Filed 6/23/26 In re T.M. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.M., a Person Coming B349458
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. 19CCJP00598H)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
N.M. et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed in part;
vacated in part with directions.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant N.M.
Peggy O’Neill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant M.G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
M.G. (mother) and N.M. (father) separately appeal from
orders reducing the parents’ visits with the child T.M. (born April
2014), denying father’s motion for a bonding study, and finding
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and California’s equivalent law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et
seq.) (ICWA) inapplicable.
The orders at issue in this appeal were made at a hearing
that took place one day after the Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.22 hearing in this matter.1 At the section 366.22
hearing, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ reunification
services and set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing
for the child. Both parents filed petitions for extraordinary writ
following the section 366.22 hearing, which we have considered
and denied in an opinion issued in case No. B349246, filed
concurrently with this opinion. Due to significant overlapping
facts and issues, we reference our opinion denying the parents’
petitions for extraordinary writ throughout this opinion.
For the reasons set forth below, the juvenile court’s order
finding ICWA inapplicable is vacated. All other orders are
affirmed.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare & Institutions Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We incorporate by reference the detailed factual and
procedural background set forth in the concurrently filed opinion
in B349246, including the family, the current referral and
removal, the section 300 petition and initial proceedings, the
adjudication hearing and related reports, the reunification
period, and the contested section 366.22 hearing and surrounding
events.
Below, we provide relevant factual and procedural
background not set forth in the concurrently filed opinion.
Facts related to ICWA
An ICWA-010(A) form was attached to the section 300
petition filed in this matter on April 27, 2023. The form indicated
on November 17, 2022, the social worker asked mother about the
children’s Indian status, and mother gave no reason to believe
the children were Indian children.
On April 28, 2023, mother and father filed parental
notification of Indian status (ICWA -020) forms stating the
children did not have any American Indian ancestry.
Other family members, including adult siblings Na.M. and
G.M., maternal grandmother Lola G., and maternal great-aunt
Rochelle M., denied having American Indian heritage.
At the April 28, 2023 hearing, the juvenile court noted the
parents indicated they did not have American Indian heritage
and found ICWA did not apply.
The dependency investigator noted in 2019 dependency
proceedings involving the family, the juvenile court found ICWA
did not apply. During the prior dependency proceedings, when
asked about American Indian ancestry, mother said, “I’ve been
researching, but I don’t know. At this point, it’s undetermined.
3
It would either be Cherokee or Pima.” Father stated, “There may
be (on mother’s side). [Her] great, great, grandmother.” Father
denied any further knowledge of mother’s possible American
Indian heritage and denied any American Indian ancestry in his
family. On March 1, 2019, DCFS sent ICWA notices to the
Cherokee and Pima tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA).
The parents also provided family information in the 2019
proceeding. Mother stated her father passed away and she had
one younger brother. Father said he grew up in Panama and
identified his parents as Wilburth M., Jr., and Magdalena C. The
paternal grandfather passed away on May 7, 2023. Father has
“three siblings from his mother and three siblings from his
father.” Father was raised by his maternal grandparents,
Moises C. and Chlotilde C. In 1993, father immigrated to the
United States and lived with his paternal grandmother
Alberta M.
On February 9, 2024, the court noted the present matter
was on calendar regarding notice and responses from the tribes.
The court stated, “[DCFS2] submitted an L.M.I. indicating all
tribes responded … that [T.M.’s sibling D.M.] is not an Indian
child and is not eligible for enrollment. The court is inclined to
find this is not an ICWA case.” The parties submitted.
On February 23, 2024, father filed relative information for
paternal uncles Gabidhal M. and Akhill M. The remaining
individuals listed were friends or insufficient relational
information was provided.
2 Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS).
4
On February 29, 2024, the juvenile court granted an
expedited interstate compact on the placement of children (ICPC)
for maternal uncle Alonzo G. in Florida.
On March 4, 2024, paternal uncles Gabadiah M. and
Edwin C. filed relative information forms.
On July 15, 2024, father stated he had ancestry with the
Papago tribe through his great-grandfather on his father’s side.
Father said mother had American Indian heritage, but he did not
know the tribe.
Mother said she had Cherokee and Papago ancestry, but
she did not know the percentage.
Adult sibling G.M. reported that in the past, the parents
had informed her that mother had Pima, Papago, and Cherokee
ancestry. G.M. did not know if it was true or “just something
that the parents are saying.” G.M. had not submitted to DNA
testing regarding American Indian ancestry.
At the August 14, 2024 six-month review hearing, the
juvenile court asked father if he or anyone in his family had
American Indian ancestry. Father replied, “From my mom, no.”
The juvenile court asked mother the same question, to which she
replied, “Currently researching that.” The court inquired, “Yes or
no today?” Mother responded, “No today.” The juvenile court told
the parents to let their counsel and the social worker know if they
had any further information.
The juvenile court asked L.M. if the family had American
Indian ancestry. L.M. responded, “No.” The court then asked
D.M., who responded he was not sure. Then court then asked
Rochelle, who responded she did not know of any American
Indian ancestry. The court found ICWA did not apply and
ordered the social worker to follow up with mother.
5
On August 13, 2024, the social worker conducted further
ICWA inquiry by mailing out ICWA notices to the Cherokee
Nation, United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians in
Oklahoma, Papago AK-Chin Indian Community, Papago Tohono
O’Odham Nation, and the BIA. On August 26, 2024, AK-Chin
Indian Community reported T.M. and the parents were not
enrolled, nor eligible for enrollment, in the tribe. On August 30,
2024, the Papago Tohono O’Odham Nation reported the children
and parents were not members of the tribe. On September 16,
2024, the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians stated the
children were not members nor eligible for membership in the
tribe.
On September 16, 2024, the juvenile court asked D.M.,
mother and father whether they had American Indian heritage.
D.M. responded, “Not that I know of, Your Honor.” Mother
responded, “We are researching that.” However, mother
acknowledged she had no information that she was affiliated
with any American Indian tribe. The court asked father if he had
any American Indian heritage, to which he responded, “I myself,
no ma’am.” The juvenile court continued to find the children
were not Indian children as defined under ICWA.
On November 14, 2024, the juvenile court again asked
mother, father, and D.M. if they had any American Indian
heritage. Mother replied, “Still looking.” She then clarified,
“That is a no.” Father responded, “Not that I know of, ma’am.”
D.M. also responded, “Not that I know of.” The juvenile court
continued to find ICWA did not apply.
On December 6, 2024, the juvenile court again asked the
parents about American Indian heritage. Mother responded,
“Not at this time, but we are researching.” Father said he had no
6
American Indian heritage. The juvenile court again found ICWA
did not apply.
At the February 7, 2025 12-month review hearing, the
juvenile court again asked mother, father, and D.M. about
American Indian heritage. The parents and D.M. denied
knowledge of American Indian heritage. Adult sibling Na.M.
denied American Indian heritage. Maternal cousins Teresa and
Anthony denied American Indian heritage. T.M.’s court
appointed special advocate had no knowledge of T.M. having any
American Indian ancestry. The juvenile court continued to find
ICWA did not apply.
On April 25, 2025, the juvenile court again asked mother,
father, and D.M. about American Indian ancestry, and all three
denied such ancestry. The juvenile court continued to find ICWA
did not apply.
The same questions were asked of the parents on June 4,
2025. The parents denied American Indian heritage, and the
juvenile court continued to find ICWA did not apply.
On the first day of the section 366.22 hearing, July 21,
2025, the juvenile court asked the parents and D.M. if they had
American Indian heritage, and all three denied any such
heritage. The juvenile court continued to find ICWA did not
apply.
The same questions were asked of mother, father, and D.M.
on the last day of the continued section 366.22 hearing,
September 29, 2025. Mother, father, and D.M. all denied
American Indian heritage. The juvenile court continued to find
ICWA inapplicable.
7
September 30, 2025 hearing
At the hearing on September 30, 2025, the juvenile court
stated, “I’m not going to bother with a new I.C.W.A. inquiry. It
was fresh from yesterday with the court’s findings.”
The court noted visitation and educational rights issues
were continued from the previous day. T.M.’s counsel had filed a
form JV-535 asking the court to limit the parents’ educational
rights and appoint T.M.’s caregiver as educational rights holder.
T.M.’s parents had communications with T.M.’s school principal
that could have a negative effect on T.M. and her attendance at
school. The parents also attempted to get access to T.M.’s mental
health records. Mother’s counsel objected, arguing there was
insufficient evidence in the record to support T.M.’s request.
Father also objected, arguing T.M. was failing in school and the
parents needed access in order to advocate for her.
The juvenile court noted it had read and considered all the
paperwork regarding the JV-535. The court took judicial notice
of “the factual basis for terminating reunification services
yesterday at the .22 for the mother and father. The court will
also take judicial notice of all of the findings and orders on this
case. The mother and father’s participation or lack of [and] their
aggressiveness in wanting to dictate [T.M.’s] educational
decisions, her journey, her educational path has not served in
[T.M.’s] best interest.”
The juvenile court referenced its decision the previous day
that the parents’ conduct and actions were not in the child’s best
interests. The court noted it terminated reunification services
“because the court found no substantive progress as depicted in
how they applied any lessons learned in their relationship
contact with this child. I do not see any reason for this court not
to grant the [child’s] request. Over the mother’s objection, over
8
the father’s objection, the court will limit the mother and father’s
educational rights and appoint [the caregiver].”
T.M.’s counsel next argued for suspension of visitation.
Counsel reminded the court of the incident in which the parents
changed the child’s summer camp from her desired camp to a
camp of their choosing, completely disregarding T.M.’s wishes.
T.M. acquiesced, but “due to the parents’ aggressiveness, [T.M.]
couldn’t even go to the camp the parents wanted her to.”
T.M.’s counsel reiterated that the parents had been
“combative” with T.M.’s school principal and noted “during the
visits, the parents all of a sudden decided that they needed to
celebrate my client’s birthday, even though my client asked them,
well, why are we celebrating my birthday.” T.M.’s counsel
reported the parents responded, “Well, we just want you to know
that we’re going to be in your life forever.” These comments
caused confusion to T.M.
T.M.’s counsel believed the court had enough information to
make the determination that it would be detrimental to T.M. to
continue ongoing visitation with the parents.
DCFS joined with T.M.’s counsel in asking to suspend
visitation. Counsel for DCFS stated, “[DCFS] is very concerned.
The parents have been decorating the visitation room with
balloons, having cupcakes for her at each visit, celebrating a
birthday that I believe is in April.”
Mother’s counsel objected, arguing the parents were
making a concerted effort to be there for T.M. when they saw her
grades were failing, and denied being “aggressive” with any
parties. Mother did not “understand how her advocating for her
daughter has been turned around to her daughter suffering so
much that no visits at all should occur.” Mother’s counsel pointed
out that a detriment finding is a very high standard and there
9
was not enough evidence to sustain it. Mother’s counsel also
argued “if my client is going to have a chance to be successful at
all during the permanency phase, obviously, it’s going to require
visits and a bond. And if she can’t have visits, that sort of makes
the permanency phase sort of completed already.”
Father’s counsel joined with mother’s counsel, arguing
there was no basis to terminate the parents’ visits. Father
expressed a concern that stopping visits would terminate any
chance he had of reunification. Father also requested a bonding
study. D.M.’s counsel joined the parents in objecting to
suspension of visitation for the parents. D.M. had repeatedly
asked for his own visits with T.M. and had not received them.
The juvenile court denied father’s request for a bonding
study. The court also denied T.M.’s request to suspend all visits.
However, the court ordered visits to be “once a week only,” in the
DCFS office, for two hours per visit. The court noted, “If T.M.
does not want to go, she doesn’t have to go.” The court ordered
the parents not to bring food, decorations, gifts, or anything to
the visits. The court stated, “it is coming across clearer and
clearer as each hearing progresses that there is [an] agenda why
these visits come with gifts, come with fancy foods, et cetera, to
confuse the child or to enhance the child to want to go to the
visits, not because she wants to see mom and dad and bond with
them, but because there are gifts and treats. Do not bring
anything.”
The court also ordered sibling visits between T.M. and D.M.
At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court asked if there was
anything else it needed to address. The parents’ counsel did not
respond.
10
On September 30, 2025, mother filed a notice of appeal
from the orders made at the September 30, 2025 hearing.3 On
October 3, 2025, father filed a notice of appeal from the orders
made at the September 30, 2025 hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of father’s motion for a bonding study
At the section 366.22 hearing that took place the day before
the hearing at issue in this matter, the court denied mother’s
motion for a bonding study. Mother and father argued for
reversal of this ruling in their petitions for extraordinary writ.
Their arguments are addressed in the concurrently filed opinion
in case No. B349246.
As both parents have previously argued the identical issue
before this court, we decline to address it a second time. Instead,
we reference the discussion of this issue in B349246, at pages 34–
37. For the reasons set forth therein, the order denying father’s
request for a bonding study is affirmed.
II. Order reducing visits
Father argues the juvenile court erred when it reduced his
visits from twice a week to once a week after it terminated family
3 Father filed a previous notice of appeal on August 26, 2025,
from the juvenile court’s orders refusing to remove a social
worker from the case and strike her reports. Father listed
hearing dates of May 1, 2025, June 4, 2025, and July 21, 2025.
The appeal was given case No. B348572 and was consolidated
with this matter by order of the court dated January 12, 2026.
Father has failed to make any arguments on appeal concerning
the matters noticed in the August 26, 2025 notice of appeal,
therefore any such arguments are forfeited.
11
reunification services.4 Mother joins father’s argument.
“Visitation orders in dependency cases are typically reviewed for
abuse of discretion and will not be reversed absent a ‘clear
showing of an abuse of discretion.’” (In re J.P. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119.)
The juvenile court denied T.M.’s request for a detriment
finding in support of termination of visitation. However, the
court reduced the parents’ visits from twice a week to once a
week and gave T.M. the option to attend the visits or not. Father
argues the reduction of visits constituted an abuse of discretion.
Father makes factual arguments concerning the enjoyable visits
T.M. had with the parents. Father also argues limiting his visits
to once a week will make it much more difficult for him to
effectively argue for the application of the beneficial parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights, should
DCFS ultimately recommend adoption.
When a juvenile court terminates family reunification
services and orders a section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing, the juvenile court “shall continue to permit the parent …
to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that
visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd.
(h).)5 There is no requirement that the juvenile court maintain
4 We decline to find father forfeited this argument by failing
to object to the juvenile court’s order below. Father argued
generally against the child’s position that visits should be
suspended, and we find this sufficient under the circumstances to
preserve his claim for appeal.
5 Contrary to father’s position, section 362.1, subdivision
(a)(1)(A) is inapplicable after reunification services have been
terminated.
12
the same frequency of visits in place during the reunification
period.
The record supports the juvenile court’s visitation order.
There was significant evidence that parental visits were
problematic to T.M., causing her behavior to regress. She
exhibited bedwetting, intentional self-soiling, skin picking, and
regressed baby talk during and following visits. T.M. realized
that the parents were trying to influence her during visits by
bringing her favorite foods and promising her things such as a
horse if she said she would go home. The parents scolded the
child about her grades and inappropriately talked about case-
related issues. When mother became upset with a social worker
during a visit, T.M. appeared uncomfortable. She also felt
uncomfortable with the parents’ comments attempting to
persuade her to take their phone calls when she did not want to.
This evidence supports the juvenile court’s order reducing
parental visits.
Father provides no legal authority that the juvenile court
erred in allowing T.M. to refuse visits. During the reunification
period, visitation is a necessary and integral component of the
reunification plan. (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)
During the reunification period, the power to decide whether
visitation occurs belongs to the court alone, and the court may
not abdicate this power to any third party, including the child.
(Id. at pp. 317–318.) However, reunification services had been
terminated in this matter when the court made its order
permitting T.M. to decline visits. In the absence of legal
authority to the contrary, we decline to find the trial court erred
in allowing T.M. to decline visits after reunification services had
been terminated.
13
Father’s argument that the reduction in visits will have a
deleterious effect on any argument he may have that the
beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of
parental rights applies—should this become an issue in the
future—is not well taken. Father provides no authority
suggesting this is an appropriate consideration for determining a
visitation schedule following termination of reunification
services. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [“After the
termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the
care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of
the child ….’”].)6
As set forth above and in the concurrently filed opinion in
B349246, there was ample evidence in the record that parental
visits were problematic for T.M. The parents attempted to
manipulate T.M., behaved aggressively towards other adults in
T.M.’s life, and pressured her in ways that made her
uncomfortable. T.M. had repeatedly expressed her desire not to
return to the parents, and the court found she was “still reeling
from the after [e]ffects of abuse.” Under the circumstances, we
find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the
parents’ visits following termination of reunification services.
6 Further, a reduction in the number of court-permitted
visits does not necessarily affect a parent’s ability to show the
beneficial parental bond. While the first element of the exception
is regular visitation and contact, “[t]he determination that the
parent had visited and maintained contact with the child
‘consistently’” takes into account “‘the extent [of visitation]
permitted by the court’s orders.’” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 632, 639.) Thus, the parents are not less likely to be
able to show the regular, consistent visitation prong of the
exception due to the court’s reduction in visits.
14
III. ICWA
A. Applicable law
“ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881, disapproved on other
grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18
(Dezi C.).)
ICWA and corresponding statutes that our Legislature
enacted to implement ICWA assign the juvenile court and DCFS
“three distinct duties” aimed at assessing whether a child in a
dependency action is an “Indian child,” and hence a child who
should not be separated from his or her tribal family through
adoption or foster care placement. (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052.) First, the statute imposes a duty of
inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be an
Indian child. If that initial inquiry creates a reason to believe the
child is an Indian child, the agency must make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child. Finally, if that
further inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian
child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply.
(D.S., at p. 1052.)
Under California state law, DCFS and the juvenile court
“have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” into
whether a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This includes DCFS making an initial
inquiry, which includes asking the child, parents, extended
family members, and anyone else that has an interest in the child
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.
15
(b).) “[E]xtended family member[s]” are defined as the child’s
“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (c).)
Federal regulations require the juvenile court to “ask each
participant … whether the participant knows or has reason to
know that the child is an Indian child. The inquiry is made at
the commencement of the proceeding and all responses should be
on the record.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); see Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.2, subd. (c) [similar state law requirement].)
A juvenile court’s findings relating to ICWA notice and
inquiry issues are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re E.W.
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 404.) When a child welfare agency
conducts an inadequate ICWA inquiry, and the record is thus
underdeveloped as to what information might exist about a
child’s Indian ancestry, a harmless error analysis is not feasible.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1126.) However, “the juvenile
court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,
proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary
function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.”
(Id. at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case.”’” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Father asserts the ICWA inquiry in this matter has been
inadequate. Mother joins father’s argument.
There were various reports that the parents and T.M. may
have American Indian heritage. Father initially denied having
American Indian heritage but later reported he had Papago
16
Indian lineage from his father and great-grandfather’s side.
Mother indicated she may have Cherokee or Pima heritage. In
July 2024, G.M. reported her parents told her mother may have
Pima, Papago, and Cherokee Indian heritage. In 2019, DCFS
reported that it had mailed ICWA notices to these tribes, but
copies of the ICWA notices are not included in the appellate
record.
While other relatives denied American Indian heritage,
including Rochelle, L.M., Na.M., and maternal grandmother Lola
G., father argues the appellate record does not reflect that DCFS
asked all available relatives, including two of his brothers.
Paternal uncles Gabadiah M. and Edwin C. filed relative
information sheets, but the record does not reflect they were ever
asked about potential American Indian heritage. Father reported
the identity of his paternal grandmother and maternal
grandparents, but there is no evidence in the record suggesting
DCFS reached out to these individuals.
DCFS agrees under the circumstances remand for
additional inquiry pursuant to ICWA is appropriate. The record,
while demonstrating significant ICWA inquiry efforts by both
DCFS and the juvenile court, does not reflect that DCFS inquired
of all available relatives. Also, DCFS acknowledges while DCFS
sent ICWA notices to the Cherokee Nation, United Keetoowah
Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, Papago AK-Chin Indian
Community, Papago Tohono O’Odham Nation, and the BIA, it is
not clear what information was provided to these tribes.
DCFS has a continuing duty of inquiry, and the juvenile
dependency case remains ongoing. Thus, DCFS concedes, it
appears appropriate to vacate the juvenile court’s ICWA order
and remand to ensure compliance with ICWA but affirm all other
orders. (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 563 [prior
17
to termination of parental rights, ICWA inquiry and notice errors
do not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s orders].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA is inapplicable is
vacated. DCFS is ordered to conduct further inquiry of the
parents’ reasonably available relatives regarding the parents’
claims of possible American Indian heritage, and to document its
efforts to inquire of such relatives. In addition, DCFS is ordered
to document all biographical information provided to the relevant
Indian tribes and perform further inquiry to any additional
relevant tribes. The juvenile court is to make new ICWA findings
based on the results of the ongoing ICWA investigation. All other
orders at issue in this appeal are affirmed.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
18