Filed 7/29/26 In re S.L. CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re S.L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
DEPARTMENT,
A175900
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. JD2500005)
D.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D.L. (Father), father of minor S.L., appeals the juvenile court’s order
denying his motion to terminate dependency jurisdiction. He contends the
court erred in continuing jurisdiction under a family maintenance plan
because he successfully ameliorated the conditions that led to the initial
assumption of jurisdiction. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
in continuing jurisdiction due to concerns with Father’s failure to fully
comply with the substance abuse treatment components of his case plan.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Initial Petition and Detention
In January 2025, the Department filed a petition under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), on behalf of 19-month-old S.L., alleging her
parents failed to provide adequate care and supervision for the minor, and
her mother, M.B. (Mother), had previously lost parental rights over three of
S.L.’s half siblings. The petition alleged a fire had destroyed the family’s
mobile home trailer, causing injury to all three residents, including S.L.
Father said the fire was caused by an unattended camp stove he was using to
heat the residence. After the family was transported to a hospital, Mother
tested for positive for methamphetamine and claimed she “had inhaled what
the father was ‘cooking.’ ” The petition alleged both parents’ lack of adequate
care and supervision of S.L., as well as Mother’s untreated substance abuse
problem, placed the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm, abuse,
and/or neglect.
During the Department’s investigation, Father reported he was S.L.’s
primary caregiver because Mother suffered from mental health issues.
Mother had an extensive child welfare history involving substance abuse and
three prior dependency cases that ended in the termination of her parental
rights. Father acknowledged his own drug use and a felony drug charge
pending against him.
At the detention hearing on January 23, 2025, Father was found to be
S.L.’s presumed father. The juvenile court ordered that S.L. be detained and
placed with a maternal relative.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In February 2025, the Department filed a jurisdiction and disposition
report recommending S.L.’s removal from the parents’ custody, with
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reunification services provided only to Father. According to the report,
Father admitted both he and Mother used methamphetamine on the day of
the fire. In January and February 2025, Father tested positive for marijuana
and alcohol, and he had been arrested in August 2024 for possession of
methamphetamine. Mother did not participate in the Department’s
investigation. In February 2025, a hair-strand test confirmed the minor’s
exposure to methamphetamine.
The Department filed an amended petition adding allegations that
Father had a history of substance abuse from which he failed to rehabilitate
and which impairs his judgment and ability to provide care, supervision, and
protection for S.L., placing the minor at substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in March 2025, the juvenile
court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j),
and ordered S.L.’s removal. The court ordered supervised visitation for both
parents, and reunification services for Father, but not for Mother.
C. Six-Month Review
In August 2025, the Department filed a status review report
recommending that S.L. be returned to Father’s care because he had made
adequate progress in addressing the issues that led to the dependency
proceedings. According to the report, Father was in sober living housing and
had successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program. He
reported he would continue to participate in Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”)
meetings.
The Department reported that in February 2025, Dr. Quynh-Uyen
Smith of Solano County Family Health Services diagnosed S.L. with fine
motor delay, social/emotional delay, and speech delay, and referred the minor
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for occupational therapy, psychological services, and an audiology evaluation.
Dr. Smith also referred S.L. to Jigsaw Diagnostic for an autism assessment.
The autism assessment was completed in May 2025, and the results showed
that S.L. met the criteria for autism spectrum disorder. Accordingly, the
evaluator recommended that S.L. participate in comprehensive intensive
speech therapy, occupational therapy, and applied behavior analysis (“ABA”).
Father disagreed with the diagnosis and requested a reassessment.
In August 2025, the juvenile court returned the minor to Father’s
custody under a family maintenance plan.
D. Family Maintenance Review Report
In January 2026, the Department submitted a review report
recommending continued court supervision. The Department found that
Father had made progress, particularly in individual and family therapy, but
there were still concerns about his ability to address S.L.’s developmental,
medical, and therapeutic needs.
The Department reported concerns about Father’s lack of candor and
diligence regarding the minor’s medical and health care needs. Father had
falsely reported that S.L. received dental treatment in November 2025 and
had no cavities; in fact, she had not been treated until December 2025, and
she did have cavities requiring further treatment. Additionally, although
S.L. had been referred for an audiology evaluation in February 2025, Father
did not follow through until eight months later, resulting in the appointment
being scheduled nearly a year after the initial referral.
The Department further reported that Father impeded the
implementation of recommended ABA services based on his insistence that
S.L. did not have autism. In September 2025, Father told the Department
that co-educational rights holder, Rose Marie Crouch, and ABA providers had
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advised him S.L. no longer required ABA services. Ms. Crouch denied
making such statements. Father also reported that North Bay Regional
Center (“NBRC”) had completed an in-home assessment of S.L. and
concluded services were no longer required. The Department contacted ABA
services provider Peak Potential, and a staff member told the Department
that when she contacted Father about an insurance issue, Father informed
her that “he no longer needed their services as [S.L.] had been approved for
services elsewhere,” which was untrue.
During a December 2025 meeting with the Department, Father
reiterated his disagreement with the autism diagnosis and stated his belief
the assessment was flawed because it relied on incorrect information from
maternal aunt and was conducted through “telehealth.” The social worker
explained that reassessment was available through NBRC and that
Department would continue to provide speech and occupational therapy and
ABA services. Father acknowledged he had initially permitted in-home
services but later terminated them because he believed the provider lacked
adequate training. When asked for permission to communicate with NBRC
about S.L.’s services, Father “was adamant that ‘everyone’ states that [S.L.]
is ‘normal’ and that she was assessed too early” for autism.
Although Father had been actively involved in family therapy, the
therapist reported challenges with Father’s communication and parenting
skills. Father referred to S.L. as a “ ‘brat’ ” and believed she was “acting out
on purpose and at times respond[ed] with directives that a two-year-old
cannot realistically understand. ” In the therapist’s view, Father required
additional education on strategies and appropriate responses for when S.L.
was acting out.
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The Department also reported concerns regarding Father’s continued
relationship with Mother. Mother acknowledged Father had visited her
workplace and requested that she not disclose the contact to the Department
or the juvenile court. She further reported that she had provided Father with
financial assistance.
Father’s case plan required him to participate in recovery services,
maintain a support network, and develop a relapse prevention plan.
Although Father had identified his support network, he declined to discuss a
relapse prevention plan and refused to identify individuals such as a meeting
facilitator who could verify his attendance at NA meetings. Father’s reason
for his refusal was that “he feels his sobriety is for himself and does not need
to be proven” to the Department. When asked for the name of the person
running the NA program, Father “remained adamant that he would not
provide any information.” Between August and December 2025, Father
completed eight of 11 random drug tests, missed two tests, “which were not
forgiven,” and tested positive for marijuana on three occasions.
E. Contested Family Maintenance Review Hearing
In March 2026, the juvenile court conducted a contested family
maintenance review hearing under section 364. The hearing proceeded
mostly on documentary evidence, including the stipulated offer of proof of
social worker Patricia Fletcher, which we now summarize.
Fletcher had worked with the family since August 2025, and she stated
there were no present concerns regarding Father’s housing. However, since
the filing of the Department’s January 2026 report, Father had “refused to
sign his case plan and to participate in the [child and family team meeting] to
identify current strengths, worries, and mental health needs for [S.L.], . . .
stating that he is ‘busy.’ ”
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Regarding Frather’s three positive drug tests, Fletcher explained that
“[t]he levels of the tests are not decreasing, indicating that he is currently
using marijuana.” Fletcher verified that Father’s medical marijuana
authorization was online, but that the website stated a card “can be obtained
in ‘about 10 minutes’ for $39.”
Fletcher further indicated that S.L.’s audiology appointment had been
rescheduled for March 16, 2026. Father followed up with the insurance
provider regarding ABA services and obtained an authorization for an autism
assessment, but the address in the insurance portal needed to be corrected.
A representative with NBRC told Fletcher that S.L. could be assessed for
autism when she is 3 years old and that “[t]here is no way to fast track this
assessment with NBRC.”
According to Fletcher, the family therapist stated Father was still
working on understanding “ ‘toddlerhood’ ” and learning appropriate
responses for when S.L. acts out, as he “speaks to [S.L.] in a manner that [a]
two-year old cannot understand.” In February 2026, Farrah Ledbetter, the
in-home speech therapist, reported concerns about Father’s words and
conduct around S.L. “[A]t the end of session on 2/9/26, [S.L.] did not want to
give me a toy back. [Father] called her a ‘rotten child.’ He took it out of her
hand and she started fussing. He called her a ‘Brat.’ As the therapist was
leaving, [S.L.] was standing in front of the door. He told her to move. When
she didn’t move, he grabbed her arm and pulled her back. She did not cry,
but she did fuss a little. He is very impatient with her.”
Fletcher also reported that she received an email from Ledbetter’s
supervisor, Nicole Armaz, confirming Ledbetter’s concerns about Father’s
verbal and physical behaviors towards S.L. According to Armaz, during the
February 9, 2026 session, Father “was very rough with [S.L.],” grabbed and
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yanked her by the arm, and shouted “unkind words” at her. When Fletcher
discussed the matter with Father in late February 2026, he stated his belief
that S.L. is “ ‘manipulative,’ and knows what she is doing when she is acting
out, as she is doing it solely to get her way.” Based on the concerns noted by
the in-home speech therapist, her supervisor, and the family therapist,
Fletcher recommended that Father receive additional parenting courses to
address alternative modes of discipline specific to toddlers and children with
special needs.
The juvenile court found that continued jurisdiction was necessary.
The court explained that while Father had found proper housing, the court
still had “serious concerns whether he . . . is able to meet the minor’s
emotional and health needs at this time.” In the court’s view, Father had not
been “entirely truthful with the Department,” had failed to demonstrate
consistent follow-through with medical appointments, including the
audiology appointment, and had “declined to cooperate with the Department”
with regard to providing information on his attendance at NA meetings.
Though Father provided some documentation of his attendance at NA
meetings, the court remarked, “I do have some concerns whether those are
correct. They were not able to be confirmed by the Department. [Father] did
not provide enough information for that to occur,” as he declined to provide
the meeting facilitator’s contact information, and “chose not to specify the
frequency of his attendance, stating he attended meetings when he was
able.’ ” The court found that Father’s lack of cooperation did not allow for “a
thorough assessment of his progress.”
Also of concern to the juvenile court were Father’s continued contact
with Mother without the Department’s permission, and his lack of
understanding of the minor’s developmental and emotional needs, as Father
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minimized S.L.’s autism diagnosis and used inappropriate physical discipline
and derogatory language toward the child. The court recognized Father’s
right to dispute the autism assessment but expressed concern “that he may
not follow through with that assessment if the Court was to terminate
jurisdiction today.” Finally, the court found that Father continued to require
additional parenting education and support to develop appropriate age-based
parenting skills and to adequately address the needs of a child with
developmental challenges.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 364 and Standard of Review
Section 364 pertains to postdisposition review hearings in the juvenile
court when a minor is not removed from parental custody. (In re N.S. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171.) Under the statute, “[a]fter hearing any evidence
presented by the social worker, the parent, the guardian, or the child, the
court shall determine whether continued supervision is necessary. The court
shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her
department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions
still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section
300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.
Failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court
ordered treatment program shall constitute prima facie evidence that the
conditions which justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist and
that continued supervision is necessary.” (§ 364, subd. (c).)
Section 364 “establishes a ‘statutory presumption in favor of
terminating jurisdiction and returning the children to the parents’ care
without court supervision.’ ” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142,
1155.) The juvenile court’s determination on whether to continue jurisdiction
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must be based on the totality of the evidence (In re D.B. (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 1073, 1086 (D.B.)), including the supplemental report of the
social worker, who must “make a recommendation regarding the necessity of
continued supervision” (§ 364, subd. (b); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.706(c)(1)). “If the court retains jurisdiction it shall continue the matter to a
specified date, not more than six months from the time of the hearing, at
which point the court shall again follow the procedure specified in subdivision
(c).” (§ 364, subd. (d).)
We review the juvenile court’s decision to continue jurisdiction for
abuse of discretion. (See In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 535, fn. 7
(A.J.).) “A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has
exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
641.) We review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the court, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party. (A.J., at p. 535, fn. 7;
In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
B. Analysis
Father argues that continued jurisdiction was not justified because he
successfully ameliorated the conditions that led to the dependency (e.g., the
family’s homelessness after the fire, Father’s methamphetamine use). He
further maintains that his resistance to the autism diagnosis was well-
founded and not grounds for continuing jurisdiction, as NBRC acknowledged
it does not assess minors until age three. As for the court’s concerns about
Father’s parenting skills, Father argues that jurisdiction is not to be
continued under section 364 simply because a parent could benefit from more
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services; rather, continued jurisdiction is appropriate only if the original
conditions that justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist.
The Department contends jurisdiction was properly continued due to,
among other things, Father’s failure to diligently follow through with S.L.’s
dental and audiology appointments, his lack of candor with the Department,
his minimization of S.L.’s autism, and concerns over his parenting judgment
and skills. Notably, the Department does not respond to Father’s broader
analytical point that in order to overcome section 364’s presumption in favor
of terminating jurisdiction, the conditions justifying continued jurisdiction
must be the same as those underlying the initial assumption of jurisdiction.
There is a potential split among the appellate courts on this score.
Division Five of the Second Appellate District concludes section 364 “does not
literally require that the precise conditions for assuming jurisdiction under
section 300 in the first place still exist,” rather, it is sufficient “that
conditions exist that ‘would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction.’ ” (In re
J.F. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 202, 210.) But Division Three of the Fourth
Appellate District has stated in dictum that “the better interpretation of
section 364(c) is that the court must terminate jurisdiction if the conditions
that justified taking jurisdiction in the first place no longer exist.” (D.B.,
supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.) D.B. reasoned that “[b]y using the phrase
‘the conditions still exist,’ the Legislature meant the conditions existing at
the time of initial assumption of jurisdiction continued to exist at the time of
the hearing, not that new conditions have arisen.” (Ibid.) A leading
secondary treatise appears to endorse J.F.’s view, stating: “It is hard to
imagine that the Legislature intended that dependency jurisdiction be
dismissed when the current circumstances suggest the family is at a high
risk for returning to the system albeit on different grounds.” (Seiser &
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Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2026 ed.) § 2.150[3],
p. 2-679.) In any event, we think Father has a point that the court’s decision
to continue jurisdiction was based in part on grounds that do not comport
with either J.F. or D.B.
The condition that led to the initial assumption of jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b), was Father’s lack of adequate care and
supervision of S.L. after he caused the fire that destroyed their home and
injured the minor. The petition was later amended to include allegations of
Father’s substance abuse. But because Father’s resistance to the autism
diagnosis and failure to diligently follow through with medical appointments
were not conditions that existed at the time of initial assumption of
jurisdiction, they were not grounds for continuing jurisdiction under the rule
of D.B. (D.B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.)
Likewise, under J.F., Father’s resistance to the autism diagnosis and
failure to diligently follow through with medical appointments were not
conditions that would themselves justify assumption of jurisdiction under
section 300. Nothing in the record or the Department’s briefing suggests
these were conditions that met the criteria of section 300, subdivision (b), of a
“substantial risk” of “serious physical harm or illness,” or any other
subdivision of section 300. As Father points out, an autism assessment
through NBRC was not yet available for S.L. And it appears that despite the
initial delay, the dental and audiology appointments were on track to be
completed. We see nothing in the record that suggests the delay placed S.L.
at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. Without more, we
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cannot say these would be new grounds for assuming (and therefore
continuing) jurisdiction.1
That said, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in continuing
jurisdiction based on concerns with Father’s compliance with the substance
abuse treatment components of his case plan. Father emphasizes he
successfully abstained from methamphetamine use throughout the
dependency proceedings. We applaud his efforts. Still, his 14-month
abstention from methamphetamine use was a relatively brief period of time
compared to his decades-long history of substance abuse, and in the review
period prior to the section 364 hearing, Father tested positive for marijuana
three times.2 Although a parent’s use of marijuana, “ ‘without more,’ ” does
not justify the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction (In re Destiny S. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003), here there was more. In addition to his positive
tests for marijuana, Father missed two drug tests, which may properly be
considered the equivalent of positive tests for substance abuse. (See In re
Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217, disapproved on another
ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560.) Meanwhile, Father flatly
refused to develop a relapse prevention plan and identify people who could
verify his attendance at NA meetings. And in insisting that “his sobriety is
for himself and does not need to be proven” to the Department, Father
1 The juvenile court ordered S.L.’s medical, dental, and mental health
treatment pursuant to section 362, which authorizes the court to “make any
and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of the child, including medical treatment, subject
to further order of the court.” (§ 362, subd. (a).) The parties do not address,
and we therefore do not consider, whether a parent’s failure to diligently
comply with a section 362 order would by itself be grounds for continuing
jurisdiction under section 364.
2 The record contains a doctor’s authorization for Father’s use of medical
marijuana.
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exhibited a troubling lack of awareness of the problems that led to the initial
assumption of jurisdiction. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the court’s decision, the evidence of Father’s stubborn resistance to key
aspects of the case plan relating to substance abuse, coupled with his long
history of substance abuse and instances of his lack of candor with the
Department, supported the court’s concern that the substance abuse
problems that led to the initial assumption of jurisdiction still existed or were
likely to exist if supervision was withdrawn. (§ 364, subd. (c).)
Finally, the juvenile court’s decision to continue jurisdiction was also
appropriately based on concerns about Father’s physical discipline of S.L. and
lack of good parenting judgment. While the fire was the main event that
triggered dependency jurisdiction, the broader issue it presented was
Father’s poor judgment and attentiveness and the resulting risks to S.L. The
same concerns were reinforced during the dependency proceedings when
Father handled S.L. in a “very rough” manner and “yank[ed] her arm” while
“shouting unkind words” at her, all in the presence of the in-home speech
therapist. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
decision, concerns about Father’s parenting judgment were properly
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether
continued court supervision was necessary for S.L.’s physical safety and
wellbeing.
For these reasons, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in continuing dependency jurisdiction under a family maintenance
plan.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to terminate jurisdiction is affirmed.
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_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Petrou, J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
Sonoma County HHSD v. D.L. (A175900)
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