Filed 8/7/26 In re S.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re S.C. et al., Persons Coming B349111
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP01847AB)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SAMUEL C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Dash Talbot, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________
In this juvenile dependency appeal, Samuel C. (father)
challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders. Father argues substantial evidence does not
support the court’s findings that his history of and current
substance abuse as well as his violent behavior put his two minor
children at substantial risk of harm. Father also argues
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s order
removing the children from him. We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Family
Father and C.M. (mother) have two children together, a
daughter, S.C. (daughter), and a son, S.C. (son). When the
underlying proceedings began, daughter was six years old and
son was five years old. At the time, father had full legal and
physical custody of the children pursuant to a September 2024
family court order. The children lived with father, paternal
grandparents, two paternal uncles, and a paternal aunt.
Paternal grandparents were the children’s primary caregivers.
Three years earlier, mother experienced mental health
issues, had been homeless, and could not care for the children.
She abandoned the children in front of father’s home in a car
with the engine running. She left a note stating she was “not
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mentally, financially or emotionally stable,” asking father to care
for the children, and giving him custody of the children. Since
then, mother had enrolled in therapy through her church and
was in a healthy mental state. She was living with her mother
(maternal grandmother) and had visits with the children,
including overnight visits every other weekend.
2. Events Preceding Petition
In June 2025, a fight broke out between father and
paternal uncles at the home they shared. There were conflicting
reports on how or why the fight began. One paternal uncle said
father was inebriated and calling both paternal uncles names.
Father said he was “non-confrontational” and the uncles were
talking about him, then “jumped on him first.” He said, “ ‘They
jumped me. It was not my decision.’ ” The fight moved through
the home, knocking a speaker and other things over, and
eventually ended outside the front door. One paternal uncle
sustained a black eye, a three-inch laceration to his cheek, and a
bloody lip. Law enforcement was called.
The children were home when the fight occurred and
witnessed some of it. They saw blood and daughter saw the
injuries her uncle had sustained. The paternal aunt moved the
children into a bedroom, where one of the paternal uncles joined
them and locked the door. At some point during the altercation,
father tried to get into the bedroom and was banging on the door.
The children were scared and crying. Daughter said father “ ‘was
trying to hurt us’ ” and “ ‘was drinking, and smoking. He got all
crazy, and he was trying to hurt us. He was out of control.’ ”
Nonetheless, daughter was not afraid father would hurt her, but
she was afraid father would “do more bad things to other people.”
One of the paternal uncles reported father pushed and knocked
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over the children during the fight, but the children denied being
pushed. Eventually, father fled, leaving the children with
relatives.
Paternal uncles reported this was not their first physical
altercation with father. They said, “[F]ather is often out of
control and causing fights in the home, and this is the worst fight
yet.” One paternal uncle “was upset and tired of [father]” and
said he was “done with my brother.” It was reported that law
enforcement knew the family and had been to the home on a
weekly basis because of “disputes in the home with father.”
However, father stated “he had never put his hands on his
brother.”
Mother and father both denied domestic violence in their
relationship. However, mother mentioned a few incidents when
father pushed her, including one time he pushed her from a
moving car he was driving while the children were in the
backseat. Mother said father also pushed a maternal uncle.
Additionally, County of Los Angeles Sheriff Department reports
from 2021 and 2024 revealed prior incidents of domestic violence
between mother and father, including incidents for which father
was arrested. Daughter also mentioned a fight between mother
and father, noting she “told them to stop,” “[m]y mom called the
police, and then my dad got arrested.” Paternal grandfather said
mother and father used to fight a lot, including one time when
mother “put a knife to [father’s] throat.” Similarly, father
referenced incidents in the past when he pushed mother and “we
would smack each other.”
It was also reported father was “known to use meth and
computer cleaner.” Although it was unclear what substances
father was using around the time of the June 2025 altercation,
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one of the paternal uncles was sure father was using “because
there is such a difference in father’s mood when he uses.” The
paternal uncle believed father was a good father “until he starts
drinking and doing drugs.” Paternal grandmother stated father
drinks when he is stressed and “ ‘likes to argue when he drinks.’ ”
Daughter said, “[W]hen she is asleep in the house, father is in the
other room drinking beer and doing bad things.” Son saw father
smoke and drink beer. According to mother, “father had a
problem with drinking three years ago,” but she believed he had
stopped drinking. Mother reported father had been
“argumentative with her recently.” Prior to the June 2025
altercation, however, mother “had no concerns,” stating father
“has been good to the children.”
In the wake of the June 2025 altercation, father admitted
that, after three years of sobriety, he had started drinking again
one month earlier “because he was stressed.” He also admitted
he smoked marijuana and abused Adderall. Father previously
had been convicted of drug possession, driving without a license,
and driving under the influence. Following a 2019 arrest for
possession of cocaine, father was ordered to attend and did attend
Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Similarly, following a 2023
arrest for driving under the influence, father was ordered to
attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and enroll in the
Drinking Driver Program. However, father failed to complete
those court-ordered programs, resulting in the issuance of a
bench warrant in April 2025. The next month (i.e., the month
before his June 2025 altercation with paternal uncles), father
was again arrested for, among other things, altering or removing
the identification mark on a firearm and having an outstanding
bench warrant.
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Following the June 2025 altercation, a referral was made to
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) and the juvenile court granted the
Department’s request to remove the children from father. The
children were released to mother.
3. Petition
On June 20, 2025, the Department filed a three-count
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of
the children (petition).1 The petition alleged the children were at
risk of harm due to father’s violent behavior, father’s history of
and current substance abuse, and mother’s failure to protect the
children from father’s substance abuse.
At the initial hearing on the petition held in early July
2025, the juvenile court detained the children from father and
maintained their release to mother. Father was granted
monitored visits. Father did not attend the initial hearing,
however, because he had entered a substance abuse program and
was not allowed outside contact. Father made his first
appearance in the proceedings in early August 2025, at which
time the court ordered weekly on-demand drug testing for father
as well as monitored visits with the children.
4. Adjudication and Disposition
In late August 2025, father told a Department social
worker he had “started to go to AA groups” and had gone to “a
rehab” but “left because he wanted to be present in Court.”
Father’s Alcoholics Anonymous attendance card showed he
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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attended seven meetings in August 2025. The last meeting
father attended was on August 27, 2025.
A September 2025 report for the court revealed father was
not abiding by the court’s visitation order. During one visit, the
monitors (paternal grandparents) went to church, leaving father
alone with the children. When asked about the unmonitored
time, father stated “he didn’t think he needed to be supervised
with his own kids.” In addition, at the end of one visit, father and
paternal grandfather yelled at mother in front of the children,
exclaiming “they should be able to keep the children as long as
they want.”
On September 17, 2025, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court found “[t]here is
clearly a history of substance use and substance abuse by father”
and “all the relatives” noted father tended to become “aggressive
or violent when he is drinking.” The court also found that, during
the June 2025 altercation, “[t]here was a lot of chaos in the
home,” “[s]peakers were falling over,” and the children were “in
the zone of danger” and “afraid for their own personal safety.”
The juvenile court dismissed the allegations concerning
mother (i.e., failure to protect) and sustained the allegations as to
father (i.e., violent behavior and substance abuse). The court
declared the children dependents of the court under subdivisions
(a) and (b) of section 300, removed the children from father, and
maintained their placement with mother. The court ordered
father to complete a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare,
to submit to drug testing, to enroll in a 12-step program as well
as parenting classes and counseling. The court also ordered
monitored visitation for father.
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Father appealed the juvenile court’s September 17, 2025,
orders.
DISCUSSION
Father makes two arguments on appeal. First, father
argues the juvenile court erred when it found dependency
jurisdiction based on his violent behavior and substance abuse.
Second, father contends the juvenile court erred when it removed
the children from his custody and care. We consider each
argument in turn.
1. Jurisdiction
a. Applicable Law
The juvenile court found jurisdiction under both
subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300. We consider subdivision
(b) first. Under that subdivision, a juvenile court may assert
dependency jurisdiction over a child when, among other things,
“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of
any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.
. . . [¶] (D) The inability of the parent or guardian to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . substance
abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1) (subdivision (b)).) In subdivision (b),
“ ‘substance abuse’ bears its ordinary meaning of excessive use of
drugs or alcohol.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 555.)
In certain circumstances, even if the minors at issue have
not been physically harmed, both substance abuse and domestic
violence may be grounds for dependency jurisdiction under
subdivision (b). (In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 531; In re T.V.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134.) “The relevant inquiry under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the
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time of the jurisdictional hearing ‘ “subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The court may consider past
events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s
protection.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.) “To
establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there
‘ “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the
alleged conduct will recur.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be
abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume
jurisdiction.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “The
legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) ‘The court need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction
and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re I.J.,
supra, at p. 773.) “ ‘The purpose of dependency proceedings is to
prevent risk, not ignore it.’ ” (Jonathan L. v. Superior Court
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1104.)
b. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
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light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings [and disposition order] of
the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In determining whether substantial
evidence exists such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
order challenged on appeal is appropriate, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the challenged order. (Ibid.)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact
could make such findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th
187, 199.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any
evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
c. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings under
subdivision (b).
Under subdivision (b), for dependency jurisdiction to exist
based on a parent’s substance abuse, the substance abuse “must
render a parent . . . unable to provide regular care for a child and
either cause the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or
place the child at substantial risk of suffering such harm or
illness.” (In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 531.) “Substance
abuse, when shown to exist, should not be regarded as
automatically amounting to prima facie evidence of the other
facts required for dependency jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 559.)
Here, it cannot reasonably be disputed that father
struggled with substance abuse. Father admitted he had
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relapsed and was drinking and using drugs in the months prior
to the June 2025 altercation. Father said he started drinking
again “because he was stressed.” Father also had a well-
documented history of substance abuse and failure to follow
through with court-ordered programs. At the time of
adjudication, father still was in the midst of his relapse.
Although he had entered a rehabilitation program, there was no
indication he completed it. He had attended only a handful of
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Moreover, the record does not
indicate whether father was addressing the stress that triggered
his relapse.
Additionally, father’s unresolved substance abuse directly
affected his ability to care for his children. Multiple people
reported father became belligerent when he drank. The June
2025 altercation is evidence of that. A paternal uncle stated
father was a good father “until he starts drinking and doing
drugs.” Indeed, although the children had not been physically
harmed to date, father’s alcohol-fueled violent behavior put the
children directly in harm’s way. Thus, contrary to father’s
suggestion, the juvenile court did not exercise jurisdiction based
solely on father’s substance abuse. Given father’s admitted and,
at the time untreated, relapse as well as the multiple reports of
his violent behavior when intoxicated in the children’s presence,
including the June 2025 altercation, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s exercise of jurisdiction based on
father’s history of and current substance abuse.
Similarly, substantial evidence supports the finding that
father’s violent behavior put the children at substantial risk of
serious harm. The June 2025 altercation was indisputably
violent and resulted in one of the paternal uncles being seriously
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injured. A portion of the fight took place in the children’s
presence. Daughter saw her uncle injured and bloody.
Household items fell over during the fighting and while the
children were present. The children were scared and crying as
they sheltered in a locked bedroom, which father tried to enter.
The record reveals this was not father’s first physical incident
with paternal uncles, with whom father and the children were
living. Additionally, the record reveals a history of violence
between father and mother, which father denied. “One cannot
correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.) Based on father’s history of
violent behavior, lack of insight, lack of effort to address the
issue, and recent relapse, it was reasonable to believe father’s
violent behavior would continue.
Father claims the juvenile court made its jurisdictional
findings based on a single incident of violent behavior—namely,
the June 2025 altercation. This is incorrect. The record includes
multiple references to past physical incidents between both
father and paternal uncles and father and mother, including
some in the children’s presence. It was reported law enforcement
knew the family and had been to father’s home on a weekly basis.
Father also suggests one of the paternal uncles was not credible
and, therefore, we should discount his description of events.
However, as noted above, we cannot reweigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 773.) By all accounts, including father’s, his violent behavior
was worsening at least in part due to his admitted substance
abuse, which triggered his aggressive and physical behavior.
Considering the entire record, we conclude substantial evidence
supported dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (b).
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Because we conclude jurisdiction was proper under
subdivision (b), we need not consider the subdivision (a)
allegations. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Father asks
us nonetheless to exercise our discretion to consider the sustained
subdivision (a) allegations. We decline to do so.
2. Removal
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a child has been adjudged a dependent child within
the meaning of section 300, the juvenile court “may limit the
control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent” if
necessary to protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) Section 361,
subdivision (c)(1) permits the juvenile court to order a child
removed from his or her parent if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is, or would be, at substantial
risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means
by which the child can be protected without removal. “ ‘ “The
parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been
actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.” ’ ” (In re A.S. (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 237, 247, disapproved on another ground by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7 (O.B.).)
In making its determination, the juvenile court may consider the
parent’s past conduct, present circumstances, and “the parent’s
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)
We review the juvenile court’s removal order under the
substantial evidence standard of review, bearing in mind the
heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. (In
re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; In re A.F., supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at p. 292; O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012;
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see In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155 [“O.B. is controlling
in dependency cases”].) “When reviewing a finding that a fact
has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question
before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.)
b. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s removal order.
The evidence discussed above that supports the court’s
jurisdictional findings also supports the court’s removal order. In
addition, father demonstrated a lack of understanding or, worse,
a disregard for the importance of the juvenile court’s earlier
orders. Although the court had ordered father’s visits with the
children be monitored, father had at least one unmonitored visit
with the children. He believed he did not need to be supervised
with his own children. Moreover, paternal grandparents—who
ostensibly could have helped father care for the children during
the underlying proceedings—also did not abide by the court’s
monitored visitation order. Finally, father and paternal
grandfather yelled at mother in front of the children, expressing
their belief that they should be able to have the children as long
as they wanted. In sum, in addition to father’s troubling
behaviors discussed above, neither father nor paternal
grandparents demonstrated they would abide by the court’s
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orders, which were made to keep the children safe. We conclude
substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s removal
order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s September 17, 2025 orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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