Filed 8/24/26 In re S.S. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re S.S. et al., Persons Coming B347949
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01148)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GENESIS M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Thomas Stephens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
Genesis M. (Mother) filed a timely notice of appeal from the
juvenile court’s June 16, 2025 disposition orders concerning her
four children. She seeks reversal of all jurisdictional findings,
made under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b), against her and Anthony C. (the father of three of
her children). The findings include that Mother and Anthony
abused methamphetamine and marijuana, failed to protect the
children from each other’s substance abuse, and their infant child
was born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine. In
her opening appellate brief, Mother contends insufficient
evidence supports the jurisdictional findings. Anthony did not
file a notice of appeal from the disposition orders.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a respondent’s brief, addressing the
merits of Mother’s contentions and arguing that substantial
evidence supports the jurisdictional findings. Simultaneously,
DCFS filed a request for judicial notice of juvenile court minute
orders showing that on April 16, 2026, while this appeal was
pending, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction
and awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody of the eldest
child and awarded Mother and Anthony joint legal and physical
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custody of their three children. No parent appealed from these
April 16, 2026 orders, and the statutory deadline for doing so has
passed.
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For
relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the [appellant] must complain of an
ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the [appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) To establish the appeal is not moot,
the appellant must “demonstrate[] a specific legal or practical
consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of the
jurisdictional finding[].” (Id. at p. 273.) Absent such a specific
legal or practical consequence, we may still exercise our
discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal in a dependency
case. (Id. at pp. 282-283, 286 [setting forth a non-exhaustive list
of factors for assessing “whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal,” and noting that “no single
factor is necessarily dispositive”].) “As a rule, courts will
generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when
‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy
between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for
the court’s determination.’ (Id. at p. 282.) In the dependency
context, specifically, “Courts may consider whether the
challenged jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for
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We grant this unopposed request for judicial notice.
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[the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 285.) Moreover,
“The exercise of discretionary review may . . . be informed by
whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.)
Because neither Mother nor DCFS addressed mootness in
their initial appellate briefing, we requested that the parties file
supplemental briefing addressing whether this appeal is moot
and should be dismissed on that basis. In her supplemental
brief, Mother concedes her appeal is moot, acknowledging she
suffers no ongoing harm since dependency jurisdiction was
terminated and the juvenile court awarded her legal and physical
custody of her children. She asks us to exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of her moot appeal, arguing this case presents
issues of “ ‘broad public interest’ ” that are “ ‘likely to recur,’ ”
such as “the reliance state agencies may have in the ruling,” “not
having families inappropriately intruded upon,” and “not having
erroneous rulings evade review.” As Mother does not claim the
jurisdictional findings are stigmatizing or could be prejudicial to
her, DCFS argues in its supplemental brief that “discretionary
review of [M]other’s moot appeal is not warranted.”
In determining whether to exercise our discretion to decide
the merits of a moot appeal, we are “guided by the overarching
goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and
protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the
family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and
emotional well-being of the child.’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
286.) “[K]eeping in mind the[se] broad principles and [the]
nonexhaustive factors discussed” in D.P. (id. at p. 287), we
decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this
moot appeal, and we dismiss it. Mother has reunified with her
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children; she has not suggested a potential, prejudicial
consequence arising from the jurisdictional findings; and we
disagree with her assertion that her challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings presents an
issue of broad public interest that would warrant discretionary
review of this moot appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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