Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re T.W. CA1/1

Filed 9/30/26 In re T.W. CA1/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/30/26 In re T.W. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re T.W. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
MARIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, A174811
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Marin County
v. Super. Ct. Nos. JD0000046 &
E.W., JD0000047)
Defendant and Appellant.

E.W. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her
request for a contested hearing for additional reunification services under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3, subdivision (f).1 While this
appeal was pending, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking further
reunification services, and the court held an evidentiary hearing. Having had
a full evidentiary hearing on the matter of reunification services, we dismiss
the appeal as moot.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
1

Code, unless otherwise indicated.

1
BACKGROUND
In December 2023, during an “altercation” with A.W. (Father) then 15-
year-old T.W. suffered serious physical injury after Father struck the child in
the back with a chair, threw him across the room, and caused him to
“asphyxiate by placing his hands around [T.W.’s] neck and lifting him off the
ground.” Three days after that incident, Mother was “the victim of intimate
partner violence” by Father in T.W.’s and his sister’s (M.W.), presence. T.W.
called the police after hearing a “thud” and hearing Mother “screaming in
pain and crying out for [T.W.] to call 911.” The Marin County Health and
Human Services Department (Department) filed a section 300 petition
alleging serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)) and a failure to protect (id.,
subd. (b)) as to T.W., and a failure to protect and abuse of a sibling as to M.W.
(id., subd. (j)), who was then 14 years old. At the detention hearing, which
parents did not attend, the court ordered the minors detained as continuance
in the parents’ home was contrary to their welfare. The minors were placed
in two separate placements. The court ordered services and visitation be
provided to the parents and set the matter for a jurisdiction and disposition
hearing. Prior to the hearing, T.W. was arrested and booked into juvenile
hall. He was later released and placed into a therapeutic foster home
through juvenile probation services.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department recommended the
court take jurisdiction over the minors, declare them dependents of the court,
and order reunification services for the parents. At the hearing, the court
sustained the allegations in the petition, followed the Department’s
recommendations, ordered visitation, and set the matter for a six-month
review hearing.

2
During the six-month review period, T.W.2 had been placed in a short-
term residential treatment program, after he had run away from his
therapeutic placement. M.W. remained placed with a nonrelative extended
family member. The court determined Mother had made adequate progress
on her case plan, ordered another six months of services, and set the matter
for a 12-month review hearing.
During the next review period, M.W. went for an extended 30-day visit
with Mother, after Mother signed a safety plan agreeing not to allow Father
back into the home.3 However, the Department received notice that Mother
had allowed Father “back into her home,” and that M.W. was “uncomfortable
with [Mother] allowing his presence” there. Mother insisted she had not
allowed Father back into the home, and instead she maintained M.W. had
mistaken a family friend for Father. The Department attempted to end the
extended visit, but Mother was “avoidant and evasive,” either not answering
the Department’s calls or not disclosing her location. During the extended
visit, M.W. missed several weeks of school, did not attend therapy, and
stopped meeting with her CASA. Mother reported M.W. refused to go to
school, and she was unable to redirect her.
In late December, M.W. went to a house party, without permission from
Mother. At the party, M.W. along with other minors were under the
influence, and one minor “sustained a gunshot wound to the leg.” When
police arrived, M.W. attempted to flee the scene by jumping out of a second
story window but was arrested shortly thereafter. Following the incident,
Mother would not provide the Department with any information on M.W.’s

2 T.W. was a “dual-status youth,” meaning he had both a dependency
and delinquency case.
3 T.W. remained in his treatment program.

3
whereabouts, and the court issued a protective custody warrant for M.W.
The court also ordered Mother produce M.W.
Prior to the visit, M.W. had been “doing very well” in her placement.
She had been attending school, taking her Epilepsy medication, attending
therapy, and “enjoy[ing] stability.”
In its 12-month review report, the Department recommended
termination of services for Mother. M.W. remained with Mother, “in violation
of court orders.” In the weeks leading up to the hearing, the Department
made 12 unsuccessful in-person attempts to contact Mother and M.W., which
included three welfare checks by the San Francisco Police Department.
Mother either refused to answer the phone or respond to texts, refused to
answer the door, or declined to answer questions when she did answer the
phone. At one point, Mother claimed M.W. had “ ‘physically attacked’ ” her
twice and later stated, she had “always wanted” to comply with the
Department and the court orders, but it was M.W. who refused to cooperate.
M.W. acknowledged the physical altercation but stated it was Mother who
slapped her “because she ‘can be annoying at times.’ ” She denied hitting
Mother. T.W. remained in his treatment program.
In an addendum report, the Department noted M.W. was finally placed
back in the Department’s care after she appeared at a juvenile delinquency
hearing for a criminal charge of resisting arrest when she fled from police.
Since returning to foster care, M.W. began attending school again and she
had “no reported negative behavioral issues.” The Department again
recommended termination of services.
At the 12-month review hearing, the court found return of the minors
would create a substantial detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being, terminated reunification services, and found a hearing

4
under section 366.26 was not in the minors’ best interest. M.W. was ordered
to remain in her current foster care placement with the goal of legal
guardianship. T.W. would remain in his placement.4 The court ordered
visitation for Mother once a week for one hour with M.W. and two hours with
T.W. and set the matter for a postpermanency review hearing pursuant to
section 366.3.
In its six-month postpermanency review report, the Department
requested the court continue its jurisdiction over the minors. M.W. had been
placed with a new nonrelative extended family member, and T.W. remained
in a short-term residential treatment program. Since being out of Mother’s
care, M.W. had “stabilized” and “thrived.” She was attending school and
reported having a “newfound motivation and interest to excel in school.”
Throughout the reporting period, the Department conducted an “intensive
family finding search” to locate a family member or friend who would be
willing to adopt or be a legal guardian for M.W. However, none had been
found. Her current caregivers were unwilling to adopt her or be legal
guardians, and they asked for more time “to assess if it is in their best
interests . . . to make that commitment.” As a result, the Department
foresaw changing M.W.’s permanent plan to that of an alternative permanent
living arrangement when she turned 16 years old. The Department was
working with the Probation Department to ensure then 17-year-old T.W. “is
connected to the Independent Living Program (ILP) services so he can
transition to extended foster care upon turning eighteen.” Both of the minors
wanted to maintain contact with Mother, recognized why they were not in

4 As T.W.’s case was a dual-jurisdiction case, and the delinquency court
and probation department were the lead court and agency, the juvenile court
did not make any placement orders as to T.W.

5
her care, and expressed disappointment that she had been unable “to keep
them secure from the safety risks posed by [Father].” Neither T.W. nor M.W.
wanted to return to Mother. T.W. wanted to live independently, and M.W.
wanted to remain in her current placement. However, both of the minors
wanted consistent contact with Mother.
Mother’s visitation with the minors had been “somewhat inconsistent.”
Additionally the Department detailed an incident where T.W. and other
minors had left the treatment program without permission, and it was
reported Mother had transported T.W. and the other minors around San
Francisco “in an unsupervised fashion.” Mother subsequently returned T.W.
to the program where staff suspected he was under the influence of
substances. However, T.W. refused to take a drug test. Mother’s conduct
was a “serious breach of supervised visitation protocol,” and the Department
reduced her visitation with T.W. from weekly to once per month.
M.W.’s CASA reported, since being placed with her current resource
parents, M.W.’s “stress level appears to have significantly decreased,” she
was “more confident, calm and content,” and she appeared “the happiest she’s
been” since the CASA had been assigned to the case in August 2024. She
recommended M.W. remain in her current placement, remain a dependent of
the court, and resume therapy. T.W.’s CASA reported although T.W.
expressed wanting to move into a resource family, his current placement at
the treatment program continued to meet his needs.
At the postpermanency review, Mother’s counsel sought expanded
visitation and a contested hearing based on section 366.3, subdivision (f) for
an additional six months of reunification services. The minors’ counsel
sought to have Mother file a section 388 petition, “as an offer of proof so that
we know what this request is based on and whether there have been any

6
change in circumstances, other than just the lack of a permanent plan that
would show that is what’s in the minors’ best interest.” County counsel
agreed, stating if a section 388 petition is filed, the parties “can flesh out the
issues more and see what’s what” and put things “in context for everyone so
we can see what has the mother really done that would warrant changing the
current orders.”
Mother’s counsel argued that an offer of proof was unnecessary but
noted she did “have a document that I can provide as an offer of proof.” The
court took the matter under submission.
At the continued hearing, County counsel and the minors’ counsel
agreed a section 388 petition should be filed. The minors’ counsel explained,
at an intervening settlement conference, she had asked for “some sort of
documentation demonstrating what [Mother] has been doing over the last
review period,” and she had not seen anything.
Mother’s counsel explained that the evening prior, Mother had given
her a “60-page safety plan and reunification proposal,” and if there was an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 366.3, subdivision (f), Mother would
be able to testify as to what she has done since the last review period. When
asked if there was any prejudice by proceeding by way of section 388 instead
of section 366.3, counsel responded that under section 366.3, subdivision (f)
there “is no change of circumstances” requirement, and under section 388
there was, and even though it was a “prima facie standard,” it was an “extra
hurdle,” which counsel argued “does make it sort of a substantial difference
even having one little difference.”
The minors’ counsel noted the minors both wanted Mother “to have
more reunification, another opportunity at reunification.” When asked if
there was any prejudice in proceeding by way of section 366.3, subdivision (f)

7
as Mother’s counsel urged rather than proceeding by way of section 388,
counsel stated the minors were “at a disadvantage” proceeding via
section 366.3 because “we haven’t seen any of the documentation that
[Mother’s counsel] says that [she] has now. So it’s difficult to even assess a
position, you know, on the merits or on how we should proceed because we’re
really, again, operating in a vacuum here. I think the JV-180 is the proper
vehicle at this stage to change the court order regarding reunification.”
The court concluded, “I have to consider whether I’m proceeding under
[section] 366.3(f) or the JV-180, what is in the best interest of the children;
and that’s what I intend to do, and that’s who I’m considering in making this
determination, procedurally, of how we’re going to give your client the
opportunity to present new information to both the Department, other
counsel, and to this Court. And I don’t see that there’s a prejudice in me
ordering that you proceed by way of a JV-180. . . . I’m not saying that what
you suggested isn’t feasible. I just think the JV-180 is going to be better for
all of us.” The court then settled the matter of visitation, found by clear and
convincing evidence it was not in the minors’ best interest to set a
section 366.26 hearing, and ordered M.W.’s permanent plan as foster care
with the goal of finding a fit and willing relative.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court reversibly erred by denying her
request for a contested hearing under section 366.3. Specifically, she
contends when a minor is placed in a long-term plan, other than adoption or
legal guardianship, section 366.3, subdivision (f) grants parents a right to a
contested hearing without requiring an offer of proof or the filing of a
section 388 petition.

8
“After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in
the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount.
Rather, at this point, ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency
and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that
continued foster care is in the best interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).) “In selecting a permanent plan,
the statutory preference is for termination of parental rights and adoption,
followed in order of priority by several alternatives the last of which (and
therefore disfavored) is continued foster care.” (In re C.W. (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 835, 840 (C.W.); § 366.26, subd. (b)(1)–(7).)
After selection of a permanent plan, and pursuant to section 366.3, the
court must hold periodic reviews. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
305.) “If the permanent plan is either for adoption or legal guardianship,”
subdivision (a) of section 366.3 controls. That provision calls for “the juvenile
court to retain jurisdiction until either [adoption or legal guardianship] is
accomplished, and to review the child’s status every six months to ensure
that the plan ‘is completed as expeditiously as possible.’ (§ 366.3, subd. (a).)”
(C.W., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 840.) “For all other children (i.e., those
who have neither been ordered placed for adoption nor with a legal guardian”
(ibid.), as is the case here, subdivision (d) of section 366.3 controls. That
provision states, in pertinent part, “If the child or nonminor dependent is in a
placement other than the home of a legal guardian and jurisdiction has not
been dismissed, the status of the child shall be reviewed at least every six
months.” (§ 366.3, subd. (d)(1).) If parental rights have not been terminated,
the review of the status of the child “may be conducted by the court or an

9
appropriate local agency.” (Ibid.) However, the court “shall conduct the
review” under certain circumstances.5 (§ 366.3, subd. (d)(1).)
At the six-month review, the “reviewing body shall inquire about the
progress being made to provide a permanent home for the child, shall
consider the safety of the child, and shall determine all of the following:
[¶] . . . [¶] (4) The extent of the agency’s compliance with the child welfare
services case plan in making reasonable efforts either to return the child to
the safe home of the parent or to complete whatever steps necessary to
finalize the permanent placement of the child. If the reviewing body
determines that a second period of reunification services is in the child’s best
interests, and that there is a significant likelihood of the child’s return to a
safe home due to changed circumstances of the parent, pursuant to
subdivision (f), the specific reunification services required to effect the child’s
return to a safe home shall be described. [¶] . . . [¶] (7) The extent of progress
the parents or legal guardians have made toward alleviating or mitigating
the causes necessitating placement in foster care.” (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(4) &
(7).)
Subdivision (f) of section 366.3, in turn, provides, “Unless their
parental rights have been permanently terminated, the parent or parents of
the child are entitled to receive notice of, and participate in, those hearings.
It shall be presumed that continued care is in the best interests of the child,
unless the parent or parents prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

5“The court shall conduct the review under the following
circumstances: [¶] (A) Upon the request of the child’s parents or legal
guardians. [¶] (B) Upon the request of the child or nonminor dependent.
[¶] (C) It has been 12 months since a hearing held pursuant to Section 366.26
or an order that the child remain in foster care pursuant to Section 366.21,
366.22, 366.25, or 366.26 or subdivision (h). [¶] (D) It has been 12 months
since a review was conducted by the court.” (§ 366.3, subd. (d)(1)(A)–(D).)

10
further efforts at reunification are the best alternative for the child. In those
cases, the court may order the parent or parents be provided further
reunification services, for up to a period of six months, and family
maintenance services, as needed for an additional six months, to return the
child to a safe home environment. This subdivision does not apply to the
parents of a nonminor dependent.”
Finally, subdivision (h) of section 366.3 provides, in pertinent part, “At
the review held pursuant to subdivision (d) for a child in foster care, the court
shall consider all permanency planning options for the child including
whether the child should be returned to the home of the parent, placed for
adoption, . . . placed with a fit and willing relative, or, if compelling reasons
exist for finding that none of the foregoing options are in the best interest of
the child and the child is 16 years of age or older, whether the child should be
placed in another planned permanent living arrangement. The court shall
order that a hearing be held pursuant to Section 366.26, unless it determines
by clear and convincing evidence that there is a compelling reason for
determining that a hearing held pursuant to Section 366.26 is not in the best
interest of the child because the child is being returned to the home of the
parent, the child is not a proper subject for adoption, or no one is willing to
accept legal guardianship as of the hearing date. If the county adoption
agency, or the department when it is acting as an adoption agency, has
determined it is unlikely that the child will be adopted . . . , that fact shall
constitute a compelling reason for purposes of this subdivision. . . .” (§ 366.3,
subd. (h)(1).)
Outside of the periodic reviews, section 388 provides the procedure for
modification of juvenile court orders, including requests for additional
reunification services. (Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and

11
Procedure (2026) § 2.180 [the filing of a section 388 petition “is still the
procedure that must be followed when the request is made at a point other
than at a review hearing”].) “Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile
court orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change of
circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the
child’s best interest.” (In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122.)
“When . . . a section 388 petition is filed after family reunification services
have been terminated, the juvenile court’s overriding concern is the child’s
best interests. [Citation.] The parent’s interests in the care, custody and
companionship of the child are no longer paramount; and the focus shifts to
the needs of the child for permanency and stability. [Citations.]
Nonetheless, a parent may rebut the presumption that continued care is in
the best interest of the child after termination of reunification services by
showing that circumstances have changed and would warrant further
reunification services.” (Id. at pp. 1122–1123.)
In practice, section 366.3, subdivision (f) grants a parent the right to a
contested review hearing in which the parent may present evidence to
overcome the presumption that continued foster care is in the child’s best
interest. (In re J.F. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 321, 331.) A parent is not
required to file a section 388 petition in order to set a contested hearing at a
section 366.3, subdivision (d) review. (San Diego County Dept. of Social
Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882, 889–890.)
There is, however, a split of authority regarding whether a parent is
entitled to a contested hearing without presenting an offer of proof.
(Compare Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1143
[concluding court’s obligation under now-section 366.3, subdivision (h) to
consider all permanency planning options does not require court to hold

12
contested hearing where the parent seeks return of the child, rather court is
required to accept offer of proof and to consider whether the parent’s
representations warrant contested hearing]; Sheri T. v. Superior Court (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 334, 341 [holding because the mother had burden of proving
setting a permanency planning hearing was not in the best interest of minor,
who was placed in long-term foster care, court entitled to ask for an offer of
proof]; M.T. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1179, 1181
[holding court justified in requiring an offer of proof before granting the
father a contested hearing on whether a permanency planning hearing would
be in the best interests of minors who were placed in long-term foster care]
with In re J.F., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 331, 333 [disagreeing with
Maricela C. and M.T. and holding a parent’s right to a contested
postpermanency review hearing may not be conditioned on an offer of proof or
the filing of a § 388 petition].)
However, we need not decide the issue for two reasons. First, here,
Mother’s counsel did have an offer of proof. Second, even assuming Mother
had the right to a contested hearing without an offer of proof or that the
juvenile court erred in not considering Mother’s offer of proof and requiring
the filing of a section 388 petition, subsequent events have rendered the
appeal moot. Namely, after the postpermanency review, Mother filed a
section 388 petition requesting reunification services,6 and the court held a
full evidentiary hearing, where Mother testified and presented evidence.
“ ‘ “An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent,
the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to

6 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of the record in
case No. A176009, which encompasses respondent’s request for judicial
notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)

13
grant the appellant effective relief. [Citations.] On a case-by[-]case basis, the
reviewing court decides whether subsequent events in a dependency case
have rendered the appeal moot and whether its decision would affect the
outcome of the case in a subsequent proceeding. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] Courts also have discretion to resolve appeals that are technically
moot if they present important questions affecting the public interest that are
capable of repetition yet evade review.” (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616,
623.)
Mother concedes the case is moot as to T.W., who turned 18 years old in
June. However, she asserts the case is not moot as to M.W. because a
hearing under section 388 and a hearing under section 366.3 “are not
interchangeable.” Under section 388 a petitioner’s request for additional
reunification services requires both changed circumstances and that the
order for reunification services be in minors’ best interests. However, under
section 366.3, subdivision (f), Mother asserts she “would have needed to show
only that further reunification is the minors’ best alternative.” Mother
maintains “[t]he section 388 hearing decided whether [her] circumstances
had changed; it did not decide whether further reunification is the child’s best
alternative—the only question a contested hearing under section 366.3,
subdivision (f), would put at issue.” Alternatively, Mother contends, even if
her challenge is moot, the issue is one of continuing public importance and
capable of repetition while evading review.
To begin with, nothing in section 366.3 contemplates that no change in
circumstances need be shown before a parent is given additional reunification
services. Although parents may not have to shoulder the burden of showing a
change of circumstances at a section 366.3 review, this does not mean a
change of circumstances need not be shown. While Mother asserts “the

14
statute recognizes that a dependent minor’s interests might be served by new
efforts toward family reunification even if a parent’s circumstances have not
changed,” a reading of the statute in its entirety suggests otherwise. Indeed,
section 366.3, subdivision (e) states the court or local agency shall determine,
“(4) . . . . If the reviewing body determines that a second period of
reunification services is in the child’s best interests, and that there is a
significant likelihood of the child’s return to a safe home due to changed
circumstances of the parent, pursuant to subdivision (f), the specific
reunification services required to effect the child’s return to a safe home shall
be described” and “(7) The extent of progress the parents or legal guardians
have made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
placement in foster care.” (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(4) & (7).) This language
contemplates a change of circumstances, even if it is the reviewing body (i.e.,
the court or agency) that makes that determination and not the parent who
may have to initially shoulder the burden. Here, it does not appear the
Department made such a determination nor did Mother request the court
make a determination of change of circumstances or challenge the
Department’s section 366.3 report. In any case, Mother offered a “60-page
safety plan and reunification proposal” with the “first five pages,” outlining
the “different agencies that she’s been working with” over the past six
months. Additionally, Mother sought to testify as to “what she has done”
over the last six months. In short, Mother offered evidence of a change of
circumstances.
“After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in
the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount.
Rather, at this point, ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency
and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that

15
continued foster care is in the best interests of the child.” (Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) The standard at a section 366.3 review “mirrors
the standard applicable to petitions to modify under section 388.” (Nahid H.
v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1068; compare § 366.3,
subd. (f) [it is “presumed that continued care is in the best interest of the
child, unless the parent or parents prove . . . that further efforts at
reunification are the best alternative for the child”]; with In re Malick T.,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1122 [post-termination of reunification services,
the focus shifts to a child’s stability, however, “a parent may rebut the
presumption that continued care is in the best interest of the child after
termination of reunification services by showing that circumstances have
changed and would warrant further reunification services”].)
Moreover, even assuming the section 336.3 “best alternative” test is
substantially different than the section 388 “changed circumstances/best
interest test” because of the requirement of changed circumstances under
section 388, here the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 petition
because she had not met her burden of showing reunification services would
be in the minors’ best interest. The court found Mother had made progress,
but the court still had concerns and concluded she had not met her “burden in
establishing that reunification services would be in the best interest of [the
minors] at this time.” Mother does not explain how additional reunification
services would not be in the minors’ best interest but would be the best
alternative.
In sum, Mother received a full evidentiary hearing on the matter of
reunification services. Accordingly, her appeal is moot.
Mother nonetheless asserts the issue on appeal warrants the exercise of
our discretion to review the merits because it represents an issue of

16
continuing public importance which is capable of repetition yet evading
review. “For the evading review exception [to mootness] to apply, there must
be more at stake than simple error-correction in an individual case. The
exception implicates the fundamental role of an appellate court as a
custodian of the law, which is why courts often say it applies to issues that
touch upon the ‘public interest.’ ” (People v. McCray (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
260, 267–268; In re Christina A. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158.)
Mother asserts that had the court proceeded by way of section 366.3,
subdivision (f) instead of section 388, the court may have concluded T.W.’s
“interests would be served by a new round of reunification services,” and T.W.
will have “age[d] out of the dependency system before the error can be
corrected on appeal.” This is simply a claim of error in this case. We
therefore find no basis for considering the merits of what is now a moot issue.
Finally, even were we to exercise our discretion to address the merits of
Mother’s claim on appeal, and even assuming the juvenile court erred in not
granting Mother’s request for a contested hearing on reunification services
under section 366.3, any error was harmless.
Generally, claims of juvenile dependency error are subject to the
miscarriage of justice standard of prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) The
“ ‘miscarriage of justice’ ” standard has been interpreted “as permitting
reversal only if a reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result
would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.” (In
re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836.)
Mother contends the error is not harmless because, although the
Department’s section 366.3 report “provided almost no evidence about [her]
progress ‘toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating the child’s

17
placement in foster care’ ” (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(7)), her attorney suggested
Mother “had made progress in rehabilitative services that may have allowed
for reunification.” Additionally, Mother points out that the minors’ attorney
“reported that both minors wanted [M]other to receive more reunification
services,” both minors wanted to maintain consistent contact with Mother,
and “neither minor was a candidate for legal guardianship.”
Although Mother contends the Department provided “almost no
evidence” about her progress, counsel did not challenge or object to the
report’s compliance with section 366.3, subdivision (e)(4) or (e)(7), or ask the
court to have the Department redo the report. Rather, counsel only
remarked, “when we read the report . . . [it] kind of makes it seem[] like she’s
not doing anything.” (See San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v.
Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 889–890 [“a party may choose to
make a request [for a determination of change of circumstance by the
reviewing body of a change of circumstances] instead of submitting a [section
388] petition in order to avoid a shouldering of the burden inherit therein of
pleading and proving change of circumstances”].) Therefore, this issue is
forfeited. (In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409–410 [failure to object in
the juvenile court forfeits a parent’s right to pursue issue on appeal].)
Additionally, despite the minors’ wishes about reunification services, “the
preference of the minor is not determinative of his or her best interests.” (In
re Richard H. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1368.) And, although the minors
did not have candidates available to become legal guardians, the presumption
post-termination of reunification services is that continued care is in their
best interest. Finally, nothing in the court’s orders prevented consistent
contact with the minors, rather the court expanded visitation.

18
Moreover, nothing precluded Mother from requesting reunification
services under section 388, and indeed, she did so. After the events at issue
here, Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting further reunification
services. Mother was granted a full hearing, where she was allowed to
present evidence, testify, and put forth argument that reunification services
were in the minors’ best interest. After hearing the proffered evidence and
testimony, the court affirmatively found mother had not met her burden “in
establishing that reunification services would be in the best interest of [M.W.]
and [T.W.] at this time.” It is simply not reasonably probable the result
would have been more favorable, and we conclude any error was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

19
_________________________
Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P. J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

A174811, In re T.W.

20

← Back to CA Unpub Decisions · Knowledge Base
Lean view · served in 1 ms · full site view