Filed 10/19/26 In re T.E. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re T.E., a Person Coming Under B349885
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
19CCJP02566,
19CCJP02566D)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L. E.,
Defendant and Appellant;
M.M.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat-Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant L.E.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent M.M.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
On March 1, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300,2 alleging that Morena M. (mother) and Luis E. (father) created a
detrimental and endangering environment for their minor child, T.E. (age 6).
The petition alleged that in prior dependency proceedings, father sexually
abused one of mother’s other children, K.M. (age 11), and that mother
continued to allow father access to the family home where T.E. and K.M.
resided with mother.3
1 We resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background
because our opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts
of the case and its procedural history. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855.)
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
3 The petition was also filed on behalf of K.M., but Luis E. is not K.M.’s
father and the juvenile court’s findings concerning K.M. are not germane to
any issue raised on appeal.
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On April 17, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the allegations against
mother and father and removed T.E. from their care. Father was granted
monitored visitation with T.E. three times per week.
On August 28, 2025, the juvenile court held a judicial review hearing
under section 364. At the hearing, the court terminated jurisdiction and
entered an order granting mother sole legal and physical custody of T.E. The
court granted father monitored visitation with T.E. “a minimum of 1 time per
year for 3 hours per visit.” As part of its order, the court specified that
father’s visits could be monitored either by a mutually agreed-upon monitor
approved by mother or a professional monitor paid by father.
Father timely appealed the juvenile court’s August 2025 order, arguing
the court abused its discretion by requiring him to bear the cost of a
professional monitor without first assessing his ability to do so. Mother
contends father forfeited this claim of error by failing to raise an objection in
the juvenile court. Father did not file a reply brief or otherwise respond to
mother’s forfeiture argument.
We agree that father has forfeited the issue. “‘A party forfeits the right
to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise
the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture . . . applies in juvenile
dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by
silently until the conclusion of the proceedings.’ [Citation.] A party may not
assert theories on appeal which were not raised in the trial court.” (In re
C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 385.) “Considering an issue for the first time
on appeal is often unfair to the trial court, unjust to the opposing party, and
contrary to judicial economy because it encourages the embedding of
reversible error through silence in the trial court.” (In re M.H. (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 699, 713–714.) While appellate courts have the discretion to
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excuse forfeiture, our Supreme Court has made it clear that such discretion
“should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal
issue.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
Here, it is undisputed that father did not object to the possibility of
bearing the cost of a professional monitor if he was unable to procure a
monitor approved by mother. On appeal, father has not attempted to rebut
mother’s forfeiture argument, nor does he argue that we should exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of his claim despite his forfeiture. In the
absence of any argument on the point by father, we can only conclude he has
tacitly conceded the issue. (See Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 35, 45 [appellant “tacitly conced[ed]” forfeiture by failing to
respond to respondent’s argument]; accord The Police Retirement System of
St. Louis v. Page (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 336, 346, fn. 3.)
As father has forfeited his only claim of error on appeal, we affirm the
juvenile court’s order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s August 28, 2025, order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J. TAMZARIAN, J.
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