Filed 9/21/26 In re S.P. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re S.P., a Person Coming B352283
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP03064
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
V.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, and Giselle Marie Achecar, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Melania Vartanian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights under section 366.26 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code1 as to her child S.P. (born December 2023).
She argues the court erred in finding the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the termination of parental rights
did not apply. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
After mother filed this appeal, a different panel of this
division affirmed, on May 21, 2026, the juvenile court’s March 11,
2025 order sustaining a section 342 petition filed on S.P.’s behalf,
and April 10, 2025 orders removing S.P. from mother and
denying mother family reunification services. (In re S.P.
(May 21, 2026, B346869) [nonpub. opn.].) We incorporate
by reference the facts and procedural history leading up to
those orders, which are set forth in our May 21, 2026 opinion.
We summarize the facts and procedural history that occurred
after the April 10, 2025 hearing.
1. Twelve-month review period
On May 20, 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed its status report for
the 12-month review hearing. As of that date, then 17-month-old
S.P. remained in the licensed foster home of caregivers Mr. and
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Father is not a party to this appeal. We do not include
facts relating to father unless relevant to the issues in mother’s
appeal or as background.
2
Mrs. G., where she first had been placed in September 2024.3
DCFS observed S.P. to have a healthy bond with her caregivers.
They provided “excellent care and supervision” for S.P., and had
given the child “structure, stability, and [a] safe environment.”
On April 10, 2025, the juvenile court had ordered mother
to have monitored visits with S.P. three times per week, for
three hours each visit. The court’s earlier December 27, 2024
order awarded mother monitored visits twice per week. From
February 3, 2025 to May 16, 2025, mother had arrived on time
to nine of 22 visits and had arrived late to three visits. Mother
was a “no-show” or had canceled nine visits, and one visit had
been canceled, apparently not by mother.
Mother’s visits were monitored by a DCFS Human Services
Aide and sometimes by the caregivers. DCFS noted that, during
visits, mother was “attentive” to S.P.’s emotional needs. She was
“observed to be able to soothe [S.P.] when she is in distress and
work with the current caretakers to ensure emotional stability.”
Mother was appropriate with S.P. and “able to maintain a
positive bond.” DCFS reported: “Mother has continued to engage
the child appropriately with a loving and nurturing bond.”
Mother was living with maternal grandmother on whom
she relied for transportation to visits. DCFS noted both parents’
family members participated in visits with S.P. and attended
court hearings. DCFS recommended the court terminate father’s
3 On December 6, 2024, the court ordered S.P. released
to mother’s custody. S.P. again was placed with the G.s a
few weeks later when mother and father engaged in the violent
altercation—described in our earlier opinion—that led the court
to sustain the section 342 petition.
3
reunification services and set a section 366.26 permanency
hearing.
On June 9, 2025, DCFS updated the court about mother’s
visitation in a last minute information report (LMI). After the
May 16 visit, mother had four more visits scheduled for May
but missed them all. Mother was a no-show to a visit that
had been rescheduled to the next day, missed one due to
an emergency and one due to illness, and gave no reason for
canceling the fourth visit. At the June 11 review hearing,
the juvenile court terminated father’s reunification services
and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
2. Section 366.26 report
DCFS filed its section 366.26 report on September 24, 2025.
The report described mother’s visits through June 16, 2025—the
last date mother had visited S.P., as of September 11. During
the monitored visits, mother was appropriate with and attentive
to S.P. Mother brought S.P. food and fed her, changed her
diaper, read to her, played and watched videos with S.P., brought
her toys, and engaged her in learning activities and coloring.
During visits, mother and S.P. were affectionate with each other,
and S.P. was happy to see mother. In addition to the missed
visits already described, mother failed to show up for her June 4
visit. Mother arrived on time for her visit on June 16 but took
a call from father and stayed on the phone for about 30 minutes.
The report included a “Caden C. [a]nalysis.”4 From
November 1, 2024 through June 16, 2025, mother attended 26
4 In In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.),
our high court articulated the factors relevant to determining
the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption.
4
of 39 scheduled visits but was late 13 times. She canceled
three visits and was a “ ‘no[-]show’ ” to 10 visits. For one of
those no-shows in March 2025, had mother canceled in advance,
the caregiver would not have woken S.P.—who had congestion—
and taken her out of the house in the rain. Mother’s visits
with S.P. were positive: she interacted appropriately with S.P.,
showed her affection, and attended to her needs. Mother talked
to S.P. “in a soft tone, and calmed her down by holding her.”
DCFS noted mother’s missed visits may not have affected S.P.
at her young age but could “affect the attachment [mother was]
building with [S.P.].” And, as S.P. “grows older, she will become
accustomed to visit[ing] her mother, therefore any missed
appointments, without any explanation, would eventually affect
[S.P.’s] emotional health.” DCFS also noted mother was “limited”
in meeting S.P.’s needs as mother had contact with S.P. only
during monitored visits and had not had a visit since June 2025.
At one year and ten months old, S.P could not express her
feelings about her relationship with mother. During visits, S.P.
reacted positively to mother, smiling when mother talked to or
played with her. S.P. appeared to enjoy her visits with mother.
DCFS noted there were times, however, when mother wanted
to lie on the couch but S.P. “wanted to get down and continue
to play.” Mother also “would take time for herself and go to
the restroom for 5–20 minutes” when maternal grandmother
joined the visit.
DCFS concluded there was “no clear evidence of a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from the child to
the mother, as the child is young and appears to be friendly with
everyone.” S.P. greeted mother “happily” and was “comfortable
in her presence during visits.” But S.P. also did “well” when
5
the visits ended and “greets her caregiver in the same manner
she greets . . . mother.”
Parents raised S.P. during her first nine months. The rest
of her short life—save for three weeks when mother temporarily
regained custody—had been under the care of the prospective
adoptive parents, the G.s. DCFS did not believe mother’s limited
and lack of contact with S.P. appeared to have “any detrimental
effect” on S.P. Due to S.P.’s young age, DCFS believed there
“would be no negative effects to severing the relationship
between” S.P. and mother. DCFS noted the opposite—that
“continuing contact with the parents would negatively affect
[S.P.]’s emotional stability and would likely lead to behavioral
issues in the future.”
Due to S.P.’s young age, DCFS opined that another
permanent plan short of adoption would not be appropriate.
DCFS noted S.P. needed “a stable, loving and nurturing home
where her needs are being met so she can develop appropriately,
without the risk of being abused or neglected.” DCFS
acknowledged mother had maintained “partial regular contact
with” S.P. but often was late and failed to show up without
notice about 10 times. DCFS also noted that, while mother was
appropriate during her visits, she did not abide by the rules
at some visits, took long restroom breaks without explanation,
and stopped scheduling visits in June 2025.
DCFS recommended adoption as S.P.’s permanent plan
and that the court terminate parents’ parental rights.
3. Mother’s section 388 petition
On October 3, 2025, mother filed a request to change court
order under section 388, asking the court to reinstate her family
reunification services. The petition argued that, since the court
6
terminated her reunification services, mother had “completed
multiple parenting classes, an anger management class, [a]
domestic violence course, and [wa]s actively participating in
individual counseling.” The petition further argued that mother
was “showing consistent effort in improving herself and is
committed to providing a safe and supportive environment for
her children.” The petition also asserted that granting mother
further reunification services and visitation would strengthen
mother’s and S.P.’s “parent and child bond and relationship,
foster a sense of security for the child, and promote social/
cognitive development.” The petition noted mother had been
“consistent with her visits throughout this case.” The petition
attached certificates of completion for mother’s parenting,
anger management, and domestic violence courses. The court
set mother’s petition for a hearing on November 14, 2025.
On October 31, 2025, DCFS filed a response to mother’s
section 388 petition. DCFS stated mother’s visits had “often been
inconsistent throughout the life of the case,” but noted, “[m]ost
recently” she had participated in visits and arrived timely.
DCFS acknowledged mother had completed parenting classes
but stated she had “failed to address the issues of the case by
maintaining a relationship with” father. The court’s December 6,
2024 order prohibited mother from monitoring father’s visits
with S.P. or allowing him to have contact with the child “ ‘outside
of DCFS approved visits,’ ” and its April 10, 2025 order prohibited
parents from visiting together. DCFS noted that, on October 3,
2025, mother sent father a photograph of mother holding S.P.
during her visit with S.P. at the DCFS office. DCFS also noted
parents had continued “to engage in a relationship, without
addressing their relationship issues” that led to their struggle
7
with domestic violence. DCFS recommended mother’s
reunification services remain terminated.
DCFS updated the court in a November 13, 2025 LMI.
A social worker from the foster family agency (FFA) recently
had been assigned to monitor mother’s visits at the DCFS office.
On October 30, 2025, mother had made a video call to father
during her visit with S.P. DCFS noted mother knew she was
not to contact father during her scheduled visits. The social
worker met with mother and again told her not to contact father
during her visits or to “assist with monitoring” father’s visits.5
Mother said she “ ‘didn’t know’ ” because she had video-called
father during visits monitored by S.P.’s caregivers, and they
had never said anything.
After the November 14, 2025 hearing, the court denied
mother’s section 388 petition, finding her circumstances were
changing, not changed.
4. Additional section 366.26 reports
On November 12, 2025, the local Regional Center informed
DCFS that S.P. was eligible for Regional Center services due to
developmental delay.
On November 20, 2025, DCFS provided an update on
mother’s recent visits with S.P. in an addendum report. Mother
participated in monitored visits at the DCFS office on October 27
and 30, and November 3, 10, and 17. Except for the video call
with father on October 30, and mother not putting S.P.’s pants or
shoes on during another visit, the monitors reported no concerns.
5 Father was incarcerated and participated in video calls
with S.P., monitored by her caregivers. He was scheduled to
be released on November 20, 2025.
8
Mother was appropriate with S.P. during her visits. She was
attentive and affectionate toward S.P., played with and read to
her, spoke to her in a “calm and loving tone,” brought S.P. food,
and changed her diaper as needed. S.P. appeared to enjoy the
visits. S.P.’s grandmothers also participated in visits.
DCFS also provided an updated Caden C. analysis. DCFS
noted that, from November 1, 2024 through November 19, 2025,
mother participated in 31 of 44 scheduled visits. She had no new
late or no-show visits. Mother’s interactions with S.P. remained
positive. DCFS noted, however, that mother went four months—
between June 16 and October 27, 2025—without visiting S.P.6
S.P. did not appear to have been negatively affected by mother’s
absence, however. When mother began visiting S.P. again, “there
was no change to [S.P.’s] behavior.” DCFS reported that during
one of mother’s recent visits, she had not corrected S.P. when
the child wrote on mother’s shirt and had not ensured S.P. was
appropriately clothed during the visit. DCFS noted S.P. was
“at an age where she is able to learn boundaries and should be
taught about wrong and right behavior. In addition, in order to
have a sense of safety, consistent and appropriate discipline is
needed for [S.P.’s] caregivers.” Mother had been “more engaging”
with S.P. during the “last few visits,” however.
DCFS restated its earlier analysis and conclusions.
It continued to believe adoption was the best permanent plan
for S.P. DCFS noted adoption “would provide stability for” S.P.,
as parents had not addressed their “relationship issues,” father
had not achieved or maintained sobriety, and mother “has never
6 As we discuss below, mother in fact resumed her visits
earlier in October.
9
been able to reunify with [S.P.’s] half-siblings.” DCFS again
noted mother’s lack of visits for four months.
5. LMIs
On December 5, 2025, DCFS provided the court with
corrected information about mother’s visits. Mother called the
DI (dependency investigator) on November 25 after reading
DCFS’s report and said visits monitored by the FFA or by
S.P.’s caregivers had been omitted. Mother reported 19 visits
monitored by the FFA worker or caregivers during October and
November 2025. DCFS verified 16 of them. During the call,
the DI asked mother why she had stopped visiting S.P. after
June 2025. Mother said the social worker had taken her off
the visitation schedule after mother had missed several visits.
She said she asked to be put back on the schedule but that
wasn’t done until she filed a complaint after September 30.
Mother also did not agree with the report’s statement that S.P.
did not have any issues when their visits ended. Mother said
S.P. “always cried,” but mother “calm[ed] her down by giving
her a teddy bear or juice.”
DCFS noted that, during a November 13 visit monitored by
the FFA worker, when S.P. hit mother after mother would not
stop tickling her, mother appropriately disciplined S.P. by taking
away the phone and telling her not to hit. During the visit, the
Regional Center coordinator arrived. S.P.’s cognitive function
had been deemed to be that of a 16-month-old rather than
a 23-month-old. The Regional Center thus recommended
specialized services for S.P. and mother. Mother appeared to
deny the need for any services and “did not believe there were
any concerns about any delays or behavior for [S.P.].” Mother
nevertheless signed the consent forms for the services.
10
The DI also asked mother about “the calls and virtual
contact” with father during visits. Mother said the caregivers
had asked her to contact father because they had been unable
to log into the application required for father’s virtual visits.
Mother said she was told on November 6, 2025, after having
had several visits since October 3, that she was not allowed
to contact father.
On December 2, 2025, the DI spoke to the social worker
about the misunderstanding about mother’s ability to contact
father. The social worker explained that, when mother reached
out to re-start her visits, no monitors were available, so FFA staff
and caregivers monitored the visits. The social worker had failed
to tell them the court order did not allow parents to visit S.P.
together. There had been no issues since the November 6
conversation with mother.
On December 4, 2025, the DI separately spoke with
caregiver Mrs. G. and the FFA worker. Mrs. G. confirmed they
had asked mother for assistance because they had not been told
parents could not have joint visits. Once they were informed on
November 6 about the court order, mother no longer contacted
father during her visits. Mrs. G. denied that S.P. cried or was
upset after mother’s visits ended. She explained that if S.P.
were fussy, it usually was because she was exhausted after the
visit. Mrs. G. said that once they returned home from the visit,
S.P “takes a nap and is happy when she wakes up.” She stated,
“ ‘[S.P.] is always happy to see her mom, but she is always happy
to see us, to see her friends, to see others.’ ”
The FFA worker also said she hadn’t been aware of the ban
on joint visits. Mother reached out to father during three of the
visits FFA staff monitored, but no concerns were reported. The
11
FFA worker shared that, although there were “ ‘no immediate
concerns,’ ” if parents’ visits were unmonitored, there would be
“ ‘concerns.’ ” She mentioned concerns about “parenting choices”
during visits: mother giving S.P. unhealthy meals, allowing S.P.
to walk barefoot or in socks in the visitation area, and—at the
beginning of the case—arguing with father during visits. The
FFA worker “never observed [S.P.] being upset when the visits
end.” She said, “ ‘Mom says bye and she ([S.P.]) is okay to go.’ ”
DCFS again noted that parents began visiting S.P.
together, but when issues arose, they were required to visit
separately. When parents visited together, mother also
“appeared more preoccupied with what . . . father was doing,
rather than focusing on [S.P.].” Since father had been
incarcerated, mother’s visits had become more regular, and
she was more engaged with S.P. But she then stopped visiting
S.P. in June, after the court had terminated her reunification
services, and did not contact DCFS about reinstating her visits
until September. DCFS noted that, since September, mother
had been visiting S.P. regularly.
By then, S.P. was two years old and had been in parents’
custody for only her first nine months. S.P. had lived with the
G.s from September 24, 2024 to December 11, 2024 and since
December 23, 2024.
DCFS noted mother ensured S.P.’s needs were met during
their visits by feeding her, changing her diaper, talking to her
in a soft tone, and holding her to calm her. However, monitors
had observed mother often fed S.P. unhealthy food, “including
junk and fast food,” let S.P. take off her shoes and pants and
run around without “grooming her appropriately” when the visit
ended, and did not believe S.P. had any delays or behavioral
12
issues that would require services. Although mother had
signed the release forms for the services, DCFS stated “mother’s
thoughts and feelings about the services can place a barrier
in addressing [S.P.’s] development in a timely manner,” if the
court were to release S.P. to mother. DCFS’s conclusions and
recommendations under its again-updated Caden C. analysis
remained the same.
DCFS attached the notes of mother’s visits from the FFA.
The notes stated mother and S.P. hugged and kissed each other
on sight, and S.P. ran toward mother. They expressed their love
for one another and were affectionate toward each other. Mother
talked to, held, and played with S.P., and read to and cuddled
with her. Mother attended to S.P.’s needs: she changed her
diaper, brought her food and fed her, did her hair, and groomed
her. S.P. called mother “ ‘mommy.’ ” At the end of a visit
in November 2025, S.P. told mother she would miss her and
loved her and gave mother a hug and kiss. In an LMI filed
December 9, 2025, DCFS noted father was parked outside the
DCFS office where mother and S.P.’s grandmothers were visiting
S.P. for her birthday. Mother had been told father could not
participate in her visit with S.P. Mother said she didn’t know
he was going to be there.
At the December 9, 2025 section 366.26 hearing,
the juvenile court admitted DCFS’s reports—filed between
September and December 2025—into evidence. Minor’s counsel
joined DCFS in asking the court to terminate parental rights.
She noted S.P. did not “seem to be negatively affected by
her mother’s absence or her mother’s presence.” But counsel
agreed with DCFS that, as S.P. got older, if mother continued
to be “consistent and inconsistent” in her visits, S.P. would be
13
negatively affected. Mother’s counsel asked the court to find that
a parental bond existed and to order legal guardianship as S.P.’s
permanent plan. Counsel argued the visitation notes showed
S.P. was attached positively to mother—she called her “mommy,”
was excited to see her, and “respect[ed] and obey[ed] her
disciplinary authority.” Counsel argued mother’s relationship
with S.P. was “strong enough” that S.P. “would be harmed
by its severance.” S.P. was heard telling mother, “ ‘I love you
mommy,’ and ‘I miss you mommy.’ ” Counsel noted that, when
mother had left S.P. with the monitor to use the restroom, S.P.
“kept calling for her mother.” Counsel argued that showed
S.P. “[wa]s impacted” even when separated briefly. Counsel
didn’t “understand how [DCFS] is willing to risk harming
the development of the child by claiming she’s too young to
be affected when she is already clearly showing attachment,
recognition, and enjoyment with the mother that has been
a consistently positive presence for her.”
DCFS’s counsel acknowledged mother had visited S.P.
but argued her visits were not consistent, as she had missed
10 visits. Counsel argued the interaction between mother and
S.P. “confer[red] some benefit” but not enough to constitute
“a substantive, positive, emotional attachment.” Finally, DCFS
argued the detriment from severing the parental relationship
did not outweigh the security and stability S.P. would receive
from adoption. Counsel reminded the court that mother had lost
custody of four other children, and—when the court gave mother
a chance by returning S.P. to her care—“mother promptly got
into it with the father,” and the court had to remove the child
from mother again.
14
The court found mother had regular visits with S.P. and
that the visits had gone well. The court also found the notes
of mother’s visits showed S.P. “does have a substantial, positive
emotional attachment to her mother. She enjoys playing
with her, is happy to see her, tells her she loves her, calls her
mommy.” The court found the detriment from severing parental
rights did not outweigh the benefit of adoption, however.
The court said,
“Although it is clear that [S.P.] is close to her mother
—mother is very much bonded with [S.P.]. I do
find that the benefit of a permanent home through
adoption does outweigh the detrimental effect that
severing the relationship will have. [¶] [S.P.] has
been in the same home for almost a year. It is stable
and provides a very emotional and safe environment
—emotionally safe environment, physically safe
environment. I think that, legally, adoption is the
preferred plan, particularly for a minor this young
and that the harm of severing her relationship with
the parents is outweighed by the stability and sense
of belonging that can be provided from a permanent
adoptive family.”
The court found S.P. was adoptable and ordered mother’s
and father’s parental rights terminated. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select
and implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification
efforts have failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–
852 (J.D.); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; see also
15
§ 366.26, subd. (b).) At that stage, the “focus shifts from
monitoring the parents’ progress toward reunification to
determining the appropriate placement plan for the child.”
(Marilyn H., at p. 305.) “The dependency statutes embody a
presumptive rule that, after reunification efforts have failed,
parental rights must be terminated in order to free a child for
adoption.” (J.D., at p. 852, citing Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 630–631.) The juvenile court must select adoption as the
permanent plan and terminate parental rights unless it finds
doing so would be detrimental to the child under one of several
statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); Caden C., at
pp. 630–631.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) codifies one
of those exceptions, which is commonly referred to as the
“ ‘parental-benefit’ ” or “ ‘beneficial parental relationship’ ”
exception. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625, fn. 2.)
The exception applies where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.) Our
Supreme Court has clarified the three elements a parent must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the
exception: (1) the parent’s regular visitation and contact with
the child; (2) the child’s “substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent,” “the continuation of which would
benefit the child”; and (3) the termination of “that attachment
would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
at pp. 631, 636.)
16
Here, the court found mother established the first two
elements of the parental-benefit exception. We thus consider
only whether the court erred in finding the benefit of adoption
outweighed the detriment to S.P. from terminating the parent-
child relationship.
In assessing whether terminating parental rights
would be detrimental to the child, the court must perform a
“case-specific inquiry,” asking, “does the benefit of placement
in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would
experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional
relationship with [the parent?]’ [Citation.] When the
relationship with a parent is so important to the child that
the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh
its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’
the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634; see also In re Andrew M. (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818 [showing child “ ‘ “would derive some
benefit continuing a relationship maintained during periods of
visitation” ’ ” is insufficient to apply parental-benefit exception].)
Because the child will not be returned to live with the parent,
even if the exception applies, “courts should not look to whether
the parent can provide a home for the child; the question is just
whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the
child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security
of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at p. 634 [section 366.26
hearing is “not a contest of who would be the better custodial
caregiver”].)
While the substantial evidence standard of review applies
to the first two elements of the parental-benefit exception, “the
ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would
17
be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with
his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)
“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318–319.) We nevertheless review the factual basis for the
juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., at p. 641.) In doing so, we do “ ‘not reweigh the
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Id. at p. 640.) We will uphold a court’s
factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence,
“ ‘even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists
and the trial court might have reached a different result had
it believed other evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) And, where the appellant
bore the burden of proof in the trial court—as is the case here—
we ask “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of
the appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (In re M.V. (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 486, 508.)
2. The court did not abuse its discretion
In deciding whether S.P. would be harmed by the severance
of her relationship with mother to such a degree that the
detriment would outweigh the benefits of adoption, the juvenile
court had to determine “in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Adverse “effects might
include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.
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Yet . . . a new, stable home may alleviate the emotional
instability and preoccupation leading to such problems, providing
a new source of stability that could make the loss of a parent not,
at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.)
Based on the visitation notes included with DCFS’s reports,
the court found S.P. and mother had a substantial, positive
emotional attachment. Mother details her visits with S.P. at
length, arguing the weight of the evidence showed they have “a
strong and close parent-child bond” and to sever it would greatly
harm S.P. The interactions between mother and S.P. described
in the visitation notes show they had a positive parent-child
bond. Mother provided for S.P.’s needs, played with her, and
taught and encouraged her. Mother and S.P. showed each other
affection, engaged with each other during visits, and expressed
their love for each other. S.P. called mother “mommy.” She was
happy to see mother at visits and would run to her. At the end
of a visit, S.P. was heard telling mother she’d miss her.
Mother didn’t visit S.P. for four months, from June until
October 2025—a significant length of time for the young toddler.
Yet, as DCFS argues and minor’s counsel noted at the hearing,
S.P. did not appear to have been negatively affected by mother’s
absence. Mother points to no evidence indicating S.P., for
example, began acting out or exhibiting emotional instability
or other behavioral issues during that period. Nor does the
record suggest S.P.’s behavior changed when mother resumed
her visits with S.P. in October. Substantial evidence also shows
S.P. easily transitioned back to her caregiver when visitation
time with mother ended. DCFS reported S.P. did well when
visits were over and “greet[ed] her caregiver in the same manner
she greet[ed] . . . mother.” Mother told the DI that S.P. always
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cried at the end of their visits, but she was able to calm her.
When the DI asked Mrs. G. about it, however, she denied that
S.P. was upset after ending a visit with mother. She said that
if S.P. were fussy, it usually was due to her needing a nap after
the visit. After getting home and taking a nap, S.P. woke up
happy. Mrs. G. said S.P. was always happy to see mother, but
she was also always happy to see friends and others. The FFA
worker also had never seen S.P. upset after a visit. After mother
told S.P. “ ‘bye,’ ” S.P. was “ ‘okay to go.’ ”
S.P. may have had initial sadness when visits came
to an end, but the court could reasonably find S.P. remained
largely unaffected by having to leave mother. Moreover, as with
mother’s four-month absence, nothing in the record suggests S.P.
exhibited any behavioral issues or was upset between her visits
with mother. And, save for a few weeks in December 2024, S.P.’s
interactions with mother since she was nine months old had been
limited to monitored visits. On this record, although S.P. may
have cried momentarily when her visits with mother were over,
and told mother she missed her, the court reasonably could
conclude S.P.’s attachment to mother was not so strong that
“it would be destabilizing to lose that relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) In short, the evidence did not
compel the court to find S.P.’s relationship with mother
“promote[d] the well-being of [S.P.] to such a degree as to
outweigh the well-being [she] would gain in a permanent
home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Rather, the record supported the juvenile court’s implicit
finding that the security and stability S.P. would receive through
adoption would make the loss of her relationship with mother,
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on balance, not detrimental. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633.) At only two years old—and suffering from cognitive
delays, which mother did not acknowledge—S.P. needed a stable,
permanent home where she could develop appropriately. By the
time of the section 366.26 hearing, S.P. had spent more than half
her life with the G.s. Except for the few weeks S.P. was placed
with mother in December 2024, the G.s had been caring for her
since she was nine months old. They were attending to her
mental, physical, and emotional needs, and had provided her
with a stable, nurturing, and safe home where she could thrive.
DCFS noted S.P. reached for the G.s when she needed something
and was loving toward them. The social worker observed S.P.
to be happy, playful, and thriving in the G.s’ care. Although S.P.
would lose what the court had found to be a substantial, positive
emotional attachment to mother, she would gain stability and
permanency from her adoption by the G.s, with whom she also
had a positive and loving relationship.
On this record, there was more than sufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s decision that termination of S.P.’s
beneficial relationship with mother would not harm S.P. “to
an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new,
adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.)
We find no abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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