you going to
pay me my money back. Bitch I’m going to beat your ass when I
see you so you better change from being my social worker cuz at
the end of the day when I see you I swear to God I’m going to
hurt you and it’s not a threat it’s a promise. . . Tell’em tht too.”
The social worker responded, “Oh ok. So let me go ahead and call
the police.” Mother then replied, “You play games we here at the
fuckn school where we have a room to visit the baby in and yeah
you playing games . . . Do what you do best at the end of the day I
don’t give a fuck about no police no police don’t scare me.”
Mother then texted maternal great aunt, threatening both
her and the relative caregiver: “BITCH wen I see you, I’m gon’
bury you in ur own backyard after I cut u up into pieces. . . .
[Y]ou and [the relative caregiver] will see me real soon all this is
over I promise you so you let your niece [the relative caregiver]
know I’m going to beat her MUTHAFUCKN ass, your gossiping
5
ass slandering ass bitch all you do is gossip and talk to you
MUTHAFUCKN much.”
Based on these threats, the department determined
visitation would only occur at an approved center or department
office.
On April 3, 2025, the trial court ordered mother to have no
contact with the social worker she had threatened or the relative
caregiver. The department assigned a new social worker to the
case.
On April 8, 2025, mother told the newly assigned social
worker that she would continue making threats, would not
comply with the court’s orders, and would, for instance, continue
contacting the caregiver. Mother claimed she had a source in law
enforcement who could obtain anyone’s address she wanted. The
caregiver was worried mother would try to come to a relative’s
home in Palmdale to get Z.L. from the caregiver. By this point,
mother’s noncooperation with the department was affecting Z.L.,
who was at risk of losing regional center services unless
education rights could be transferred to the caregiver. Though it
seems some visits with Z.L. may have occurred, the department
was “unable to establish a visitation schedule with mother.”
In mid-April 2025, father reported that mother had
assaulted him. Mother had refused to leave father’s home, took
his phone, hit him in the head multiple times, and grabbed his
pocketknife. Father feared mother was going to stab him and
wrestled the knife away. He called the police, and mother was
arrested. Father wanted no further contact with mother.
The adjudication hearing occurred on April 30, 2025.
Mother contended there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
single allegation of endangering drug use. She argued that she
6
had a chronic pain condition requiring close monitoring from her
doctor, and provided a pain management agreement and two
negative drug tests from February. She also submitted her
medication regimen and documentation showing she had received
an ultrasound while pregnant. The department submitted
evidence that mother was referred to and missed a drug test in
January.
The trial court sustained the petition based on current
substance abuse, but it struck out the petition’s allegation that
mother had a history of such abuse. The court found mother’s
prescriptions did not explain the presence of “metabolites of
cannabinoids, amphetamine, cocaine, and methamphetamine in
the child’s meconium,” and found that Z.L. had exhibited
“discernable withdrawal symptoms including tremors.” The court
further found the risk to Z.L. had not been mitigated because
mother had “not shown much progress” in addressing her
substance abuse and exhibited erratic behavior. The court
ordered the department to provide mother with drug testing
referrals. Separately, the court granted temporary restraining
orders protecting, from mother, the previous social worker and
father.
B.
In advance of the August 2025 disposition hearing the
department reported further case developments.
Regarding substance abuse, mother continued to deny
cocaine use. Mother missed two department-scheduled drug tests
in May 2025. Mother provided a negative test in June from her
doctor.
Regarding father, mother told the department about
father’s history of domestic violence, his abusive tendencies
7
towards his children, his purchases of prescription pills and
marijuana from his son, his relatives’ violent behaviors (including
how his son had recently brandished a firearm in the home), and
his theft of money from her back in 2024. Mother admitted that,
despite the protective order, she was at father’s home and hid
there when the department came to interview him. Mother
denied father’s version of the domestic conflict he reported in
April 2025, described him as the aggressor, and said father
continued to contact her despite the restraining order.
Regarding visitation, mother had a monitored visit in May
2025, and the social worker reported no concerns. Mother
cancelled four visits in May 2025. When the social worker had to
cancel another visit in late May 2025, the following text exchange
occurred:
Social Worker: I apologize in advance; an
emergency has arisen with one of my other cases,
necessitating the cancellation of tomorrow’s visit.
Mother: You can assign someone else to perform the
task.
Social Worker: Regrettably, I am unable to do so.
Mother: I already have a monitor supervisor;
therefore, you can assign someone else. When I see
you, I will lay my hands on you; you need Jesus. You
need prayers and the Holy Spirit.
On June 2, 2025, mother became upset with the social
worker who was trying to schedule visitation because she
perceived the department as facilitating father’s visitation at the
expense of mother’s. Mother yelled and ended the call saying,
“bye bitch.”
8
On June 12, 2025, the court appointed the relative
caregiver as co-holder of Z.L.’s education rights. The court had
concerns over mother’s increasingly erratic behavior, and Z.L.’s
counsel advised that mother did not believe her child needed an
evaluation or assessment.
On June 18, 2025, mother texted the social worker that
mother had secretly recorded all of their conversations.
At a hearing in late June 2025, the court ordered the
department and mother to confer about a visitation schedule, and
for the department to provide makeup visits for any that were
canceled for reasons other than mother’s conduct. That same
day, mother and the social worker had the following text
exchange after mother stated her belief that visitation no longer
had to occur at the department’s office:
Social Worker: If you could please give me a call to
discuss your visits further
Mother: Tht house [referring to father’s house] gon
get blown the fuck up if u take my child over there
and even get him hurt, I don’t want my fuckn baby
over there, I’ll b watching
Social Worker: [Mother] these are threats you are
making and court will be aware of it
Mother: I said tht jus to see how facetious u r, ur
treacherous.
Mother then texted the social worker: “Flor again YOU
BET NOT TAKE MY CHILD OVER THERE, I’m watching bet
tht, I told you why and u playing games wit taking my child to a
dangerous zone, I’ll intervene before tht happens” and “I’m
watching you, so think about what I said, if I c the grandmother
or Congo pull up wit my child to tht house, it’s going to get ugly
9
so if u care about my child’s safety I better not c tht bcus me and
u will have problems also.”
Father reported that mother had threatened him that
same day. Father told the department that mother had sent
someone to his house, with a gun on his lap, and told father to
stay away from Z.L. or else. The man claimed he had followed
father and told father what he had been wearing and whom he
worked with. Mother also texted father to “[s]tay the fuck away
from my baby before I kill you,” and “[t]ell tht since you like to
tell snitch bitch, I’ll c u soon.” Due to these threats, father
wanted to cease further visitation with Z.L.
Given these threats of violence, the department sought to
cease mother’s visitation. The court granted the department’s
request on July 10, 2025.
The court held the disposition hearing on August 13, 2025.
Mother’s counsel sought Z.L.’s release to mother. Counsel
pointed to mother’s negative drug test from June. Counsel
provided a partial report mother received from the police that
listed mother as a victim of assault with a deadly weapon, though
the report did not name the aggressor. Counsel also provided a
complaint mother filed with the Department of Social Services
alleging the previous social worker harassed and discriminated
against mother. And counsel provided a case management
schedule cover sheet listing contact information for the Dream
Live Hope Foundation. Counsel noted that mother had
submitted a total of three negative drug tests from February and
June 2025, and argued mother had not exhibited any behaviors of
drug use.
Z.L.’s counsel sought removal from mother. Counsel
argued the evidence showed mother could not “handle heightened
10
emotional events” and was “verbally aggressive.” Counsel sought
reinstated visitation for mother, noting there were no allegations
of mother’s physical violence towards Z.L., but asking that any
visitation be subject to a safety plan.
The department also sought removal from mother.
The court removed Z.L. from both parents and ordered
reunification services. The court denied visitation with mother,
finding it would be detrimental to Z.L. The court ordered a case
plan for mother that included a full drug/alcohol program with
aftercare, weekly random, on-demand drug testing, and a 12-step
program; anger management; and mental health counseling with
a psychological assessment, psychiatric evaluation, a
requirement to take all prescribed psychotropic medications, and
individual counseling. The court then issued more permanent,
three-year restraining orders protecting, from mother, the
previous social worker and father.
Explaining this disposition, the court reasoned that it
“must look to the entire constellation of facts,” and not just the
sustained petition, to craft an appropriate disposition. While the
case began due to mother’s cocaine use, “mother has
demonstrated ongoing emotional and mental instability that may
be caused either by her substance use or an organic mental
health condition.” “Mother’s conduct has been violent. She has
directed credible threats to at least” the social worker and
father . . . . The child has been implicated in a variety of these
threats. While mother did not intend to harm [Z.L.] herself
mother’s threat suggests that should she act on those threats
[Z.L.] would be harmed. [Z.L.] would be in the immediate vicinity
of any violent conduct that mother might actually engage in
should she follow through with those threats.” Mother’s negative
11
drug tests, the court concluded, did not overcome the
department’s and father’s evidence.
Mother timely appealed, challenging the juvenile court’s
assumption of jurisdiction and several aspects of its dispositional
orders.
II.
None of the challenged dependency court orders were
erroneous.
A.
Sufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional finding.
“ ‘A jurisdictional finding that the minor is a person
described in section 300 must be made by at least a
preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.] “We review the
jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We
consider the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the juvenile court’s findings and affirming the order
even if other evidence supports a different finding. [Citation.]
We do not consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the
evidence.” [Citation.] “The parent has the burden on appeal of
showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s order.” ’ ” (In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 851
(M.D.); see also In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Z.L. was a child described in section 300, subdivision (b).
Subdivision (b)(1)(D) permits jurisdiction when a “child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness as a result of . . . [¶] [t]he
inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due
12
to the parent’s . . . substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D); see
In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 556 (N.R.).)
That is, the record supports the court’s finding of mother’s
current substance abuse. (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 555
[“ ‘substance abuse’ bears its ordinary meaning of excessive use of
drugs or alcohol”].) Mother tested positive for cocaine
metabolites, not for any prescribed pain medications, when
admitted to the hospital on December 22, 2024. Mother denied
cocaine use, offered unconvincing explanations for why she may
have tested positive (such as through second-hand smoke), and
complained that the hospital had tested her and her child
illegally. The relative caregiver corroborated mother’s drug
dependency and described how mother would stay up for days at
a time.
Additionally, mother exhibited erratic behavior up through
adjudication. She threatened the social worker and the relative
caregiver, resulting in no contact and restraining orders being
issued against her. She assaulted father, resulting in her arrest.
She declined a drug test referral. The court could reasonably
infer, based on mother’s initial positive drug test, inconsistent
statements, and increasingly erratic, violent behavior, that
mother was abusing drugs and that her denials lacked credibility.
(See In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601 [“The juvenile
court was entitled to conclude the mother had been transparently
dissembling about her drug use”], disapproved on another ground
in N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 560, fn. 18.)
The record further supports that mother’s substance abuse
showed an inability to care for Z.L. and created a substantial risk
of harm. The hospital’s meconium test indicated mother’s illicit
drug use during the last four to five months of her pregnancy.
13
Z.L. was born with amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine
metabolites, and cannabinoids in her system. And Z.L., from
birth past six weeks, suffered from withdrawal induced tremors.
She required respiratory observation. (See In re Troy D. (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 889, 904 [recognizing harm when child at birth
was affected by prenatal drug use, including by having
“symptoms associated with methamphetamine withdrawal”].)
This case is thus unlike In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
315, 326, 332, in which a positive toxicology result, standing
alone, was insufficient to support jurisdiction. (Ibid. [reversing
where no evidence child suffered withdrawal symptoms despite
positive meconium test for hydrocodone and hydromorphone].)
Mother’s repeated denials about her drug use, the caretaker’s
assessment of mother, and mother’s escalating violent behavior,
described above, further support the risk of continuing harm to
the child. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [denial can be
evidence of unawareness of risk and unwillingness to change];
In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [same].) The
evidence also supported the inference that mother minimized the
negative effects drugs have on children when she previously
provided Z.L.’s half-sister with marijuana edibles. (See In re T.V.
(2012) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.) [“A parent’s past conduct
is a good predictor of future behavior”].)
Mother highlights her lack of criminal history involving
illicit substances, the tenderness she showed Z.L. during birth
and monitored visitation, and two negative drug tests she
provided in February 2025. These matters do not compel denial
of jurisdiction. The two negative drug tests, not conducted by the
department, were, moreover, counterbalanced by a declined test
and do not necessarily quiet concerns about mother’s prenatal
14
use and her increasingly erratic behavior. (T.V., supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [“ ‘Facts supporting allegations that a
child is one described by section 300 are cumulative.’ [Citation.]
Thus, the court ‘must consider all the circumstances affecting the
child, wherever they occur’ ”]; In re Natalie A. (2015)
243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186 [refusal to test permits inferences
regarding use].) Ultimately, we do not reweigh the evidence on
appeal, even if it could support a contrary holding. (M.D., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 851.)
In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s
jurisdictional finding.
B.
The juvenile court’s dispositional orders — which removed
Z.L. from mother’s custody, required mother to undergo drug and
mental health treatment, and denied mother visitation — are
likewise not erroneous.
1.
As to removal, mother’s arguments are conclusory and
result in forfeiture. Even so, substantial evidence supports
removal.
A court may remove a child from a parent’s physical
custody only if clear and convincing evidence establishes (1)
“[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of
the child if “returned home,” and (2) “there are no reasonable
means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected
without removing” the child from the parent’s custody. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1); In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145–146.)
Mother’s conduct, current circumstances, and response to
conditions underlying the dependency allegations are relevant
15
considerations. (See In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332;
see also In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156.)
We review a removal order for substantial evidence, but we
“attune” that standard to account for the heightened burden of
proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 997; see
also In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245.) Accordingly, we
determine “whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.,
at p. 1011.) Mother has the burden to show the record lacks that
substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
Mother has not met her burden.
Mother offers two undeveloped reasons to reject the court’s
removal order. First, she contends she was “fully capable of
taking care of her child” by the disposition hearing. This is the
entirety of mother’s argument regarding the lack of danger to
Z.L. Second, mother contends the court failed to consider
reasonable alternatives to removal. She asserts the child could
have been released to mother with “stringent” supervision
conditions. The entirety of this argument reads: “The juvenile
court could have made stringent orders regarding placement of
[Z.L.] with mother. The service providers would be mandated
reporters and would oversee mother’s care of [Z.L.] and report
any inappropriate behavior or concerns. Also, the assigned
[department] social worker would be available to conduct
unannounced visits to the home and schools to assess the status
of the children’s placement in mother’s care.” These arguments
are generic, unsupported by record citations and a discussion of
the record, and provide no legal analysis. Thus, mother has not
made a proper argument challenging the removal order. (See
16
WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“In order to demonstrate error, an
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record”];
In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 410 [“This is no legal
analysis at all. It is simply a conclusion, unsupported by any
explanation of why the petition’s allegations were not sufficient.
Hence, appellant has forfeited the claim of error”].)
In any case, the juvenile court’s removal findings are
supported. Mother’s threats during the dependency proceedings
were significant and escalating. She repeatedly threatened the
first and second social workers. She threatened the caretaker.
She threatened to blow up father’s house. She dispatched an
emissary to personally threaten father with a firearm. This, all
on top of the April 2025 encounter that resulted in mother’s
arrest during which mother hit father in the head multiple times
and seized his pocketknife, causing father to fear he would be
stabbed. Mother’s conduct caused the court to suspend visitation
for fear of violence.
Aside from mother’s threats and violence, mother expressed
disdain for the court’s orders, stating she would not follow them,
and she had a history of refusing to do so. She was uncooperative
with the department, and this negatively impacted Z.L.’s access
to Regional Center services. She continued denying drug use,
and missed two tests in the two weeks after the court referred
her to drug testing at the adjudication hearing, making three
total missed tests. Mother never tested for the department.
In short, mother’s behaviors put Z.L. at risk and her active
disdain for court orders and the department made less restrictive
17
alternatives, none of which were suggested to the juvenile court,
impracticable.
2.
The court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered
mother to participate in drug testing, drug treatment, a mental
health assessment, and mental health treatment as part of her
reunification case plan.
“Section 362, subdivision (d) authorizes the juvenile court
to ‘direct any reasonable orders to the parents’ of a dependent
child as the court deems necessary and proper to ensure
appropriate care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance,
and support of the child (§ 362, subd. (d)), and the juvenile court
enjoys broad discretion in crafting a dispositional case plan to
this end.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 522 (I.R.).) “At
disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the
sustained petition when it considers what dispositional orders
would be in the best interests of the child[ ]. [Citations.] Instead,
the court may consider the evidence as a whole.” (In re Briana V.
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.); see also In re
Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [court may
address other obstacles that impede parent’s reunification in case
plan].) “We review the juvenile court’s disposition case plan for
abuse of discretion.” (I.R., at p. 522.)
As we have already discussed, substantial evidence
supports the court’s jurisdictional finding that mother abused
drugs. The statute expressly recognizes that an ordered program
“designed to eliminate those conditions that led” to the assertion
of dependency jurisdiction are appropriate. (See § 362, subd. (d).)
Accordingly, “we cannot say that the juvenile court’s order
requiring [mother] to attend [drug testing and treatment] was
18
beyond the bounds of reason.” (Briana V., supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.)
Similarly, requiring mother to participate in a mental
health assessment and treatment was not an abuse of discretion.
While the juvenile court did not base its jurisdiction on mother’s
mental health struggles, it had a reasonable basis to believe
mother suffered from mental health issues. (See In re D.L. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148 [juvenile court has authority to issue
orders to address issues not described in sustained dependency
petition].) Given the court’s “broad discretion in crafting a
dispositional case plan,” we see no abuse of discretion. (I.R.,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 522.) The court found mother had
exhibited “emotional and mental instability,” engaged in violent
conduct, and directed credible threats at those around her,
threats which implicated the child’s welfare. The record amply
supports this finding. Mother experienced trauma from her
mother’s violent death, the relative caregiver had expressed
concern about mother’s mental health, and mother’s threatening
behavior continued to escalate, from verbal threats to physical
assault, with no abatement in sight. The court could reasonably
conclude it was in the child’s best interest for a mental health
professional to assess and treat mother. (See In re Rodger H.
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1183 [“The court’s principal concern
is a disposition consistent with the best interests of the minor”].)
To the extent mother contends the court could not order her to
“follow[] all recommendations that flow from” the ordered
psychological and psychiatric evaluations, she forfeited this
contention by not raising it below. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293; In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 521; cf.
In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 725 [suggesting
19
applicability of forfeiture rule to case plan issue when objection
would not have been a futile gesture].) At any rate, mother has
not identified prejudice flowing from this direction. The juvenile
court, in February of this year, found mother’s case plan
compliance to be “substantial.” A section 388 petition, or other
appropriate proceeding, remains available should issues with the
direction emerge. (See In re M.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 412, 430
[finding error harmless].)
3.
Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the visitation
order.
Mother disputes the juvenile court’s dispositional finding
that visitation with her would be detrimental to the child.
Concurrent with filing her reply brief, mother requested that we
take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s February 19, 2026,
minute order lifting the prior restriction of mother’s visitation.
Mother asserts the “minute order is relevant to the current status
of the matter and the termination of the visitation detriment that
was an issue in this appeal.” Her reply brief states, “the
detriment finding previously made by the juvenile court has been
lifted.” We agree, grant mother’s unopposed request, and find
mother’s challenge to the detriment finding is now moot. (See
In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [“A reviewing court must
‘ “decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a
juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its]
decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent
proceeding” ’ ”].)
20
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
21