Filed 7/21/26 In re Wilian J. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re WILIAN J. et al., Persons B347725
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
________________________________ Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP00496A, B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NORMA P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Norma P. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (d), and disposition orders declaring her
children, Wilian J., Jr. and Martha J., dependent children of the
court.1 Norma argues substantial evidence did not support the
court’s findings that there is a substantial risk Wilian Jr. and
Martha will be sexually abused by their father, Wilian J.; that
Norma failed to adequately protect Wilian Jr. and Martha from
sexual abuse; and that Wilian Jr. and Martha suffered, or there
is a substantial risk they will suffer, serious physical harm or
illness, as a result of Norma’s failure to protect them. Because
substantial evidence supported the court’s jurisdiction findings,
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Police Investigate and Arrest Wilian
Norma P. and Wilian have two children, Wilian Jr. and
Martha, who were 10 years old and four years old, respectively,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
when the Department filed a petition under section 300. When
Norma and the children moved to the United States in 2018, they
joined Wilian, who was living in the home of his aunt, Martha M.
Several of Wilian’s relatives also lived in the home, including
Martha M.’s daughter Donay and Donay’s daughters Cataleya
and Ashlyne (and three other children). Wilian’s family shared
one bedroom; Donay and her children occupied another.
In April 2024 Cataleya, who was then 11 years old,
reported to a forensic nurse that Wilian had molested her
numerous times between the ages of five and seven. Cataleya
stated that, in one instance, Wilian rubbed her vagina under her
clothing. Cataleya said that on another occasion, while Norma
was nearby but not paying attention, Wilian put his hands down
Cataleya’s pants, rubbed her vagina, and put his finger in his
mouth. Cataleya said Wilian also groped her breasts and
buttocks over her clothing. Cataleya stated she also saw Wilian
slap Ashlyne on the buttocks and put his hands down her pants.
In August 2024 Ashlyne, who was then 16 years old, told
police that when she was 11 or 12 years old Wilian showed her a
pornographic video of a naked woman performing sexual acts.
Ashlyne learned from her brother that Wilian had shown him the
same video. Ashlyne also described several occasions where
Wilian touched her thighs, grabbed her breasts, and touched her
buttocks. On one occasion Wilian “tried to kiss her, and [told]
Ashlyne . . . to close her mouth but [she] could feel his tongue all
over her face.” On another Wilian slapped Ashlyne’s buttocks in
front of her sister, an incident Cataleya confirmed. Ashlyne said
that, because she and Cataleya shared their experiences, Ashlyne
knew Wilian also sexually abused Cataleya.
3
Ashlyne also stated that, when she was 12 years old,
Wilian came into her room and tried to unbuckle her pants while
Wilian’s adult daughter, Helen, slept nearby. Ashlyne ran out of
the room and told her mother, Donay. Donay confronted
Ashlyne’s grandmother and Wilian about the abuse. Wilian
denied the allegations, and the grandmother accused Ashlyne of
lying and convinced Donay not to call the police. Ashlyne’s
maternal aunt, Leslie, believed Ashlyne’s allegations because
Wilian also did “weird things to her, such as taking pictures of
her through the window while she was changing.” After this
incident, Donay moved Ashlyne and Cataleya out of the home.
In June 2024 Donay called Wilian and accused him of
inappropriately touching Cataleya and Ashlyne. Wilian denied
touching either of them and refused to apologize for something he
said he did not do. He called Cataleya a liar and stated that, “as
her mother, she [meaning Donay] should know this.” Wilian,
however, admitted that, on one occasion when he was drunk, he
showed Ashlyne (but not Cataleya) a “porno video” of two women
kissing, while Norma and Helen were sitting nearby. Wilian
asked Donay for forgiveness.
When the police interviewed Wilian, he denied showing
Ashlyne anything inappropriate. When one of the officers
questioning Wilian said she had listened to his June 2024 phone
conversation with Donay, Wilian changed his story. Wilian
initially admitted that, while drunk, he showed Ashlyne a picture
of a shirtless male and that she ran out of the room crying.
Later, however, Wilian said he showed a video of an adult male
wearing very little clothing (but with his penis covered) “dancing
sexy.”
4
In February 2025 the police arrested Wilian for willfully
and lewdly committing a lewd and lascivious act upon the body of
a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), sexually
penetrating a child under the age of 14 by means of force or
violence (id., § 289, subd. (b)), and knowingly exhibiting harmful
matter that depicts a minor engaging in sexual conduct (id.,
§ 288.2, subd. (a)). The police reports stated that several years
earlier Wilian had abused his minor cousins, Cataleya and
Ashlyne. Wilian denied that he had abused his cousins and that
he had access to the two children while he lived with them. The
police contacted the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services. Shortly after his arrest, Wilian was
deported to El Salvador.
B. The Department Files a Petition Under Section 300
The Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of
Wilian Jr. and Martha, alleging that they suffered, or there was a
substantial risk they will suffer, serious physical harm or illness
as a result of Norma’s failure to protect them; that there was a
substantial risk Wilian will sexually abuse Wilian Jr. and
Martha; and that Norma failed to adequately protect the children
from sexual abuse. The Department alleged two counts under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and two counts under section 300,
subdivision (d), based on these allegations. The Department
alleged that Norma failed to protect the children when she knew
Wilian sexually abused his cousins and that she allowed Wilian
to reside in the children’s home with unlimited access to them.
The Department alleged such “sexual abuse of the cousin[s] by
the father, and the mother’s failure to protect the children,
endangers the children’s health and safety, creates a detrimental
5
home environment, and places the children at risk of serious
physical harm [and] sexual abuse.”
C. The Department Conducts an Investigation
Norma told a Department social worker that she never saw
Wilian behave inappropriately with Cataleya or Ashlyne. Norma
said that, though her family lived with Cataleya and Ashlyne,
Norma’s family did not interact with the girls during that time.
Norma believed Wilian was innocent and stated “he has never
been accused of anything like this before.” Norma described
Wilian as a good parent and said she would allow him to return
home after his release from jail.
Norma claimed she did not learn about the allegations of
sexual abuse until after Wilian was arrested. Norma stated:
“I only ever saw him as a good dad to my kids. I am having
trouble assimilating what is being said there. I don’t know
what could have happened. I did not see it so I can’t accuse him
and say that he did it.” When asked what she thought of Wilian
showing his young cousins a pornographic video, Norma said:
“I don’t know if it happened, maybe they took his phone, but he
was never alone with them.” When asked whether Wilian’s
admission he showed the cousins the video changed her
perception of him, Norma stated: “Maybe but I don’t think so,
because he has always protected his family and cared for them.
He has always been a good dad with his own children. He hasn’t
done anything that you said he did or that he accepted he did.
He has always protected them.” Norma said she did not feel her
kids would be unsafe with Wilian because Wilian never acted
inappropriately with them. Norma stated that, if she could, she
would accept Wilian back home. She said: “If he made a mistake,
6
he needs to correct it and be different” by attending therapy and
finding God.
The social worker interviewed Helen and Wilian Jr. Helen
stated she heard about the allegations against Wilian, but
insisted Wilian was incapable of doing those things. Helen said
the cousins never told her about any sexual abuse. Wilian Jr.
said he saw the police arrest Wilian and later learned about the
sexual abuse allegations, but he denied Wilian ever sexually
abused him.
In a telephonic interview with the social worker, Wilian
(who was in El Salvador) repeatedly denied sexually abusing
Cataleya or Ashlyne. He claimed Donay was “the problem,” had
“so many husbands,” and “did not pay attention to her own kids,”
yet was making accusations against him. Contradicting Norma’s
statement she did not know or suspect Wilian was abusing his
cousins until after he was arrested, Wilian admitted he told
Norma about the sexual abuse allegations after his June 2024
phone call with Donay. Wilian said he did not have plans or
enough money to return to the United States.
The social worker assessed the risk to Wilian Jr. and
Martha of abuse and neglect as “Very High.” The Department
stated in its jurisdiction report Norma “demonstrates limited
resilience as she has allowed [Wilian] to reside in the home and
have access to the children despite knowing about the
allegations.” The Department stated Norma “does not appear to
have insight as to the [effects Wilian’s] actions can have on
children. [Wilian] has shown sexually abusive tendencies
towards other children, as such, his behaviors may escalate to
other children in the household including his own.” The
Department concluded that, though Wilian did not abuse his
7
children, exposing them to such sexual abuse could cause them
emotional harm, psychological harm, and trauma.
The Department also identified several additional risk
factors. For example, according to Wilian, Norma learned about
the sexual abuse allegations two years ago, yet she allowed
Wilian access to their children. And despite the statements by
Cataleya and Ashlyne, Wilian’s arrest, and Wilian’s admission he
showed one of the cousins pornography, Norma did not believe
Wilian sexually abused his cousins and her perception of him had
not changed.
D. The Juvenile Court Sustains the Petition, but Later
Terminates Its Jurisdiction
The juvenile court sustained the petition, declared
Wilian Jr. and Martha dependent children of the court, and
released them to Norma. Norma timely appealed.
At the six-month review hearing under section 366.21,
subdivision (e), the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction,
finding the conditions that justified assuming jurisdiction under
section 300 no longer existed. The court granted Norma sole
legal and physical custody of both children.
DISCUSSION
A. Norma’s Appeal May Be Moot, but We Exercise Our
Discretion To Hear It
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
8
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) A case is moot when events render it
“‘“impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’” (Ibid.) “Effective”
relief has two conditions. First, the plaintiff must complain of an
ongoing harm. Second, the requested outcome must directly
redress or rectify that harm. (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042,
1051 (S.R.); see D.P., at p. 276.) This rule applies in dependency
cases. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) A reviewing
court must “‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent
events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and
whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in subsequent
proceeding.”’” (S.R., at p. 1042; see D.P., at p. 276.) But even
where an appeal is moot, “courts may exercise their ‘inherent
discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., at p. 282;
accord, S.R., at p. 1051.)
Norma’s appeal is potentially moot for at least two reasons.
First, neither Norma nor Wilian appealed from the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction finding Wilian sexually abused his cousins.
“Dependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to his or her
parent” (In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 634, 638),
meaning the juvenile court may have jurisdiction based on a
finding against one parent only. Thus, where, as here, the
juvenile court makes jurisdiction findings regarding both parents,
but the parents challenge the findings regarding only one of the
parents, the appeal may be moot. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 283-284; see In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137, 150-151
[“‘Because the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of the child, not
the parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one
parent only.’”].) Thus, even if we reversed the finding Norma
9
failed to protect the children, the juvenile court would still have
had jurisdiction over Wilian Jr. and Martha based on the findings
regarding Wilian’s conduct, and we could not provide Norma
effective relief. (See D.P., at pp. 283-284; M.C., at pp. 150-151.)
Second, while the appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction over the children and granted Norma
sole physical and legal custody. “An order terminating juvenile
court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier
order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163;
see In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [an appeal “may
become moot where subsequent events, including orders by the
juvenile court, render it impossible for the reviewing court to
grant effective relief”].) However, “when a juvenile court’s
finding forms the basis for an order that continues to impact a
parent’s rights—for instance, by restricting visitation or
custody—that jurisdictional finding remains subject to challenge,
even if the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction.”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Conversely, when “the
juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction without issuing any
order that continues to impact the parents,” “complaining of
‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal. The stigma
must be paired with some effect on the [parent’s] legal status that
is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision.”
(Id. at p. 277; accord, S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1051.)
“A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis
whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter
make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the
outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” (D.P., at p. 276; see S.R.,
at p. 1051.)
10
“‘[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case
is not moot, and merits review is required.”’ (In re S.R., supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 1052.) One such consequence is mandatory
listing on the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI). (S.R., at
p. 1048; D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.) Pursuant to the Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.), a
child protective agency “shall forward” for inclusion in the CACI
every substantiated report of “child abuse or severe neglect.”
(Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a).) “‘[I]nformation included in the
CACI is available to a wide variety of state agencies, employers,
and law enforcement,’ and inclusion of a parent’s conduct in the
CACI carries significant consequences for the parent.” (S.R., at
p. 1048., see D.P., at p. 279.) “Where a juvenile court sustains an
allegation of child abuse, a parent may later be estopped from
challenging his or her inclusion in the CACI.” (S.R., at p. 1055;
see Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (e).)
Whether Norma is or may be subject to inclusion in the
CACI is not an easy question; Wilian, not Norma, abused
Cataleya and Ashlyne, but Norma knew about the abuse. The
juvenile court found Norma “failed to protect the children when
she knew of [Wilian’s] sexual abuse of” the minor cousins and
that she allowed Wilian “to reside in the children’s home and to
have unlimited access to the children.” Norma’s conduct falls
somewhere between “severe neglect,” which must be reported to
the CACI, and “general neglect,” which does not. (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 281.)2 But the Supreme Court has
2
“‘“Severe neglect” is defined as ‘the negligent failure . . . to
protect the child from severe malnutrition or medically diagnosed
nonorganic failure to thrive,’ or ‘willfully caus[ing] or permit[ing]
the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation such
11
emphasized, “appellate courts have discretion to conduct a merits
review of the parent’s claim even if the case is moot.” (S.R.,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054.) We do that here.
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Findings Under Section 300, Subdivisions (b) and (d)
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides the juvenile court
may exercise jurisdiction where a “child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) [t]he failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child.” Under this provision the child protective agency must
prove “‘(1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure
or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious
physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness.’” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712; see
In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.)
Section 300, subdivision (b), requires proof the child is
subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775), though the
court need not wait until the child is abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take steps to protect the child. (In re Cole L.,
that their person or health is endangered.’ [Citation.] ‘“General
neglect” means the negligent failure of a person having the care
or custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, or supervision where no physical injury to the child
has occurred but the child is at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm or illness.’” (See In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 281.)
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supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.) And a parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct
may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to
believe that the conduct will continue.’” (Id. at pp. 601-602.)
Nevertheless, “‘“[t]o establish a defined risk of harm at the time
of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere
speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.’”’” (In re
S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712-713; see In re J.A. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.)
We review the jurisdiction findings for substantial
evidence. (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021,
1034; In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645.) We “draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record
favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if
there is other evidence to the contrary.” (A.L., at p. 645; see In re
C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 571.) “‘We consider the entire
record, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the
juvenile court’s findings and affirming the order even if other
evidence supports a different finding. [Citation.] We do not
consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.’”
(In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411-412; see In re S.F.,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Findings
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings
under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). Wilian’s sexual
conduct toward his young cousins living in the same house posed
a risk of harm to Wilian Jr. and Martha. Norma’s repeated
denial Wilian abused the two girls, her lack of insight, and her
refusal to ban Wilian from the home all supported the court’s
13
finding she failed to protect the children from known sexual
abuse. (See In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1332
[substantial evidence supported jurisdiction findings under
section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), where the father’s
sexual abuse of a cohabitant’s 11-year-old daughter put the
father’s children at risk of harm]; In re Y.G. (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 109, 116 [substantial evidence supported
jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), where the
parent’s abuse of a nonrelative child tended “to prove that the
parent suffers from characteristics that also place the parent’s
child at substantial risk of similar abuse”]; see also In re Cole C.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917 [substantial evidence supported
jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (j), where the
parent’s abuse of other children in the household created a
substantial risk of harm to the child].)
In addition, Norma repeatedly denied or minimized
knowing that Wilian sexually abused the cousins. (See In re
Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 806 [substantial evidence
supported jurisdiction findings under section 300,
subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), where the father denied he abused
his son, and the mother refused to accept responsibility for failing
to protect the children].)3 After Wilian’s arrest, when the
3
In In re Carlos T., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 795 the court
concluded that, because the mother knew the father sexually
abused their daughter, the juvenile court could reasonably infer
the mother should have suspected he was also sexually abusing
their son. (Id. at pp. 804-805.) Norma attempts to distinguish
Carlos T. by arguing there was no evidence Wilian sexually
abused Wilian Jr. or Martha. But Wilian repeatedly abused
Cataleya and Ashlyne while they were living under the same roof
as his children, and the juvenile court found Norma knew of the
14
Department social worker asked Norma if Wilian inappropriately
touched Cataleya and Ashlyne, Norma said, “No.” When asked if
she believed the allegations against Wilian could be true, Norma
said, “I can’t say because I did not see,” and “I am not sure if it’s
possible, maybe they invented it or their mom did.” When asked
her thoughts on the cousins’ accounts of the abuse, Norma
responded, “I don’t know what happened, I don’t spend time with
them and the mom . . . is not a good mom. Their mom isn’t even
married to their dad, to my knowledge she left their dad.”
Norma’s refusal to acknowledge the abuse Wilian committed and
the risk his conduct posed further supported the juvenile court’s
findings. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘[d]enial
is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are
likely to modify their behavior in the future without court
supervision’”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197
[“[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].)
Substantial evidence also supported the court’s finding
Norma knew of or suspected the sexual abuse before Wilian was
arrested. Norma repeatedly claimed she did not know or suspect
any sexual abuse until Wilian’s arrest. But when asked if Norma
knew about the allegations two years before his arrest, Wilian
said, “Yes . . . I . . . told her and she said I had to speak up
because I was being accused for something I did not do. With my
wife I have communication and we get along. I was able to
explain things to her.” And even if Norma did not learn of the
abuse until after Wilian was arrested, that knowledge did not
abuse. (See id. at p. 805 [“[g]iven her knowledge that father was
a sexual predator, it was reasonable for the court to infer that
mother should have suspected that father also was sexually
abusing their son”].)
15
deter her from saying she would allow Wilian to return home.
After Wilian’s arrest Norma told the Department social worker:
“I don’t know if . . . they will allow him to be with us. But if he is
allowed, we will keep working together.” Nor did learning Wilian
had shown the cousins pornography change Norma’s opinion of
Wilian; she remained unwilling to restrict his access to the
children.
Norma’s argument there was no evidence Wilian abused
his children is meritless. Subdivisions (b) and (d) of section 300
do not require the parent to abuse the child named in the
petition. (See In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773
[subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) of section 300 require “only a
‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or neglected”].)
The juvenile court did not have to wait until Wilian abused
Wilian Jr. and Martha to assume jurisdiction and take steps to
protect them. (See I.J., at p. 773; In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212-213.) Given Wilian’s sexual interest in
young relatives, the court reasonably inferred Norma should have
suspected Wilian could also abuse their children. (See In re T.V.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a
good predictor of future behavior.”]; In re Ana C., supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332 [father’s conduct “has been ‘so
sexually aberrant’ to support the commonsense conclusion that
most every person in the family home was at risk of sexual
abuse”]; In re Y.G., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 116 [section 300,
subdivision (b), permits “a finding of danger to the parent’s child
based on evidence of conduct with an unrelated child”].)
Norma argues there was no “current risk” of harm under
section 300, subdivision (b), at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
because Wilian had been deported to El Salvador and had no
16
reasonable prospects of returning. Section 300, subdivision (d),
unlike section 300, subdivision (b), however, does not require a
finding of current risk at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
(In re Carlos T., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 803), and one basis
for jurisdiction is enough (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283;
In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 852). Moreover, Wilian’s
absence did not eliminate the risk. (See Carlos T., at p. 806 [if
the incarcerated father were “released from custody . . . there is
every reason to believe [he] would resume his sexual abuse of [his
children] without the state intervening to prevent him from
obtaining access to them”].) Deportation, like incarceration, is a
barrier to access, but not a permanent one, and it is not a
substitute for a parent’s protection. And Norma indicated that, if
Wilian returned, she would allow him to be with the children.
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DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction findings and disposition orders are
affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
18