Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re Skyler G. CA2/5

Filed 9/3/26 In re Skyler G. CA2/5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/3/26 In re Skyler G. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re SKYLER G. et al., B351578
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
_____________________________
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 24CCJP01315AB)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BENJAMIN G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.

1
Lori N. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian A. Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
In this dependency appeal, Benjamin G. (father) challenges
the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights.
Specifically, he challenges the court’s implicit finding that the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.)1 did not apply. Because this finding is
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Father and So.G. (mother) have two children—Skyler G.
(born 2012) and Ariel G. (born 2016). Mother passed away in
2023.
B. Actions giving rise to dependency jurisdiction
In 2024, father began leaving the children with relatives
and others, without providing any way for the caregivers to
contact father. He also refused to enroll the children in school or
provide them with medical care

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
II. Procedural Background
A. Initiation of dependency jurisdiction
On April 29, 2024, the Los Angeles Department of Children
and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the
juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over Skyler and
Ariel because (1) father “[o]n prior occasions” “made an
inappropriate plan for the children’s care and supervision” by
leaving them “in the care of unrelated adults and the maternal
aunt, Oseta T[.], without making a plan for the children’s ongoing
care and supervision,” and (2) father “failed to provide the
children with the basic necessities of life including food, clothing,
shelter, and medical treatment.” The petition further alleged
that father’s conduct “endangers the children’s physical health
and safety, creates a detrimental and endangering home
environment, and places the children at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, and danger,” thereby warranting the exercise of
jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300.
B. Exertion of dependency jurisdiction, removal,
and reunification efforts
On June 5, 2024, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing at which it amended the first allegation
to include father’s failure to “provide the children with the basic
necessities of life,” sustained that allegation, and dismissed the
second allegation as duplicative. The court removed the children
from father’s custody, placed the children in the home of the
maternal aunt Oseta, and ordered the Department to provide
father reunification services.
From June 5, 2024 through June 25, 2025, the Department
provided father with reunification services; the court terminated

3
those services upon finding that father had made no progress
with his case plan. The court set a permanency planning
hearing.
On January 6, 2026, the juvenile court held the
permanency planning hearing, rejected father’s request to apply
the parental benefit exception, and terminated father’s parental
rights over both children.
C. Efforts to ascertain whether the children fall
under ICWA, and juvenile court’s ultimate ICWA finding
Prior to filing its petition, the Department spoke with
father, the children, the maternal aunt, and the children’s school
counselor about whether the children might be Indian children.
All denied any such possibility.
At the initial hearing in this case on April 30, 2024, father
submitted an ICWA-020 form indicating that he was “or m[ight]
be a member of . . . a federally recognized Indian tribe.”2 Father’s
lawyer reiterated that father was “claiming Native American
ancestry” but was unable to “name the specific tribe.” The court
ordered the Department to “investigate and see if there are some
other paternal relatives who can shed light on the issue.”
Prior to the six-month review hearing (that is, prior to
November 2024), the Department reinterviewed the children, the
maternal aunt and father about the children’s Indian heritage.
The children and maternal aunt denied any heritage. But father
for the first time reported that (1) “his cousin” told him that
“[f]ather’s maternal grandfather’s parents [that is, the children’s
great-great-grandparents] were from the Yavapai Tribe in

2 Mother’s family reported that mother was Samoan and had
no Indian heritage. Father does not argue that the children have
any Indian heritage through mother.

4
Arizona,” but father did not know their names, and (2) father’s
maternal grandfather’s name was Leo G. (with two possible
spellings of Leo’s last name). The Department sent notices to the
three Yavapai Tribes—namely, the Yavapai Nation, the Yavapai-
Apache Nation, and the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe. Those
notices included the children’s full names and birthdates;
mother’s full name, last address, and birth and death dates;
father’s full name, current address, birthdate and possible
affiliation with a Yavapai tribe; and Leo G.’s full name (with both
possible spellings) listed as “Father’s Biological Grandfather.”
The last two tribes responded that the children were not Indian
children; the Yavapai Nation did not respond. The Department
also reviewed a 2013 referral it had received regarding father,
which listed three parental relatives—a then-deceased paternal
grandmother, a paternal step-grandfather who had no blood
relation to father and for whom the Department had no contact
information; and a paternal aunt, Laura T., with a “562” area
code number and who had never responded to the Department’s
efforts to contact her.
Prior to the 12-month review hearing (that is, prior to June
2025), the Department reinterviewed the children, the maternal
aunt, and father; this time, all three denied any Indian heritage.
In a September 2025 report, the Department relayed that it
had asked father about the children’s Indian heritage again.
This time, father stated that he “can’t think straight” and then
denied any Indian heritage, but added, “it isn’t like it will change
anything.”
At an October 22, 2025 hearing, the Department asked for
a continuance of the permanency planning hearing. At that
hearing, the juvenile court asked the Department if they had

5
identified any paternal relatives. The Department replied that
father did not “name” any paternal relatives, but “provided the
possibility of Yaqui lineage; however, the Department did notice
the Yaqui tribe, and the Yaqui tribe responded that the children
were not eligible.” (Although the transcript reports “Yaqui,” the
context confirms that the Department’s lawyer misspoke or the
reporter misheard—because father’s report and the Department’s
notice both pertained to the Yavapai tribe.)3 The juvenile court
then directly asked father for the names of any relatives, and
father provided the name of his sister Laura (the same paternal
aunt from the 2013 referral) and provided a “323” number. The
court ordered the Department to “follow up on that.”
In a December 2025 report, the Department reported that
it had spoken with paternal aunt Laura. She indicated that the
children’s paternal great grandfather was born in Jerome,
Arizona, but that she “d[idn’t] think” her family was affiliated
with any tribe and that she had “no information.”
At the permanency planning hearing on January 6, 2026,
the court found that the Department had “conducted a reasonable
and diligent inquiry” into the children’s Indian heritage and
found no reason to know that ICWA applied.
D. Appeal
Father timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Father argues that we must conditionally reverse the order
terminating parental rights because the trial court erred in
implicitly finding that ICWA’s mandate had been met.

3 The juvenile court repeated this misnomer at the January
6, 2026 hearing.

6
ICWA was enacted “out of concern that ‘an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and
private agencies,’” and “aims to keep Indian children connected to
Indian families.” (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255,
265.) To that end, under ICWA and the corresponding statutes
the California Legislature enacted to implement it (§§ 224-224.7),
a juvenile court and the Department have duties aimed at
assessing whether a child in a dependency action is an “Indian
child” (§§ 224.2, 224.3). An “Indian child” is a child who (1) is “a
member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b) [adopting
federal law definition].) By its terms, this definition turns ‘“on
the child’s political affiliation with a federally recognized Indian
Tribe,’” not “necessarily” “the child’s race, ancestry, or ‘blood
quantum.’” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882,
disapproved on other grounds by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).)
The Department and the juvenile court have three duties
under ICWA. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; see
generally Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1134.)
-- Duty of initial inquiry. The initial “duty” of the
Department and the court is “to inquire whether [a] child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The Department
discharges this duty by “asking” family members “whether th[e]
child is or may be an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b).) This includes
inquiring of not only the child’s parents, but also others,
including but not limited to “extended family members.” (Ibid.)
For its part, the juvenile court is required, “at the first

7
appearance” in a dependency case, to “ask each party to the
proceeding” “whether they know or have reason to know that the
child is an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (c).)
-- Duty of further inquiry. The second duty is the duty
of the Department or the juvenile court to “make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(e).) This duty is triggered if the Department or court “has
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” (ibid.), and,
once triggered, obligates the Department to conduct a more
thorough investigation and to undertake “‘meaningful effort’”
through further interviews aimed at gathering information,
through contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State
Department of Social Services for assistance, and through
contacting the relevant Indian tribe(s) (id., subd. (e)(2); In re K.T.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 743-744; In re D.F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 566-567). The Department or court “has reason
to believe that an Indian child is involved” if the Department or
court “has information suggesting that either the parent of the
child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for
membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe,” including
information “indicat[ing]” but not “establish[ing]” the existence of
any of the six circumstances satisfying the “reason to know” a
child is an Indian child, detailed next. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
-- Duty to notify the pertinent tribe(s). The third duty is
to notify the relevant Indian tribe(s). (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is triggered if the Department or the
court “knows or has reason to know . . . that an Indian child is
involved” based on the inquiries performed under the second
duty. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) The Department or juvenile court has
“reason to know a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian

8
child” in one of six statutorily defined circumstances—namely,
when (1) “[a] person having an interest in the child . . . informs
the court that the child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1));
(2) “[a]ny participant in the proceeding . . . informs the court that
it has discovered information indicating that the child is an
Indian child” (id., subd. (d)(3)); (3) “[t]he child . . . gives the court
reason to know that the child is an Indian child” (id., subd.
(d)(4)); (4) the child or the parents reside, or are domiciled, “on a
reservation or in an Alaska Native village” (id., subd. (d)(2)); (5)
“the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court” (id., subd.
(d)(5)); or (6) “either parent or the child possess an identification
card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe”
(id., subd. (d)(6)).
In assessing whether ICWA has been violated, we review
any questions of law de novo but review the court’s ICWA
findings for substantial evidence. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1134 [factual finding that ICWA does not apply is “‘subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence’”]; id. at p.
1144 [noting that such review is “deferential”].)
Because father does not assert that the Department or
juvenile court had a duty to formally notify any tribes (the third
duty), and because father’s report of possible Yavapai heritage
was sufficient to create a “reason to believe that an Indian child
is involved” and thus to trigger the duty of further inquiry, we
focus on whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s implicit finding that the Department complied with its
duty of further inquiry.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that the
Department and the juvenile court satisfied ICWA’s duty of
further inquiry because they made a meaningful effort to

9
determine whether Skyler and Ariel are Indian children within
the meaning of ICWA. The Department started by asking father
and the available maternal relatives (including the maternal
aunt) if the children had any potential Indian ancestry. When
mother’s relatives indicated that mother had no such ancestry
but father indicated that he might have a tie to a Yavapai tribe,
the Department chased down that lead by contacting the three
federally recognized Yavapai tribes setting out the pertinent
available information about the children, father, and Leo G. (the
relative with the closest ties to a tribe). After the Department
reported to the juvenile court that the tribes had either indicated
there was no tie or not responded, the court asked father if he
had any other living relatives. When father named his sister
Laura, and provided a current phone number, the Department
followed up on that lead and talked to Laura, who indicated that
there was no Indian heritage on her side of the family.
Father proffers three deficiencies that he believes foreclose
a finding that the Department’s further inquiry was sufficient.
First, father asserts that the Department’s inquiry was
deficient because the Department never asked father for the
name or contact information of the “cousin” who told father that
his family might have Yavapai heritage; did not ask father
whether his grandfather Leo G. was living or dead (despite father
being 50 years old at the time these dependency proceedings
began, such that his grandfather would have been at least in his
late 80s or early 90s); and did not ask father whether Leo G.
(whose last name father did not know how to spell) or any other
relative had information about the family’s heritage. Although
the Department has a duty “on an ongoing basis [to] include in its
filings a detailed description of all inquiries” it makes under

10
ICWA (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5)), we reject father’s
argument. Father asks us to infer from the absence of
information in the Department’s report on these topics that the
Department did not ask father for more information about the
cousin, or whether Leo G. was still alive, or whether father had
additional relatives to contact, when an equally reasonable
inference is that the Department did ask those questions and
father provided no pertinent information, particularly in light of
the Department’s practice of reporting detailed biographical
information about relatives whenever that information was
provided. To the extent father suggests that ICWA requires a
transcription of all questions asked by the Department to which
there is a negative or unhelpful response, we reject that
suggestion. Indeed, when the court later asked father if he had
any living relatives the Department could contact, father did not
name the cousin or anyone else other than his sister—of whom
the Department already knew.
Second, father identifies what he views as two deficiencies
with the notice forms that the Department sent the three
Yavapai tribes. As a threshold matter, father’s argument ignores
that these notices were sent—not to discharge the Department’s
duty of formal notice—but rather its precursor duty of further
inquiry. Where, as here, notice is sent as part of a further
inquiry, more informal communication is the norm (In re T.G.
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290), and, indeed, all the statute
requires (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C) [Department must initially
contact tribes and provide them with the information each tribe
identifies as necessary to ascertain membership or citizenship
eligibility]; In re P.H., Jr. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 992, 997-998 [no
need for additional information in notices when formal inquiry

11
duty not triggered]). The first deficiency father identifies is the
Department’s failure to send notices to the BIA or the
Department of Social Services, but this was unnecessary because
notice to those agencies is necessary at the further inquiry stage
only if assistance is needed to “identify[] the names and contact
information of the tribes” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B), italics added;
In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1184)—and here, the
Department already had that information for the three Yavapai
tribes it needed to contact. The second deficiency father
identifies is the Department’s failure to include in the notices the
information the Department possessed regarding the deceased
paternal grandmother. While the information about the paternal
grandmother could have been included, its omission did not
render the informal notices to the tribes (or the Department’s
further inquiry) deficient. The Department provided the
information most directly tied to the three tribes (as father’s
cousin had reported the heritage through Leo G.), and the tribes
were able to make their determination without requesting any
further information “identified by the tribe as [being] necessary”
to make that determination. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) At the
stage of the more informal duty of further inquiry, that suffices.
Third and lastly, father asserts that the Department’s
inquiry was deficient because it did not contact his sister, Laura,
until father provided current contact information for her. We
reject this assertion. Although the Department was aware of
Laura’s existence (due to the 2013 referral), the Department’s
prior efforts to contact Laura using a “562” number were
unsuccessful. It is not until father provided a current “323”
number that the Department had any way to reach her. Its
failure to re-try a number that did not work before was not

12
deficient. Father relatedly asserts that the Department should
have re-noticed the three Yavapai tribes after speaking with
Laura to add that Leo G.’s place of birth was Jerome, Arizona.
Father provides no basis to believe that this additional iota of
information would have added anything to the tribes’
determination; the tribes’ failure to ask for such information
indicates it would not have added anything.
As our Supreme Court noted in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1141, a juvenile court has “‘“relatively broad discretion to
determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.”’” Absolute
perfection is not required; a misstep or omission does not
automatically mandate a do-over. Here, the Department
repeatedly asked about Indian heritage and followed up on any
and all leads. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that the Department’s ICWA inquiry was
sufficient.

13
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating father’s parental
rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

I concur:

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

14
In re S.G.
B351578

BAKER, J., Concurring

Although I do not subscribe to the opinion for the court’s
discussion of applicable law in all its particulars, I agree the
juvenile court’s order should be affirmed.

BAKER, J.

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