Filed 6/29/26 In re S.N. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re S.N., a Person Coming Under the H053804
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 25JD028432)
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
CHILDREN'S SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.N.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In February 2025, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s
Services (Department) received a referral for alleged child abuse by P.N. on her son S.N.,
who was then seven years old. The juvenile court detained S.N. and ordered the
Department to provide reunification services to P.N. After the six-month review hearing,
the juvenile court found that the Department had provided reasonable reunification
services and ordered the Department to continue providing such services. P.N. challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that reasonable reunification
services were provided. As explained below, we reject this challenge and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Removal
On the morning of February 12, 2025, P.N. was running late for one of her
university classes and in a rush to drop S.N. off at school. S.N., who has autism and
speech delays, did not want to go to school and began to scream. School staff witnessed
P.N. yank S.N. by his arm, hit him three times on the back of his head with an open palm,
push him to the ground, and drag him by the hood of his jacket. The incident was
videotaped by the school’s cameras. School staff intervened and contacted law
enforcement, who arrested P.N. for child abuse and placed S.N. into protective custody.
P.N. refused to speak with law enforcement without an attorney, became
aggressive, and attempted to bite an officer. The Department subsequently interviewed
P.N., who is Vietnamese, in Vietnamese. During that interview, P.N. admitted that she
hit S.N. but said that she did not mean it. However, she stated that the Department “did
not have proof” because S.N. did not sustain any injuries. P.N. also “minimized the
situation and stated that in Vietnam, it would have been worse” and that the incident “was
nothing compared to what she endured.” A couple of weeks later, P.N. informed the
Department that she had been stressed about her university classes and, in dropping S.N.
off for school, had parked in the fire lane so she could get home early enough for a quiz.
P.N. said that she loved S.N. and that the incident was “completely out of character” for
her and occurred in the heat of the moment.
On February 14, 2025, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition
alleging that S.N. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he had
suffered, or there was a substantial risk that he would suffer, serious physical harm in
P.N.’s care. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) (Subsequent undesignated
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
After an initial detention hearing, the juvenile court detained S.N. and set a
jurisdiction and disposition hearing for March 10, 2025, which it later continued to
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March 17, 2025. The court also ordered twice-weekly supervised visitation. P.N.
attended the initial detention hearing assisted by an interpreter, though she responded in
English to the court’s inquiries. The whereabouts of S.N.’s father were unknown, and he
did not attend the hearing or otherwise participate in the dependency proceedings.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In advance of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Department submitted a
report recommending that the allegations in its petition be found true and that P.N. be
provided family reunification services. The Department also noted that the
February 2025 incident was not the first referral it had received concerning S.N. In
May 2023, it had received a report of P.N. pulling S.N.’s hair, shaking him, and kicking
him. That referral was apparently resolved without removal.
The Department’s case plan directed P.N. to participate in (1) a parent orientation
class through the Department, (2) a class on parenting for special needs children, (3) a
certified 52-week child abuser’s treatment program, and (4) counseling or psychotherapy
to address past trauma. The Department also recommended that P.N. continue with
twice-weekly, two-hour supervised visitation with S.N. The juvenile court adopted the
Department’s recommendations and set a six-month review hearing for
September 3, 2025, which was later continued to September 22, 2025.
C. Reunification Services
1. Initial Case Plan Services
The Department referred the family to wraparound services and P.N. to parent
advocate services, dependency advocacy services, individual therapy, and parenting
classes. In June 2025, wraparound services were approved, and the wraparound team
began working with S.N.’s caregiver to complete an application for S.N. to receive
services through the San Andreas Regional Center. S.N.’s caregiver reported that
behavior services had recently been approved for S.N. and were anticipated to start soon.
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P.N. participated in the services ordered in her case plan. She engaged in weekly
telephone therapy beginning in April 2025. She completed the parent orientation class in
April 2025 and the parenting class for children with special needs in August 2025.
However, the Department noted that P.N. had not yet demonstrated the new parenting
concepts or skills learned in the class and was continuing to use the same methods with
S.N. as she had before the class. The Department acknowledged P.N.’s efforts to engage
with her case plan but expressed concern that she lacked insight and accountability and
that she did not express remorse for her conduct.
In addition to the foregoing services, the Department conducted child and family
team meetings, had monthly contact with P.N., S.N., S.N.’s caregivers, and providers in-
person and via e-mail, text, and telephone; it collaborated with community agencies and
providers for services; it coordinated medical, behavioral, and developmental
appointments for S.N.; and it provided a special fund to support S.N.’s and the
caregivers’ needs, including clothing, recreational and after-school activities, and
childcare. The Department social worker conducted monthly in-person meetings with
P.N. and her parent advocate to discuss P.N.’s case plan progress, timeline of her case,
and any challenges.
The Department also arranged supervised visitation for P.N. with S.N. Between
March and July 2025, these visits occurred twice weekly. However, in July 2025, S.N.
began refusing visits. When Department staff attempted to pick up S.N. for visits, he
screamed, cried out loud, and had emotional outbursts, though these emotional responses
subsided by September. When offered a choice of visitation in person, virtually, or via
telephone, S.N. declined, stating “I don’t like [Mom] . . . she mean[] . . . she hit me.”
Department staff continued to encourage visitation, contacting S.N. on the day of his
scheduled visits to offer a choice of in-person, virtual, or telephone visit, and then
informing P.N. whether that day’s visit would occur. At the Department’s suggestion,
P.N. provided pictures and videos for the Department to share with S.N.; however he
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declined to look at them. The Department also suggested that P.N. bring S.N.’s favorite
Vietnamese foods to visits.
2. The Child Abuser’s Treatment Program
In addition to the services described above, P.N.’s case plan included a certified
52-week child abuser’s treatment program. However, in its August 2025 status report,
the Department acknowledged that it had not yet made a successful referral to such a
program. In late April 2025, the Department had referred P.N. to a 52-week child
abuser’s treatment program. However, neither of the two agencies contacted by the
Department offered the class in Vietnamese, P.N.’s preferred language. Accordingly, the
Department contacted two units to inquire about interpreter services for this class, but
that request remained pending by the time of the status report.
On September 19, 2025, the Department resubmitted the referral for a 52-week
child abuser’s treatment program, this time, per P.N.s request, for one in English. In the
Department’s opinion, due to P.N.’s “significant language barriers,” a course in
Vietnamese would be appropriate, and the Department noted that it was in the process of
requesting interpreter services. However, P.N. claimed to be “fully capable of
completing this program in English,” and she asked to register for the class in English.
3. Additional Services
The Department updated P.N.’s case plan to include, in addition to the outstanding
52-week child abuser’s treatment program, the following services: counseling or
psychotherapy to address P.N.’s past trauma, S.N.’s trauma, the impacts of abuse on a
child, effective parenting skills, and understanding the needs of a child with autism; a
psychological evaluation; a women’s support group; and building a circle of natural
support. The Department also recommended that P.N.’s case plan include an “intensive
up-front & parent skill-building program.” (Capitalization omitted.)
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D. Six-Month Review Hearing
The six-month review hearing was held on September 22, 2025. The Department
recommended continuing reunification services as well as a psychological evaluation for
P.N. P.N. submitted on the Department’s recommendation to continue reunification
services. However, she expressed “frustrat[ion] with the delays in the Department
finding a Vietnamese service for her,” and accordingly she indicated that she was not
requesting additional accommodations and would prefer to complete services in English.
The juvenile court adopted the Department’s recommendations and found that
returning S.N. to P.N. would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety,
protection, and physical or emotional well-being. The court also found “[b]y clear and
convincing evidence, reasonable services have been offered or provided” to P.N., and it
ordered that S.N. and P.N. continue to receive reunification services. The juvenile court
set a 12-month review hearing for March 2026.
P.N. filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s order.
II. DISCUSSION
P.N. challenges the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided
reasonable reunification services. She argues that there is insufficient evidence that the
reunification services provided by the Department were reasonable because undisputed
evidence shows that the Department failed to timely make arrangements for her to
participate in the 52-week child abuser’s treatment program. We consider this argument
below. However, before doing so, we address the Department’s contention that P.N.
forfeited this argument.
A. Forfeiture
The Department argues that P.N. forfeited any challenge to the juvenile court’s six-
month status review order by submitting on the Department’s recommendations. We
disagree.
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As a general rule, arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited. (See, e.g.,
In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 724-725; see also American Indian Health &
Services Corp. v. Kent (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 772, 789 [“ ‘ “Appellate courts are loath to
reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to
argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider . . . .” ’ ”].) However,
“[t]he contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence . . . is an
obvious exception to the rule.” (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23,
fn. 17.) Accordingly, a parent challenging a mandatory finding—such as that reasonable
reunification services were provided—does not forfeit that challenge by failing to object
to it in the juvenile court. (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464 [“[W]hen the
merits of a case are contested, a parent is not required to object to the agency’s failure to
carry its burden of proof.”]; In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 [“When the
merits are contested, a parent is not required to object to the social service agency’s
failure to carry its burden of proof on the question of adoptability.”].)
Additionally, in juvenile dependency cases, challenges may be waived by
submitting to a child welfare department’s recommendations. (In re Richard K. (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 580, 588-589 (Richard K.).) However, courts have distinguished between
submitting to a department’s report and submitting to a department’s recommendations.
Where a parent submits on the report, “the parent agrees to the court’s consideration of a
such information as the only evidence in the matter,” but does not waive the right to
“challenge it as insufficient.” (Id. at p. 589; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126,
136 (T.V.).) However, when a parent submits on the Department’s recommendations, the
parent waives the right to challenge the adoption of that recommendation. (Richard K., at
p. 589; T.V., at p. 136.)
In this case, P.N. submitted to one recommendation. At the six-month review
hearing P.N.’s counsel said that she was “submitting today to continue . . . reunification
services.” P.N. did not submit to any of the Department’s other recommendations—
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including, most pertinently, the recommended finding that reasonable reunification
services were provided. To the contrary, P.N. expressed frustration with the delay in
finding a Vietnamese service, presumably for the 52-week child abuser’s treatment
program.
As a consequence, P.N. did not waive the right to challenge the reasonableness of
the reunification services offered by the Department, and even though she did not
challenge those services in the juvenile court, under the well-established exception
concerning sufficiency of the evidence, she is entitled to argue on appeal that the
Department failed to satisfy its burden of proof.
B. Reasonable Reunification Services
P.N. contends that the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided
reasonable reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence, primarily
because of the delay in referring her to the child abuser’s treatment program. As
explained below, we disagree and conclude that, notwithstanding the delay in providing
this program, the trial court’s finding that the Department provided reasonable
reunification services is supported by substantial evidence.
1. Relevant Legal Principles
When child is removed from his or her parent during a dependency proceeding,
the juvenile court is generally required to order the Department to provide reunification
services to the child and parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Services “may include provision of
a full array of social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent
reabuse of children.” (§ 300.2, subd. (a).) The court is thereafter required to hold
periodic status review hearings, including at six and 12 months after the dispositional
hearing. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1)(C).) At the six-month review hearing, “[i]f the child is not
returned to their parent or legal guardian, the court shall determine by clear and
convincing evidence whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or
legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the
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continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal
guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8).)
The “adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Department’s]
efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.” (Robin V. v. Superior
Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) To support a finding that reasonable services
were offered or provided to the parent, “the record should show that the supervising
agency [1] identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, [2] offered services
designed to remedy those problems, [3] maintained reasonable contact with the parents
during the course of the service plan, and [4] made reasonable efforts to assist the parents
in areas where compliance proved difficult.” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403,
414 (Riva M.), italics omitted; see Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
1415, 1426.)
“The standard is not whether the reunification services provided were the best that
might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) In other
words, “ ‘[r]eunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But they should be
tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. [Citation].’ ” (David B. v. Superior
Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793-794 (David B.).)
Juvenile court findings regarding the adequacy of reunification services are
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
1048, 1061-1062.) “In general, when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court
must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability
demanded by this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1005, fn. omitted.) The burden is on the petitioner to show that the evidence is
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
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942, 947.) In determining whether substantial evidence supports a finding, reviewing
courts do not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment for that of the juvenile
court. (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1166.)
2. Analysis
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
the Department provided reasonable reunification services. While the Department
delayed in referring P.N. to the child abuser’s treatment program, the record shows that
the Department otherwise provided reasonable reunification services, and P.N. has not
demonstrated that participation in the child abuser’s treatment program was critical to
those services.
First, there was evidence that the Department reasonably “identified the problems
leading to the loss of custody” over S.N. (Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.)
The Department interviewed Mother at the outset of the dependency proceedings, and in
its jurisdiction and disposition report noted that Mother had physically abused S.N., had
not taken accountability for her actions, had shown aggressive behavior throughout the
Department’s investigation, and indicated that her actions “were nothing” compared to
what occurs in Vietnam. Accordingly, the Department decided that Mother would
“benefit from parenting and anger management classes, as well as individual counseling.”
Thus, the record shows that the Department identified the problems that led to P.N.’s
abuse of her son and loss of custody.
Second, there was evidence that the Department “offered services designed to
remedy those problems.” (Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) In addition to
providing Mother with a parent advocate, the Department referred the family for
wraparound services, which were approved in June 2025. The wraparound team then
worked with S.N.’s caregiver to begin the application process for S.N. to obtain services
through the San Andreas Regional Center. The Department also referred P.N. to a parent
orientation class, which she completed in April 2025, and a class on parenting children
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with special needs, which P.N. completed in August 2025. Finally, the Department
referred P.N. to weekly therapy, which she began attending in April 2025. Thus, the
record shows that the Department offered services designed to help P.N. overcome the
problems that led her to lose custody of S.N.
Third, there was evidence that Department “maintained reasonable contact with
[P.N.] during the course of the service plan.” (Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414,
italics omitted.) Following the initial hearing, the Department conducted monthly
meetings with P.N. and her parent advocate to discuss the progress of P.N.’s plan and the
challenges facing her. In addition, with the wraparound services team, the Department
held multiple child and family team meetings, and it had monthly communication with
P.N. as well as S.N. and others, in person and via e-mails, text, and telephone. Thus, the
record shows that the Department maintained reasonable conduct with P.N. while she
was receiving reunification services.
Fourth, there was evidence of the final factor considered in determining the
reasonableness of reunification services: the Department’s efforts to assist P.N. (Riva M.,
supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) As noted above, the Department conducted monthly
meetings with P.N. to discuss the challenges facing her. In addition, when S.N. began
refusing visits from P.N. in July 2025, the Department made efforts to encourage
visitation. Among other things, it contacted S.N. on the day of each scheduled visit to
offer visitation in multiple alternate formats. It also provided S.N. with videos and
pictures from Mother, and it encouraged Mother to bring S.N. his favorite foods.
P.N. does not dispute that the Department identified the problems that led her to
lose custody of S.N., offered services to address those problems, maintained reasonable
contact with P.N., or attempted to assist her. However, P.N. argues that the Department
failed to make a sufficient effort to secure enrollment in the 52-week child abuse
treatment program and therefore failed to provide her “with assistance to access the
services she needed to reunify with her child.” P.N.’s primary objection appears to be to
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the delay in referring her to the child abuse treatment program, not to the eventual referral
to a program in English rather than her preferred language. We are not persuaded.
The delay in referring to P.N. to this program was not unexplained but was instead
due to the perceived need to accommodate P.N.’s language needs. The Department’s
conclusion that a Vietnamese program would be appropriate, as well as its efforts to
secure such a program, were reasonable. It was reasonable for the Department to attempt
to refer P.N. to a child abuser treatment program in Vietnamese. It is well-settled that a
parent’s language barrier may necessitate the provision of reunification services through
the use of interpreters or service providers with necessary language skills. (See In re J.P.
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 626-628.) In addition, the Department had good reason to
think that P.N. would benefit from treatment in Vietnamese: She was initially
interviewed in Vietnamese, she requested a Vietnamese-speaking officer when initially
detained, and she was assisted by a Vietnamese interpreter in court. As a consequence,
there was substantial evidence that the Department’s decision to refer P.N. to a child
abuse treatment program in Vietnamese was reasonable.
There also was substantial evidence that the Department’s efforts to refer P.N. to a
class in Vietnamese were reasonable. The Department referred Mother to the program in
late April 2025, and the Department contacted two agencies about it. However, neither
agency conducted the program in Vietnamese. The Department then contacted the
Special Fund Unit and Parent Education Unit to request interpreter services for the
program, but by September 2025 it had received no response. Moreover, when P.N.
indicated that she was capable of completing the program in English and asked to be
referred to a program in English, the Department did so. The juvenile court is in the best
position to understand the practical realities of the resources in its jurisdiction and
therefore to determine whether this level of diligence was reasonable based on those
resources. On the record before us, the juvenile court could appropriately find that the
Department made reasonable efforts to identify an accessible program.
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Although the Department might have referred P.N. to a child abuse treatment
program earlier, nothing in the record suggests that the Department acted unreasonably in
failing to do so. The program is not statutorily required, and it was only one of many
services offered to P.N. In addition, while the child abuse treatment program is plainly
relevant to the problems that led to S.N.’s removal, there is no evidence in the record
concerning the program’s importance or effectiveness, much less that it was critical to
overcoming the problems that led to the removal of S.N. As a consequence, we cannot
say that it was unreasonable for the Department to delay referring P.N. to the program
while its request for interpreter services was pending. (See, e.g., Melinda K. v. Superior
Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1159 [holding reunification services reasonable
despite several month delay in providing counseling].)
For the same reason, even if it was unreasonable for the Department to delay
referring P.N. to a child abuser treatment program while its request for interpreter
services was pending, it does not follow that the overall reunification services provided
by the Department were unreasonable. As noted above, “ ‘[r]eunification services need
not be perfect.’ ” (David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) To the contrary, the
services need only be “reasonable under the circumstances.” (Misako R., supra, 2
Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) In light of the evidence that the Department identified the
problems that led to S.N.’s removal, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with P.N., and made reasonable efforts to assist P.N. in
addition to its attempts to refer her to a program accessible in her preferred language—
and the absence of any evidence that the child abusers treatment program was critical to
remedying P.N.’s problems—the trial court had an adequate basis for finding that,
overall, reunification services provided by the Department were reasonable.
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that the Department provided reasonable reunification services.
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III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s September 22, 2025 order is affirmed.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
____________________________________
DANNER, J.
In re S.N.; Santa Clara County DFCS v. P.N.
H053804