Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re Sebastian N. CA2/3

Filed 10/19/26 In re Sebastian N. CA2/3
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/19/26 In re Sebastian N. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re SEBASTIAN N., a Person Coming B351297
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP03076A
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ARIK N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Arik N. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s
December 2025 jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning
his infant son, Sebastian N. Father contends that substantial
evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that father
failed to protect Sebastian, and the juvenile court erred by
removing Sebastian from father’s physical custody, permitting
father only monitored visits, and including individual counseling
in father’s reunification plan. We find no error, and thus we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Sebastian’s birth and detention.
Sebastian was born in October 2025.1 Jessica M. (mother)
tested positive for methamphetamines, fentanyl, and opiates at
his birth, and Sebastian tested positive for methamphetamines
and amphetamines. Mother admitted using methamphetamines
“ ‘off and on’ ” for the past five years, but said she had not used
drugs since she learned she was pregnant. She had not received
any prenatal care.
Mother has four older children with different fathers. She
tested positive for methamphetamines at the birth of three of the
four children, in June 2016, July 2021, and February 2024. All
four children had been adopted or were in legal guardianships.

1 All dates are in 2025 unless otherwise indicated.

2
Mother has an extensive criminal record, including for possessing
controlled substances.
Father said he and mother began a relationship in 2021
and had lived together on and off from 2021 to 2025. They ended
their relationship three months before mother gave birth and
they did not plan to reconcile. Father said mother had never told
him she had a substance abuse problem or had used substances
while she was pregnant. Father appeared not to believe that
Sebastian had a positive toxicology screen, telling the social
worker, “ ‘My baby is fine. They checked him and he’s fine.’ ”
Father denied using drugs himself, but he declined to
voluntarily drug test. The social worker reported that during an
October 16 interview, father appeared flushed, his eyes were
dilated, and he was unfocused. Father acknowledged an arrest
for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, but said the
drugs were not his—that he “took the blame for his ‘street
family.’ ” Father also had been arrested for child cruelty and
possession of a stolen vehicle. He denied culpability for the child
endangerment arrest, saying he was fighting with the paternal
grandfather when grandfather’s wife, who was holding her young
child, tried to intervene and inadvertently scratched the child.
Father lived with paternal grandmother, who had an
extensive criminal history and a 15-year history of
methamphetamine use. Paternal grandmother said she had been
sober since her last arrest in 2019. She was willing to care for
Sebastian.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition a
few days after Sebastian’s birth. As subsequently amended, the
petition alleged that Sebastian was a juvenile court dependent

3
because he tested positive for methamphetamines and
amphetamines at birth (count b-1); mother used drugs
throughout her pregnancy and tested positive for
methamphetamines, fentanyl, and opiates at Sebastian’s birth,
and father knew or reasonably should have known of mother’s
substance abuse and failed to protect Sebastian (count b-2);
father had a history of substance abuse and criminal activity
(count b-3); and mother’s older children were juvenile court
dependents because of mother’s substance abuse (count j-1).
The juvenile court ordered Sebastian detained from both
parents. Father was permitted a minimum of nine hours of
monitored visits per week.
II. Jurisdiction and disposition.
Father said he had been diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder and dropped out of high school after
eleventh grade. He currently was unemployed and had no
income. Father admitted using drugs in the past, but denied
doing so currently, and he acknowledged that he and mother
associated with drug users. He also acknowledged knowing that
mother had other children who had been adopted, but said he
never asked why because “ ‘it’s none of my business.’ ”
Paternal grandmother said mother had lived in her home
several times, most recently for four months during her
pregnancy. Paternal grandmother knew mother had a substance
abuse history but denied knowing that mother used drugs while
pregnant. Paternal grandmother also knew father had used
drugs in the past, but she did not believe he was currently using.
She worried about what she described as father’s lack of
judgment.

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Father visited Sebastian inconsistently in October and
November. In October, father had two in-person visits and
canceled one. In November, father had three in-person visits,
and missed or cancelled eight.
The caregiver reported that father’s eyes appeared glassy
during a virtual visit in October, as if he were under the influence
of drugs. Father had five negative drug tests in October and
November, missed one scheduled drug test, and failed to provide
enough urine for another test. The social worker believed father
was “not . . . fully forthcoming as to his substance abuse.”
At the December 9 jurisdiction hearing, father’s counsel
asked the court to strike the allegations against father, urging
that father never suspected mother was using drugs during her
pregnancy, was shocked when Sebastian tested positive for
drugs, had no arrests during Sebastian’s lifetime, and
consistently tested negative for drugs. Minor’s counsel asked the
court to sustain the b-1 and b-2 counts (mother’s drug use and
father’s failure to protect) and strike the b-3 count (father’s drug
use and criminal history). Minor’s counsel argued that father
should have known of mother’s substance abuse because mother
used drugs throughout their relationship, and father admitted
that he and mother hung out with friends who used drugs.
Further, father had his own history of substance abuse and
therefore should have been able to recognize the signs.
DCFS’s counsel argued that father’s testimony that he did
not know mother used drugs was not credible because father
admitted knowing that mother had used drugs in the past and
that he and mother associated with drug users. Further,
although mother and father had some breaks in their
relationship, they lived together during mother’s pregnancy with

5
Sebastian, and father admitted knowing that mother had other
children whom she was not caring for.
The juvenile court dismissed the b-3 count of the petition,
noting that father was alleged to have been arrested for, but not
convicted of, drug possession and child endangerment. The court
also dismissed the j-1 count as duplicative of the b-2 count. It
sustained the b-1 and b-2 counts, explaining with regard to father
as follows:
“I do find that father cannot simply turn a blind eye.
I don’t find [credible] father’s statement that he didn’t know
about mother. First of all, he was inconsistent about whether
mother tested positive, claiming he didn’t know . . . . But it’s
quite clear that he knew that she had tested positive because he,
at [the] time of the testing, said that there was no proof for it . . . .
“I find that equally incredible and unreliable that the
father did not know that the mother was using during her
pregnancy, because even the paternal grandmother . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
. . . understood that mother had a substance abuse history. . . .
[Paternal grandmother] also stated that father was the child she
was always worried about because of his poor choices, his lack of
judgment, and his behaviors. She did not believe he was
currently using, but he had used in the past, and [she]
acknowledged her own issues with substance abuse. She was not
told much about [father’s] arrest, and it appears that the father
has not been very forthcoming about his history with his own
family . . . .
“The court also notes that in addition to the father turning
a blind eye to mother’s drug use, during one of the interviews,
father’s eyes were dilated. This is . . . before he started testing
negative for the Department. And while he has been clean lately,

6
the court notes he . . . failed to appear for a test and he couldn’t
produce urine on [one] date. . . .
“The father hasn’t been able to hold a job. Father hasn’t
been able to complete school . . . so the court believes that, given
those circumstances, that father obviously must have known, and
if he did not know, he should have known and he turned a blind
eye to it.”
With regard to disposition, father’s counsel asked the court
to release Sebastian to father or, alternatively, to allow father
unmonitored visits. Father’s counsel also objected to father being
ordered to participate in a 12-step program and individual
counseling.
The court found that it was premature to return Sebastian
to father, noting that father had missed many visits, appeared
glassy-eyed during a meeting with a social worker, and did not
drug test consistently. Thus, the court did not believe Sebastian
could safely be returned to father at that time. The court ordered
father to undergo 10 random drug tests, take a parenting class,
and engage in individual counseling to address case issues,
including the impact of substance abuse on child development.
Father was permitted a minimum of nine hours of monitored
visits weekly.
Father timely appealed from the disposition order.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that substantial evidence did not support
the juvenile court’s finding that he failed to protect Sebastian
from mother’s drug use. Father also contends the juvenile court
erred by removing Sebastian from his custody, permitting him
only monitored visitation, and ordering him to engage in

7
individual counseling. Father’s contentions lack merit, as we
discuss.
I. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that father failed to protect Sebastian.
Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) provides that a child is within the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction if, among other things, “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child.”
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Father contends that substantial evidence did not support
the failure-to-protect finding because he did not know that
mother used drugs while she was pregnant with Sebastian.3 In

2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

3 DCFS asks us to dismiss father’s appeal as nonjusticiable
because father has not challenged the sustained allegations

8
support, he notes he told the social workers he never saw mother
use drugs and did not know she lost custody of her older children
because of substance use. Further, father says he and mother
were no longer involved romantically and he was committed to
complying with court orders and protecting Sebastian from
mother.
We conclude that the juvenile court’s finding that father
failed to protect Sebastian was supported by substantial
evidence. As DCFS notes, mother had a substance abuse problem
that dated back to at least 2010. Mother and father had lived
together on-and-off for four years before Sebastian was born, and
mother gave birth to at least one drug-exposed baby—and
possibly two—during that time. Father knew that mother did
not have custody of any of her four older children. On this record,
the juvenile court reasonably concluded that father’s testimony
was not credible and father either knew or had reason to know of
mother’s drug use. (See In re Roberto C. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1241, 1255 [in the absence of evidence of abuse by the parent,
“there must be a showing that the parent knew or had reason to

against mother. We decline to do so. The jurisdictional findings
father challenges are what make him an offending (rather than a
nonoffending) parent, which has significant implications for child
placement. (See In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762–
763, disapproved on other grounds in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 283; In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1244–1245
[under § 361.2, “[i]f there is no showing of detriment, the court
must order the [department] to temporarily place the child with
the nonoffending noncustodial parent”].) We therefore will
address the merits of the appeal. (See In re D.P., at pp. 276–279,
285; In re Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 536, 542, fn. 2.)

9
know that another person to whom the child was exposed was
engaging in conduct resulting in abuse or injury”].)
Further, while father’s ability to protect Sebastian from
mother’s drug use while Sebastian was in utero admittedly was
limited, there is no evidence that father took any steps to help
mother curb her drug use, such as by encouraging her to enter
drug treatment or enlisting the support of her family. On this
record, therefore, substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s finding that father failed to protect Sebastian from
mother’s drug use.
II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
dispositional order removing Sebastian from father.
Section 361, subdivisions (c)(1) and (d) provide that a child
shall not be taken from a parent’s physical custody unless the
juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that there
would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical or emotional
well-being if placed with the parent, and there are no reasonable
means by which the child can be protected without removing the
child from the parent’s physical custody.
“A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental
inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a
potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the
parent. (In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52.) ‘The parent
need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually
harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is
on averting harm to the child.’ [Citation.] The court may
consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present
circumstances.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169–
170.)

10
We review a dispositional order removing a child from a
parent for substantial evidence, “ ‘ “keeping in mind that the trial
court was required to make its order based on the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence.” ’ (In re I.R. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944,
960.) In applying this standard of review, “ ‘the question before
the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Ibid.)
As discussed above, there was substantial evidence that
father failed to protect Sebastian from mother’s drug use during
her pregnancy. Although the parents are no longer romantically
involved, father’s poor judgment and lack of protective capacity
continue to place Sebastian at risk in father’s care. Additionally,
there was reason to suspect that father may have been using
drugs. Father admitted associating with known drug users,
including mother, and he had been arrested for possessing drugs
and drug paraphernalia. Father refused to drug test voluntarily
immediately after Sebastian’s birth, and in the subsequent
weeks, father had five negative drug tests, but missed one
scheduled test and claimed not to be able to provide enough urine
for another. And, both the social worker and foster parent
caregiver suspected father was under the influence on two
separate occasions. All of these factors gave the juvenile court
reason to suspect that father was using drugs.

11
Further, the juvenile court reasonably believed that
father’s drug use would interfere with his ability to safely care for
Sebastian. Sebastian was a vulnerable infant who tested positive
for methamphetamines and amphetamines at birth. Father
expressed disbelief that Sebastian had been exposed to drugs
prenatally, telling the social worker that Sebastian was “fine.”
Although father was neither attending school nor working, he
repeatedly missed visits with Sebastian, often without any prior
notice. And, he sometimes failed to bring supplies, such as
diapers or a bottle, to care for Sebastian during visits. In short,
father demonstrated an inability to commit to a schedule or to
care for Sebastian’s needs.
Father contends that DCFS could have protected Sebastian
in his custody by ordering DCFS to make frequent unannounced
visits. But Sebastian was only two months old at the time of the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing and he thus required
constant care by a sober caregiver. Unannounced home visits
would not have ensured Sebastian’s safety when DCFS was not
in the home. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293
[“Unannounced visits can only assess the situation and [a
parent’s] sobriety at the time of the visit”].) Substantial evidence
thus supports the removal order.
III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering monitored visitation and individual
counseling.
The juvenile court has broad discretion in ordering
visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re
S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557; Heidi S. v. David H.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162–1163.) In making visitation
orders, the court is guided by the principle that “[v]isitation shall

12
be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the
child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); In re Nicholas B. (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) Equally important, however, is the
statutory dictate that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the
safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Thus, visitation
orders necessarily involve “a balancing of the interests of the
parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In
balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial
discretion should determine whether there should be any right to
visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation. The
court may, of course, impose any other conditions or
requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of
the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (In re Jennifer
G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) We review an order setting
visitation terms for abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb
the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination. (In re Brittany C. (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)
As discussed above, the juvenile court found that father
failed to protect Sebastian from mother’s drug use, and it
reasonably suspected that father may also have been using
drugs. In light of Sebastian’s very young age and vulnerability,
the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that father’s
visits with Sebastian would remain monitored until father could
establish his sobriety through 10 clean drug tests.
With regard to the individual counseling requirement
component of father’s case plan, we note that the juvenile court
has broad discretion when fashioning orders for the well-being of
a child. (§ 362, subd. (a) [the court “may make any and all
reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,

13
maintenance, and support of the child”].) Here, as we have said,
father had a history of drug use, was unable to hold a job, and
had been in a four-year relationship with a chronic drug user.
Under these circumstances, the order requiring individual
counseling on case issues, including the effect of substance abuse
on child development, was not an abuse of discretion.

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DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ASHWORTH, J.*

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

* Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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