Filed 11/4/26 In re V.K. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re V.K. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088447
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2600011)
v. OPINION
S.K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,
Judge. Affirmed.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy County Counsel.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
S.K. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order bypassing
reunification services to him under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(6) (hereafter section 361.5(b)(6)). On appeal, Father argues the juvenile
court erred in denying Father services under section 361.5(b)(6) because substantial
evidence does not support a clear and convincing “no benefit” finding and the juvenile
court failed to make the individualized child specific determination required by
section 361.5(b)(6) and section 361.5, subdivision (i).2 We disagree and affirm the order
denying Father reunification services.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2026, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services
(DPSS) filed a petition on behalf of then 15-year-old V.K., 14-year-old L.K., and 12-year-
old L.S.K. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual
abuse), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The petition alleged that Father sexually abused four
now adult siblings, that Mother was aware of the abuse and allowed Father to remain in
the home and provide care for the children. Specifically, the petition alleged Father
1 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise stated.
2 S.K. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. Mother and Father have five adult
children and three minor children.
2
anally penetrated D.K. on two occasions, raped A.K. three times, inappropriately touched
O.K., and showed N.K. pornography, forced her to give him oral copulation, forced oral
copulation upon her, manually stimulated her, and anally penetrated her with his penis.
The petition also alleged Father and Mother had a history of discouraging the children
from disclosing abuse or neglect. The petition further alleged V.K., L.K., and L.S.K.
were at risk of abuse due to the sexual abuse of their now adult siblings.
The family had 11 prior referrals for neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse of
the children between 2004 and 2023. In 2013, N.K. disclosed sexual abuse by Father
between the ages of five and 12. N.K. said the abuse stopped in 2009. At age 22, N.K.
moved out of the home and confronted Father who apologized and also admitted abusing
A.K. and O.K.
The parents had emigrated from Uzbekistan prior to the birth of their children.
The entire family were hearing impaired and required both an American Sign (ASL)
language interpreter and a Certified Deaf Interpreter. The two oldest children also had
severe autism. DPSS utilized an ASL video interpreting service to communicate with the
family. Mother confirmed that she preferred to communicate through ASL and to receive
letters and forms in English.
DPSS received the current referral on January 5, 2026, with allegations of sexual
abuse and general neglect. The family resided together in the same home apart from two
other adult siblings, N.K. and P.K. When DPSS met with Mother, she explained that “the
two oldest adult children, [A.K.] and [D.K.], are diagnosed with Autism, and everyone in
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the family is hearing impaired.” Mother confirmed the family was previously
investigated by Yolo County and Sacramento County, but she “reported the allegations
were ‘misunderstandings’ regarding allegations of physical discipline.” When DPSS
asked her about the allegations, Mother said that “the agencies needed to know the
children were, ‘safe from the father touching them inappropriately.’ ” Mother “explained
the father was never a Christian in the past, but now he is Christian and he ‘obviously
made some mistakes’ prior to becoming a Christian.” Mother “disclosed she found out
around Thanksgiving of 2013 or 2014 that the father ‘touched’ and ‘molested’ [A.K.] and
[N.K.].” Mother “was unsure when the abuse began, but reported [N.K.] told her the
abuse stopped in 2009.” Mother initially denied that Father sexually abused D.K., but
later said “the father told her ‘something’ happened to [D.K.] with ‘someone.’ ” She
could not recall further details.
Mother claimed that she planned to report Father to law enforcement and file for
divorce, but N.K. “allegedly begged the mother not to” because “ ‘the abuse stopped’
three or four years [ago].” Mother explained that she confronted Father “shortly after
[N.K.]’s disclosure” and Father “ ‘confessed’ to the mother he had molested the two older
daughters and allegedly apologized for what he had done.” Father “ ‘confessed’ ” when
the family was living in Sacramento that he “touched [N.K.] and [A.K.] on their ‘private
parts inappropriately.’ ” Mother indicated that Father had not and would not molest the
younger children. In the past, Mother was “ ‘a little suspicious’ ” that something was
wrong with Father, A.K. and N.K., but she could not verbalize why. She “intuitively”
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knew something was wrong, and now she knew “ ‘intuitively he’s fine.’ ” Mother
“ ‘knew’ ” Father was no longer molesting “any other children” and she “admitted to
leaving the father to provide sole care for the children as needed.” Mother denied Father
ever sought treatment or obtained counseling for the abuse, and believed Father had
changed because he became a Christian, attended church, read the bible and behaved
“calmer.”
L.K. and L.S.K. denied Father inappropriately touched them and denied seeing
Father behave inappropriately with their siblings. V.K. also denied sexual abuse and
denied seeing Father act inappropriately with his siblings. Adult sibling O.K. also denied
being inappropriately touched. O.K., L.K., V.K., and L.S.K. informed DPSS they all felt
safe in the home and believed Father had “ ‘changed.’ ” The children expressed an
understanding as to the abuse N.K. suffered and believed Father was a good father to
them. They expressed concern about N.K. and were adamant about not staying with N.K.
Father informed DPSS that the family was being investigated “because of what
happened 16 years ago.” He asserted that the abuse stopped in 2010 and that he had
changed. Father declined to discuss the allegations without an attorney present.
DPSS also spoke with adult sibling N.K. When asked about the family’s history
with child welfare services, N.K. “recalled an investigation occurring when she was
approximately four or five-years-old” and said her “ ‘parents trained me not to say
anything.’ ” N.K. “confirmed [D.K.] is deaf and has autism, and [A.K.] is deaf, blind and
has autism.” N.K. was unwilling to answer any questions about the investigation other
5
than those pertinent to arranging the children’s placement, as N.K. “was worried about
her safety and protection.” N.K. did not have frequent communications with the family
as she moved out three years prior and saw the family twice per year. N.K. last saw the
family in December 2025 and inquired of L.K. and L.S.K. if Father abused them in any
way and they denied being abused. N.K. “confirmed the father confessed to touching
[O.K.] in a sexual manner when [O.K.] was approximately one-year[]-old.”
N.K. eventually confirmed she was sexually abused by Father and that the abuse
began when N.K. was around five years old, and the family was living in Sacramento.
N.K. explained the abuse began when Father showed her pornography and bathed with
her. She said the abuse “escalated” in 2006 when the family moved and her mother
worked on weekends. Father also forced N.K. to give him “ ‘blowjobs’ ” when Mother
ran errands. Father showed N.K. pornography “which depicted father/daughter sexual
relationships (older men with what appeared to be approximately 12-year-old girls) and
sibling sexual relationships.” N.K. said her father “linked the sexual acts to the Old
Testament and justified the incestuous relationships as biblical, as the family was and had
been very religious.” N.K. reported Father “forced oral copulation upon her, would
manually stimulate her, took photographs of her (possibly videos; however, she
remembered cameras being around) and anally penetrated her with his penis ‘a few
times.’ ” N.K. “denied remembering any digital or penile penetration of her vagina.”
N.K. “shared one memory of the father bringing [D.K.] into his bedroom and the father,
‘tried to engage all three of us.’ ”
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N.K. noted Father stopped sexually abusing her when she was approximately
12 years old. N.K. said she “repressed the memories” of the abuse until she became an
adult and entered her first relationship. When N.K. spoke with Father about the abuse, he
was surprised she remembered what happened. Later in 2022, Father “apologized to
[N.K.] for what he had done to her and admitted to also sexually abusing [A.K.] until the
age of 18-years-old.” N.K. never witnessed Father sexually abusing A.K. or O.K., but
after Father confessed to abusing A.K. and O.K., she said “there were many signs [A.K.]
was also abused.” N.K. “often saw blood in the bathroom before the time [A.K.] could
have begun menstruation.” N.K. also reported that A.K. displayed “severely sexualized
behaviors, such as touching random men’s genitals in public, and touching others
frequently.” N.K. described that A.K. “was always in pain, she would hit her genitals and
breasts and punch her eyes.” N.K. believed A.K. lost her eyesight as a result of the
sexual abuse by Father as A.K. would continuously hit her eyes.
Following the investigation, DPSS obtained protective custody warrants to remove
the children from their parents’ custody on January 7, 2026.
The detention hearing was held on January 13, 2026. At that time, the children’s
counsel noted the children were anxious for the investigation to conclude and they
wanted to return home. The juvenile court formally detained the children from parental
custody and ordered the children placed on an extended visit with a non-relative family
member. The parents were provided with pre-dispositional services and supervised visits
twice a week for two hours.
7
On February 6, 2026, DPSS filed a first amended petition on behalf of the children
to reflect that Father sexually abused the children’s adult siblings by engaging in sodomy,
rape, oral copulation, penetration with a foreign object, and exposure to pornography,
which placed V.K., L.S.K. and L.K. at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm
or illness. The petition struck reference to adult sibling O.K. and allegation b-3 was
amended to reflect that Mother knew of the sexual abuse N.K. suffered but permitted
Father to act as the children’s primary caregiver and minimized his prior sexual abuse.
At a continuance hearing on March 12, 2026, the children’s counsel noted that the
children were frustrated with the amount of time the case was taking.
Mother was again interviewed for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. As to the
abuse allegations, Mother claimed she had never seen it and could not say if it was
“ ‘true’ ” or “ ‘false.’ ” She claimed she was confused because N.K. kept changing her
stories.
The children informed DPSS that they would like to return home to their parents,
and if that was not possible, they stated that they were comfortable remaining with their
current caregiver. They affirmed that their caregiver had been meeting all their
immediate needs and that they felt safe in their caregiver’s home. The children had
adjusted well to their current placement and their caregiver reported that the children
were emotionally comfortable, engaged in normal daily routines, and participated in
school and extracurricular activities. The caregiver also noted that the children appeared
happy, felt safe, and received consistent care and supervision.
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The parents participated in supervised visits with the children. The caregiver
supervised the parents’ interactions with the children. On March 31, 2026, the children
reported their parents were visiting consistently and “described them as positive
experiences.” The parents frequently attended the children’s extracurricular sporting
events, church services and would spend additional time with the children afterward. The
children expressed interest in having longer visits, having visits in a home setting, and
allowing family outings such as going to the beach. DPSS noted that because the family
attends the children’s games, tournaments and church services, the parents had “a
significant amount of cumulative supervised family contact well beyond the scheduled
two-hour community visits[.]” The children declined to participate in mental health
services.
The parents were also regularly participating in pre-dispositional services. Father
informed DPSS that he was scheduled to begin parenting classes through the Orange
County Deaf Equal Access Foundation (OCDEAF). Father enrolled in a 10-week
Positive Parenting Program. Mother attended her parenting program through the Center
on Deafness Inland Empire (CODIE). By April 2026, Mother and Father both completed
their respective parenting programs. Father also attended counseling. Mother also
continued to participate in individual therapy, although she was “slow to open up” and
most of her communications centered on her religious background. Mother’s therapist
opined that although Mother cared deeply for her children, she did not “appear to fully
understand the severity of the situation or her role within it.” Mother could “recite the
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steps required of her moving forward” but had “not yet demonstrated the ability to
meaningfully connect this information to her children’s past experiences.”
Father’s therapist Dr. Kordus reported Father “attended the majority of his
scheduled sessions and has been generally cooperative with the structure of treatment”
but “throughout the course of therapy, he has consistently denied any wrongdoing related
to the allegation that led to his referral.” Due to Father’s consistent denials his “treatment
has not been able to include direct processing of the alleged behavior.” Although Father
was “able to express socially normative beliefs at an abstract level (for example, stating
that individuals who harm children should be held accountable),” he “demonstrates
limited ability to apply these principals to personal or situational contexts.” Dr. Kordus
explained Father’s “responses reflect cognitive rigidity when discussing . . . general or
hypothetical scenarios” which “limited opportunities for deeper therapeutic exploration
of accountability, impact, and behavioral change.” Dr. Kordus also noted concerns
regarding Father’s “affective presentation,” since Father “has discussed highly emotional
or distressing events—including the deaths of family members and topics involving
significant conflict—while displaying minimal observable distress and, at times,
smiling.” Dr. Kordus opined “[t]his pattern of incongruent and restricted affect may
indicate emotional blunting, suppression, or compartmentalization, which could impact
his ability to access and process emotional experiences and may limit his capacity for
empathy and self-reflection.” Dr. Kordus further stated “when discussing broader issues
related to harm or authority, the father’s reasoning appears to shift depending on
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contextual factors such as perceived power, role, or justification.” Dr. Kordus believed
that “[t]his variability suggests inconsistent application of moral or safety-related
standards, particularly when considering the perspective of vulnerable individuals.”
Father reported his coping strategies rely on prayer and reading the bible, but “it remains
unclear whether these practices facilitate emotional processing or function primarily as a
means of distancing from distressing material.”
Prior to the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the children all prepared
letters to the court. L.S.K. stated she missed her parents and expressed she felt the safest
and happiest when she was with them. She wanted to return home to her parents. V.K.
said his parents take good care of him, are kind and supportive, and have never abused
him. He also wanted to return home. L.K. wanted to return to her family as she loved
her parents very much and being away from them had been painful for her. She felt the
happiest and safest when she is with her family. The children’s letters were filed with the
court on May 5, 2026.
The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on May 5, 2026. DPSS
recommended the juvenile court find the allegations in the first amended petition true,
remove the children from parental custody and declare them dependents of the court,
provide Mother with reunification services, and bypass services to Father under
section 361.5(b)(6). Father and Mother requested the court find the petition not true and
dismiss it. The children’s counsel agreed with DPSS’s position and informed the court
the children feel safe and happy with their parents and are open to conjoint counseling.
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The juvenile court interlineated the first amended petition to strike reference to
adult sibling O.K. from allegations b-1, b-2, d-1 and j-1, and struck allegation b-3. The
court found true the interlineated allegations, declared the children dependents of the
court, and removed them from their parents’ custody. Specifically, the court found that
Father sexually abused siblings N.K., A.K,, and D.K, but not O.K. The court found
N.K’s abuse occurred from approximately age five to 12, that D.K. was anally penetrated
on two occasions, and that A.K. was raped a minimum of three times. The court found
these facts “constitute severe sexual abuse,” relying on N.K.’s disclosure, confirmed by
Mother, and Father’s admissions to Mother.
The court addressed reunification services to Father under section 361.5(b)(6).
The court noted it shall not order services unless clear and convincing evidence that
reunification is in the best interest of the children under section 361.5(c)(2). The court
noted that Father “has been generally cooperative with the therapy sessions.” The court
explained while treatment has not included “direct processing of the alleged behavior,”
clinical efforts focused on evaluating Father’s “cognitive, emotional and interpersonal
functioning, including his capacity for insight, empathy and personal responsibility.” The
court noted Father “is able to express socially normative beliefs at an abstract level,”
including that individuals who harm children should be held accountable, and that he
demonstrates “greater cognitive flexibility when discussing general or hypothetical
scenarios” as compared to self-referential topics. The court also noted the therapist’s
concerns about “a pattern of incongruent and restricted affect,” possible “emotional
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blunting, suppression or compartmentalization,” and “inconsistent application of moral or
safety related standards, particularly when considering the prospective of vulnerable
individuals.”
The court recognized that all three children wanted to be reunified with both
parents and that it had reviewed their letters. However, the court found that services
would not benefit the children based on the specific acts of severe sexual abuse and the
circumstances under which abuse was inflicted. The court noted the abuse occurred “in
the family home as to three children over many years” and “the emotional trauma
suffered by all three victims continues to this day.” The court also found that “it was not
likely the children could be safely returned to father within 12 months with no continuing
supervision.”
Relying on In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276 (A.G.), “where the court
properly denied services to Father in the case of two sons when the father was found to
have severely sexually abused his daughter,” the court explained “[s]ection 361.5(i)
expressly provides that in determining whether to deny services pursuant to 361.5(b)(7)
[sic], the court shall consider any information it deems relevant, including severe sexual
abuse of the sibling.” The court concluded that severe sexual abuse of a sibling,
regardless of the victim’s sex or current age, supports a bypass finding as to other
children in the household. The court thereafter declared the children dependents of the
court, ordered them removed from parental custody, provided Mother with reunification
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services, and found services would not benefit the children and thus bypassed Father’s
services under section 361.5(b)(6). Father timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the juvenile court’s dispositional order denying him family
reunification services should be reversed and the matter remanded. He argues that the
court’s bypass finding pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) was not supported by
substantial evidence and believes the children would benefit from a tailored,
individualized plan.
A. Applicable Law
As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the
dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to “the
child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)
However, it is also the “intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young
children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without
undue delay.” (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) Thus,
the statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the delay attributable to the
provision of reunification services would be more detrimental to the minor than
discounting the competing goal of family preservation. (Ibid.) Specifically,
section 361.5, subdivision (b) exempts from reunification services “ ‘those parents who
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are unlikely to benefit’ ” from such services or for whom reunification efforts are likely to
be “ ‘fruitless.’ ” (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470, 474.)
The statutory sections authorizing denial of reunification services are sometimes
referred to as “bypass” provisions. (Melissa R. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
816, 821.) Under section 361.5(b)(6), the court may issue a bypass order if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that a dependent child has been so adjudicated “as a result
of severe sexual abuse . . . to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian,
. . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue
reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.”
The term “severe sexual abuse” in the statute “is defined very broadly.”
(Cal. Juvenile Dependency Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1st ed. 2015) § 5.57, p. 370.)
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)(B), provides: “A finding of severe sexual abuse, for the
purposes of this subdivision, may be based on, but is not limited to, sexual intercourse, or
stimulation involving genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal contact . . . or
the penetration or manipulation of the child’s, sibling’s, or half sibling’s genital organs or
rectum by any animate or inanimate object for the sexual gratification of the parent or
guardian . . . .” Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that the severe
sexual abuse prong of the foregoing language applied.
In determining whether reunification services will benefit the child pursuant to
section 361.5(b)(6), the court “shall consider any information it deems relevant, including
the following factors:” (1) “The specific act or omission comprising the severe sexual
15
abuse”; (2) “The circumstances under which the abuse . . . was inflicted”; (3) “The
severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child”; (4) “Any history of abuse of
other children by the offending parent ”; (5) “The likelihood that the child may be safely
returned to the care of the offending parent . . . within 12 months with no continuing
supervision”; and (6) “Whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending
parent . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (i).) If the court decides to bypass services, it must “read
into the record the basis for a finding of severe sexual abuse . . . under paragraph (6) of
subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual findings used to determine that the
provision of reunification services to the offending parent . . . would not benefit the
child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (k).)
Once it has been determined that section 361.5(b)(6) applies, “ ‘ “the general rule
favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would
be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (In re William B.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227 (William B.); in accord, A.G., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th
at p. 281.) Thus, under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), “[t]he court shall not order
reunification for a parent . . . described in [section 361.5(b)(6)] unless the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) “The burden is on the parent to . . . show that reunification would
serve the best interests of the child.” (William B., at p. 1227; in accord, A.G., at p. 281.)
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B. Standard of Review
On a challenge to the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services, we apply the
substantial evidence standard. We do so bearing in mind that the court’s decision must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
1635, 1654.) “In so doing, we presume ‘in favor of the order, considering the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of
every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’ ”
(In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164 (G.L.).) Our role is not to reweigh the
evidence or to make credibility determinations. (A.A. v. Superior Court (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 237, 242.)
C. Analysis
Here, the juvenile court found during the jurisdiction/disposition hearing that
Father committed “severe sexual abuse” against N.K., A.K. and D.K., based upon “clear
and convincing evidence.” The court further found bypassing reunification services for
Father was appropriate under section 361.5(b)(6), based upon a determination that
offering Father services was not in the best interests of L.K., L.S.K. and V.K.
Father impliedly concedes that the bypass provision, section 361.5(b)(6), is
applicable in this case. Father, however, argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support the juvenile court’s finding that reunification services for Father were not in the
best interests of L.K., L.S.K. and V.K. by clear and convincing evidence. He notes that
the severe sexual abuse findings relate to children who are no longer minors and not the
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subject of this dependency proceeding. He also argues that the juvenile court failed to
make individualized child specific best interest findings required by section 361.5(b)(6)
and section 361.5, subdivision (i).
The best interest determination requires consideration of (1) the parent’s current
efforts, (2) the parent’s fitness, (3) the parent’s history, (4) the seriousness of the problem
that led to the dependency, (5) the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child bonds,
and (6) the child’s need for stability and continuity. (A.G., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at
p. 281.) “A best interests finding also requires a likelihood that reunification services will
succeed. [Citation.] ‘In other words, there must be some “reasonable basis to conclude”
that reunification is possible before services are offered to a parent who need not be
provided them. [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1228-1229.)
Here, there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s determination
that offering reunification services to Father is not in L.K., L.S.K., and V.K.’s best
interests. The court found Father committed severe sexual abuse of N.K., A.K., and
D.K., relying on N.K.’s disclosure, confirmed by Mother, and Father’s admissions to
Mother. The court noted N.K’s abuse occurred from approximately age five to 12, that
D.K. was anally penetrated on two occasions, and that A.K. was raped a minimum of
three times. Father has not challenged the jurisdictional findings against him. Thus, it is
undisputed that Father abused N.K., A.K. and D.K. when they were minors and his three
youngest children are at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to his conduct. It is
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not just actual harm with the three minor children, but a risk of harm as well, given the
lack of protectiveness and long-term abuse.
During the disposition portion of the hearing, the court noted it shall not order
services unless clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the best interest of
the children under section 361.5(c)(2). The record indicates the court considered the
factors in section 361.5, subdivision (i) before it determined that providing Father with
reunification services would not benefit the three minor children.
The first factor to be considered is the specific act or omission comprising the
severe sexual abuse or the severe physical harm inflicted on the child or the child’s
sibling or half sibling. (§ 361.5, subd. (i)(1).) Here, the juvenile court found that N.K.’s
statements regarding the years of sexual abuse she experienced were credible and were
corroborated by Mother and Father’s admissions. The court referred to N.K.’s statement
that Father forced oral copulation on her, manually stimulated her, and anally penetrated
her with his penis. The court also noted N.K.’s disclosure that she remembered Father
bringing D.K. into his bedroom, where Father attempted to “engage” both D.K. and N.K.
in group sex.
The second factor is the circumstances under which the abuse or harm was
inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. (§ 361.5, subd. (i)(2).) The
evidence indicates Father subjected his children N.K., D.K. and A.K. to repeated sexual
abuse when they were minors. The court cited N.K.’s assertion that her mother worked
on weekends and “that was when the majority of the abuse occurred,” but Father “also
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forced [N.K.] to give him ‘blowjobs’ when the mother would run errands.” The court
noted that Father tried to inflict similar abuse on D.K., and found it “clear” that “abuse
was occurring in the household[.]” The court also found credible Mother’s initial
statements to the social worker and noted “the mother admitted the father confessed to
molesting [A.K.], [D.K.] and [N.K.]. She stated the father anally penetrated [D.K.] with
his penis on two occasions and quit when [D.K.] couldn’t figure out how to give him a
blowjob.” The court explained Mother stated Father then ignored D.K. The court also
noted Father admitted to N.K. that he sexually abused A.K. until the child was 18 years
old. The court explained, when Mother was questioned about A.K., Mother “stated the
father confessed to raping [A.K.] at least three times but felt bad because of her severe
autism and stopped abusing her.”
The juvenile court must also consider the severity of the emotional trauma
suffered by the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. (§361.5, subd. (i)(3).) Here,
the impact of Father’s horrific abuse on D.K. and A.K. cannot be adequately measured
because they are autistic and nonverbal. The juvenile court, however, found that Father
abused his three children in the family home over many years, and that the three victims
continued to suffer emotional trauma. This finding is supported by substantial evidence.
N.K. “expressed deep remorse for [A.K.],” and “due to [A.K.]’s continuous hitting of her
eyes” the child “eventually lost her vision.” The court also noted that “Mother also
confirmed at one point that she knew the abuse stopped to [A.K.] and [D.K.] as they no
longer avoided [Father] and tried to be around him.” Father also manipulated N.K.’s
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emotions to prevent her from disclosing the abuse to anyone after she told Mother. The
court explained that after N.K. disclosed the abuse to Mother, the next day “the mother
told [N.K.] the father was about to kill himself.” N.K. also “explained because she
thought she was the only victim, the sexual abuse had ended years before, and due to her
conditioned desire to keep the family together above all else, she told her mother she did
not want anything to happen to the father.” N.K. also said “the fear of being the cause of
the family disbanding kept her from fully disclosing the abuse to anyone (other than the
mother and father) to this date.”
The fourth factor the court must consider is whether there is any history of abuse
of other children by the offending parent or guardian. (§ 361.5, subd. (i).) Here, Father
subjected his biological children N.K., D.K., and A.K. to years of rape, sodomy, and
forced oral copulation. The court noted that Father abused N.K. from the age of five
through age 12. The court also pointed out that Father anally penetrated D.K. on two
occasions, and he raped A.K. at least three times. Moreover, the family has a long history
with child protective services in multiple counties involving 11 prior referrals for general
neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse of the children between 2004 and 2023.
The fifth factor the court must consider is the likelihood that the child may be
safely returned to the care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with no
continuing supervision. (§ 361.5, subd. (i)(5).) The juvenile court here found it unlikely
that the children could return to Father’s care without continuing supervision even if
Father received 12 months of reunification services. The court noted that in therapy
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Father demonstrated a limited ability to apply socially normative principals to his own
actions and displayed “cognitive rigidity” when discussing self-referential topics.
Although the court noted that Father displayed “greater cognitive flexibility” when
discussing general or hypothetical scenarios and was generally cooperative, “[t]his
discrepancy has limited opportunities for deeper therapeutic expiration of accountability,
impact and behavioral health change.” The court noted that Father’s therapist Dr. Kordus
was “concerned with a pattern of incongruent and restricted affect which may indicate
emotional blunting, suppression or compartmentalization [. . .] which could impact his
ability to assess and process emotional experiences and may limit his capacity for
empathy and self deflection.” The court also highlighted the concern that Father
inconsistently applied moral and safety related standards particularly when considering
the perspective of vulnerable individuals.
The sixth factor the court must consider is “[w]hether or not the child desires to be
reunified with the offending parent . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (i)(6).) The court noted it was
taking into consideration that L.K., L.S.K., and V.K. wished to be reunified, but the court
concluded this was outweighed by the risk of harm to the children, which supported
denying Father reunification services. The court found that services would not benefit
the children based on the specific acts of severe sexual abuse and the circumstances under
which abuse was inflicted. The court noted the abuse occurred “in the family home as to
three children for many years” and “the emotional trauma suffered by all three victims
continues to this day.” The court also considered whether the children could be safely
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returned home without further supervision in 12 months but found it was not in the
children’s best interests due to the severity of the sexual abuse Father inflicted on the
children’s siblings and Father’s inability to benefit from services as noted by Father’s
therapist. The record indicates L.K., L.S.K., and V.K. would not benefit from providing
Father reunification services.
Father argues that reunification services were in L.K., L.S.K., and V.K.’s best
interests because they all wanted to return home, they all described feeling “ ‘safest and
happiest’ with their parents,” they described Father as kind and supportive, there was no
evidence Father ever abused L.K., L.S.K., and V.K., and the abused children were now
adults. Father maintains that if he received reunification services addressing the sexual
abuse allegations, he would likely succeed in reunifying with his three minor children.
But Father also held a parental role as to N.K., A.K., and D.K., and there was substantial
evidence he committed long-term, severe sexual abuse against N.K., A.K., and D.K.,
causing them serious emotional trauma. In addition, as previously noted, Mother and
Father had a child protective services history, spanning decades and involving 11 prior
referrals for general neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse of the children between
2004 and 2023.
Furthermore, it was unlikely Father would reunify with L.K., L.S.K., and V.K.,
because of Father’s serious sexual abuse of N.K., A.K., and D.K., and because the
evidence demonstrated it was unlikely Mother would protect the other children from
Father. There was overwhelming evidence that N.K. informed Mother on several
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occasions that Father was sexually abusing her and that Mother knew something was
occurring between Father, N.K. and A.K., and Mother did little, if anything, to protect
N.K., A.K., and D.K. Mother permitted Father to remain in the family home and did not
contact law enforcement. Also, Mother stated she did not believe Father would abuse the
other children. “[I]t is a ‘commonsense notion that any child who is residing with a parent
. . . who has sexually abused the child’s sibling, and/or a parent who has minimized the
sexual abuse of the child’s sibling, is living in a dysfunctional and potentially harmful
environment.’ ” (A.G., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 281, quoting In re Maria R. (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 48, 68.) The risk would be even greater if Father was no longer living
in the family home with Mother. Absent juvenile court supervision, the children could be
spending time alone with Father away from Mother’s home, thereby providing greater
opportunity for sexual abuse.
The improbability of Father reunifying with L.K., L.S.K., and V.K. is further
apparent from the fact that, although these minor children requested to be returned to
Mother and Father’s care as soon as possible, their attorney advised the court against
doing so because she believed the children would be at risk of harm and requested Father
be denied services under 361.5(b)(6). This, no doubt, is because, as stated in Los Angeles
County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
962, 968, “[c]ases overwhelmingly hold that sexual abuse of one child may constitute
substantial evidence of a risk to another child in the household—even to a sibling of a
different sex or age or to a half sibling.” “Undoubtedly, appellate courts have rarely if
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ever been faced with a situation in which a father sexually molests one female minor in
the household and the juvenile court does not find another female minor in the household
to be at risk. The cases cited categorically state that aberrant sexual behavior directed at
one child in the household places other children in the household at risk, and this is
especially so when both children are females.” (Id. at p. 970.)
Despite Father’s efforts in services, there was still a “very real concern for the risk
of recidivism.” (Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 741, 751.) “[A]n
abusive parent’s risk of recidivism is not necessarily limited to a child who was the
parent’s previous victim. The parent may very well pose a serious threat to his or her
other children. The Legislature appears to have recognized this sad circumstance in its
drafting of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).” (Deborah S., at p. 751; see In re P.A.
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 [“any younger sibling who is approaching the age at
which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse”]; In re Karen R.
(2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 90 [sexual abuse of a sibling poses a danger of substantial
harm to all the children in a household]; In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177,
198 [household “web of denial” regarding sexual abuse portends emotional harm for
other siblings], disapproved on another ground as stated in In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766; cf. In re Kieshia E. (2000) 6 Cal.4th 68, 77 [“When a parent abuses his or her own
child, or permits such abuse to occur in the household, the parent also abandons and
contravenes the parental role”].) The overwhelming evidence provided by DPSS
regarding the sexual abuse suffered by N.K., A.K., and D.K. was more than sufficient for
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the juvenile court to conclude that failure to reunify would not be detrimental to L.K.,
L.S.K., and V.K.
In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, on which Father relies, can be
distinguished from the present case. In that case, in denying reunification services, the
juvenile court said it was adopting the proposed findings in the child welfare services
department’s report without stating which bypass provision applied, identifying any
specific instances of severe physical harm, or addressing whether the children would
benefit from reunification services. (Id. at p. 1149.) This court held that findings as to
reunification services should generally not be implied “ ‘from an otherwise silent
record.’ ” (Id. at p. 1150.) More importantly, we held that in that case, there was not
enough evidence in the record to make such inferences. (Ibid.) By contrast, the juvenile
court in this case recited its findings into the record strictly following section 361.5,
subdivision (k), and the record was anything but silent as to the basis for the findings of
severe sexual abuse and the lack of benefit to the children from reunification services.
Contrary to Father’s claim, the juvenile court recited the severity of past abuse and did tie
those historical facts to a “present, child-specific ‘no benefit’ determination.”
Father’s remaining arguments all fail under the standard of review. He cites
evidence he believes is favorable to his view that L.K. L.S.K. and V.K.’s best interests lie
in reunification services with him. But the cardinal rule of appellate review is that we do
not speculate whether the dependency court might have reached a different conclusion
had it determined the facts and weighed credibility differently. (In re Dakota H. (2005)
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132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) Instead, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling, resolve all conflicts in favor of the
ruling, and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision below. (G.L., supra,
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.) In sum, we must “ ‘accept the evidence most favorable to
the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be
accepted by the trier of fact.’ ” (In re J.F. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 202, 209.)
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5(b)(6), because substantial evidence
supported its finding that Father severely sexually abused N.K., A.K., and D.K., and
offering reunification services as to his other children was not in their best interests.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order denying Father reunification services is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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