Filed 8/5/26 In re Y.L. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B346072
In re Y.L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05696A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CYNTHIA L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lucia J. Murillo, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
After Cynthia L. (mother) failed to reunify with her son,
Y.L., the juvenile court ordered legal guardianship as the
permanent plan and, eventually, terminated dependency
jurisdiction. A little over five months later, mother filed a
petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,
asking the court to return Y.L. to her custody, reinstate her
family reunification services, award her unmonitored visits, or
order Y.L. to engage in conjoint counseling with her.1 The
juvenile court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Mother now appeals. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Proceedings from 2019 through 2023
The dependency proceedings began in San Mateo County in
2019, when the county’s Human Services Agency was alerted
that mother’s mental and emotional problems were causing her
to neglect eight-year-old Y.L. Mother had never enrolled Y.L. in
school or complied with California home school education
requirements. The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging
Y.L. was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or
illness as a result of mother’s inability to provide care due to her
untreated mental illness. Y.L. was allowed to remain in mother’s
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
custody under agency supervision. The case was transferred to
Los Angeles County after mother and Y.L. relocated in late 2020.
Once in Los Angeles County, mother refused services for
herself or for Y.L. She denied any mental health problems and
claimed the case was open only because her family had spread
lies about her. She insisted that the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) supervision was unnecessary. Mother
repeatedly canceled service appointments and, on one occasion,
appeared to be coaching Y.L. during a virtual intake for services.
In June 2021, DCFS obtained juvenile court authorization to
remove Y.L. from mother.
Once nine-year-old Y.L. was in a foster care placement, the
caregivers discovered that he had an ongoing bedwetting
problem. Mother had been having Y.L. sleep in a diaper lined
with a maxi pad. Y.L. also engaged in unusual behavior and
appeared to be isolated from any relationships other than
mother.
Later in June 2021, at a monitored visit soon after the
detention, mother called law enforcement and alleged that Y.L.
was being abused in the foster home. A social worker arrived to
find the police present and mother and Y.L. screaming and
crying. Y.L. said he had heard the foster mother call him a
“dumbass.” The foster mother denied this had occurred.
Although she had used a similar Spanish term, she explained
that she was not referring to Y.L. and was instead using the term
to refer to a difficult situation that did not involve Y.L. According
to mother, Y.L. said he was called “dumbass” and told to go into a
bathroom where “the man” was. Mother feared Y.L. would be
sexually assaulted, thus she called the police and left several
3
messages for the social worker. The social worker was required
to defuse the situation.
At a subsequent visit, mother asserted that the foster
mother was mistreating Y.L. Y.L. told mother no one was
treating him badly. “Mother began to cry and scream and say
that [the social worker] had to move [Y.L.] from the abusive
home.” As mother continued to cry louder, Y.L. became upset
and also started to cry and scream. The social worker tried to
walk away with Y.L. “Mother got on her knees and began to cry
louder and begged [the social worker] to move [Y.L.] from the
abusive home because he is being psychologically abuse[d] every
day.” Once in the social worker’s car, Y.L. appeared to be
hyperventilating. He told the social worker he was not
mistreated in the foster home and did not want to be moved. He
said mother confused him and he would start to think that maybe
the things mother alleged were really happening. When the
social worker explained that he should not say things were
happening just to make mother happy, he said “he understood
but that he did not want to make mother sad.”
After this incident, the foster mother informed the social
worker that Y.L. had begun soiling his underwear and did not
notice when he “ ‘poops on himself.’ ” The bedwetting was also
worse.
In August 2021, the juvenile court sustained a
supplemental petition alleging that mother continued to exhibit
mental and emotional problems, she resisted treatment, and she
continued to isolate Y.L. from appropriate socialization. The
court removed Y.L. from mother and ordered reunification
services, including monitored visits at least twice each week.
4
Over the next three years, mother participated in
individual therapy and was compliant with court-ordered
programs. However, DCFS’s assessment was that she continued
to deny the underlying case issues and instead claimed others
were abusing Y.L. She did not use her individual therapy to
address case issues. She repeatedly alleged the foster mother
abused Y.L. in various ways, yet Y.L. had never described such
abuse in any monitored visit.
In May 2022, mother went to Y.L.’s school and alleged that
he was being bullied. Y.L. denied telling mother that he was
being bullied. The next day, he said he had been thinking about
the word “suicide” all day. Later that year, mother unilaterally
disenrolled Y.L. from the middle school he was planning to
attend. He missed a middle school orientation as a result. Y.L.
told the foster mother about his disappointment that he was
unable to attend the orientation. The foster mother managed to
get Y.L. reenrolled before the school year began. Mother denied
disenrolling Y.L. from the school, but school staff had identified
her.
Y.L. told a social worker that mother did not believe what
he said or did not understand him. Their communication during
visits was limited because he did not know what to say to mother.
He was constantly worried about saying something wrong or
doing something that would earn mother’s disapproval.
By late 2022, Y.L. began to indicate that he did not want
unmonitored visits with mother or overnight visits. Although
Y.L. and mother participated in conjoint therapy, the therapist
terminated services after mother attempted to subpoena her.
The therapist reported to a social worker that “mother is creating
a case against caregiver stating caregiver is coaching [Y.L.] to say
5
he does not want to return with mother.” Y.L. told a social
worker he was not ready to reunify with mother. DCFS opined
that although mother had complied with court-ordered programs,
she had not made progress in addressing the issues that led to
dependency jurisdiction. Mother had “completed programs, but
there is no behavioral change that has come from the programs
she has participated in and completed.”
In December 2022, mother’s therapist submitted a letter to
the court indicating mother had used her 53 sessions of
individual counseling to work on case issues. The therapist
opined that mother was working on having a positive mindset.
She did not believe mother suffered from a paranoid condition.
Further, the therapist opined that mother would not be a danger
to Y.L. Mother also had a psychiatric evaluation. The evaluator
determined mother was not suffering from any psychiatric
condition “other than an adjustment disorder related to family
discord & the custody situation.” He did not suggest that mother
take any psychiatric medications.
By mid-2023, Y.L. was thriving in the foster home and did
not want to leave. He also began to periodically refuse to visit
mother. In June 2023, mother called the continuing services
social worker after a visit, fearful that Y.L was being abused
because he had made a sound and held his knee during the visit.
Y.L. told the social worker he did not tell mother he was in pain,
he made the noise “for the fun of it,” and he was upset with
mother for making a false allegation that he was being abused.
Subsequently, he refused to attend a visit for fear that mother
would make more false allegations. In the weeks that followed,
Y.L. repeatedly refused to attend visits. Although social workers
arrived to take him to visits, reassured him that they would not
6
allow mother to be inappropriate, and informed him that visits
were court-ordered, Y.L. simply refused to go. At one visit he was
convinced to attend, then almost 12-year-old Y.L. told mother he
did not want her to make any further allegations of abuse and
that he was safe in the foster home. Y.L. told social workers he
wanted the visits reduced to once a week or every other week.
In August 2023, minor’s counsel filed a section 388 petition
on Y.L.’s behalf asking the court to change the visitation order to
once a week. The petition explained: “[Y.L.’s] adamant and
continuous refusal to see his mother indicated that he is not
comfortable with her. [Y.L.] has been through a lot and would
benefit from less stress when it comes to these visits.”
In an interview with a social worker for a section 388
report, Y.L. said he did not want to live with mother at that time
or in the near future. Mother asked him questions that made
him feel uncomfortable, weird, and upset, including about how
the foster family was treating him. Y.L. told mother he was fine
and to stop asking questions, but she did not seem to listen to
him. Mother treated him “ ‘like a little kid’ ” and he was tired of
mother “always accusing [the foster parents] of hurting him.” He
also told the social worker: “[N]o one is going to make him go on a
visit if he does not want to go. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Y.L.] stated he
wants to see mother every other week and does not want to do
weekly visits even if the Court orders it to occur weekly.” He said
the caregivers had “never spoken badly about mother to him and
have never told him not to go on the visits.”
In her interview for the report, mother explained she was
concerned that someone at the foster care placement was
physically abusing Y.L. Her concerns were based on seeing
marks on his arm on one occasion, and another time when he
7
said “ouch” after sitting down. She believed that Y.L. had
refused visits because the caregivers were influencing him and
“putting thoughts into his head.” In her view, the court had
wrongfully removed Y.L. from her care and she expected the
court to return him to her custody. She believed the foster
mother was trying to turn Y.L. against her.
In September 2023, the foster mother told a social worker
that Y.L. experienced mood swings when visits with mother were
mentioned to him. She had observed a “negative change in
[Y.L.’s] behaviors and moods” since the social workers and court
“have been pushing visits with mother.” According to the foster
mother, Y.L. did not speak about mother between visits or ask for
her. When visits were imminent, his mood shifted and he became
“irritable and upset stating he does not want to go on the visit.”
In another interview with a social worker, Y.L. again
explained that mother fabricated allegations about the foster
parents and this led him to refuse visits with her. He “stated he
‘gets a bad feeling’ and ‘feels uncomfortable’ during the visits
with mother and that he will ‘sometimes cry’ due to mother
accusing his caregivers of abuse as they have become like his
family.” Mother whispered in his ear at the end of visits, even
though she had been warned not to. He was happy living with
the caregivers and did not want to return to mother.
In October 2023, the juvenile court granted the section 388
petition and reduced mother’s visits to once per week. The court
further ordered that Y.L. was not required to visit. At the
section 366.26 hearing conducted on the same day, the court
selected legal guardianship as Y.L.’s permanent plan and
appointed the foster parents the legal guardians.
8
Post-Permanency Proceedings and Mother’s Section 388
Petitions
After the legal guardianship was in place, Y.L. continued to
indicate he only wanted to visit mother once every other week,
then he refused to attend visits altogether. In late December
2023, he refused to get out of the car for a visit after realizing
that mother had brought father to the visit without any advance
notice. Y.L. also continued to believe that mother would make
false allegations against the caregivers. He told a social worker
that he felt anxious and nervous before visits because he did not
know what mother would say or do and this would upset him the
entire day. He wanted to stay with the legal guardians until he
is “an adult or older.”
In March 2024, mother filed a section 388 petition, asking
that the court return Y.L. to her care, reinstate her reunification
services, “enforce and increase” her visits to be more frequent and
longer; and allow her to have unmonitored visits that would
progress to overnight and weekend visits. As evidence of changed
circumstances, mother attached a letter from her therapist
indicating that mother had continued regularly attending
therapy; she had “become more compassionate and empathetic”;
and she was “very capable of taking care of her son.” The
therapist recommended that Y.L. be “reunited” with mother after
some “conjoint sessions to assess the mother-son’s relationship.”
Mother also attached a February 2023 letter from the therapist
who had provided conjoint therapy. The letter documented the
sessions and noted mother and Y.L. “showed love and respect to
each other during sessions.”
Following a hearing set to determine whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition. The
9
court concluded mother had not shown a change in
circumstances.
Before an August 2024 status review hearing, Y.L. told a
social worker he only wanted to visit mother on “ ‘big holidays.’ ”
He was refusing weekly visits.
In August 2024, mother filed another section 388 petition.
She asserted the caregivers had “abused and groomed” Y.L., and
“poisoned him against” mother, causing him to refuse to visit her.
Mother again asked that the court return Y.L. to her custody or
liberalize and increase her visits. She further asked that the
court remove Y.L. from the foster home and order a forensic
interview “to assess the abuse he has suffered by his caregivers
and the ‘grooming’ they have inflicted upon him.” In support of
the petition, mother and maternal grandmother submitted
declarations detailing the June 2021 visit at which Y.L. said the
foster mother had called him a “dumbass” and the incident that
followed.
The juvenile court directed DCFS to investigate. Y.L. told
a social worker that he did not want visits with mother because
he was upset with her. Mother continued to lie about the legal
guardians and he had told her multiple times that he was safe
and well cared for. He was worried that mother would make new
allegations and that it might lead to his removal from the legal
guardians. At most, he wanted to have a visit with mother once a
week for one hour. He did not want unmonitored visits or
overnight visits. He said mother had attempted to whisper to
him at previous visits, telling him to “lie about allegations and
say he would like to return back with her.” He did not want to
leave the legal guardians’ home.
10
At a hearing set to determine whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the section 388
petition. The court found there was no change in circumstances
and the request was not in Y.L.’s best interests. At a status
review hearing conducted the same day, the court terminated
dependency jurisdiction.
The Section 388 Ruling at Issue
In February 2025, mother filed another section 388
petition. Mother asserted there were changed circumstances
because she had completed a new psychological evaluation. The
evaluator concluded mother did not suffer from any chronic
mental health condition that would cause her to become psychotic
in the absence of ongoing treatment. Mother again asked that
the court return Y.L. to her custody, reinstate her family
reunification services, liberalize her visits, and/or order conjoint
counseling.
The court again ordered DCFS to investigate. Now 13-
year-old Y.L. described how past visits with mother had gone
poorly, including because mother would ask if the legal guardians
were abusing him and she accused the guardians of things that
were not true. He “was adamant that he does not want to have
anything to do with mother, does not want to reunify with her,
and was not willing to participate in any conjoint therapy with
mother.” He had sent his social worker a text message
expressing his unhappiness that mother was asking for his
return and visits. He reported that his emotions changed
negatively when “ ‘things with [mother]’ ” were brought up.
Going to court negatively affected him at school and at home. He
wrote that he did not want to “ ‘return to the past,’ ” he did not
want anything to do with mother, and, “You guys can’t make me
11
want to have anything to do with her or have anything to do with
her. And I have the right to not have things to do with her. I’m
really happy with my [legal guardian] I don’t want to get moved
or anything.”
Mother told the social worker she had not had direct
contact with Y.L. since July 2024. “She strongly believes that
[Y.L.’s] decision to avoid all contact with her is largely influenced
by his caregiver. According to [mother], she feels that the
caregiver ‘coaches’ [Y.L.] when he expresses not wanting any
interaction with her.”
At the hearing, the juvenile court determined mother had
not established a prima facie case for relief under section 388.
The court explained that even if the psychiatric report indicating
mother was doing better than in the past represented a changed
circumstance, the court could not conclude that it would be in
Y.L.’s best interest to change the prior orders.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Summarily Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition
A. Legal principles and standard of review
Under section 388, a party may seek modification of a prior
juvenile court order. The moving party must show there is a
change of circumstances and that the requested modification is in
the child’s best interests. “To obtain a hearing on a section 388
petition, the parent must make a prima facie showing as to both
elements. [Citations.] [¶] The petition should be liberally
construed in favor of granting a hearing, but ‘[t]he prima facie
requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by
evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable
12
decision on the petition.’ [Citations.] The petition may not
consist of ‘general, conclusory allegations.’ [Citation.] . . . When
determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing,
‘the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history
of the case.’ [Citation.]” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
1, 7 (Samuel A.).)
Here, the juvenile court had terminated family
reunification services, ordered a permanent plan of legal
guardianship, and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Family
reunification was not the focus of the proceedings. Instead, the
juvenile court was required to prioritize “ ‘the needs of the child
for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a
rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best
interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for
change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must
recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question
before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie
M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re K.L. (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 52, 62 (K.L.).)
Mother asserts that this court must conduct a de novo
review of a juvenile court order summarily denying a section 388
petition. Not so.2 Mother’s argument relies on two cases, neither
of which supports her assertion. In In re Angel B. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 454, the mother argued that the juvenile court
violated her constitutional rights by denying her request for a
hearing on her section 388 petition. The court explained: “[T]he
juvenile court not only denied [the mother] an evidentiary
hearing, but also summarily denied the petition. We review such
2 However, we note that under any standard of review our
conclusion would be the same in this case.
13
a summary denial for abuse of discretion [citation], and resolve
the constitutional issue as a matter of law.” (Angel B., at p. 460,
italics added, fn. omitted.) The court then evaluated whether the
summary denial was an abuse of discretion and concluded it was
not. (Id. at pp. 462, 465.) The court did not explicitly return to
the constitutional question, presumably because having
determined the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, it could
only conclude, as a matter of law, that the denial did not violate
the mother’s constitutional rights.
Likewise, in In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, the
reviewing court evaluated whether the juvenile court abused its
discretion in denying the mother’s section 388 petition without a
hearing. (Jeremy W., at p. 1413.) Because the uncontradicted
evidence demonstrated the mother had made a strong prima facie
showing of changed circumstances, the record did not support
summary denial. Accordingly, mother had “the right to
procedural due process to permit a full and fair hearing on the
merits.” (Id. at p. 1416.) Jeremy W. does not stand for the
proposition that any juvenile court order summarily denying a
section 388 petition is subject to de novo review on appeal.
To the contrary, it is well established that we review a
juvenile court order summarily denying a section 388 petition for
abuse of discretion. (Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7;
K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 62; In re Brittany K. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505; In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
246, 250.) Mother has not argued that the court’s order was
based on a mistake of law on undisputed facts, or any other
circumstance that would trigger de novo review. (Samuel A., at
p. 7.)
14
“ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (Stephanie M., supra, 7
Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.) “ ‘The denial of a section 388 motion
rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (In
re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445 (Daniel C.).)
B. Discussion
Mother contends her petition established a change of
circumstances because she completed her case plan, maintained
contact with Y.L., and submitted a psychological examination
opining she was not suffering from any significant mental illness.
However, these were not new or different circumstances.
The juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification
services in January 2023. In the last status review report filed
before the January 2023 hearing, DCFS informed the court that
mother had completed court-ordered services and continued
participating in programs. She maintained contact, or attempted
to maintain contact, with Y.L. for the entire pendency of the case.
Before the January 2023 hearing, mother submitted a letter from
her individual therapist indicating she had regularly attended
counseling and worked on case issues. Mother also submitted a
psychiatric evaluation which concluded that mother was not
suffering from any psychiatric condition other than “adjustment
disorder” related to the custody situation. Mother’s therapist
agreed with this assessment.
Thus, none of the circumstances mother identified in her
section 388 petition were new or changed since the January 2023
order terminating her reunification services, or the October 2023
15
orders reducing the frequency of mother’s visits and selecting
legal guardianship as the permanent plan. In addition, although
she submitted a more recent psychiatric evaluation with the
section 388 petition, the evaluator indicated he was “in
agreement with the other mental health professional who
previously evaluated” mother in 2021. In short, mother
presented no change of circumstances.
Further, as the juvenile court recognized, the petition failed
to make a prima facie showing that any of the orders requested
would be in Y.L.’s best interest. The petition offered conclusory
statements that it would be in Y.L.’s best interest to “repair the
bond” with mother and that frequent contact with her would
“improve his emotional and mental health.” These statements
were in direct conflict with the record from the prior three years
and were unsupported by any details or specific facts. (K.L.,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 62–63.)
The juvenile court was not required to ignore the entire
factual history of the case. The record was replete with
indications that frequent contact with mother caused Y.L.
extreme anxiety and led to his negative behavior at home and at
school. As time passed, Y.L. became increasingly articulate about
why more frequent contact with mother was detrimental to his
wellbeing. Although Y.L.’s own statements about his desires
could not be the only factor in the juvenile court’s decision, the
court appropriately considered his statements. (See In re Michael
D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087 [while child’s wishes are not
determinative of his best interests, spontaneous statements may
be “powerful demonstrative evidence” of what those best interests
are]; see also § 366.26, subd. (h)(1) [at all selection and
implementation of permanent plan proceedings, the court “shall
16
consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests
of the child”].)
Not only was Y.L. 13 years old and therefore capable of
explaining himself, his concerns were supported by the extensive
record of mother’s conduct. Indeed, when interviewed for the
final section 388 petition, mother continued to blame the legal
guardian for Y.L.’s refusal to visit her. This corroborated Y.L.’s
concerns that mother would continue to fabricate allegations
about the legal guardians and that she failed to listen to or
believe him.
Nothing in mother’s section 388 petition suggested that
returning Y.L. to mother’s custody would be in his best interest.
Nor did any portion of the petition suggest that reinstating
reunification services, liberalizing visits, or ordering conjoint
counseling would enhance the stability and level of permanence
he had received in the legal guardianship. Mother’s conclusory
assertions that Y.L. would benefit emotionally from “being
parented by and/or having extended contact” with mother were
insufficient to establish a prima facie showing under the
circumstances of this case. (See Daniel C., supra, 141
Cal.App.4th at p. 1446 [de facto parents did not make prima facie
showing that return of children would be in their best interest
where two of the children did not want to see the de facto parents
and a third child refused further visits].)
Finally, we agree with DCFS that mother forfeited any
argument regarding the enforcement of the existing visitation
order by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. 3 Mother’s
3 Mother supports her argument with cases describing
visitation as an essential part of a reunification plan. Here,
17
section 388 petition asked the court to increase her visits and
liberalize them. It did not seek clarification or enforcement of the
existing order.
“The court does not err by failing to do that which it is not
requested to do. [¶] When a child refuses visitation, it is the
parent’s burden to request a specific type of enforcement, or a
specific change to the visitation order. Absent a request, it is not
the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to the
intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a
parent.” (In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046.) We
also agree with the Sofia M. court’s assessment: “The reality in
many of these cases is that the parent has irreparably damaged
the relationship beyond salvage. This cannot be presumed, of
course, and thus courts must, consistent with the child’s well-
being, order visitation and enforce that order appropriately. But
if it turns out, after reasonable efforts have been exhausted, the
child simply cannot be persuaded to visit, that, in and of itself, is
not a basis for reversal.” (Id. at p. 1047.)
however, reunification services were terminated and a
permanent plan of legal guardianship was in place. Principles
regarding reunification or maintaining the parent-child
relationship were no longer applicable. (See, e.g., In re J.N.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 458–459 [“visitation is not integral to
the overall plan when the parent is not participating in . . .
reunification efforts”].) Further, to the extent mother is
attempting to challenge the juvenile court’s October 2023 order
granting Y.L.’s section 388 petition limiting her visits, we must
reject the challenge as untimely.
18
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
19