Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re W.R. CA4/1

Filed 11/13/26 In re W.R. CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/13/26 In re W.R. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re W.R. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D087909
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J521709AB)
Petitioner and Respondent,

v.
C.C.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Devon L. Lomayesva, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant and Objector.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for
Petitioner and Respondent.
C.C. (Father) filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s order
denying his request to have all reports prepared by the San Diego County
Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) translated to Haitian Creole.
In his briefing, Father does not address the order regarding translation of
reports. Instead, Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders, contending the court did not comply with the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because it did
not inquire “into the existence of child welfare or custody proceedings in
Florida or any other states and countries” in which the children lived. We
conclude that the notice of appeal is inadequate to address Father’s UCCJEA
claim and, even if it was adequate, Father has not shown any error by the
juvenile court. Thus, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
F.B. (Mother) and Father were never married. Mother is the biological
parent of five-month-old M.C. and eight-year-old W.R. Father is the
biological parent of M.C.
In October 2025, the Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b) petition alleging the children, W.R. and M.C., had
suffered or there was substantial risk they would suffer serious physical
harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of the parents to
supervise or protect the children adequately. The petition further alleged
Mother and Father exposed the children to domestic violence and, during one
incident, Mother dropped M.C. on the floor, resulting in M.C. hitting his
head. At the detention hearing, the court found the Agency had made a
prima facie case on its petition, detained the children in out-of-home
placements, granted Mother and Father separate supervised visitation with
the children, and ordered voluntary services for Mother and Father. As to
W.R., the court exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to the
UCCJEA and indicated it would conduct an inquiry with the appropriate
court in Haiti, W.R.’s country of birth.

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At the December 2025 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Mother’s
counsel stated W.R. was born in Miraguane, Haiti, and there was no
judgment as to W.R.’s biological father and no custody orders. The court
elevated Father to presumed father status as to W.R.
At the February 2026 contested adjudication hearing, the court made a
true finding on the petition, ordered the parents and the Court Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA) to hold joint educational rights for the children,
took jurisdiction over W.R. and M.C., declared the children dependents, and
ordered reunification services for Mother and Father.
In March 2026, the court held a special hearing on Mother and Father’s
request to have the Agency’s reports translated to their native language of
Haitian Creole. In denying the translation request, the court explained there
was no legal authority to support the request, and the lack of translated
reports had not prejudiced the parties as jurisdiction and disposition had
been set and Father was making progress. The court ordered that an
interpreter be present at all future hearings, that any updates to the case
plan be translated to Haitian Creole, and that the Agency provide an
interpreter to review “any and all reports generated by the Agency” with the
parents. The court set the six-month review hearing for August 2026.
DISCUSSION
A. Scope of Appeal
Father’s notice of appeal indicates he appeals from the March 2026

order denying his translation request.1 Despite this, his opening brief
purports to challenge the trial court’s inquiry under UCCJEA.
“To appeal from a superior court judgment or an appealable order of a
superior court, . . . an appellant must serve and file a notice of appeal.” (Cal.

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

3
Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1).) “Care must be taken in drafting the notice
of appeal to identify the order or judgment being appealed so as not to
mislead or prejudice [the] respondent.” (Morton v. Wagner (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967.) Our jurisdiction to address trial court error is
“ ‘limited in scope to . . . the judgment or order appealed from.’ ” (Soldate v.
Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073.) A notice
of appeal from a trial court order or judgment “is sufficient if it identifies the
particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.100(a)(2).) Although we are obligated to “liberally construe[ ]” a notice of
appeal, when a notice unambiguously refers to a specific order and fails to
mention another, it is inadequate to allow review of the second, unspecified,
order. (Shiver, McGrane & Martin v. Littell (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1041,
1045 [“Despite the rule favoring liberal interpretation of notices of appeal, a
notice of appeal will not be considered adequate if it completely omits any
reference to the judgment being appealed.”].)
Here, Father’s notice of appeal states it appeals from the findings and
orders of the court issued on “3/20/26- Special Hearing” and explains it refers
to the “special hearing as to agency providing father, who speaks AND reads

Haitian Creole, all social worker reports in his native language.”2 The notice
of appeal does not list any other date or order. Father’s opening brief, by
contrast, does not set forth any argument or claim of error relating to the

2 Father’s opening brief on appeal also confirms that he “appealed from
the court’s denial of his counsel’s request that all reports be translated to
Father’s native language of Haitian Creole.”

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denial of his request to have the Agency reports translated.3 Instead, Father
argues the juvenile court did not comply with UCCJEA. Because Father’s
notice of appeal only sought review of the trial court’s March order and it did
not identify any other order, it is inadequate and does not allow us to review

his UCCJEA claim.4 (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 173
[“The policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal in favor of its
sufficiency . . . does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as
reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all”].)
B. UCCJEA
Even if we were to exercise our discretion to consider Father’s UCCJEA
claim, we would find no error.
1. Guiding Principles
The UCCJEA “ ‘is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between
states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote cooperation between
states, and facilitate enforcement of another state’s custody decrees.’ ” (In re
Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 516.) Thus, the UCCJEA ensures that
only one state has jurisdiction to make child custody determinations at a time
and it “takes a strict ‘first in time’ approach to jurisdiction.” (Segal v.
Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, 702–703; In re Marriage of Paillier
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 461, 469.)
“ ‘[A] court ‘has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination’ if it is the child’s home state.” (Segal, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th

3 Father has forfeited any arguments regarding the translation order due
to his failure to make them in his appellate briefing. (See, e.g., Asaro v.
Maniscalco (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 717, 728, fn. 4.)

4 In his briefing, Father does not address the deficiencies in his notice to
appeal.

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at p. 703, fn. 6, quoting Family Code section 3421, subd. (a)(1).5) “ ‘Home
state’ means the state in which the child lived with a parent or person acting
as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding” even if the child is absent from
the state so long as a parent continues to live there. (Fam. Code § 3402,
subd. (g), § 3421, subd. (a)(1).) “In the case of a child less than six months of
age, the term [‘home state’] means the state in which the child lived from
birth with [a parent or person acting as a parent].” (§ 3402, subd. (g).) “The
general rule of the UCCJEA, subject to certain delineated exceptions, is that
once the court of an appropriate state—that is, one having jurisdiction under
its terms—has made an initial child custody determination, that court
obtains exclusive, continuing subject matter jurisdiction over the child.”
(A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 523 (A.H.).)
Alternatively, a court can exercise jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination if (1) a court of another state does not have home state
jurisdiction “or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum . . .”
and (2) both of the following are true: “(A) The child and the child’s parents,
or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a
significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence. [¶]
(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships.” (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2); see In
re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 668.)
“On appeal, ‘when the facts are contested, a trial court’s jurisdictional
finding under the UCCJEA is reviewed under the deferential substantial
evidence standard. When conducting a substantial evidence review, we must

5 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling or judgment being
reviewed, and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the family [or
juvenile] court’s findings. The[trial] . . . court’s resolution of conflicts in the
evidence and credibility assessments are binding on this court.’ In contrast,
we review de novo, or independently, a . . . court’s determination of
jurisdictional facts based on undisputed evidence and its interpretation of
statutes.” (In re A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 669–670, fn. omitted.)
2. Additional Background
When the Agency filed the dependency petitions in October 2025, W.R.
was eight years old and M.C. was five months old. W.R. was born in Haiti.
M.C. was born in Florida. Mother and Father both reported they had lived in
the United States for approximately one year. Prior to moving to the United
States, Mother and Father lived in Mexico. Father stated he had lived in San
Diego for approximately one year, had a work permit, was seeking
employment, received public benefits, attended school to learn English, and
had a cousin in the area. Mother stated she moved to San Diego from Florida
one month after M.C. was born. Mother and Father denied any prior
involvement with any child welfare agency in San Diego or Florida. Mother
and Father indicated in the parentage inquiry forms that no court had ever
entered a paternity judgment or order for child support. Mother also
informed the court that there was “no judgment as to who [W.R.’s] father is
and no custody orders” in Haiti or anywhere else.
Father reported W.R. was enrolled at a local elementary school and
M.C. attended day care. Both children were enrolled in Medi-Cal health
insurance and M.C. was a patient at a local health center.
3. Analysis

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Father contends we should reverse the trial court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional findings and orders because the trial court did not inquire into
the existence of child welfare or custody proceedings in “Florida or any other
states and countries in which the children previously resided.” We disagree.
When a court is informed that a child custody proceeding took place
elsewhere, it “shall immediately communicate with the other court.” (§ 3424,
subd. (d).) Here, Mother and Father consistently denied the existence of any
prior custody orders or involvement with child welfare services in relation to
either child in Florida or anywhere else. They also signed and submitted
forms to the court affirming the same. Thus, the court’s duty to communicate
with other courts was not triggered as it was not informed of any other
proceedings or orders relating to the children. (In re C.T. (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 101, 110 [interpreting section 3424, subdivision (d) to
require contact with other court “as soon as possible after learning of the
existence” of other proceedings].)
Moreover, there was no evidence that any other state or country was
the children’s home state. Mother and W.R. lived in Florida for
approximately eight months from late 2024 to June 2025. M.C. was born in
Florida in May 2025, and Mother and the children left Florida when M.C.
was one month old. They then lived in San Diego for four months before the
dependency petitions were filed. As a result, Florida was not either child’s
home state because neither child lived there “for at least six consecutive
months immediately before” the Agency filed its petitions or in M.C.’s case
“from birth.” (§ 3402, subd. (g), italics added.) Additionally, neither parent
continued to reside in Florida as Mother had been in San Diego for four
months and Father had been in San Diego for one year. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).)

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Thus, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Florida was not the
children’s home state, and the court had no duty to contact courts in Florida.
To the extent Father contends the court should have inquired with
courts in Haiti, Chile, Indiana, and Mexico because one or both parents may
have resided there for various periods of time, his contentions are unavailing.
Five-month-old M.C. only lived in Florida and California. Therefore, no other
state or country could be M.C.’s home state. (In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
125, 140 [“Because R.L. never lived in Mexico, Mexico does not have home
state jurisdiction.”].) Mother and W.R. may have resided in other states and
countries for varying periods of time, but none were relevant to the home
state determination because they did not reside there “for at least six
consecutive months immediately before” the Agency filed its petitions.
(§ 3402, subd. (g).)
Acknowledging that neither child lived in California for six months
immediately before the dependency petitions were filed, the Agency contends
the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2).
The record contains substantial evidence showing Father and the
children had significant connections to California. Father lived in California
for at least one year before the petition was filed, had a work permit, was
seeking employment, received public benefits, attended school four days a
week to learn English, and had family in San Diego. (In re S.W. (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1509 [mother who remained in California and sought
public assistance in the state was not here temporarily].) Father’s cousin
supported Father and the children with childcare, transportation of the
children for visitation, and with the safety plan. (In re A.C., supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 676 [relative providing childcare and transportation to

9
medical appointments supported significant connection].) W.R. attended
third grade at a local elementary school and M.C. attended day care. Both
children were enrolled in Medi-Cal health insurance and M.C. was registered
at a local health center. (In re Marriage of Sareen (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
371, 381–382 [family relationships, parent’s work, child’s daycare and
schooling established significant connection to California].) Therefore, the
record shows that Father and the children had significant connections to
California when the dependency petitions were filed. (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(2)(A).)
We further conclude there was substantial evidence in California
regarding W.R.’s and M.C.’s “care, protection, training, and personal
relationships” at the time their dependency petitions were filed. (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(2)(B).) The domestic violence incidents that caused the children to
come to the attention of the Agency and the court occurred in California. The
San Diego Police Department responded to the incident and prepared reports.
After Mother dropped M.C., he received care at a San Diego hospital. The
family’s landlord and roommate witnessed prior arguments between Mother
and Father, and his home surveillance cameras captured the incident when
Mother dropped M.C. on the floor. Moreover, Father’s cousin and M.C.’s
daycare provider cared for both children and regularly assisted with
transportation. Accordingly, evidence regarding the children’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships existed in California.
(§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
Because there is substantial evidence to support the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2), we find no error.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.

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AMIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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