In re W.L. CA6

Filed 7/30/26 In re W.L. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re W.L., a Person Coming Under the H053832
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 24JD028283)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Respondent,

v.

K.L.,

Appellant.

This is the second appeal by K.L. (Mother) arising from juvenile dependency
proceedings involving her daughter, W.L., a five-year-old with special needs. In the first
appeal, Mother challenged the juvenile court’s disposition removing W.L. from her care.
We affirmed. (In re W.L. (Dec. 15, 2025, H053170) [nonpub. opn.].) Mother now
appeals the orders entered at the six-month review hearing. She argues that the juvenile
court erred in finding a substantial risk of detriment if W.L. were returned to her care
with family maintenance services; in addition, she argues that the Santa Clara County
Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) failed to provide reasonable
reunification services by refusing to “step down” supervised visitation to unsupervised
visitation. We are not persuaded by these arguments and will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Appeal
For context, we briefly summarize the relevant facts and history from the
proceedings addressed in our prior opinion.1
This matter came to the Department’s attention in November 2024, when law
enforcement placed Mother on an involuntary psychiatric hold under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5150 and took W.L., then three years old, into protective
custody.2 Officers had responded to multiple reports that Mother was behaving
erratically at a retail store late at night and appeared to be either under the influence or
experiencing a mental health crisis. Several witnesses reported that Mother had caused
W.L. to fall out of her stroller twice, shoved W.L. into the car, and drove off at high
speeds, swerving off the road and passing through stop signs with W.L. unsecured in the
car. Officers observed that Mother appeared “[s]uper manic,” disheveled, and had
difficulty speaking in coherent sentences; W.L. displayed visible signs of neglect,
including malnourishment. Mother later admitted to using methamphetamine that day,
after driving for almost a week with W.L. from Oklahoma to California.
An initial evaluation of W.L. diagnosed her with “failure to thrive” and found that
she was physically underdeveloped for her age, had “dental disease associated with
drinking bottles of milk well beyond the first year of life,” and exhibited “pervasive
developmental delay, including cognitive, speech, and motor delays.” The evaluation
concluded that W.L. “has experienced profound neglect, including supervisory and
medical neglect, beyond standards in our community.”

1 W.L.’s father is not a party to this appeal, and the findings pertaining to him are
not at issue. Accordingly, we recite only the information relevant to the juvenile court’s
findings and orders for Mother.
2 All undesignated statutory references herein are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2
In December 2024, the Department filed a petition under section 300,
subdivision (b), alleging that W.L. had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering,
serious physical harm or illness because of Mother’s inability to provide care as a result
of mental illness or substance abuse. Mother initially delayed the dependency
proceedings by objecting to her court-appointed attorney, initiating a paternity action in
Oklahoma, and seeking to have the dependency matter heard there. Mother was also
uncooperative with the Department, did not participate in her case plan, failed to provide
medical releases for W.L., minimized W.L.’s conditions, and discussed the dependency
proceedings with W.L. during her supervised visits despite repeated warnings from
visitation supervisors to refrain from doing so.
After resolving the question of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing in March 2025, where Mother continued to deny responsibility and
downplay the severity of W.L.’s condition. The court noted numerous concerns
regarding W.L.’s physical and developmental delays, and it found that Mother lacked
sufficient understanding of, and accountability for, those issues. The court ultimately
found sufficient evidence to support the allegations in the petition, declared W.L. a
dependent, removed her from Mother’s care, ordered reunification services, and ordered
supervised visitation, with the Department having the discretion to increase the frequency
and duration of visits.
Mother appealed, arguing that the removal order was not supported by the
evidence and violated her constitutional rights. This court found these arguments to be
unavailing, holding that the record contained substantial evidence of W.L.’s “profound
neglect” while in Mother’s care, Mother’s repeated noncompliance, and her continued
failure to acknowledge the risk she posed to W.L. This court affirmed the juvenile
court’s orders.

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B. The Six-Month Review and Contested Hearing
In September 2025, while Mother’s prior appeal was still pending, the juvenile
court held a six-month review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e). Mother
opposed the Department’s recommendation to continue family reunification services and
not return W.L. to her care with family maintenance services, and so the matter was set
for a contested hearing the following month.
At the contested hearing, the court received the Department’s reports and heard
testimony from Mother, her therapist, and the social worker. Minor’s counsel agreed
with the Department’s recommendations and expressed the concern that “[W.L.] requires
a high level of care[,] and [Mother] still has a lot of work to do … to gain permanent
stabilization.” By contrast, Mother argued that the Department had not met its burden of
showing detriment to W.L. if she were returned to Mother’s care, and also the
Department had failed to provide reasonable reunification services by limiting Mother to
supervised visits. Alternatively, Mother requested that the court exercise its discretion to
order unsupervised visitation.
By the time of the hearing, W.L. had been diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorder and required additional services, including behavioral therapy, physical therapy,
and an assessment for therapeutic counseling. Since her removal, it was also reported
that W.L. had made significant progress: she had gained weight, was eating well, was
potty-trained, and had enrolled in a child care center that could support her
developmental and academic needs. Mother acknowledged that W.L. had been
malnourished and had had a speech delay while in her care, and that she (Mother) should
have sought and prioritized medical care for W.L. The social worker reported that
although W.L. appeared “a bit dysregulated” after her visits with Mother, the supervised
visits were going well in the structured environment provided by the Department. The
Department had also moved Mother’s visits from a closely observed area to a less
restrictive location, allowing Mother “more free range with [W.L.].”

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The evidence showed that, in contrast to her actions prior to the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, Mother was actively participating in her case plan, making use of the
services and referrals provided by the Department and attending most of W.L.’s medical
appointments, although Mother cancelled and “no-showed” a number of appointments
related to W.L.’s therapeutic assessment. Mother completed parenting classes,
underwent a psychological evaluation, engaged in weekly individual therapy, and
attended monthly appointments with a psychiatrist to manage her medications for
anxiety, including benzodiazepine. She also participated in random drug testing,
although she missed four tests and had two positive tests for alcohol; Mother initially
attributed those results to using mouthwash and brushing her teeth before testing.
Mother was diagnosed by her psychiatrist, Dr. William Yang, with generalized
anxiety disorder, and she also reported prior diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and post-
traumatic stress disorder. Her psychological evaluation, conducted by Dr. Anh D.
Weber, noted that although she had a history of higher education and above-average
cognitive abilities, her mental health challenges impaired her judgment, insight, and
ability to provide W.L. with appropriate and stable care. Mother’s symptoms appeared to
be “poorly managed,” she showed “limited insight into the impact of her mental health on
her parenting” ability. Mother “demonstrated difficulty understanding and meeting her
child’s developmental and emotional needs[,]” and remained focused on “her own
distress and desire for reunification, without fully acknowledging the child’s condition or
the reasons for removal.” Weber recommended ongoing medication monitoring,
individual and group therapy, trauma-focused treatment or cognitive behavioral therapy,
dialectical behavior therapy, dyadic therapy, and parenting education for special needs
children.
Mother’s therapist, Cheryl Mims, who had treated her for anxiety since the
disposition hearing, testified that Mother had made progress in managing her symptoms.
Mims explained that Mother’s anxiety was tied to the dependency proceedings and likely

5
would not further improve until reunification, stating that Mother had reached a point
where “it is about as good as she’s going to get.” Mims stated that Mother no longer met
the criteria for treatment through their clinic’s outpatient specialty program, although she
did not oppose continued therapy as recommended in the psychological evaluation.
Mims also acknowledged that their therapy had not addressed the role that Mother’s
conduct had played in putting W.L. at risk.
Despite Mother’s active participation in her case plan, the Department remained
concerned over her management of her medications, her understanding of W.L.’s special
needs, and her ability to manage and stabilize her ongoing mental health issues. One
month prior to the initial six-month review hearing, Mother had voluntarily admitted
herself into an inpatient psychiatric hospital. Hospital records attached to the social
worker’s reports indicated that leading up to her hospitalization, Mother reported
“depressive symptoms,” “suicidal thoughts,” and “escalating substance use.” At the
hearing, Mother acknowledged that she was not managing her anxiety well and was self-
medicating with marijuana and alcohol. The hospital discharged her six days later with
diagnoses of depression and anxiety disorder. It also adjusted her anxiety medication and
prescribed medication to “decrease alcohol cravings.” Mother explained that she had
begun experiencing withdrawal symptoms after her psychiatrist reduced her medication
dosage, and she became distressed when she learned that the Department was not
recommending W.L.’s return at the six-month review. She stated that she did “every
single thing” in the case plan “in order to be reunited with [W.L.],” and she felt hopeless
that the Department would nonetheless continue to recommend W.L.’s removal from her
care. As a result, she used marijuana once and alcohol twice to manage her anxiety, and
these are the circumstances that led her to admit herself to the hospital.
The Department noted other concerns, including the social worker’s observations
that Mother sometimes appeared “manic” and “visibly nervous and shaky.” Mother had
also sent “incohesive and emotionally reactive” text messages to the social worker,

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claiming that the social worker and the Department were “racist,” and the social worker
continued to experience ongoing issues with Mother’s lack of insight “into the impact of
her mental health on her parenting” and the lack of transparency regarding her
prescription medications. Additionally, although the Department had provided Mother
with housing referrals since the disposition hearing, Mother had only recently secured a
transitional housing unit; after several months, Mother would be expected to search for
employment and begin paying rent by the spring of 2026. The social worker testified
that she hoped Mother would be able to maintain stability in the new housing
arrangement, but it was too soon to assess whether she could do so at that point.
C. The Findings and Orders
After taking the matter under submission, the juvenile court delivered its ruling on
November 3, 2025. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the
Department had provided reasonable services. The court listed numerous examples of
the Department’s efforts, including frequent and ongoing contact with Mother,
coordinating visitations with W.L., connecting Mother with mental health providers, and
providing referrals to parenting classes and housing services. The court did not agree
with Mother’s argument that the Department’s refusal to liberalize visitation was a denial
of reasonable services, concluding that it was a “reasonable decision” by the Department
that Mother was not ready at that time for a “step down” from supervised visitation.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a substantial
risk of harm in returning W.L. to Mother’s care. While it acknowledged Mother’s
“excellent” and “consistent” efforts, the court also noted that Mother’s “progress in
addressing the underlying issues, while ongoing, is not where we need it to be for a
return.” Mother still needed to work on “gaining insight on how her choices impact
[W.L.],” and how to meet W.L.’s special needs. According to the court, Mother’s
“mental health” was the “crux of the issue,” and her “lack of insight remain[ed] a major

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concern.” The court referred to its “own observations of [Mother] … in court 11 times
over the past 10 months.” Mother was “unable to answer questions directly … without
going off on tangents,” “had a hard time containing herself and being still,” exhibited
“constant activity and movement,” “often talked over others, had a hard time listening,”
and often provided “slippery” answers in court such that the court was left with “the
feeling of not being sure what the actual answer was.” The court read extensive portions
of the psychological evaluation in which the evaluator noted similar behaviors and
concluded that Mother’s “ongoing mental health concerns are likely to impair her
emotional regulation and judgment, particularly when faced with stress or high pressure
situations.”
The court did emphasize that Mother’s behaviors had improved over the course of
the dependency proceedings and encouraged her to continue with therapy and to stay on
her path toward reunification with W.L. The court stated that it needed “to see a longer
track record of [Mother] showing emotional regulation and emotional stability,” as well
as “insight and accountability” for the circumstances that led the family to dependency
court, to reduce the risk to W.L. The court adopted the Department’s recommendation
for continued reunification services, including supervised visitation, and set the matter for
a 12-month status review hearing in early 2026.
Mother timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
As noted above, Mother challenges the following findings from the juvenile court:
(1) returning W.L. to her care at the six-month review would have created a substantial
risk of detriment to W.L.’s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being, and
(2) the Department provided reasonable reunification services. Mother further argues
that at a minimum, the juvenile court should have ordered less restrictive visitation to

8
support her reunification with W.L. Applying the governing standards of review, we
discern no error in the juvenile court’s ruling.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘Dependency proceedings span up to four stages: jurisdiction, disposition,
reunification, and permanency. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373, 377.)
During the reunification stage, “[w]hen a child has been removed from a parent’s
custody, the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the
reunification of the family.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624
(Michael G.).) “Such services may, depending on the case, include evaluations and
assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse treatment and testing, and
other forms of assistance.” (Ibid.) The court must also hold periodic review hearings,
ordinarily at six-month intervals, to evaluate the status of reunification efforts and next
steps. (§ 366.21; see also Michael G., supra, at p. 625.)
At the six-month review hearing, “after considering the admissible and relevant
evidence, the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their
parent … unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of
the child to their parent … would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)
“If the child is not returned to their parent … the court shall determine by clear and
convincing evidence whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent …
in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of
the child have been provided or offered to the parent.” (Id., subd. (e)(8).)
We review these rulings for substantial evidence, construing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party and “keep[ing] in mind that the purpose of the
reunification plan is ‘to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place.’ ”
(In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1483 [substantial evidence standard for

9
detriment finding]; In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061 [substantial evidence
standard for reasonable services finding].) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question … is whether the record as
a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012.)
We review the juvenile court’s visitation orders for abuse of discretion, applying
a “ ‘very high degree of deference to … the juvenile court.’ [Citation.]” (In re R.M.
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 134–135.) “We determine whether the order exceeded the
bounds of reason and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the
juvenile court. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 135.)
B. The Juvenile Court’s Detriment Finding
The record is undisputed that, by the time of the six-month review hearing, Mother
was actively participating in her case plan. Mother argues that given this active
participation and her progress to date, the court’s finding of detriment rested “largely on
speculative concerns” about her mental health and parenting capacity, rather than
evidence of a present risk of harm to W.L.
This argument does not rest on a fair characterization of the evidence. As Mother
acknowledges, “a parent’s compliance with the case plan is not a guarantee the child will
be returned to the parent.” (In re Jacob P. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 819, 830.) The
juvenile court must still consider whether the parent eliminated the conditions leading to
the child’s removal and whether the child would be safe in the parent’s custody. (See
In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141–1142.) The court may consider a

10
parent’s lack of insight when assessing whether a child may be safely returned home, so
long as the observation is supported by evidence. (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 865–867.)
Here, the juvenile court’s detriment finding rested primarily on Mother’s limited
insight into the effect of her mental health on her ability to care for W.L., who has special
needs and requires ongoing services. Although the juvenile court acknowledged
Mother’s efforts and improvements, it concluded that Mother had not yet fully addressed
the problems that led to W.L.’s removal. The juvenile court’s concerns were not
speculative; they were grounded in concrete facts that Mother largely did not dispute:
W.L. entered the dependency system after Mother experienced a mental health crisis;
W.L. was malnourished, underdeveloped, and exhibited signs of profound neglect; and
Mother failed to prioritize W.L.’s medical care. As noted earlier, just one month before
the original six-month review hearing, Mother again experienced a mental health crisis,
voluntarily admitting herself to an inpatient psychiatric hospital for six days after
reporting depressive symptoms, suicidal thoughts, and escalating substance use. The
record showed that, despite months of therapy, Mother continued to struggle with anxiety
and depression and had self-medicated with marijuana and alcohol. Although Mother
showed growth in admitting herself to a hospital, she largely attributed the hospitalization
to external circumstances, including medication changes and the Department’s
recommendation against W.L.’s return, rather than showing accountability regarding her
ongoing mental health instability and acknowledging how it could affect her ability to
meet W.L.’s daily needs.
The juvenile court’s finding also relied on Mother’s psychological evaluation, the
social worker’s observations, and its own observations of Mother in court, all of which
reflected continuing emotional instability and a limited understanding of the impact of
her mental health on her parenting. On the present record, it was reasonable for the
juvenile court to conclude that Mother had not yet sufficiently ameliorated the

11
circumstances that led to W.L.’s removal and that returning W.L. to Mother’s care at the
six-month review hearing would create a substantial risk of detriment to W.L.3
Mother repeatedly points to selected evidence that she believes is favorable to her:
e.g., her therapist Cheryl Mims’s testimony, Mother’s acknowledgment of her errors
leading to W.L.’s removal, and her positive visits with W.L. In essence, this is an
invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, something that we cannot do on appeal. (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we
do not inquire whether the evidence could potentially support a finding that is contrary to
the finding made by the juvenile court; rather, we review whether the record contains
evidence, contradicted or not, that supports the finding that was made. (Adoption of A.B.
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 925; In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 857 [we “ ‘affirm
the order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.’ [Citation.]”].)
For the reasons already stated, we conclude that it does.
C. The Juvenile Court’s Reasonable Services Finding
Mother goes on to argue that because she was limited to supervised visits with
W.L. during this review period, the Department failed to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, that it provided reasonable reunification services.
“Reunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But they should be
tailored to the specific needs of the particular family.” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) The Department provides reasonable services when it
“identif[ies] the problems leading to the loss of custody, offer[s] services designed to
remedy those problems, maintain[s] reasonable contact with the parents,” and makes

3 Mother argues that the juvenile court could have returned W.L. to her care under
a family maintenance plan, and that the availability of that option “confirms that
continued removal was not required.” Mother’s argument rests on the faulty premise that
W.L. could be safely returned to her care, even with ongoing services. The juvenile court
specifically rejected that premise.

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“reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.”
(In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.)
Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding that the Department
maintained consistent contact with her, coordinated her visits with W.L., set up child and
family team meetings, connected her with providers and resources to address her mental
health, and provided her with referrals to support her housing needs. Instead, her position
is that the Department’s refusal to permit unsupervised visitation, standing alone,
rendered the services unreasonable.
There is no doubt that visitation is an essential component of reunification
services. (In re A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) Section 362.1, subdivision (a)
requires that “any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services,
shall provide ... [¶] ... for visitation between the parent ... and the child.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) “Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-
being of the child.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, Mother cites no authority, and we are aware of
none, holding that the Department’s refusal to “step down” visitation to accommodate a
parent’s subjective belief that she is ready for unsupervised visits renders reunification
services unreasonable. Indeed, the law is settled that “ ‘a parent’s liberty interest in the
care, custody and companionship of children cannot be maintained at the expense of their
well-being.’ [Citation.]” (In re A.O., supra, at p. 1062.) Thus, “ ‘[w]hile visitation is a
key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children
“and on the elimination of conditions” ’ ” that led to dependency proceedings. (Ibid.)
In this case, the record contains substantial evidence that the Department made
reasonable efforts to arrange and facilitate visitation between Mother and W.L. in a
manner consistent with W.L.’s safety and well-being. Contrary to Mother’s claim, the
record shows that, although her visits remained supervised, the Department liberalized
visitation by moving them to a less restrictive location, giving Mother greater freedom to
interact with W.L. By the time of the six-month review hearing, the evidence showed

13
that Mother, while being on “the path” towards reunification with W.L., had not yet
progressed to the point where unsupervised visitation was considered appropriate. As
noted, substantial evidence supported both the Department’s and the juvenile court’s
concerns that Mother’s ongoing mental health issues continued to affect her ability to
provide W.L. with a safe and stable environment. The social worker expressly pointed
out that the supervised visits had gone well “because the visits are observed, structured,
and have a safe play environment.” On this record, the Department did not act
unreasonably in declining to move to unsupervised visitation at this stage of the
proceedings. Liberalized but still supervised visitation, standing alone, did not render the
reunification services unreasonable.
Mother’s reliance on Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415,
1419 (Tracy J.), is misplaced. In Tracy J., over the course of 12 months, the parents—
who were developmentally disabled—had not been informed about their child’s medical
appointments in advance, did not receive any instruction on how to recognize their
child’s special needs, were not referred to the requisite parenting programs, and were not
offered services designed to address the mother’s specific physical disabilities. (Id. at
pp. 1419–1420, 1427–1428.) There, the limitations on the parents’ visits were based
primarily on the fact that they were disabled without any evidence that their behavior had
jeopardized or would jeopardize the child’s safety. (Id. at p. 1427.) Here, by contrast,
Mother does not dispute that the Department provided her with reasonable resources to
address the issues that led to W.L.’s dependency. Furthermore, unlike in Tracy J., the
limitation on Mother’s visitation was directly based on the determination that she
continued to pose a risk to W.L.’s safety, not based solely on any untreated disability.
We conclude that the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding was supported
by substantial evidence.

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D. The Juvenile Court’s Discretion to Continue Supervised Visitation
As a final alternative, Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying her request for unsupervised visits, given that she had made significant progress.
She points to the evidence that her recent visits with W.L. had been appropriate and
positive, as well as evidence that she completed her parenting classes, maintained regular
drug testing, consistently participated in therapy, and secured housing.
Again, Mother’s argument appears to be another invitation to ignore the standard
of review and reweigh the evidence. “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the [juvenile] court.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) On the present record, the juvenile court acted within its
discretion in maintaining supervised visits. As stated above, its decision was supported
by substantial evidence and did not exceed the bounds of reason.
We recognize Mother’s efforts and commitment to W.L., and we echo the juvenile
court’s hope that she continues to make progress towards reunification. At the same
time, the dependency scheme requires that the juvenile court place the child’s safety and
well-being at the forefront of its considerations.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s November 3, 2025 findings and orders from the six-month
review hearing are affirmed.

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CHUNG, J.

WE CONCUR:

GREENWOOD, P. J.

DANNER, J.

In re W.L.; Santa Clara County DFCS v. K.L.
H053832


Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.