In re W.A. CA2/2

Filed 9/30/26 In re W.A. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re W.A., a Person Coming Under B347519
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01381A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.A. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant M.A.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant S.A.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
S.A. (Mother) and M.A. (Father) each appeal the juvenile
court’s dispositional order. Mother appeals W.A.’s removal from
her custody, while Father appeals the court’s requirement he
participate in a drug and alcohol program. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prior History
The family came to the attention of law enforcement for
three domestic violence incidents resulting in arrests.
In April 2024, Mother was arrested after arguing with
Father at the family home while W.A., then less than two years
old, was present. Mother threw objects at Father and kicked him;
Father pushed Mother and pulled her hair to prevent her from
leaving. When Mother ran from the home, Father pursued her in
his car. W.A. was left alone in the home for five or 10 minutes.
In October 2024, police arrested Father at the family home
after Father threw Mother to the ground. D.G.F., maternal
grandmother (Grandmother), witnessed the incident and said
W.A. was playing in his bedroom at the time.
In February 2025, Mother was arrested after Father
reported she ran over his foot with her car, sprayed him with
pepper spray, and told him, “You deserve to die.” Mother
admitted pepper spraying him because she feared for her safety
when he aggressively reached into her car window.
About a week later, Father obtained a temporary
restraining order (TRO) requiring Mother to stay away from both
him and W.A. Father called police five times to report Mother
came to the family home, despite the TRO. Thereafter, Mother
obtained a TRO against Father. Mother later stated that despite
the orders, Father had come to see her on two occasions and “her
location via her car or phone.

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II. Current Case Petition and Jurisdictional Hearing
This case arose in March 2025 when the Ventura County
Human Services Agency (Agency) received a referral after Father
was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), over
100 miles per hour, with W.A. in the backseat. Father failed a
field sobriety test and refused a blood test. When his blood was
eventually drawn four and a half hours later, Father’s blood
alcohol content was 0.126 percent.
Agency social workers arrived at the scene to secure W.A.
and commence their investigation. When interviewed, Father
said he was driving home after spending the day at the beach in
Malibu with W.A.; he denied drinking any alcohol and driving
over 100 miles per hour.
A few days later, the juvenile court temporarily detained
W.A. from both parents pending the jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing. W.A. was placed with Grandmother in the
family home.
The Agency’s investigation revealed that Father abused
alcohol and the parents had a volatile relationship, punctuated
by mutual violence.
Father’s drinking often precipitated the couple’s arguments
and violent interactions. Mother said Father was intoxicated
multiple times a week, and when he is drunk, he fights with her
and sometimes hits her. She claimed Father had used marijuana
and mushrooms in the past. Grandmother said Father is an
alcoholic who stays out all night and returns home the next
morning, drunk and quite loud. Father had a job at the maternal
grandfather’s business, but he was fired when he was thrown out
of a client’s restaurant for being drunk during work. Neighbors
had seen Father drunk on several occasions.

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As to domestic violence, the parents accused each other of
weekly aggression and violence from the beginning of their
relationship. In addition to the three prior incidents that resulted
in arrests: (1) Father hit Mother’s stomach while she was
six months pregnant with W.A.; (2) Mother hit Father in the head
with a knife stand; and (3) Father pushed Mother to the ground
after W.A.’s first birthday party, kicked and bloodied her face,
and pulled her back inside the home when she attempted to flee.
Neighbors confirmed hearing loud arguments between them.
Grandmother said the arguments frequently took place in W.A.’s
presence.
The parents vacillated about the future of their
relationship. Initially, in March 2025, both wanted a divorce. By
April 2025, they planned to reconcile and live together as a
family. Father denied having an alcohol problem, and Mother
denied violence had occurred in their relationship.
The Agency’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001
petition alleged juvenile court jurisdiction with respect to W.A.
arising from: (1) Father’s DUI arrest; (2) Father’s incarceration
after his arrest; (3) Father’s “substance abuse issues, including
but not limited to alcohol”; (4) Father’s verbal abuse and physical
violence against Mother; (5) Mother’s verbal abuse and physical
violence against Father; and (6) Mother’s failure to protect W.A.
from Father’s substance abuse. At the jurisdictional hearing in
May 2025, the Agency withdrew the failure to protect allegation
against Mother.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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Both parents waived their rights to contest the remaining
allegations of the petition. The juvenile court sustained the
petition. Among other things, the court ordered Father to submit
to random drug testing.
III. Transfer to Los Angeles
After the jurisdictional hearing, the case was transferred
from Ventura Superior Court to Los Angeles Superior Court. The
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) assumed responsibility for the case.
The parents vacated their TRO’s, dismissed their pending
restraining order requests, and proceeded with their plan to
reconcile. They lived together in hotels or cars.
During May and June 2025, Father missed three drug
tests. The first was because of a scheduling error, but Father
missed two tests thereafter because “he does not have time . . . to
look at the site daily.”
In late May 2025, Mother sent DCFS various complaints
about Father and Grandmother. She said she might seek a
restraining order against Grandmother on the ground
Grandmother was “abusing her.” The purported abuse included
messages from Grandmother asking Mother to: show
appreciation for Grandmother’s care of W.A.; focus on Mother’s
reunification with W.A.; and not forgive Father too quickly.
Grandmother said Mother had accused her of “ ‘ridiculous’ ”
things, such as trying to take over both the family home and W.A.
Grandmother tried to be polite to Mother “ ‘because if I tell her
she is wrong, she will throw more things at me.’ ” However,
Grandmother said she “ ‘would never call the police’ ” if a verbal
altercation with Mother escalated. Grandmother told DCFS she
did not call the police during the parents’ past violent

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altercations because “she did not feel it was her place to do so.”
DCFS was concerned that if Mother returned to the family home,
she and Grandmother may have physical conflict and not call law
enforcement for assistance, which would put W.A. at risk.
In June and July 2025, Mother e-mailed the DCFS social
worker multiple times complaining about her relationship with
Father, including Father’s purported infidelity, Father’s stealing
money from Mother, threats Father made, and arguments they
had with each other. Mother claimed she was not living with
Father and had reported him to federal immigration authorities
for a fraudulent marriage.
The parents became less cooperative with DCFS as the
dispositional hearing approached. Mother believed the
dependency case arose solely from Father’s DUI arrest and did
not acknowledge DCFS’s concern with the parents’ mutual
domestic violence. Mother said she completed an online domestic
violence support group, where she learned “ ‘not to react’ ” to
violence.
Mother said she and Father had two sessions of conjoint
therapy and their relationship was “ ‘really good.’ ” Later, Mother
told DCFS she did not really communicate with Father outside of
counseling.
Father claimed he and Mother were currently living
together in a hotel and had no issues with each other. He was
shocked and upset to learn Mother told DCFS she had reported
him to immigration authorities.
IV. Dispositional Hearing
The dispositional hearing was held in early July 2025.
DCFS’s and W.A.’s counsel each recommended W.A. be removed
from both parents, in part because the parents failed to

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acknowledge their dangerous pattern of domestic violence and
continued to live together while arguing and threatening each
other. However, W.A.’s counsel sought unmonitored visits for
Mother.
Mother’s counsel argued W.A. should be returned to
Mother, possibly with the condition she live with Grandmother
and W.A. in the family home. Mother was committed to
reunifying with W.A., had positive visits with him, and was
showing progress in her domestic violence classes and conjoint
counseling.
Father objected to being ordered to complete “a full drug
program,” in addition to the Alcoholics Anonymous and DUI
programs that were already part of his criminal case.
The juvenile court determined there was clear and
convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the physical and
emotional well-being of W.A., and no reasonable means to protect
his physical and emotional health without removing him from the
parents. (See § 361, subd. (c).) While the court recognized the
parents had begun education and treatment programs, it was
“too soon” and “premature” for either one to regain custody of
W.A. The court rejected Father’s request to substitute the
programs ordered in his criminal case for those of the juvenile
court. It granted Mother unmonitored visits with W.A.
Mother and Father each timely appealed. (See § 395,
subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)

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DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Order Removing
W.A. from Mother
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A child may be removed from a parent’s custody upon clear
and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned
home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor
from the [parent’s] physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
“ ‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high
probability. . . .’ . . . Actual harm to a child is not necessary . . . .”
(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154, citations omitted.)
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
challenged order. (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) We
will affirm a removal order “supported by substantial evidence”
(ibid.), keeping in mind that because the juvenile court’s finding
must be based on clear and convincing evidence, “the record
[must] contain[] substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the existence of that fact to be highly
probable” (id. at p. 149).
B. Merits
This record contains substantial evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s order removing W.A. from Mother’s custody.
Mother’s ongoing, volatile relationship with Father, characterized
by a recurring pattern of mutual domestic violence, posed a
substantial danger to W.A. “Even if a child suffers no physical
harm due to domestic violence, a ‘cycle of violence between . . .
parents constitute[s] a failure to protect [a child] “from the

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substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering
serious physical harm or illness from it.” ’ ” (In re V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) Moreover, “[a] parent’s denial of
domestic violence increases the risk of it recurring.” (Ibid.)
The parents’ mutual domestic violence began before W.A.
was born, and continued for years until both obtained TRO’s,
including at least the six incidents summarized above. Police
came to the family home for domestic violence on three occasions,
when W.A. was present, and arrested Mother twice and Father
once. Even when TRO’s were in place, both parents repeatedly
violated them, including Father’s tracking Mother and arriving
at her hotel drunk with W.A. in the car.
The parents’ toxic and volatile relationship continued
through the pendency of this case. By around April 2025, the
parents had agreed to reconcile and were living together. Mother
gave inconsistent accounts of her relationship with Father,
alternatively claiming she did not talk to him much (despite
living with him), or they had a really good relationship (despite
her imminently reporting him to immigration authorities for
fraud). And notwithstanding a well-documented history of
domestic violence in her relationship with Father, Mother not
only refused to acknowledge her role in that violence, but denied
any violence had ever occurred.
The parents’ ongoing volatile relationship, punctuated by
violence that Mother denied, amounts to substantial evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s removal of W.A. from Mother. (See
In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [“an ongoing cycle of
domestic violence” and the father’s denial of violence were
substantial evidence supporting removal from the father’s
custody].)

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That Mother attended a few counseling sessions and
completed a domestic violence program in the two months
between the jurisdictional hearing and the dispositional hearing
is commendable, but her progress did not eliminate the danger to
W.A. Mother’s attendance in counseling was inconsistent, and
she acknowledged limited accountability for how her own
behavior contributed to a risk to W.A. Mother still believed the
only reason for the dependency case was Father’s DUI, believed
her relationship with Father was “really good,” and denied past
violence. Thus, the juvenile court reasonably determined it was
premature to return W.A. to her care. (See In re V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 [while the father made some progress in
his programs, “we cannot second-guess an order supported by
substantial evidence”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293
[“ ‘[d]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether
persons are likely to modify their behavior’ ”].)
Mother argues the evidence shows she was merely a victim
of Father’s violence. We disagree. The uncontested allegations of
the jurisdictional petition included that Mother “recurrently
engages in domestic disputes” involving “verbal abuse and
physical violence,” and Mother’s “failure to address the ongoing
domestic violence placed [W.A.] at substantial risk of physical
and emotional harm.” Mother was twice arrested for domestic
violence against Father while W.A. was in the family home. Thus,
Mother’s reliance upon cases involving nonoffending parents is
misplaced. (See In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 961 [the
father was a victim of the mother’s abuse, reported her actions to
authorities, and did not commit abuse]; In re Ma.V. (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 11, 22–23 [jurisdiction unwarranted where

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perpetrator of violence had left the family home and the mother
had no contact with him for intervening 10 months].)
Finally, Mother argues she should have been allowed to
live with W.A. and Grandmother in the family home. But the
juvenile court reasonably determined that would not diminish the
danger to W.A. Grandmother’s presence had not deterred past
violence between the parents, and Grandmother did not call the
police during the parents’ prior verbal and physical altercations.
In addition, there was evidence Mother had a volatile
relationship with Grandmother: Mother claimed Grandmother
abused her, Mother threatened to obtain a TRO against her, and
Mother sought to remove W.A. from Grandmother’s custody.
This record does not suggest Grandmother’s presence in the
home would sufficiently protect W.A. or prevent violence between
the parents, particularly where Mother continued to deny her
role in that violence. (See In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 157–158 [home visits by DCFS would not prevent domestic
violence, particularly when the father denied past violence].)
II. The Juvenile Court Reasonably Ordered Father to
Participate in an Alcohol and Drug Program
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a child is a dependent of the juvenile court, the court
“ ‘has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and
protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order
accordingly.’ ” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071;
see § 362, subd. (a).) That can include directing the child’s
parents “to participate in a counseling or education program.”
(§ 362, subd. (d).) However, “orders must be ‘reasonable’ and
‘designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s
finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.’ ”

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(In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229; see also § 362,
subd. (d).)
“We review the juvenile court’s disposition case plan for an
abuse of discretion.” (In re D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071;
see also In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006
[clear abuse of discretion required for reversal].) A court abuses
its discretion when its decision “exceeded the bounds of reason.”
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) “[T]he
paramount concern always must be the child’s best interests, and
we cannot reverse a disposition order reasonably fashioned to
eliminate the conditions that led to dependency jurisdiction.”
(In re D.P., at p. 1071.)
B. Merits
The juvenile court appropriately required Father to
participate in a “[f]ull drug/alcohol program” as part of his case
plan. Contrary to Father’s suggestion, jurisdiction was not based
on “a single DUI incident.” Father did not contest the allegations
of the jurisdictional petition, which included his “substance abuse
issues” as “evidenced by a substance abuse related criminal
history.” “ ‘[S]ubstance abuse,’ ” as used in section 300,
essentially means “the excessive use of drugs or alcohol” so as to
“render a parent . . . unable to provide regular care for a child
and either cause the child to suffer serious physical harm or
illness or place the child at substantial risk of suffering such
harm or illness.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 531; see also
§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).)
The juvenile court’s order is reasonably designed to address
Father’s substance abuse, which is “a problem that prevents the
child’s safe return to parental custody.” (In re Nolan W., supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 1229; cf. In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696,

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726 [where insufficient evidence supported the jurisdictional
finding of substance abuse, “treatment orders aimed at
eliminating that invalidated jurisdictional finding must also be
reversed”].)
Because Father’s uncontested substance abuse was one
reason W.A. was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
Father’s reliance upon cases involving a nonoffending parent or
with minimal evidence of substance abuse is misplaced. (See In re
Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177, 180 [insufficient evidence
to require nonoffending parent to attend parenting classes]; In re
Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957, 960 [drug testing could not
be imposed upon the father where only evidence of his drug use
was “the unsworn and uncorroborated allegation of [the mother,]
an admitted drug addict”]; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
155, 172–173 [drug testing could not be imposed where there was
no evidence of substance abuse].)
Father argues it was unreasonable to require him to
complete a program for alcohol and drugs, because the evidence
suggested he abused only alcohol. Not so. In addition to Mother’s
claim of Father’s past mushroom and marijuana use, Father
missed three drug tests in May and June 2025. The juvenile court
could “properly treat [those] as . . . positive test[s].” (L.C. v.
Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1036.)
Without citing any authority, Father argues the juvenile
court could not consider those missed tests because they occurred
after the jurisdictional hearing. We disagree. Father’s missed
drug tests, which are properly considered positive, are plainly
related to one of the reasons the juvenile court assumed
jurisdiction—Father’s substance abuse issues. Even if drug use
per se “had not yet affected [Father’s] ability to care for [W.A.],” it

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was reasonable for the juvenile court to address that issue in the
reunification plan by ordering Father to complete a full drug and
alcohol program. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1008.)
Finally, Father argues the drug and alcohol program “was
overly burdensome” in light of the other programs he was ordered
to complete—including a domestic violence program, a 12-step
program, and individual counseling. But “we cannot reverse a
disposition order reasonably fashioned to eliminate the conditions
that led to dependency jurisdiction, no matter how burdensome
its requirements may seem from the parent’s perspective.” (In re
D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071–1072.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.

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